Plain Error, Prosecutorial “Belief” Language, and Ineffective Assistance: Commentary on State v. Lowry (Mont. 2025)

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Montana Supreme Court’s memorandum decision in State v. Lowry, 2025 MT 265N (DA 23-0604), affirming Bobby Francis Lowry’s jury conviction for accountability for aggravated assault arising out of a jailhouse beating inside the Lewis and Clark County Detention Center.

Although the Court explicitly designates this as a noncitable memorandum opinion under Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of its Internal Operating Rules—meaning it “shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent”—the decision provides a useful window into how Montana’s high court:

Applies the plain error doctrine to unobjected-to allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument;
Evaluates ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims on direct appeal under the Strickland standard;
Handles disputes over authentication and use of jail surveillance video and related testimony; and
Continues its line of cases minimizing prejudice from a jury’s brief, inadvertent observation of a defendant in restraints outside the courtroom.

The case centers on Lowry’s claim that the prosecutor’s closing argument improperly expressed a personal belief in his guilt, that his trial counsel failed him by not objecting to multiple issues, and that potential jurors seeing him in handcuffs undermined his right to a fair trial. The Court rejects all of these contentions and affirms the conviction.

2. Summary of the Opinion

2.1 Parties and Procedural Posture

Appellee: State of Montana.
Appellant: Bobby Francis Lowry.
Court of Origin: First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, Hon. Michael F. McMahon.
Charge at Trial: Aggravated assault, with an alternative theory of accountability for aggravated assault (Montana’s accomplice liability theory).
Jury Verdict: Not guilty of aggravated assault as principal; guilty of accountability for aggravated assault.
Appeal: Alleged plain error based on prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, plus multiple ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

2.2 Factual Background in Brief

On October 26, 2021, in Pod 3 at the Lewis and Clark County Detention Center, inmate S.H. was attacked in his cell by multiple inmates, called a “snitch,” and beaten so severely that he suffered a broken nose and broken vertebrae, lost consciousness under his bed, and awoke covered in blood and stool. Initially, S.H. falsely reported he had fallen, fearing retaliation.

The State ultimately identified four inmates as involved: Kaleb Verley, Garret Hamilton, Wesley Rhodes, and Lowry. Verley, Hamilton, and Rhodes pled guilty to aggravated assault or accountability therefor and testified under immunity at Lowry’s trial. Their testimony conflicted significantly, while S.H. testified that all four—including Lowry—attacked him, though he could not match specific acts to specific assailants because he was under the bunk and jail attire was uniform.

Key corroborating evidence came from jail surveillance video showing all four men entering S.H.’s cell. The camera did not capture the assault itself, but it did show Lowry leaving S.H.’s cell during the assault, going to the pod’s kiosk, and then returning to the cell. During the investigation, Deputy Blair had digitally zoomed in on this kiosk segment and concluded Lowry was checking his messages, not reporting the assault or seeking medical help. The zoom function, however, was not available on the version of the video shown to the jury.

2.3 Issues on Appeal

Prosecutorial Misconduct / Plain Error
Whether two statements in the prosecutor’s closing argument—phrased in terms of what “the State believes”—constituted improper expression of personal belief in Lowry’s guilt, requiring plain error review despite the absence of a contemporaneous objection.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC)
Whether Lowry’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for:
- Failing to object to the allegedly improper closing argument statements;
- Failing to object to admission of the jail surveillance video for insufficient authentication;
- Failing to object to Deputy Blair’s testimony about “zooming in” on the video and describing what Lowry was doing at the kiosk; and
- Failing to move for a mistrial immediately after Lowry reported that potential jurors saw him in handcuffs in the hallway before trial sessions.

2.4 Holding

The Court declined to invoke plain error review and held that, taken in context, the prosecutor’s references to what “the State believes” were permissible explanatory statements about the State’s theory and charging decision, not improper personal opinions of guilt.
The Court rejected all IAC claims, finding either no deficient performance or no prejudice under Strickland v. Washington:
- No prejudice from failure to object to closing argument; the comments did not undermine trial fairness.
- No prejudice from failure to object to authentication; any foundational defect in the video was easily curable and would not have changed the outcome.
- No prejudice from failure to object to the “zoom-in” testimony; again, even if objected to, it was unlikely to alter the verdict.
- No prejudice from not moving earlier for mistrial based on jurors potentially seeing Lowry in handcuffs; Montana precedent treats such brief, inadvertent hallway sightings as non-prejudicial.
The conviction was affirmed.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Nature of the Opinion: Memorandum, Nonprecedential Decision

At the outset, the Court invokes Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of its Internal Operating Rules:

“this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent.”

This designation means:

The opinion is reserved for cases “controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.”
It will appear on a quarterly list of noncitable cases but cannot be used as binding or persuasive authority in later litigation.

Despite its nonprecedential status, the opinion is a clear illustration of how the Court applies existing doctrines. It is particularly valuable as an example for practitioners concerned with plain error, closing argument boundaries, and IAC on direct appeal.

3.2 Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Plain Error Doctrine

3.2.1 The Challenged Closing Argument Statements

Lowry focused on two passages from the prosecutor’s closing argument:

Early in her closing, the prosecutor said:

“The State has charged Bobby Lowry with aggravated assault, or in the alternative, accountability for aggravated assault. This means that the State believes that Bobby Lowry either committed the offense personally against [S.H.] or, at the very least, he aided and abetted others in committing this beatdown against [S.H.].”
Later, in discussing accountability and the “mere presence” instruction, she said:

“But what the State would tell you is this: We didn’t charge Mr. Lowry because he was there, we charged Mr. Lowry because, upon review of the evidence, the State firmly believes that Mr. Lowry, number one, knew what was going on, and, number two, made every attempt he could to assist it, or, in the alternative, that, number three, as [S.H.] testified, Mr. Lowry assaulted [S.H.] himself.”

Lowry argued these statements improperly invaded the jury’s province by expressing a “personal belief” in his guilt. However:

No objection was made at trial to either statement.
On appeal, Lowry sought review only under the plain error doctrine.

3.2.2 Doctrinal Framework: Plain Error in Montana

The Court reiterates the basic rules for plain error review:

Under State v. Aker, 2013 MT 253, ¶ 21, 371 Mont. 491, 310 P.3d 506 (citing Longfellow), courts generally do not review alleged prosecutorial misconduct when no contemporaneous objection is made.
However, as State v. Mercier, 2021 MT 12, ¶ 13, 403 Mont. 34, 479 P.3d 967 recognizes, the Court may review under plain error.
The modern articulation of the doctrine comes from State v. Hayden, 2008 MT 274, ¶ 17, 345 Mont. 252, 190 P.3d 1091, and State v. Lawrence, 2016 MT 346, ¶ 9, 386 Mont. 86, 385 P.3d 968, as quoted in Mercier and State v. Bryson, 2024 MT 315, ¶ 24, 419 Mont. 490, 560 P.3d 1270:
- Plain error is reserved for errors that “impact the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
- It is applied “sparingly, on a case-by-case basis,” and only when:
  - A fundamental constitutional right is implicated, and
  - Failure to review would:
    - result in a manifest miscarriage of justice,
    - leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the proceedings, or
    - compromise the integrity of the judicial process.
- The party seeking reversal bears the burden of firmly convincing the Court that these criteria are met.

Thus, even if the prosecutor’s comments were problematic, the doctrinal bar for plain error relief is high.

3.2.3 Prosecutorial “Belief” and Montana’s Prohibition on Personal Opinion

Montana law prohibits prosecutors from inserting personal opinion into their argument:

State v. Miller, 2022 MT 92, ¶ 24, 408 Mont. 316, 510 P.3d 17: a prosecutor may not directly express personal belief in guilt or that the accused is the one who committed the crime.
M. R. Pro. Cond. 3.4(e): a lawyer shall not in trial “state a personal opinion as to the … guilt or innocence of an accused.”

However, as Mercier, ¶ 37 and Miller, ¶ 22 also emphasize, prosecutors may:

Comment on “the gravity of the crime charged, the volume of evidence, credibility of witnesses, inferences to be drawn from various phases of evidence, and legal principles involved.”
“based on the evidence, applicable law as stated in the jury instructions, and [their] analysis of the evidence, … properly comment on and argue for any position or conclusion regarding the nature, quality, or effect of the evidence” (emphasis in original).

Alleged misconduct must be evaluated in “the context of the entire argument.” State v. McDonald, 2013 MT 97, ¶ 14, 369 Mont. 483, 299 P.3d 799.

3.2.4 Distinguishing the “Flagrantly Improper” Cases

Lowry analogized his case to three prior instances where the Court did intervene under plain error:

State v. French, 2018 MT 289, 393 Mont. 364, 431 P.3d 332.
The prosecutor told the jury the defendant had previously been convicted of the same charges at an earlier trial—an exceptionally prejudicial, plainly improper disclosure.
State v. Stringer, 271 Mont. 367, 897 P.2d 1063 (1995).
The prosecutor called defense witnesses “liars” outright.
State v. Musgrove, 178 Mont. 162, 582 P.2d 1246 (1978).
The prosecutor explicitly called the defendant a liar and stated personal belief in guilt: “I’m convinced that Musgrove is a liar and he is responsible.”

The Court characterizes these as “flagrantly improper” examples and notes that the statements in Lowry are “plainly distinguishable.”

3.2.5 The Court’s Application in Lowry

The Court interprets the prosecutor’s “belief” language as:

Describing why the State charged Lowry with particular counts (principal and accountability), and
Explaining the State’s theory in relation to the evidence and the jury instructions (especially the “mere presence” instruction).

Key contextual points:

The first “believes” statement came in a straightforward explanation of the charges and elements.
The second “firmly believes” statement was preceded by a direct reference to the judge’s “mere presence” instruction, and framed as “what the State would tell you” on the evidence.

The Court concludes:

“the statements are akin to summaries of the particular charges against Lowry and the reasons the State filed the charges in the manner it did, rather than statements of the prosecutor’s personal belief that Lowry was guilty…. Neither statement conveyed the prosecutor’s own personal opinion.”

Given this characterization, the Court holds:

The comments did not rise to the level of misconduct that implicates “fundamental fairness” or requires plain error review.
Lowry’s right to a fair trial was not undermined, and the conviction stands.

3.3 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC)

3.3.1 Strickland Framework and Direct Appeal Limits

Montana follows the classic Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) test, adopted in Whitlow v. State, 2008 MT 140, ¶ 10, 343 Mont. 90, 183 P.3d 861:

Deficient performance: Counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Prejudice: There is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Montana cases reaffirming and clarifying this standard include:

State v. Weber, 2016 MT 138, ¶ 11, 383 Mont. 506, 373 P.3d 26;
State v. Howard, 2011 MT 246, ¶ 18, 362 Mont. 196, 265 P.3d 606;
State v. Ward, 2020 MT 36, ¶ 18, 399 Mont. 16, 457 P.3d 955;
State v. Edwards, 2011 MT 210, ¶ 22, 361 Mont. 478, 260 P.3d 396.

Notably:

There is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Whitlow, ¶ 21.
“Failure of either prong is fatal to an IAC claim.” Edwards, ¶ 22.
Only record-based IAC claims are cognizable on direct appeal. Aker, ¶ 22.

In Lowry, the Court addresses all IAC claims on the existing record, concluding that either counsel’s performance was not deficient or that Lowry suffered no prejudice.

3.3.2 Failure to Object to Prosecutor’s “Belief” Statements

Because the Court has already determined the prosecutor’s statements did not amount to misconduct undermining the fairness of the trial, it reasons that:

Even if counsel had objected, those objections would have been at most “arguably without procedural or substantive merit,” and
There is no reasonable probability of a different outcome had an objection been made.

The Court cites Heddings v. State, 2011 MT 228, ¶ 33, 362 Mont. 90, 265 P.3d 600:

“a claim of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel will not succeed when predicated upon counsel’s failure to make motions or objections which, under the circumstances, would have been frivolous, which would have been, arguably, without procedural or substantive merit, or which, otherwise, would likely not have changed the outcome of the proceeding.”

Thus, the second prong—prejudice—is not met, and this IAC claim fails.

3.3.3 Video Authentication and “Zoom-In” Testimony

(a) Authentication of the Jail Video

Under M. R. Evid. 901(a), evidence is authenticated when there is “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Courts have broad discretion in determining whether the foundation is adequate. City of Missoula v. Forest, 236 Mont. 129, 134, 769 P.2d 699, 702 (1989).

Here, Lowry argued that:

Deputy Blair’s foundation was insufficient because he only described how he obtained the video and how he stored it in the WatchGuard Evidence Library;
He did not testify to how the video was created or affirm that it was a true and accurate depiction of what it showed.

The Court acknowledges that proper authentication of a jail video ordinarily would include testimony that the video is a true and accurate depiction of what it purports to show, citing:

M. R. Evid. 901(b)(1) (testimony of a witness with knowledge);
State v. High Elk, 2006 MT 6, ¶ 35, 330 Mont. 259, 127 P.3d 432 (photographs authenticated by an officer who testified they accurately depicted the wounds he observed).

The Court also notes that Officer Ball had testified regarding:

His familiarity with the jail’s cameras, their placement, and fields of view;
The layout of Pod 3 and location of S.H.’s cell.

The Court candidly admits that additional explicit authentication testimony could have been required if an objection had been made. But it reasons:

The video was central to the State’s case.
The State plainly had available witnesses who could easily have provided the missing explicit foundation.
Any objection would likely have resulted merely in a brief remedial foundation and admission of the same evidence.

Accordingly, even assuming a foundational flaw, Lowry could not show that counsel’s failure to object to Exhibit 3 was prejudicial under Strickland; the outcome would almost certainly have been the same.

(b) The “Zoom-In” Testimony

Lowry also argued that counsel should have objected to Deputy Blair’s testimony about:

“zooming in” on the video while investigating; and
concluding from that zoomed version that Lowry was scrolling through messages at the kiosk, not requesting medical help.

At trial, the version of the video available to the jury did not have the zoom-in function. This raised possible issues under M. R. Evid. 1002 (the “best evidence” rule) and the general principle that the version reviewed by the jury should match the basis for testimony about its contents.

Again, the Court reasons that:

An objection might have led to inquiries about whether the correct video version was introduced or to production of the zoom-capable version.
Regardless, Blair, as an investigating officer, would still likely have been permitted to testify to his observations of the video he reviewed.

Thus, the Court concludes it “cannot” find that an objection would have altered the outcome. Without a showing of prejudice, this IAC claim fails.

3.3.4 Failure to Promptly Move for Mistrial Over Handcuff Sighting

Lowry last contended that his counsel was ineffective for not immediately moving for a mistrial upon learning that potential jurors may have seen him handcuffed in a hallway adjacent to the jury assembly room as he was escorted from jail to the courtroom.

The trial court:

Held a post-trial hearing on Lowry’s mistrial motion;
Viewed courthouse surveillance footage, which showed Lowry being escorted down a hallway near, but not within, the courtroom;
Noted that the video did not itself show the handcuffs, and Lowry could only say he “believed” some potential jurors could see them.

The District Court assumed, for the sake of argument, that potential jurors had momentarily seen Lowry in handcuffs, but nonetheless denied the mistrial motion for lack of actual prejudice.

The Supreme Court upholds this ruling, relying on a well-established line of Montana authority:

State v. Baugh, 174 Mont. 456, 571 P.2d 779 (1977) – The Court held that a defendant is not entitled to a mistrial solely because a juror momentarily or inadvertently saw him in handcuffs outside the courtroom.
Porter v. State, 2002 MT 319, ¶ 28, 313 Mont. 149, 60 P.3d 951 – Reaffirmed that the constitutional right to be free from shackles during trial does not extend to transportation to and from the courthouse; it explicitly cited Baugh.
State v. Pendergrass, 189 Mont. 127, 134, 615 P.2d 201, 205 (1980) – Affirmed no prejudicial consequences where the jury saw the defendant in handcuffs outside the courtroom.
State v. Schatz, 194 Mont. 59, 63, 634 P.2d 1193, 1196 (1981) – Affirmed no prejudice where some jurors saw the defendant leaving the courthouse in handcuffs.
Porter, ¶ 31 – Again, no prejudice where the defendant momentarily wore handcuffs in front of potential jurors.

The Court contrasts these with:

Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1999) – Where the defendant was shackled in view of the jury for the entire trial, prompting habeas relief.

Applying Montana precedent, the Court reiterates:

“in the absence of evidence indicating prejudicial consequences, a jury momentarily and inadvertently observing a defendant in restraints does not warrant a mistrial.”

Because the District Court’s denial of the mistrial was itself correct on the law, counsel cannot have been ineffective for failing to make an earlier mistrial motion that would have necessarily failed as well. No prejudice exists, so this IAC theory also fails.

3.4 Accountability for Aggravated Assault and the “Mere Presence” Instruction

While not the formal focus of the appeal, the conviction rests on the alternative theory of accountability for aggravated assault, rather than Lowry personally committing the assault. This highlights several important features of Montana criminal law.

Accountability: Montana law holds a person criminally liable as an accomplice if, with the requisite mental state, he aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid another in planning or committing an offense.
Mere Presence Instruction (Jury Instruction No. 23): The instruction provided:

“The Defendant’s mere presence at the scene of the charged offenses is an insufficient basis upon which to find him guilty of any offense for which the Defendant is here on trial.”

The prosecutor acknowledged this instruction in closing (“I understand the judge’s instructions and, obviously, No. 23 …”) and used it to frame why the State believed Lowry’s actions went beyond mere presence.

The surveillance video evidence—that Lowry left the cell during the assault, used the kiosk, and re-entered the cell—combined with S.H.’s testimony (that all four attacked him) provided a factual basis for the jury to conclude:

Lowry knew what was happening;
He did not seek help or intervene; and
He at least aided and abetted the ongoing assault, even if he did not personally inflict the most serious injuries.

The split verdict (not guilty as principal; guilty on accountability) reflects the jury’s careful parsing of these theories.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 Plain Error Review

Plain error allows an appellate court to correct an error that:

Was not objected to at trial; and
Is so serious it threatens the fundamental fairness or integrity of the proceeding.

Montana uses this sparingly. It is not enough that a mistake happened; the error must:

Impinge on a basic constitutional right (e.g., fair trial, due process, right to counsel), and
Be grave enough that failing to correct it would seriously undermine public confidence in the justice system.

In Lowry, the Court concludes the prosecutor’s “State believes” language does not rise to this level.

4.2 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC)

To win an IAC claim, a defendant must show:

Your lawyer’s performance was objectively unreasonable.
Not just that another lawyer might have done it differently, but that what your lawyer did (or failed to do) fell below professional norms.
The error mattered to the outcome.
There must be a reasonable probability the verdict would have been different without the lawyer’s error.

If either element is missing, the claim fails. Courts are reluctant to “second-guess” trial tactics with hindsight, and they assume attorneys act reasonably unless clearly proven otherwise.

4.3 Authentication of Evidence (Rule 901)

“Authentication” answers: Is this piece of evidence what it claims to be? For video evidence, this usually requires:

Someone familiar with what’s depicted to say: “Yes, this is a fair and accurate representation of what I saw,” or
A chain-of-custody explanation of how the recording was created, stored, and preserved without alteration.

In Lowry, the Court acknowledges that more explicit authentication could have been demanded, but because the State could easily have supplied it, no prejudice was shown from counsel’s failure to object.

4.4 Shackling and Juror Observations

Defendants generally have a right not to be shackled in front of the jury during trial because shackles suggest guilt or danger. However:

This right does not automatically extend to brief, incidental views while a defendant is being transported to or from the courthouse.
Montana precedent holds that a short, accidental glimpse of a defendant in handcuffs outside the courtroom almost never justifies a mistrial without concrete evidence of prejudice.

Lowry continues this line, finding no prejudice from any possible brief view of handcuffs in a hallway.

4.5 Accountability vs. Principal Liability

Being convicted “on an accountability theory” means:

You did not necessarily commit every act that makes up the crime; but
You intentionally aided, encouraged, or facilitated others in committing it.

For example, standing by during a beating can lead to accountability if:

You knew the attack was happening; and
You did something to help or encourage it (even if indirectly), beyond just being present.

But “mere presence” at the scene, with no active assistance, knowledge, or encouragement, is not enough for conviction. That line—between passive presence and active participation—was central in Lowry.

5. Broader Impact and Practical Takeaways

Although State v. Lowry is a memorandum opinion and “does not serve as precedent,” it offers practical lessons for litigators and trial courts in Montana.

5.1 For Prosecutors: Framing “Belief” in Closing Argument

Phrases like “the State believes” are not automatically improper, if they clearly refer to:
- The basis for charging decisions; or
- The State’s evaluation of the evidence as it relates to jury instructions.
Danger arises when the prosecutor’s statements become:
- Expressions of personal conviction divorced from the evidence (e.g., “I know he’s guilty,” “I’m convinced he is a liar”), or
- Attacks on defendant’s character beyond what the evidence supports (e.g., “He’s an evil man who must be stopped”).
Best practice remains to:
- Anchor all argument firmly in the evidence (“The evidence shows…,” “You heard testimony that…”).
- Avoid “I think” or “I believe” phrasing entirely to minimize risk of reversal.

5.2 For Defense Counsel: Objecting Strategically

Lowry illustrates both sides of the objection calculus:

Failure to object may force an appellate argument into the narrow channel of plain error, which is difficult to win.
Yet objecting to foundational defects that can be instantly cured may only temporarily delay admission of damaging evidence without altering the outcome, weakening later IAC claims.

Defenders should:

Be especially attentive during closing arguments to any prosecutorial use of personal opinion, character attacks, or references to prior convictions.
Carefully assess foundational issues—if the State clearly has available witnesses to cure the problem, the strategic value of objection may be limited, but it can still preserve issues for appeal.
Promptly raise and create a record on shackling or restraint issues inside the courtroom, which are much more likely to raise constitutional concerns than hallway sightings.

5.3 For Trial Judges: Managing Video Evidence and Shackling Concerns

The opinion highlights two important trial management points:

Video Evidence.
- Ensure that the version of the video shown to the jury matches the basis for any witness testimony about its contents (e.g., zoom functions used in the investigation).
- Make a clear record that a qualified witness has authenticated the video as accurate and unaltered.
Restraints.
- While brief, inadvertent hallway sightings generally do not require a mistrial, judges should minimize their occurrence and promptly address any courtroom shackling issues on the record.
- Post-trial hearings, supported by surveillance video where possible, help clarify what actually occurred and whether any jurors were likely prejudiced.

5.4 For Appellate Practice: Record-Based IAC

Lowry reinforces that:

Only record-based IAC claims can be decided on direct appeal; anything requiring extra-record evidence (e.g., counsel’s strategy discussions, uncalled witnesses) must await postconviction proceedings.
Even with a full record, the Strickland prejudice prong is a formidable barrier, especially where the State could easily cure any alleged defect at trial.

6. Conclusion

State v. Lowry, though designated a nonprecedential memorandum opinion, offers a concrete, contemporary example of how the Montana Supreme Court applies settled law to recurring trial issues:

It clarifies that prosecutorial language framed as “the State believes,” when tethered to the evidence and the rationale for charging decisions, does not necessarily constitute improper personal opinion.
It underscores the demanding nature of plain error review, which is reserved for egregious, outcome-threatening violations affecting the integrity or public reputation of the judicial process.
It reaffirms the stringent two-pronged Strickland standard for ineffective assistance and illustrates how both lack of deficiency and particularly lack of prejudice can defeat IAC claims on direct appeal.
It aligns with longstanding Montana precedent minimizing the prejudicial effect of brief, inadvertent juror observations of a defendant in handcuffs outside the courtroom.
It demonstrates the court’s practical approach to evidence authentication—acknowledging technical imperfections while focusing on whether any such defect realistically could have changed the result.

In the broader legal landscape, Lowry functions as an instructive illustration rather than a formal source of law. It reminds prosecutors to keep argument grounded in evidence and law, defense counsel to make timely and strategic objections, and trial courts to vigilantly manage the presentation of evidence and handling of defendants in custody. For students and practitioners of Montana criminal law, it is a compact but rich case study in the interplay between trial advocacy, evidentiary foundations, appellate review standards, and constitutional protections in criminal prosecutions.