Pittman v. State: Florida Supreme Court Reaffirms Phillips—Hall Not Retroactive and Procedural Bars Apply to Successive Intellectual-Disability Claims

Pittman v. State: Florida Supreme Court Reaffirms Phillips—Hall Not Retroactive and Procedural Bars Apply to Successive Intellectual-Disability Claims

Court: Supreme Court of Florida

Date: September 10, 2025 (Corrected Opinion)

Docket: No. SC2025-1320

Introduction

This death-warrant appeal arises from the Florida Supreme Court’s per curiam decision affirming the summary denial of David Joseph Pittman’s fourth successive motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and denying his motion for a stay of execution under section 922.07(1), Florida Statutes (2025). Pittman, sentenced to death for the 1990 murders of his former wife’s family members, sought another evidentiary hearing to establish that his execution is constitutionally prohibited due to intellectual disability. The Court held that the claim was untimely and procedurally barred and declined to revisit its pivotal 2020 decision in Phillips v. State, which held that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hall v. Florida does not apply retroactively. The Court therefore denied relief and refused to stay the execution set for September 17, 2025.

Case Background

The facts of the underlying crimes—multiple stabbings followed by arson—are recounted in the Court’s 1994 direct appeal decision (Pittman v. State (Pittman I), 646 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1994)). A jury convicted Pittman of three counts of first-degree murder, arson, and grand theft; the jury recommended death (9–3), and the trial court imposed death sentences based on two aggravating circumstances per murder: (1) prior violent felony and (2) heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC), rejecting mental mitigation as outweighed.

Procedural Posture

  • 1994: Convictions and death sentences affirmed on direct appeal (Pittman I); U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari (1995).
  • 2011: State postconviction relief denied and affirmed on appeal (Pittman II, 90 So. 3d 794 (Fla. 2011)); initial state habeas denied.
  • 2015–2018: Federal habeas denied; Eleventh Circuit affirmed (Pittman III, M.D. Fla. 2015; Pittman IV, 871 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2017)); U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari (2018).
  • 2022: Third amended successive 3.851 motion and Rule 3.800(a) motion rejected; Florida Supreme Court affirmed (Pittman V, 337 So. 3d 776 (Fla. 2022)). The Court held any intellectual-disability claim had to be filed no later than 60 days after October 1, 2004.
  • August 15, 2025: Governor issued a death warrant; Pittman filed a fourth successive 3.851 motion alleging entitlement to an evidentiary hearing on intellectual disability and a motion for stay.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Affirmed summary denial: The Court affirmed the circuit court’s summary denial of Pittman’s fourth successive postconviction motion because his intellectual-disability claim is both untimely and procedurally barred.
  • Phillips controls; no retroactivity of Hall: The Court again refused to revisit Phillips v. State, 299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2020), which receded from Walls v. State (2016) and held that Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014), is not retroactive in Florida postconviction proceedings.
  • Due process and Eighth Amendment challenges rejected: The Court held that Pittman received all process due (notice and opportunity to be heard) and that adherence to Phillips does not render Florida’s death-penalty scheme arbitrary or capricious.
  • Stay denied; mandate immediate: Because Pittman failed to present substantial grounds for relief, the Court denied a stay of execution and directed that the mandate issue immediately; no oral argument and no rehearing would be entertained.
  • Dissent: Justice Labarga dissented, consistent with his prior dissents in Phillips and Pittman V, expressing concern that adherence to Phillips deprives some individuals of meaningful consideration of intellectual-disability claims and leads to inconsistent treatment among similarly situated defendants.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • Standards for summary denial and successive motions
    • Bogle v. State, 322 So. 3d 44 (Fla. 2021): Summary denial is appropriate when the files and records conclusively show no entitlement to relief.
    • Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 2008); Rolling v. State, 944 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2006): Allegations accepted as true unless conclusively refuted.
    • Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d 82 (Fla. 2011); Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 2000): Defendant must plead a prima facie legally valid claim; conclusory assertions insufficient.
    • Marek v. State, 8 So. 3d 1123 (Fla. 2009); State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 2003): Decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing is subject to de novo review.
    • Rule 3.851(d)(1), (e)(2), (f)(5)(B), (h)(6): One-year limit for filing; bars on untimely and repetitive claims; standards for summary denial; warrant-phase procedures.
    • Hendrix v. State, 136 So. 3d 1122 (Fla. 2014); Van Poyck v. State, 116 So. 3d 347 (Fla. 2013): Claims previously raised and rejected are procedurally barred in successive motions.
  • Retroactivity, intellectual disability, and categorical exemptions
    • Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014): Invalidated Florida’s rigid IQ cutoff of 70 by requiring consideration of the standard error of measurement and adaptive deficits.
    • Walls v. State (Walls I), 213 So. 3d 340 (Fla. 2016): Initially held Hall retroactive; later receded from by Phillips.
    • Phillips v. State, 299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2020): Held Hall is not retroactive under Florida’s retroactivity doctrine; receded from Walls I.
    • Foster v. State, 395 So. 3d 127 (Fla. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1939 (2025); Walls v. State (Walls II), 361 So. 3d 231 (Fla. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 174 (2023): Court declined to revisit Phillips and consistently applied its non-retroactivity holding.
    • Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94 (Fla. 2023); Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 2023); Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883 (Fla. 2013): Procedural bars and filing deadlines apply even to categorical exemption claims.
    • In re Bowles, 935 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2019): Eleventh Circuit similarly enforces time limits against successive categorical exemption claims.
  • Due process and Eighth Amendment
    • Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016); Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993): Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.
    • Bates v. State, No. SC2025-1127, 50 Fla. L. Weekly S223, 2025 WL 2319001 (Fla. Aug. 12, 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-5370, 2025 WL 2396797 (U.S. Aug. 19, 2025): Rejected warrant-phase due process claim to further develop mental-state evidence as time-barred.
    • Miller v. State, 379 So. 3d 1109 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 241 (2024): Adherence to Florida capital jurisprudence (including Lawrence and Bush) does not make death-penalty administration arbitrary or capricious.
  • Stay of execution standard
    • Dillbeck, 357 So. 3d at 103 (quoting Davis v. State, 142 So. 3d 867, 873–74 (Fla. 2014)): A stay on a successive motion is warranted only when substantial grounds for relief are shown.

Legal Reasoning

1) Phillips governs; no retroactivity for Hall-based claims

Pittman’s core argument depended on retroactive application of Hall v. Florida, which would relax Florida’s pre-2014 approach to IQ evidence and require consideration of the standard error of measurement and adaptive functioning. The Court, however, reaffirmed Phillips—its controlling authority that Hall is not retroactive to cases already final on direct review. The Court noted it has repeatedly declined to recede from Phillips (Foster; Walls II) and again declined to do so here. As a result, Pittman could not reopen his case to seek a new intellectual-disability determination grounded in Hall.

2) Timeliness: The claim is time-barred

The Court emphasized its prior ruling in Pittman V that any intellectual-disability claim had to be filed no later than 60 days after October 1, 2004 (the effective date of Florida’s intellectual-disability procedures in capital cases). Because Pittman’s current claim was filed decades later and raised after a death warrant issued, it was untimely under Rule 3.851(d)(1) and the Court’s earlier case-specific holding.

3) Procedural bar: The claim is successive

Pittman had already raised an intellectual-disability claim in prior postconviction litigation. Under Hendrix and Van Poyck, claims raised and rejected previously are procedurally barred from relitigation in a successive motion. The Court expressly rejected the contention that procedural bars should not apply to intellectual-disability claims, pointing to a line of cases (e.g., Dillbeck, Barwick, Carroll) holding that time limits and procedural strictures apply even to categorical exemption claims. The Court also noted consistency with Eleventh Circuit authority (In re Bowles).

4) No entitlement to an evidentiary hearing

Because the claim was both untimely and procedurally barred, the Court held that Pittman had not shown entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. The Court reiterated it would not make original factual findings concerning intellectual disability in the appellate posture of a summary denial. The summary denial standard permits courts to deny a hearing when the motion and record conclusively refute entitlement to relief.

5) Due process and Eighth Amendment arguments fail

On due process, the Court cited Asay and Bates in holding that Pittman had notice and an opportunity to be heard but did not meet the standards for overcoming summary denial; the Court declined to expand due process to permit a late or successive evidentiary development of mental-state evidence in contravention of established time limits. As to the Eighth Amendment, the Court rejected the claim that adhering to Phillips renders Florida’s capital sentencing arbitrary, citing Miller for the proposition that Florida’s scheme remains constitutionally sound and the Court’s retroactivity analysis under its established test does not alter that constitutional conclusion.

6) Denial of stay

Because Pittman’s claims presented no substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted, the Court denied a stay of execution, consistent with Dillbeck and Davis.

Impact and Significance

  • Consolidation of Phillips as controlling law: This decision reinforces that Phillips remains firmly entrenched in Florida postconviction practice: Hall does not apply retroactively, and the category of defendants who secured Hall-based relief under Walls I before Phillips will not expand.
  • Strict enforcement of timeliness and procedural bars to Atkins/Hall claims: Even claims invoking the categorical exemption from execution (intellectual disability) are subject to Rule 3.851’s filing deadlines and successive-motion bars. The Court underscores that warrant-stage filings cannot bypass these constraints.
  • Uniformity with Eleventh Circuit: By citing In re Bowles, the Court signals alignment with federal appellate practice in the Eleventh Circuit on time limits for successive categorical exemption claims, reducing incentives for parallel federal end-runs.
  • Due process scope clarified: Due process protects notice and a fair opportunity to be heard; it does not authorize late-stage development of record evidence when the claim is time-barred or previously litigated.
  • Operational effects in warrant litigation: Practitioners should expect the Court to deny oral argument, reject rehearing, and issue immediate mandates when successive, time-barred claims are brought under warrant. Stays will hinge on a showing of substantial, timely, and non-barred grounds for relief.
  • Continuing debate highlighted by dissent: Justice Labarga’s dissent renews the fairness concerns he articulated in Phillips and Pittman V—namely, that some intellectually disabled defendants might be foreclosed from merits hearings due to timing rules, producing inconsistent treatment. Although the majority has consistently rejected those concerns, the dissent keeps the policy debate alive for legislative or federal scrutiny.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Intellectual disability as a categorical bar: The Eighth Amendment forbids executing individuals who are intellectually disabled (a principle deriving from U.S. Supreme Court case law). Florida provides a statutory and procedural framework to adjudicate such claims pre- and post-trial. But claims must be timely and comply with procedural rules.
  • Retroactivity (Florida’s framework): Florida applies its own retroactivity doctrine to determine whether new constitutional rules apply to cases already final on direct appeal. In Phillips, Florida held that Hall (a 2014 refinement in intellectual-disability assessment standards) does not retroactively reopen final cases.
  • Successive postconviction motions: Rule 3.851 generally permits one round of postconviction litigation within a year of finality. Later (successive) motions are disfavored and are barred absent narrow exceptions (e.g., newly discovered facts that could not have been raised earlier), and claims previously litigated cannot be relitigated.
  • Summary denial: A court may deny a postconviction claim without an evidentiary hearing if the motion and existing record conclusively show the movant is not entitled to relief. The appellate court reviews the denial de novo.
  • Stays of execution under warrant: A stay is extraordinary relief. On successive motions, it is granted only if the movant shows substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted.
  • Due process in warrant litigation: Due process ensures notice and a fair chance to present claims. It does not guarantee a hearing when claims are untimely, repetitive, or conclusively refuted by the record and controlling law.

Notable Procedural and Institutional Points

  • No rehearing; immediate mandate: The Court explicitly stated no rehearing would be considered and directed the mandate to issue immediately—reflecting the compressed timetable under a death warrant.
  • Panel composition: Chief Justice Muñiz and Justices Couriel, Grosshans, Francis, and Sasso concurred; Justice Canady recused; Justice Labarga dissented.
  • Counsel: Appellant was represented by the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel (Middle Region); the State by the Attorney General’s office.

Conclusion

The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Pittman v. State cements the Court’s post-Phillips jurisprudence: Hall is not retroactive in Florida postconviction proceedings; intellectual-disability claims are subject to Rule 3.851’s time limits and successive-motion bars; and warrant-stage filings cannot circumvent these procedural constraints. The Court rejected Pittman’s due process and Eighth Amendment challenges and denied a stay, underscoring both the priority of finality and the narrow availability of warrant-phase relief. While Justice Labarga’s dissent highlights enduring concerns about equitable access to merits determinations for potentially intellectually disabled defendants, the majority’s firm adherence to Phillips signals stability in Florida’s capital postconviction landscape and provides clear guidance to litigants: intellectual-disability claims must be timely, preserved, and pursued within the established procedural framework, or they will not be heard.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Florida

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