Plain-Error Limits on Esteras/Tapia Challenges to Post-Revocation Supervised Release

I. Introduction

In United States v. Melvin Ford (11th Cir. Jan. 13, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a revocation sentence in which the district court imposed (i) a year and a day of imprisonment (recommended by the parties) and (ii) five years of supervised release (not recommended by the parties). Ford argued that the supervised-release term was imposed for an impermissible purpose—retribution—in violation of the statutory revocation framework as clarified by the Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Esteras v. United States. He also claimed the five-year term violated the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.

The appeal presented two central issues: (1) how plain-error review constrains challenges to a revocation court’s alleged reliance on prohibited sentencing purposes when imposing (or reimposing) supervised release, and (2) whether a substantial supervised-release term after revocation can be grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. On the statutory argument, the court assumed (without deciding) that the district court may have plainly erred under Tapia v. United States and/or Esteras v. United States, but held Ford failed to show the error affected his substantial rights. On the constitutional argument, the court held the five-year supervised-release term did not plainly violate the Eighth Amendment because it was within the statutory maximum and not grossly disproportionate to Ford’s multiple violations.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

• Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025)
  

  The panel treated Esteras as the controlling doctrinal shift: “district courts cannot consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release.” The Supreme Court’s rationale—Congress excluded retribution-oriented considerations from the revocation calculus in 18 U.S.C. § 3583—framed Ford’s argument that the district court’s remarks about “rewarding” misconduct and Ford’s “respect” for the court reflected retributive reasoning.

  Notably, the Eleventh Circuit underscored Esteras’s careful limitation: the Supreme Court “declined to weigh in” on whether retribution for violating supervised-release conditions can ever be a permissible consideration in the post-revocation sentence. That reservation left lower courts to decide individual cases through the lens of statutory text and standard-of-review constraints—here, plain error and substantial-rights prejudice.

• Tapia v. United States, 584 U.S. 319 (2011)
  

  Tapia prohibits imposing or lengthening imprisonment to promote rehabilitation. Ford invoked Tapia to argue that the district court’s emphasis on providing “tools and resources” and “structure” reflected an impermissible rehabilitative purpose. The panel, however, relied on Eleventh Circuit interpretation of Tapia error (via Vandergrift) to focus the inquiry on whether rehabilitation influenced the custodial term, while Ford’s challenge targeted the supervised-release term.

• United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2014)
  

  Vandergrift supplied two key propositions used by the panel: (1) considering an improper § 3553(a) factor at revocation is procedural error, and (2) unpreserved claims are reviewed for plain error. The panel also quoted Vandergrift’s articulation that “Tapia error occurs where the district court considers rehabilitation when crafting a sentence of imprisonment.”

• Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129 (2018) and United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2007)
  

  These decisions provided the four-part plain-error framework and emphasized that even clear mistakes do not warrant relief absent prejudice and a serious effect on the fairness/integrity of proceedings.

• United States v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2020)
  

  Innocent supplied the definition of when an error is “plain”: “clear or obvious,” typically resolved by statutory text or controlling precedent.

• United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933 (11th Cir. 2016)
  

  Trailer anchored the panel’s statement of authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) to impose a new term of supervised release after revocation imprisonment, and the statutory rule that the new term is capped by the authorized maximum minus the revocation prison term.

• United States v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1 (11th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 2010)
  

  These cases supplied general sentencing review principles (abuse of discretion; challenger’s burden), though the heart of this appeal turned on plain-error preservation failures.

• United States v. Alberts, 859 F.3d 979 (11th Cir. 2017)
  

  Alberts provided the decisive prejudice rule: an error affects substantial rights only if it likely changed the outcome, and a defendant cannot show prejudice if the improper consideration was “only a minor fragment of the court’s reasoning.” The panel used Alberts to deny relief even while assuming possible plain error under Tapia/Esteras.

• United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2012), United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2019), United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2014), United States v. Johnson, 451 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Bowers, 811 F.3d 412 (11th Cir. 2014)
  

  These cases collectively supplied the Eighth Amendment framework: de novo review when preserved; plain error when not; the “narrow proportionality principle” in non-capital cases; the “gross disproportionality” threshold; the strong presumption for sentences within statutory limits; and the Eleventh Circuit’s observation that it has “never found a non-capital sentence of an adult” to violate the Eighth Amendment.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory framework: what revocation courts may consider
   

   The opinion carefully distinguishes between the broad sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the narrower subset incorporated by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) and § 3583(e) for supervised-release decisions (including revocation and reimposition). Critically, the statutory cross-references for supervised release omit § 3553(a)(2)(A) (seriousness, respect for law, just punishment) and § 3553(a)(3) (kinds of sentences available). Under Esteras, that omission is treated as purposeful: Congress did not authorize retribution as part of the revocation calculus.

2. Standard of review controls the outcome
   

   Ford did not object at the revocation hearing that the district court was impermissibly relying on § 3553(a)(2)(A), so review was limited to plain error. This is not a mere technicality: plain-error review required Ford to show not only an obvious legal mistake, but also that it likely changed the result.

3. Assumed error, no prejudice
   

   The district court stated it would not “reward” Ford by terminating supervision and referenced his lack of “respect” for the court, his repeated violations, and his commission of a “serious felony” while on supervision. The panel assumed (without deciding) that these remarks could be read as prohibited considerations under Tapia and/or Esteras, particularly because they touched on noncompliance and future consequences.

   But the panel held Ford could not show substantial-rights prejudice. It emphasized the district court’s additional, forward-looking explanations: supervised release provides “structure,” “tools and resources,” and a compliance incentive after release. It also found it “significant” that Ford violated conditions after serving less than two years of an initial ten-year term—suggesting a rational, non-retributive basis for continued supervision to mitigate recidivism and manage reintegration.

   Relying on United States v. Alberts, the court concluded any improper factor was, at most, a “minor fragment” rather than outcome-determinative reasoning.

4. Eighth Amendment claim rejected as not grossly disproportionate
   

   Because Ford did not object on Eighth Amendment grounds below, plain-error review applied. The panel applied the non-capital “gross disproportionality” threshold from United States v. Flanders and reiterated the general rule from United States v. Johnson that sentences within statutory limits are rarely unconstitutional.

   The supervised-release term was below the statutory cap (the opinion describes a nine-year ceiling after accounting for the revocation prison term). Given multiple admitted violations—including a new felony—the panel found no gross disproportionality. It also rejected Ford’s “punitive cycle” argument factually: at age 49 at revocation, he would be around 56 upon completion, which is not equivalent to a life sentence.

C. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision is practically important for post-Esteras revocation litigation in three ways:

• It highlights the litigation value of preservation. Even when Esteras arguably makes reliance on retribution “plain,” defendants still must prove prejudice—often difficult when the record contains permissible, forward-looking reasons (deterrence, protection of the public, rehabilitation in the sense of services/structure tied to supervised release rather than custody).
• It signals how courts may characterize supervision as forward-looking. The panel treated “structure,” “tools,” and reintegration resources as legitimate rationales for supervised release, distinguishing them from impermissibly using rehabilitation to lengthen imprisonment under Tapia.
• It reinforces the steep hill for Eighth Amendment challenges to supervised release terms. By emphasizing statutory limits, multiple violations, and the Eleventh Circuit’s historically narrow proportionality enforcement, the opinion suggests that only extreme, unusual records are likely to clear the “gross disproportionality” threshold—especially under plain-error review.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervised release: A post-incarceration monitoring period with conditions (reporting, travel restrictions, drug testing). Violations can lead to revocation and additional imprisonment, followed by a new supervision term under § 3583(h).
• Revocation: The court’s decision that violations justify ending the current supervision term and imposing sanctions (often imprisonment and renewed supervision).
• § 3553(a)(2)(A) (“retribution” factors): Seriousness of the offense, respect for the law, and just punishment. Under Esteras, these are excluded from the statutory factors Congress directed courts to consider at revocation.
• Plain error: A demanding appellate standard for unpreserved issues. Even if the judge clearly erred, the defendant must show the error likely changed the outcome.
• Gross disproportionality (Eighth Amendment): In non-capital cases, only an extreme mismatch between the offense and the punishment triggers constitutional invalidation; sentences within statutory limits are rarely deemed grossly disproportionate.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Melvin Ford illustrates the post-Esteras landscape: revocation courts may not premise revocation sentencing on retribution, but appellate relief will often turn on preservation and the ability to prove prejudice. Even where a court’s remarks flirt with prohibited purposes, affirmance is likely if the record supports permissible, forward-looking reasons for renewed supervision. The decision also reaffirms the Eleventh Circuit’s highly constrained approach to Eighth Amendment proportionality challenges to non-capital sentences, including supervised-release terms imposed after revocation.