Pinetree Principle:
Timely and Methodologically-Sound Expert Evidence Is Essential for Insureds Under All-Risk Policies

1. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision in 4539 Pinetree LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, No. 24-12713 (11th Cir. Jul. 2, 2025) (non-argument calendar), reinforces a recurring—but now crystal-clear—theme in first-party property insurance litigation: an insured cannot survive summary judgment on an all-risk policy without (1) disclosing experts in a timely manner, and (2) ensuring that those experts use reliable, data-driven methodologies.

Pinetree, the owner of a Miami Beach residence allegedly damaged during Hurricane Irma, sought hundreds of thousands of dollars in indemnity under its Lloyd’s policy. The insurer denied the supplemental claim, pointing to the $100,000 windstorm deductible and the insured’s failure to comply with post-loss duties. Litigation ensued; ultimately, the district court struck both of Pinetree’s experts—one for methodological unreliability, the other for untimely disclosure—and entered summary judgment for Lloyd’s. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in full.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The appellate court upheld the exclusion of causation expert John Micali under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert, finding his opinions speculative and unsupported by data.
• It likewise affirmed the exclusion of public adjuster Rami Boaziz under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) for late disclosure, emphasizing the absence of substantial justification or harmlessness.
• With no admissible expert proof of hurricane-related damage during the policy period, Pinetree failed to meet its burden under Florida law; therefore, summary judgment for Lloyd’s was appropriate.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) – establishes the trial court’s gatekeeping role for expert testimony.
• Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2003) – reiterates abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings.
• Hughes v. Kia Motors Corp., 766 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2014) – articulates the three-part test for Rule 702 admissibility (qualification, reliability, helpfulness).
• McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2004) – underscores focus on methodology, not conclusions.
• OFS Fitel, LLC v. Epstein Becker & Green, P.C., 549 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2008) – authorizes exclusion of undisclosed experts under Rule 37(c)(1).
• Jones v. Federated Nat’l Ins. Co., 235 So. 3d 936 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) & Peek v. American Integrity Ins. Co., 181 So. 3d 508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) – Florida cases requiring insureds to prove direct physical loss within the policy period, typically through qualified experts.
• Newcomb v. Spring Creek Cooler, Inc., 926 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 2019) – standard of review for summary judgment (de novo).

The Eleventh Circuit leaned heavily on these authorities to validate both evidentiary exclusions and the ultimate dispositive ruling. Each precedent cemented a segment of the analytical chain: Daubert/Hughes/Quiet Tech for reliability determinations, OFS Fitel for sanctions, and Jones/Peek for the insured’s substantive burden under Florida all-risk policies.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

a. Exclusion of John Micali

The court scrutinized Micali’s method: a single visual inspection 16 months after landfall, absence of pre-loss condition data, no wind-speed calculations, and a causation opinion resting on “no evidence that damage pre-existed.” The district judge deemed this speculative and unreliable, and the panel agreed. Notably, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized the methodology-versus-conclusion distinction from Daubert; Micali’s lack of analytical bridge between minimal data and sweeping conclusions rendered his testimony inadmissible.

b. Exclusion of Rami Boaziz

Pinetree attempted to convert its public adjuster from fact witness to expert after discovery closed and after Lloyd’s filed for summary judgment—without an expert report. Rule 37(c)(1) presumes exclusion unless the failure to disclose is substantially justified or harmless. Here, neither prong was satisfied: Lloyd’s had already prepared its dispositive motion, had no opportunity to depose Boaziz as an expert, and would be prejudiced by surprise testimony. The Eleventh Circuit found no abuse of discretion.

c. Summary Judgment

Florida’s all-risk framework places the initial burden on the insured to prove a direct physical loss during the policy term. Without admissible expert testimony, Pinetree lacked evidence on causation. No genuine dispute of material fact remained, making summary judgment inevitable.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

• Heightened procedural vigilance for insureds and their counsel – Late expert disclosures, even of previously identified fact witnesses, are likely to be excluded in the Eleventh Circuit absent extraordinary justification.
• Methodological rigor in property-damage causation – Visual inspections long after the event, unsupported by meteorological data or pre-loss documentation, will seldom clear the Daubert hurdle.
• Blueprint for insurers’ defense strategy – Targeting expert admissibility can dispose of an entire case if the insured’s prima facie burden depends on that testimony.
• Influence on district-court gatekeeping – The opinion reiterates that district judges have broad discretion and appellate deference when enforcing Rules 26/37 and Rule 702.
• Potential spillover into other jurisdictions – While unpublished, the reasoning aligns with nationwide trends. Other circuits and state courts may cite the decision persuasively, especially on the intersection of late disclosure and summary judgment.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• All-Risk Policy – An insurance contract covering all perils except those expressly excluded; the insured must still prove a loss occurred during the policy period.
• Daubert Standard – A rule that requires judges to ensure expert testimony is both relevant and reliable, focusing on methodology rather than conclusions.
• Rule 26 & Rule 37(c)(1) – Federal procedural rules requiring timely disclosure of expert witnesses; violations trigger mandatory or discretionary sanctions, including exclusion.
• Summary Judgment – A procedural mechanism where the court resolves a case without trial because no material fact disputes require a jury; governed by Rule 56.
• Visual Inspection Evidence – Observations made by an expert during on-site visits; without supporting data (e.g., photographs, measurements), such observations may be deemed speculative.
• Windstorm Deductible – A special, often large deductible applied to hurricane or wind damage claims, reducing insurer liability for smaller losses.

5. Conclusion

Pinetree may be unpublished, but it delivers a robust cautionary tale. The Eleventh Circuit’s per curiam opinion crystallizes the “Pinetree Principle”: In first-party property disputes, the insured’s case rises or falls on timely disclosed, methodologically reliable expert testimony establishing causation within the policy period. Failure on either timing or reliability not only dooms the expert evidence but, where no alternative proof exists, warrants summary judgment for the insurer. Going forward, litigants in the hurricane-damage arena— indeed, in any all-risk insurance contest—must marshal admissible expert support early and diligently, or risk losing before ever reaching a jury.