Plain Error in Unsettled Law: NCIC Evidence, Anonymous Tips, and Second Amendment Challenges in Johns v. State (Del. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Johns v. State (Dec. 16, 2025) is a dense, doctrinally significant opinion at the intersection of criminal procedure, evidence, and the modern Second Amendment. Although the Court ultimately affirms all of the defendant’s convictions, it does so on carefully limited grounds, repeatedly emphasizing the constraints of plain-error review and the importance of a fully developed record for constitutional challenges.

The case arises from a Wilmington drug investigation centered on 514 West 6th Street. After three anonymous tips, a period of surveillance, and two traffic stops, police obtained a warrant, searched the home, and recovered a loaded firearm, large quantities of marijuana, methamphetamine pills, and cash. Appellant Lamotte Johns, a convicted felon, was tried and convicted of:

• Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (PFBPP), 11 Del. C. § 1448
• Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited (PABPP), 11 Del. C. § 1448
• Two counts of Drug Dealing
• Receiving a Stolen Firearm, 11 Del. C. § 1450
• Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (PFDCF)
• Possession of Drug Paraphernalia

On appeal, Johns raised five issues:

1. NCIC hearsay: whether testimony about a National Crime Information Center (NCIC) check showing the gun was stolen was impermissible hearsay.
2. Confrontation Clause: whether reliance on the NCIC information violated the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.
3. Search warrant: whether the warrant to search 514 W. 6th Street lacked probable cause because it relied on unreliable and stale anonymous tips.
4. Second Amendment facial challenge: whether 11 Del. C. § 1448 (prohibiting certain felons from possessing firearms/ammunition) is unconstitutional on its face under the Second Amendment (and the Delaware Constitution).
5. Second Amendment as-applied challenge: whether § 1448 is unconstitutional as applied to Johns himself.

Critically, Johns did not object at trial to the NCIC testimony and did not raise any Second Amendment challenge to § 1448 in the Superior Court. As a result, the Delaware Supreme Court reviews issues (1), (2), (4), and (5) only for plain error. The only fully preserved issue is the validity of the search warrant.

The opinion is noteworthy for three principal contributions:

• It refines Delaware’s understanding of plain error in situations where the underlying legal question is unsettled and authority is divided or sparse.
• It confirms, in line with prior Delaware precedent, that an anonymous tip corroborated by police investigation can establish probable cause for a search warrant.
• It situates Delaware’s felon-in-possession statute, § 1448, within the evolving framework of Bruen and Rahimi, and explains what an as-applied Second Amendment challenge requires after those decisions—while declining to decide the merits due to an inadequate record.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Delaware Supreme Court (Justice Valihura, joined by Justices LeGrow and Griffiths) affirms the judgment of the Superior Court in all respects. In outline:

• NCIC evidence – hearsay & Confrontation Clause (Issues 1 and 2):
  • Standard of review: plain error (no objection at trial).
  • Holding: No plain error. Delaware and U.S. Supreme Courts have not addressed NCIC records in this context, and other jurisdictions are split or silent. Without clear, binding law—and with a thin factual record about how NCIC operates—the Court cannot say the admission was “plainly” erroneous under either hearsay rules or the Confrontation Clause.
• Search warrant / probable cause (Issue 3):
  • Standards of review: de novo for legal conclusion about probable cause; abuse of discretion for denial of motion to suppress.
  • Holding: The affidavit established probable cause under the “four corners” test. Assuming the 2021 tips were stale, the July 2022 anonymous tip—corroborated by surveillance and two traffic stops—created a logical nexus between drug dealing and 514 W. 6th Street. The Superior Court correctly denied suppression; the warrant is constitutional.
• Second Amendment challenges to § 1448 (Issues 4 and 5):
  • Standard of review: plain error (no constitutional challenge raised below).
  • Facial challenge: Under Salerno and Rahimi, a facial challenge fails if there is any set of circumstances in which the statute is constitutional. Given Heller’s and Bruen’s acceptance of felon-disarmament laws and Rahimi’s approval of disarming those who pose a credible threat to others, § 1448 has plainly constitutional applications. No plain error.
  • As-applied challenge: An as-applied challenge requires a detailed, individualized assessment of the defendant’s criminal history and current dangerousness. The appellate record is too underdeveloped to conduct that inquiry for Johns, and the trial court had no occasion to do so. Failing to address the issue sua sponte was not plain error.

The Court repeatedly emphasizes that, except for the warrant issue, it is not deciding the underlying constitutional questions on the merits. It merely holds that the Superior Court did not commit plain error in failing to raise and resolve those issues on its own.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. NCIC Evidence, Hearsay, and the Confrontation Clause

1. Procedural Posture: Everything Framed Through Plain Error

At trial, Detective Christopher Rosaio testified that he conducted a “wanted check” of the recovered Taurus .38 via NCIC and “determined that it was reported stolen out of South Carolina.” Defense counsel did not object. That NCIC-derived fact was the only evidence that the gun was stolen; without it, the State could not have proved Receiving a Stolen Firearm under 11 Del. C. § 1450.

On appeal, Johns for the first time argued:

• The NCIC-based statement was inadmissible hearsay, and
• Its admission violated the Confrontation Clause because no NCIC custodian or declarant testified.

Because neither issue was preserved, the Court applied the familiar Delaware plain-error standard, rooted in Wainwright v. State and Morales v. State:

• The error must be “apparent on the face of the record” and “basic, serious, and fundamental,” and
• It must be “clearly prejudicial to substantial rights” such that it jeopardizes the fairness and integrity of the trial.

Everyone agreed the NCIC testimony was outcome-determinative for the stolen-firearm count, so the prejudice prong was satisfied. The real fight was whether any error was “plain” in the first place.

Here the Court significantly clarifies and generalizes its earlier decision in Johnson v. State (2001), where it had held:

If neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor this Court has definitively ruled on the issue, and the federal courts that have addressed it are divided, the failure to exclude such evidence sua sponte does not constitute plain error.

In Johns, the Court extends that logic beyond the narrow “federal-courts-only” framing:

• The core idea is whether the legal error is clear under existing law.
• If there is no binding authority and persuasive authority is split or lacking, the question is, by definition, not “plain.”
• The Court sees “no reason to read Johnson narrowly” and indicates that splits or uncertainty in any persuasive courts (state or federal) can defeat a claim of plain error.

That expanded understanding of plain error is one of the key doctrinal contributions of Johns.

2. Hearsay and NCIC: An Unsettled, Fact-Dependent Question

The Court notes a striking absence of binding authority on NCIC hearsay questions:

• U.S. Supreme Court: has discussed NCIC in other contexts (e.g., clerical errors, identification, suppression issues) but never in a hearsay-evidence framework.
• Delaware courts: only two opinions even mention NCIC:
  • Ruffin v. State (2015) — involved an ATF trace report; NCIC was mentioned by analogy, but the Court did not decide NCIC’s admissibility under hearsay rules.
  • State v. Humble (Del. Com. Pl. 2001) — a sentencing case where NCIC information was allowed because sentencing hearsay standards are relaxed and NCIC was deemed to have “minimum indicia of reliability.” It did not resolve NCIC’s status under trial-evidence hearsay rules.

The Court then canvasses other jurisdictions and finds a split:

• Admitted under exceptions:
  • United States v. Enterline (8th Cir. 1990): computerized stolen-vehicle database entries admitted as public records (Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)).
  • Frye v. Commonwealth (Va. 1986) and Cooper v. Commonwealth (Va. Ct. App. 2009): NCIC printouts admitted as business records, emphasizing regular preparation and reliance by law enforcement.
  • State v. Sneed (N.C. Ct. App. 2011): NCIC report re stolen gun admitted under business-records exception (plain error rejected).
• Rejected or doubted as hearsay-exception evidence:
  • United States v. Hendricks (11th Cir. 2005): acknowledged that an NCIC report is hearsay and “does not fall within the Federal Business Records Act or any other recognized exception,” though the Rules of Evidence did not apply in that supervised-release proceeding.
  • United States v. Long (5th Cir. 1978) and United States v. Johnson (5th Cir. 1969): NCIC hearsay referenced but ultimately admission deemed harmless.
  • Castillo-Salgado v. State (Tex. App. 2014): found no proper predicate had been laid for NCIC admission under any exception.
  • State v. Torres (N.J. App. Div. 2022): declined to admit NCIC data under New Jersey’s business-record exception due to insufficient proof of the reliability of the data’s sources.

Some New Jersey cases (McGee, Underwood) suggest NCIC information might be admissible if the proponent shows in detail how data are reported, entered, and retrieved and that those processes are reliable, but Torres explained that this showing was not made there.

Delaware’s own hearsay rules (e.g., D.R.E. 803(6), 803(8)) focus on trustworthiness for public and business records. But Johns underscores that:

• The trial record contains no evidence at all about how NCIC collects, maintains, or verifies stolen-gun data.
• The parties offered almost no information about NCIC’s structure, legal duties, or reliability protocols.

Given:

• no Delaware precedent on point,
• no Supreme Court precedent,
• a genuine split and uncertainty among other courts, and
• a nearly nonexistent factual record on NCIC operations,

the Court holds it cannot say that admitting the NCIC testimony was clearly erroneous under existing law. It explicitly leaves open whether NCIC information might qualify under Delaware’s public-records or other exceptions when properly supported. The key is that any error here was not “plain.”

3. Confrontation Clause and NCIC: Even Less Legal Guidance

The Confrontation Clause issue is even more unsettled. Under Crawford v. Washington and its progeny, the Sixth Amendment bars admission of testimonial out-of-court statements unless:

1. The declarant is unavailable, and
2. The defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine that declarant.

The question is whether NCIC “stolen-gun” data are testimonial. Neither the Delaware Supreme Court nor the U.S. Supreme Court has ever addressed that specific issue. Nationwide, virtually no cases squarely do so either. The one close analog the Court finds is the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Carrion (2021).

In Carrion:

• The underlying database of issued firearm permits was deemed non-testimonial—a neutral government record created for administrative purposes.
• But an affidavit by a non-testifying detective, stating that a search of that database showed no permit for the defendant (prepared specifically for his prosecution), was held testimonial. Using that affidavit without live cross-examination violated the Confrontation Clause.

By contrast, in Johns:

• There was no affidavit; only Detective Rosaio’s in-court testimony that an NCIC check showed the gun was stolen.
• Rosaio did testify and could be cross-examined, but no NCIC custodian or declarant did.

The Delaware Court notes that Carrion could be read to imply:

• Raw database data are generally non-testimonial;
• The confrontation problem arises when those data are summarized in a testimonial affidavit by a non-testifying witness.

At the same time, Delaware’s own confrontation jurisprudence—especially Chavis v. State (2020)—complicates the picture. In Chavis:

• Non-testifying DNA analysts recorded intermediate lab steps; a testifying analyst later synthesized those results into an opinion introduced at trial.
• The Court held the intermediate entries were non-testimonial because:
  • They were not made for the primary purpose of proving an element of the crime; and
  • They did not, by themselves, “prove—or aim to prove—anything” about the defendant’s guilt, but merely documented adherence to testing protocols.

That analysis emphasized:

• Whether a statement is created for use at trial, and
• Whether it is offered as a substitute for live testimony on an essential element.

In Johns’s case:

• The NCIC database entry itself was not created for his trial; it stems from a prior report of a stolen gun.
• Yet the NCIC result was offered precisely to establish an essential element of the crime of receiving a stolen firearm.

The Court recognizes a potential tension:

• Carrion might be read to treat the underlying database as non-testimonial (which would favor the State);
• Chavis and general confrontation doctrine might support viewing the NCIC record as testimonial when used to prove a key element (which would favor Johns).

Given:

• the complete absence of authority directly on NCIC and the Confrontation Clause,
• the fact that neither side briefed Carrion or Chavis, and
• the fact-sensitive nature of the testimonial inquiry,

the Court refuses to declare the admission clearly unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment. Again, it expressly disclaims any view on the merits in a properly preserved, fully developed case; it holds only that the Superior Court did not plainly err by failing to intervene sua sponte.

4. Practical and Doctrinal Significance

This NCIC discussion has several important implications:

• Expanded plain-error doctrine: The Court confirms that where law is unsettled, split, or thin, trial judges are not obliged to recognize and correct potential evidentiary or constitutional errors sua sponte.
• Need for factual development: Parties challenging or defending NCIC-derived evidence must build a record:
  • How does NCIC receive stolen-gun reports?
  • What verification, auditing, and correction mechanisms exist?
  • Under what legal authority is data entered and maintained?
  Without such information, hearsay-exception and reliability determinations are nearly impossible.
• Open constitutional questions: The Court deliberately preserves, rather than resolves, the ultimate questions:
  • Can NCIC entries about stolen firearms fit within Delaware’s public-records or business-records exception?
  • Are such entries “testimonial” under Crawford and Chavis when offered to prove an element?
• Defense strategy lesson: Because the NCIC entry supplied an essential element of one charge, failure to object at trial effectively forfeited a potentially serious evidentiary and constitutional dispute. The Court signals that such issues must be preserved and factually supported in the trial court.

B. Probable Cause, Anonymous Tips, and the Search of 514 W. 6th Street

1. The Legal Framework: Four Corners, Probable Cause, and Deference

The Court reaffirms the familiar Delaware approach to search warrants:

• A warrant is valid if the affidavit’s “four corners” supply facts that would lead a neutral magistrate to a reasonable belief that
  • an offense has been committed, and
  • evidence or contraband will be found at the place to be searched.
• The reviewing court:
  • Gives “great deference” to the magistrate’s determination;
  • Avoids “hypertechnical” or “grudging” review (Ventresca, Holden, Sisson); and
  • Permits reasonable inferences and common-sense judgments, not “elaborate specificity.”

On constitutional issues, the Court reviews de novo whether probable cause existed, and for abuse of discretion the Superior Court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

2. Anonymous Tips and Corroboration Under Delaware Law

The Court situates this case within a line of Delaware decisions on informants and probable cause:

• Holden v. State, 60 A.3d 1110 (Del. 2013):
  • Confidential informant tips alleged drug dealing at a residence.
  • Police surveilled, saw a brief visit and departure, and then found drugs on the departing driver.
  • The Superior Court suppressed for lack of reliability; the Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding:
    • An informant’s tip can establish probable cause if corroborated, even if the informant’s credibility is otherwise unknown.
    • Corroboration of criminal activity, not just identity or innocuous details, is key.
• Diggs v. State, 257 A.3d 993 (Del. 2021):
  • Reiterated that anonymous tips may be considered if corroborated by police observations; a separate reliability analysis is not required once corroborated.
• Tolson, Cooper (2011 table), Taylor and related cases:
  • Probable cause can rest on an unverified informant’s tip when predictive details of criminal conduct are borne out by surveillance or controlled buys.
  • Courts distinguish between corroborating “identity” and corroborating “criminality.” Only the latter is probative of probable cause.
• LeGrande v. State, 947 A.2d 1103 (Del. 2008), and Valentine v. State, 207 A.3d 566 (Del. 2019):
  • Suppressed warrants where anonymous tips were not meaningfully corroborated in terms of criminal activity (only presence/identity was confirmed).

The doctrinal thread is clear: an anonymous tip alone is generally insufficient, but once independent police work confirms its criminal allegations, it can be fairly considered in the probable-cause calculus.

3. Application to the Johns Affidavit

The affidavit in this case recounted:

• Two 2021 anonymous tips (September 2021), alleging:
  • Johns was a felon selling marijuana, other drugs, alcohol, and tobacco out of 514 W. 6th Street, which also functioned as an unlicensed barbershop;
  • He possessed multiple firearms (including a loaded silver firearm) at the residence; and
  • He drove a silver Mercedes with a specific Delaware plate.
• A July 2022 anonymous tip, alleging:
  • Johns was “selling large quantities of marijuana and other illegal substances” out of 514;
  • He conducted transactions via an unlicensed barbershop at the same address;
  • Drugs were hidden in the bedroom closet, basement, and “hidden traps” throughout the home;
  • He hid firearms in the residence, kept one on his waist, and was a person prohibited by a prior felony gun charge;
  • The tipster supplied Johns’s DOB, phone number, and identifying details.
• Police corroboration via databases:
  • DELJIS confirmed Johns’s identity, address, phone, vehicle, and person-prohibited status.
• First August 2022 traffic stop:
  • DOCV agents observed an individual briefly interact with Johns at the doorway of 514 and then leave by car.
  • During a stop for a traffic violation, police found marijuana on the driver, who stated he bought it at 514 from a “friend” he knew from “cutting hair.”
• Second August 2022 traffic stop (Charles Webster):
  • Webster visited 514 for about an hour, then drove off.
  • Stopped for failing to signal, he appeared highly nervous, could not focus, and resisted exiting the vehicle.
  • When ordered out and told he was resisting, he fled the scene at speed.

The Superior Court prudently assumed, arguendo, that the 2021 tips might be stale and evaluated probable cause primarily on:

• The July 2022 tip, and
• The two August 2022 traffic stops and related surveillance.

The Delaware Supreme Court does the same and concludes:

• The July 2022 tip alone is not enough; the anonymous source’s credibility is unknown.
• But, under Delaware law, the tip need not be independently “reliable” if its criminal allegations are corroborated by police.
• The first August stop corroborates the claim that:
  • Marijuana is being sold from 514; and
  • The sales are connected to Johns’s barbershop operation, given the driver’s reference to a friend known from “cutting hair.”
• The second August stop reinforces suspicion that:
  • Visitors to 514 may be leaving with contraband; and
  • Webster’s extreme nervousness, refusal to exit, and flight support a common-sense inference that he possessed something he did not want discovered.

Taken together, the July tip and the two stops support a reasonable inference that:

• Johns is engaged in ongoing drug dealing from 514; and
• Evidence of such dealing will be found inside the residence.

The Court rejects several specific defense arguments:

• “Only identity was corroborated.” – Not so. The driver’s marijuana and statement about buying from a barber-friend at 514, and Webster’s suspicious behavior after visiting 514, directly corroborated criminal conduct, not just identity.
• “Uncorroborated details defeat probable cause.” – Probable cause does not require the State to confirm every allegation in the tip. It requires enough corroborated criminal facts to create a logical nexus between contraband and the place searched.
• “No typical drug-dealing indicia (heavy foot traffic, controlled buys).” – Holden expressly warns against imposing a checklist of “typical” facts. The absence of some common features does not negate probable cause where other strong indicia exist.
• “Drivers did not fully detail their transactions or identify Johns by name.” – Again, the Court emphasizes common sense over granular, technical demands. The magistrate was entitled to infer from the sequence of observed facts that 514 was a source of marijuana sales.

Given the four-corners test and significant deference to the magistrate’s “practical, common-sense” judgment, the Court holds that the affidavit established probable cause. The denial of the motion to suppress was not an abuse of discretion, and the search of 514 was constitutional.

4. Lessons for Future Practice

This portion of Johns largely applies well-settled Delaware law, but it offers several concrete reminders:

• Anonymous tips remain usable, but only when police corroborate the alleged criminal activity, not merely descriptive facts.
• Probable cause is a holistic, common-sense concept; courts avoid rigid checklists and speculative hyper-technical challenges.
• Defense counsel seeking suppression should focus on:
  • Gaps or weaknesses in the link between observed conduct and alleged criminality;
  • Absence of any corroboration of criminal aspects of a tip, as in Valentine and LeGrande.

C. Second Amendment Challenges to 11 Del. C. § 1448

1. Framework: Facial vs As-Applied Challenges and Plain Error

Section 1448 makes it a crime for certain categories of “persons prohibited”—including those with specified felony convictions—to possess firearms or ammunition. Johns challenged this statute under both:

• The U.S. Constitution (Second Amendment), and
• The Delaware Constitution (Art. I, § 20), though he did not develop any distinct state-constitutional analysis.

Because he did not raise any constitutional objection to § 1448 in the Superior Court, the Delaware Supreme Court again applies plain-error review, layered on top of the usual presumptions:

• Presumption of constitutionality: Statutes are presumed valid; challengers must demonstrate unconstitutionality by clear and convincing evidence.
• Facial vs as-applied:
  • A facial challenge requires showing that “no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid” (Salerno); it is “the most difficult challenge to mount.”
  • An as-applied challenge contends that the statute is invalid in the particular circumstances of the case, even if valid generally.

2. Facial Validity After Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi

Johns’ facial challenge confronts a high wall of Supreme Court precedent:

• D.C. v. Heller (2008): While recognizing an individual right to possess firearms for self-defense, Heller expressly cautioned that “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill” remain presumptively lawful.
• McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010): Reiterated Heller’s felon-prohibition dictum when incorporating the Second Amendment against the states.
• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022): Replaced the former two-step scrutiny framework with a history-and-tradition test:
  • If the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct, the burden shifts to the government to show that the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
  • Six Justices in Bruen (including the majority and concurring/dissenting opinions) reaffirmed that Heller’s recognition of felon-disarmament laws remains intact.
• United States v. Rahimi (2024): Applied Bruen’s framework to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), upholding disarmament of individuals subject to domestic violence restraining orders who pose a “credible threat” to the safety of others. The Court emphasized that “our tradition of firearm regulation allows the Government to disarm individuals who present a credible threat to the physical safety of others.”

Delaware precedent is also relevant:

• State v. Robinson (Del. 1969): upholding an earlier version of § 1448 against a vagueness challenge.
• Short v. State (Del. 1991 table): upholding § 1448 under the Delaware Constitution, pre-Heller/Bruen.

The Court in Johns does not comprehensively apply Bruen/Rahimi to § 1448. Under plain-error review, it only needs to decide whether:

• It was “clearly erroneous” for the Superior Court not to sua sponte declare § 1448 facially unconstitutional in light of those cases.

The answer is plainly “no”:

• Heller and McDonald explicitly preserve felon disarmament; Bruen and Rahimi reaffirm that view.
• Rahimi’s history-and-tradition analysis indicates that legislatures may disarm those who demonstrably pose a credible threat to others’ physical safety.
• The Third Circuit, in Pitsilides v. Barr (2025), recognized that non-violent offenses like drug dealing can still present sufficient danger to justify disarmament; dealing in controlled substances often “leads to violence.”

Accordingly, the Delaware Supreme Court concludes it is quite easy to imagine constitutional applications of § 1448—for example, disarming individuals convicted of violent felonies or dangerous drug/gun offenses. That alone defeats a facial challenge under Salerno and Rahimi. Because the statute is clearly constitutional in some applications, it cannot be “plainly” unconstitutional on its face.

The Court also addresses Johns’ reliance on the Third Circuit’s en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General (“Range II”, 2024). Range held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to a man whose sole disqualifying offense was a decades-old misdemeanor-equivalent false statement to obtain food stamps. The Third Circuit was explicit: its holding was “narrow” and not a facial invalidation of felon-in-possession statutes.

The Delaware Court thus finds Range inapposite to a facial challenge and notes that several other circuits (Duarte (9th Cir. 2025), Browne v. Reynolds (8th Cir. 2025)) have declined to follow Range’s as-applied analysis in their own contexts.

3. As-Applied Challenge: Pitsilides, Danger, and the Need for a Developed Record

Far more interesting—and forward-looking—is the Court’s discussion of Johns’ as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 1448.

Here, the Court builds heavily on the Third Circuit’s post-Rahimi decision in Pitsilides v. Barr (2025), which carefully explains how as-applied Second Amendment challenges should work after Bruen and Rahimi:

• Rahimi holds that disarmament is consistent with historical tradition where the person disarmed “poses a clear threat of physical violence to another.”
• Therefore, in an as-applied challenge, the key question is whether the challenger, in light of his actual history and circumstances, “presently pose[s] the kind of danger envisioned by Rahimi and Range II.”
• Courts must consider:
  • The nature and circumstances of the predicate offense(s);
  • The individual’s entire criminal history and pattern of conduct;
  • Post-conviction behavior, rehabilitation, or recidivism; and
  • Any other factors bearing on the person’s capacity to safely possess firearms.

In Pitsilides, the defendant’s disqualifying offense was gambling-related (bookmaking). He argued that gambling is non-violent. But the Third Circuit found the record too thin to decide whether his particular conduct was truly non-dangerous—gambling operations can be enforced violently depending on the circumstances. Without details, the court could not grant as-applied relief.

The Delaware Supreme Court applies this logic to Johns:

• Johns seeks to show that § 1448 is unconstitutional as applied to him, but:
  • He provided almost no information about his personal history, the circumstances of his prior convictions, or his present dangerousness;
  • The Superior Court, having never been asked to do so, made no findings on those issues.
• The appellate record contains only a partial sketch:
  • Prior conviction for Drug Dealing–Aggravated Possession under a prior version of 16 Del. C. § 4752(a);
  • A prior PFBPP conviction under § 1448(e), both categorized as violent felonies; and
  • Several older drug-distribution-related offenses over some thirty years (distribution of marijuana, maintaining a dwelling for drugs, etc.).

Against this backdrop:

• The limited known facts do not favor Johns: multiple serious drug and firearm offenses tend to support, rather than undercut, a finding of dangerousness.
• More importantly, the Court stresses that it simply lacks the detailed factual record needed to undertake the individualized dangerousness inquiry that Rahimi and Pitsilides require.

Given:

• the presumption of constitutionality,
• the demanding nature of as-applied Second Amendment claims, and
• the posture of plain-error review,

the Court holds that the Superior Court did not plainly err by failing to sua sponte reach and resolve an as-applied constitutional challenge that Johns never presented and that the record does not support. It therefore affirms without prejudice to properly framed as-applied litigation in a case where:

• The issue is preserved, and
• The record is developed with specific evidence of the defendant’s history, conduct, and current risk profile.

4. Institutional and Doctrinal Significance

The treatment of § 1448 in Johns is cautious but important:

• It preserves existing Delaware precedent that § 1448 is constitutionally valid, at least in many applications.
• It aligns Delaware with national Second Amendment doctrine by:
  • Accepting Bruen’s history-and-tradition framework and Rahimi’s “credible threat” concept;
  • Recognizing that some felon-disarmament statutes will survive scrutiny when aimed at dangerous individuals.
• It signals the proper structure of as-applied challenges post-Rahimi:
  • They are intensely fact-specific;
  • They require an evidentiary record that goes beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction; and
  • They may be viable in some cases (e.g., decades-old, truly non-violent offenses with strong evidence of rehabilitation), but not in others.
• It underscores procedural discipline: appellate courts will not convert a bare record into a de facto declaratory judgment on the Second Amendment without proper preservation and development below.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Plain Error

“Plain error” is a safety-valve doctrine. When a party fails to object at trial, appellate courts normally will not consider the issue. Plain-error review allows them to do so only if:

• The error is obvious under current law—so clear that the trial judge should have noticed it without an objection.
• The error seriously affects the fairness or integrity of the proceedings (for example, likely changed the outcome).

In Johns, the Court stresses that an error cannot be “plain” when:

• No binding court has decided the issue; and
• Other courts are split or silent.

2. Hearsay and NCIC

“Hearsay” is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of what it asserts. It is generally inadmissible unless covered by an exception (e.g., business or public records).

The NCIC is a nationwide law-enforcement database. When an officer testifies, “NCIC showed the gun was stolen,” that is usually hearsay: the officer is relaying someone else’s out-of-court data entry as proof that the gun was stolen.

Whether that hearsay is admissible depends on whether NCIC entries can fit into a hearsay exception and whether the database processes are reliable. Johns holds only that Delaware law does not yet clearly answer that question, especially on a thin record.

3. The Confrontation Clause and “Testimonial” Statements

The Sixth Amendment gives a criminal defendant the right to confront (cross-examine) the witnesses against him. Under Crawford, out-of-court statements that are “testimonial”—essentially, created for use in criminal prosecution—cannot be admitted unless the declarant is unavailable and was previously subject to cross-examination.

Examples:

• Police interrogation statements
• Affidavits prepared for prosecution
• Formal lab certificates used to prove forensic results

Neutral business or administrative records may be non-testimonial, even if admissible hearsay, because they are not created primarily for criminal trials. Johns leaves open whether NCIC stolen-gun entries fall on the testimonial or non-testimonial side of that line.

4. Probable Cause and the Four Corners Test

“Probable cause” is a practical standard: Are there enough facts to reasonably believe a crime was committed and that evidence will be found in a particular place? It is much less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Under the “four corners” test, courts look only at what is written in the warrant affidavit—not later testimony—to decide whether probable cause existed. Courts give magistrates substantial deference and interpret affidavits in a common-sense way.

5. Anonymous Tips and Corroboration

Anonymous tips by themselves are weak. They gain weight when later events match the tip’s predictions, especially predictions about criminal activity (where, how, and what kind of illegal conduct will occur). Police surveillance, controlled buys, or traffic stops that uncover contraband can corroborate tips and help establish probable cause.

6. Facial vs As-Applied Constitutional Challenges

• Facial challenge: “This law is unconstitutional in all its applications.” To win, the challenger must show there are no situations where the law could be valid.
• As-applied challenge: “This law is unconstitutional as used against me in this specific context.” The law might be valid generally but not for this person’s particular circumstances.

After Bruen and Rahimi, as-applied Second Amendment challenges often turn on whether the particular individual still poses a credible threat of violence or danger that justifies disarmament under historical tradition. That inquiry is fact-intensive and record-dependent.

V. Broader Impact and Future Directions

Johns v. State is deliberately narrow in its ultimate holdings but significant in its guidance:

• Plain error and unsettled law: The Court clarifies that when law is undeveloped or divided, trial judges are not expected to anticipate future doctrinal developments without a defense objection. This protects trial courts from being faulted for failing to raise novel issues sua sponte.
• NCIC and evidentiary law: The opinion invites future, better-developed litigation on whether and how NCIC entries can be admitted:
  • As public or business records under Delaware’s hearsay rules, and
  • Consistent with the Confrontation Clause.
  Lawyers on both sides now have a roadmap of missing factual predicates that must be supplied.
• Fourth Amendment practice: The reaffirmation of Holden and related cases underscores the effectiveness of combining tips with targeted surveillance and traffic stops. It also reinforces that suppression arguments must meaningfully engage with the corroboration of criminal activity, not just identity or innocuous facts.
• Second Amendment litigation: The Court’s discussion of § 1448, Bruen, Rahimi, Range, and Pitsilides:
  • Signals that Delaware will likely accept, at least in principle, as-applied Second Amendment challenges for some non-dangerous individuals; but
  • Makes clear that those claims require detailed evidence and must be preserved at the trial level.

Going forward, Johns will likely be cited for:

• Its treatment of plain error where legal authority is sparse or divided;
• Its reinforcement of the “tip + corroboration” model for probable cause; and
• Its procedural guidance on how (and when) to mount as-applied Second Amendment challenges to felon-in-possession statutes.

VI. Conclusion

Johns v. State does not blaze new substantive trails in any single doctrinal area, but it performs a crucial consolidating and clarifying role at a moment of rapid change in criminal and constitutional law. It:

• Recalibrates Delaware’s understanding of plain error in the face of unsettled or divided authority;
• Affirms established principles on probable cause and anonymous tips, applying them to a modern drug-investigation context; and
• Positions Delaware’s person-prohibited firearm statute within the post-Bruen, post-Rahimi landscape, emphasizing the need for individualized, record-based analysis in future as-applied challenges.

For practitioners, the case is a sharp reminder: constitutional and evidentiary issues must be raised and developed in the trial court. For scholars and future litigants, Johns marks an important waypoint in Delaware’s ongoing engagement with evolving doctrines on evidence, the Fourth Amendment, and the Second Amendment.