Plain Meaning over Liberal Construction: “Unexpected” Means Not Anticipated Within the Normal Course of Duties; UAPA Judicial Review Applies Even When the Administrative Hearing Is Not a Contested Case

Introduction

In Matthew Long v. Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the Court of Appeals and the Chancery Court, reinstating the Board of Trustees’ denial of PTSD-based disability pension benefits to a long-serving Chattanooga firefighter. The Court used the case to resolve two recurring issues in Tennessee administrative and pension law:

• Subject-matter jurisdiction and review standards under Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-9-114 when a municipal civil service board’s proceeding is not a “contested case” under the UAPA; and
• How to interpret the term “unexpected” in a municipal pension policy that conditions mental-health disability benefits on proof that the disability directly resulted from one or more “unexpected” traumatic events.

The parties were Matthew Long (applicant/firefighter) and the Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund (the Fund), with the National Conference on Public Employee Retirement Systems filing an amicus brief. The central legal questions included: (1) whether courts have jurisdiction to review the Fund’s decision despite the absence of UAPA-contested-case procedures; (2) whether the pension policy’s “unexpected” language is ambiguous and, if so, whether pension texts must be construed liberally for employees; (3) whether courts should defer to the Fund’s interpretation of its own policy; and (4) whether the Board’s denial was arbitrary or capricious or unsupported by substantial and material evidence under the UAPA.

Summary of the Opinion

• Jurisdiction and Review Standard: The Court held that although the Fund’s hearing was not a UAPA “contested case,” judicial review still lies under § 27‑9‑114(b)(1), which imports the UAPA’s judicial review standards. A UAPA-compliant final order is not required to confer jurisdiction in this posture, though findings and reasons are recommended.
• Interpretation of “Unexpected”: “Unexpected” is not ambiguous merely because it is undefined in the policy. Applying ordinary meaning, an event is “unexpected” if it is not anticipated or regarded as probable within the normal course of the applicant’s regular or assigned duties. The Court thus rejected the lower courts’ ambiguity finding and their reliance on liberal-construction principles.
• Liberal-Construction Doctrine: The long-standing rule that pension statutes are construed liberally in favor of employees does not apply when the text is unambiguous. The Court found the policy unambiguous and declined to apply liberal construction.
• Deference to the Board: The Court did not decide whether to apply agency-deference principles because the Board’s interpretation matched the policy’s plain meaning; the outcome was the same with or without deference.
• UAPA Merits Review: The Board’s denial was supported by substantial and material evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. On this record, the traumatic events cited—while horrific—were not shown to be “unexpected” within a senior firefighter’s normal duties.
• Open Questions Reserved: The Court expressly did not decide whether the “unexpected” requirement conflicts with the City Code’s definition of “job-related disability,” nor did it resolve broader questions about deference to local agencies or deference outside contested cases.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court used a series of authorities to correct confusion around § 27‑9‑114 and to anchor its interpretive methodology:

• Subject-matter jurisdiction:
  • State v. Bristol, 654 S.W.3d 917 (Tenn. 2022): Appellate courts must examine subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte.
  • In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. 2012): Jurisdictional questions reviewed de novo.
  • § 27‑9‑114(a) vs. (b): The Court clarified that subsection (a)(1) imposes UAPA contested-case procedures only when the hearing is itself a “contested case,” whereas subsection (b)(1) independently requires courts to apply UAPA standards of judicial review to any decision of a civil service board affecting employment status. This clarification distinguishes and corrects over-reads of Tidwell v. City of Memphis, 193 S.W.3d 555 (Tenn. 2006), and the Court of Appeals’ Phillips v. Chattanooga Fire & Police Pension Fund, 2022 WL 16579684 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).
  • Davis v. Shelby County Sheriff’s Department, 278 S.W.3d 256 (Tenn. 2009): Even when a board is exempt from contested-case procedures (there, by home-rule charter), judicial review still proceeds under the UAPA via § 27‑9‑114(b)(1). This case supplied the analytic framework to separate subsections (a) and (b).
• Textual interpretation and ambiguity:
  • Wallace v. Metropolitan Government, 546 S.W.3d 47 (Tenn. 2018); State v. Deberry, 651 S.W.3d 918 (Tenn. 2022); Johnson v. Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d 840 (Tenn. 2013); Davis v. Reilly, 683 S.W.3d 739 (Tenn. 2024): These cases provided the plain-meaning, whole-text interpretive approach and the caution that a term is not ambiguous merely because it is undefined or disputed by the parties. The Court also resorted appropriately to authoritative dictionary definitions to confirm ordinary meaning.
• Liberal-construction doctrine in pension cases:
  • Collins v. City of Knoxville, 176 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. 1944): Origin of liberal construction for pension statutes.
  • Wyckoff v. Board of Administration of Retirement System of Memphis, 348 S.W.2d 289 (Tenn. 1961): Limits the liberal-construction doctrine to situations where the text is ambiguous. The Court relied on Wyckoff to hold that no liberal construction applies when policy language is clear.
  • Simmons v. Hitt, 546 S.W.2d 587 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976): A frequently cited Court of Appeals articulation of liberal construction, which the Supreme Court tethered to the threshold requirement of ambiguity.
• Deference to agency interpretations:
  • Vodafone Americas Holdings v. Roberts, 486 S.W.3d 496 (Tenn. 2016); Jackson Express, Inc. v. Tennessee Public Service Commission, 679 S.W.2d 942 (Tenn. 1984); Pickard v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Board, 424 S.W.3d 511 (Tenn. 2013): Tennessee’s prior endorsements of deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations echo the federal Auer/Seminole Rock line. The Court noted the nationwide trend questioning such deference (e.g., Decker, Kisor) and Tennessee’s statutory inroads (Tenn. Code Ann. § 4‑5‑326), but declined to decide the deference issue here because it would not change the result.
• UAPA standard of review:
  • Tenn. Code Ann. § 4‑5‑322(h): Grounds for reversal under the UAPA.
  • Moss v. Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board, 665 S.W.3d 433 (Tenn. 2023); StarLink Logistics v. ACC, 494 S.W.3d 659 (Tenn. 2016); Taylor v. Board of Administration, City of Memphis Retirement System, 681 S.W.3d 751 (Tenn. 2023): These cases frame the “narrow and deferential” review, define “substantial and material” evidence, and describe when a decision is arbitrary or capricious despite some evidentiary support.

Legal Reasoning and How the Court Reached Its Decision

1) Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Review Framework

The Court clarified a persistent misreading of § 27‑9‑114. Subsection (a)(1) requires civil service boards to conduct contested case hearings in conformity with the UAPA only when the hearing meets the UAPA definition of a “contested case” and affects employment status. By contrast, subsection (b)(1) independently requires that judicial review of any civil service board decision affecting employment status proceed under the UAPA’s standards, regardless of whether the administrative proceeding was a contested case. Because Mr. Long’s hearing was not a contested case (no statute or constitutional provision required a hearing), the board was not compelled to produce UAPA-compliant findings and conclusions. Nevertheless, the courts possessed jurisdiction, and the UAPA’s judicial-review standards applied under § 27‑9‑114(b)(1).

2) Interpreting “Unexpected” in the Pension Policy

The policy conditioned mental-health disability benefits on proof that the disability directly resulted from one or more “traumatic event[s]” that are “identifiable,” “undesigned and unexpected,” and external to the applicant; and, when a claim is based on a mental stressor without physical injury, from direct personal experience of a terrifying or horror-inducing event involving actual or threatened death or serious injury. The Court held:

• “Unexpected” is not ambiguous merely because it is undefined. Ordinary meaning governs: unexpected events are those not anticipated or not regarded as probable or likely.
• Context matters. Because the policy simultaneously requires that the traumatic event occur “during and as a result of the Applicant’s regular or assigned duties,” “unexpected” refers to what is not anticipated or probable within the normal course of those duties.
• Thus, the trial court’s event-specific approach (focusing only on whether the precise occurrence was unexpected in a narrow sense) was too constricted; the correct inquiry asks whether events of that kind are anticipated as part of the job.

3) Liberal Construction Does Not Override Unambiguous Text

While Tennessee historically instructs that pension provisions be construed liberally in favor of employees, the Court reaffirmed Wyckoff: liberal construction is a tool for resolving ambiguity, not for creating it. Because “unexpected” is clear in context, the Court of Appeals erred in declaring ambiguity and invoking liberal construction to favor the applicant.

4) Deference to the Board’s Interpretation Not Decided

Although the Fund urged deference to its interpretation under cases like Vodafone and Jackson Express, the Court found it unnecessary to decide the viability or scope of such deference in this setting. The Board’s interpretation aligned with the policy’s ordinary meaning; deference would not alter the outcome. The Court flagged, but left unresolved, the broader question of Auer/Seminole Rock-like deference to local agencies, especially outside contested cases, against the backdrop of § 4‑5‑326 (which eliminates deference in certain state contested cases).

5) Application of the UAPA Standard of Review

Under § 4‑5‑322(h), reversal is proper only if the decision violates law, exceeds authority, is made upon unlawful procedure, is arbitrary or capricious (including abuses of discretion), or lacks substantial and material evidentiary support. The Court emphasized that “substantial and material evidence” is less than a preponderance; courts may not reweigh facts.

Applying that lens, the Court reviewed the record evidence about four traumatic events Mr. Long identified and his general testimony about firefighter duties:

• 2008 Bailey–Willow car wreck (multiple child fatalities and severe injuries): Horrific, but the record did not show such a call was unexpected for a firefighter; Mr. Long acknowledged responding to car crashes and encountering death.
• 2013 Highland Park fire (child fatality and severely burned survivor; later visit by the survivor): Again, deeply disturbing, but fires with fatalities are within the realm of anticipated duties. The unannounced visit by a survivor could be subjectively surprising; nevertheless, a victim’s gratitude visit is not necessarily beyond what firefighters might anticipate in their role.
• Pedestrian struck by car: Similarly, traumatic but not shown to be unexpected for a firefighter trained and assigned to respond to serious accidents.
• Encounter with an armed man during a call without police backup (2019): Although the presence of a gun on that particular call was not expected, Mr. Long acknowledged he had previously encountered people with guns in the course of his work, suggesting such risks are, regrettably, part of the job’s anticipated hazards.

The Court concluded that the record contained substantial and material evidence supporting the Board’s determination that the precipitating events were not “unexpected” within the normal course of a senior firefighter’s duties. Therefore, the denial was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Court did not revisit the separate “refused-corrective-treatment” ground, noting that the Fund did not pursue that issue on appeal and, in any event, the “unexpected” element alone sustained the Board’s decision.

Impact and Implications

A. Clarified Path to Judicial Review of Municipal Civil Service Decisions

• Immediate procedural clarity: Litigants and trial courts should no longer conflate § 27‑9‑114(a)(1) (contested-case procedures) with § 27‑9‑114(b)(1) (judicial review standards). Even when a pension board’s hearing is not a contested case, courts have subject-matter jurisdiction and must apply UAPA standards on judicial review.
• Orders without findings: While not jurisdictionally fatal, skeletal orders complicate review. The Supreme Court “always recommends” findings; boards should provide reasons to fortify their decisions against arbitrary-and-capricious challenges and to facilitate meaningful review.

B. Substantive Standard for First-Responder PTSD Claims Under Similar Policies

• Plain-meaning benchmark: “Unexpected” now carries a clear, job-contextualized meaning: not anticipated or probable within the normal course of the applicant’s regular or assigned duties. Applicants must build a record showing how the precipitating event falls outside the expected incidents of their role, not merely that it was shocking or unusually graphic.
• Burden of proof: Where policies require “evidence satisfactory to the Board,” applicants should anticipate a deferential review standard and must marshal objective proof tailored to the policy’s elements (e.g., expert testimony on role-specific expectations; departmental protocols; comparative call data; evidence that a particular scenario is atypical for the role).
• Narrowing the role of liberal construction: Courts will not use liberal construction to circumvent unambiguous eligibility criteria. Employers’ clear drafting matters.

C. Drafting and Governance Considerations for Municipal Plans

• Ensure alignment with enabling ordinances: The Court noted, but did not decide, whether the “unexpected” requirement is consistent with the City Code’s definitions of “job-related disability.” Boards should audit plan policies to avoid ultra vires risk or conflicts with municipal code.
• Define key terms or adopt contextual standards: Although undefined terms are not necessarily ambiguous, boards may reduce litigation risk by expressly articulating job-context measures of “unexpected” and other contested elements in their policies.
• Record building: Boards should foster robust administrative records (including reasons) to support decisions under the UAPA’s substantial-and-material evidence standard.

D. The Future of Agency Deference in Tennessee

• Open question preserved: The Court did not decide whether to accord “controlling weight” to a local agency’s interpretation of its own rules, particularly outside contested cases. Tennessee has already limited deference in certain state-agency contested cases by statute (§ 4‑5‑326). Whether similar limits will extend to local boards or to non-contested matters remains unresolved.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Contested case: A proceeding in which a statute or constitutional provision requires an agency to determine a party’s rights after a hearing. If no law requires a hearing, it is generally not a “contested case,” even if a hearing is held voluntarily.
• § 27‑9‑114(a) vs. (b):
  • (a)(1): If the hearing is a contested case and affects employment status, the board must follow UAPA contested-case procedures.
  • (b)(1): Regardless of whether (a)(1) applies, courts must use UAPA judicial review standards when reviewing decisions by civil service boards that affect employment status.
• Arbitrary or capricious decision: A decision without substantial and material evidentiary support, or one showing clear error in judgment, lack of reasoning, or disregard for pertinent facts.
• Substantial and material evidence: Less than a preponderance; more than a mere scintilla. Courts do not reweigh evidence; they ask whether a reasonable person could reach the agency’s conclusion on the record.
• Liberal-construction doctrine (pensions): A presumption favoring employees that applies only when the text is ambiguous. It cannot override clear language.
• Deference to agency interpretations (Auer/Seminole Rock): The idea that courts give weight to an agency’s interpretation of its own rules. This doctrine has been narrowed nationwide, and Tennessee has begun limiting it by statute; its future scope for local agencies and non-contested matters is unresolved.
• “Unexpected” in this context: Not simply that the precise incident was surprising to the individual, but that events of that kind are not anticipated or probable within the ordinary scope of the job. A claimant’s unexpected reaction (e.g., development of PTSD) does not make the event itself “unexpected” for eligibility purposes.

Conclusion

The Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision establishes two important guideposts. Procedurally, it disentangles § 27‑9‑114 by confirming that courts retain jurisdiction to review civil service board decisions under UAPA standards even when the administrative proceeding is not a contested case—and that the absence of a UAPA-style final order does not defeat jurisdiction. Substantively, it holds that “unexpected” in a municipal pension policy for mental-health disability claims carries its ordinary meaning in the context of the claimant’s job: the claimant must show the precipitating traumatic event(s) were not anticipated or probable in the normal course of their regular or assigned duties. Because the policy text was unambiguous, the liberal-construction doctrine could not be used to broaden coverage.

Applying a deferential UAPA review, the Court found substantial and material evidence supporting the Board’s conclusion that the events identified by Mr. Long—although tragic—were not “unexpected” for a senior firefighter. The Board’s denial was therefore not arbitrary or capricious. The decision signals to litigants that clear plan language will be enforced as written, to boards that careful policy drafting and reason-giving matter, and to courts that UAPA review remains narrow. At the same time, the Court leaves for another day the extent of agency deference in local, non-contested settings and whether particular plan terms conflict with enabling municipal codes—issues likely to resurface in future pension litigation involving first responders’ mental-health claims.