Pike v. Budd: First Circuit Holds State Actors May Be Individually Liable Under § 1983 for Creating a Hostile Work Environment for Non‑Employees; Replaces Title VII’s “Employer Liability” Element with a “Color‑of‑Law” Individual‑Liability Requirement

Introduction

This First Circuit decision confronts a recurring but undertheorized problem at the intersection of constitutional torts and workplace discrimination: when, and on what terms, can a non‑employee sue a state actor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a hostile work environment that occurs in a shared governmental workplace?

Plaintiff‑Appellant Samantha Pike, a licensed alcohol and drug treatment counselor employed by a private nonprofit (Wellspring, Inc.), served as the lead treatment provider on Maine’s Adult Treatment and Recovery Court (TRC) team in Penobscot County. Defendant‑Appellee Charles F. Budd, Jr., the presiding state judge over that TRC, allegedly made unwelcome sexual advances toward Pike at a mandatory out‑of‑state professional conference and later summoned her to his chambers, continuing the advances while wearing his judicial robe. Pike sued Judge Budd in his individual capacity under § 1983, alleging an Equal Protection violation through sex‑based hostile work environment. The district court dismissed on qualified immunity, reasoning that case law did not clearly establish that a state judge’s harassment of a private contractor working on a court team violated the Equal Protection Clause.

On appeal, the First Circuit vacates the dismissal. It holds that Pike plausibly alleged: (1) that Budd acted under color of state law; (2) that his conduct stated a hostile work environment claim cognizable under § 1983; and (3) that the right was clearly established so as to defeat qualified immunity at the pleading stage. Most significantly, the court articulates a clean doctrinal bridge between Title VII’s analytic framework and § 1983: in § 1983 hostile work environment claims, the traditional Title VII “employer liability” element is replaced with a requirement that the individual harasser acted under color of state law.

Summary of the Opinion

The court holds that Pike plausibly alleged Budd acted under color of state law. Totality‑of‑circumstances—including his supervisory authority over Pike’s TRC work, the mandatory nature of the conference, his explicit invocation of his judicial status in sexualized contexts, and his post‑conference summoning of Pike to chambers in robe—supports state action.
The court reaffirms that the Title VII hostile‑environment framework applies to Equal Protection claims under § 1983, with an important adaptation: for § 1983, the sixth Title VII element (“some basis for employer liability”) is replaced by “some basis for individual liability,” satisfied here by showing the harasser acted under color of state law.
On the merits of the hostile‑environment pleading, the court concludes the alleged conduct—including physical intimidation (cornering at hotel room threshold, repeated close following and looming “directly behind,” summoning to chambers and approaching from behind) plus pervasive unwelcome sexualized comments—plausibly alleges behavior sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment.
The court finds the right clearly established: longstanding First Circuit precedent recognizes Equal Protection hostile‑environment claims under § 1983; state action doctrine focuses on actual power exercised, not formal labels; and cases make clear that a state actor’s misuse of supervisory authority to sexually harass violates the Constitution. Qualified immunity is therefore unavailable on the pleadings.
The judgment is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. Costs are taxed in favor of the appellant.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Outcome

State Action (“Under Color of Law”)

West v. Atkins (U.S. 1988) and United States v. Classic (U.S. 1941): Establish that a defendant acts under color of state law when exercising power made possible by state authority or abusing a state‑conferred position.
Martinez v. Colón (1st Cir. 1995); Zambrana‑Marrero v. Suárez‑Cruz (1st Cir. 1999): Adopt a totality‑of‑the‑circumstances approach, focusing on the nature and circumstances and the relationship of the conduct to official duties. Time and place are factors, not dispositive constraints.
Lindke v. Freed (U.S. 2024): Reinforces that the private/public line turns on substance, not labels, underscoring that off‑site or off‑hours conduct can still be under color of law when connected to wielded state authority.
Griffin v. City of Opa‑Locka (11th Cir. 2001): City manager’s rape after a civic meeting could be state action where attendance was expected and authority was invoked; parallels here include the “effectively required” conference and post‑event use of official power.

Hostile Work Environment via § 1983

Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico (1st Cir. 1988); White v. Vathally (1st Cir. 1984); Pontarelli v. Stone (1st Cir. 1991): The First Circuit has long applied Title VII’s analytical framework to Equal Protection claims under § 1983 and recognized sexual harassment as actionable under § 1983.
Vance v. Ball State University (U.S. 2013); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (U.S. 1986); Harris v. Forklift Systems (U.S. 1993); Oncale v. Sundowner (U.S. 1998): Supreme Court Title VII decisions framing hostile environment’s “severe or pervasive” standard, objective and subjective offensiveness, and relevance of context.
Billings v. Town of Grafton (1st Cir. 2008); O’Rourke v. City of Providence (1st Cir. 2001); Rosario v. Dep’t of Army (1st Cir. 2010): First Circuit applications of hostile‑environment principles, including that the cumulative effect of verbal harassment can be actionable.
Vera v. McHugh (1st Cir. 2010): Physical invasion of personal space (close staring, legs touching, blocking exit) in a short timeframe can be severe enough; central to the court’s assessment of Pike’s allegations.
Ponte v. Steelcase (1st Cir. 2014): Distinguished; two isolated car‑ride incidents that did not affect work performance and caused only momentary discomfort did not suffice at summary judgment—unlike Pike’s allegations of intimidation plus work disruption.
Craig v. M&O Agencies (9th Cir. 2007); Quantock v. Shared Marketing (7th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth (U.S. 1998): Authority magnifies severity; even limited episodes can be severe where the harasser wields significant power.
Hernández‑Loring v. Universidad Metropolitana (1st Cir. 2000); Cruz v. Coach Stores (2d Cir. 2000): Third‑party harassment evidence can contribute; physically threatening proximity crosses the line into actionable harassment.

Individual Liability and the Title VII/§ 1983 Interface

Roy v. Correct Care Solutions (1st Cir. 2019): A private‑employer nurse working in a state prison pursued § 1983 claims against state officials; the court evaluated hostile environment first, then analyzed individual liability—signaling that lack of a shared employer is not a categorical bar under § 1983.
Hafer v. Melo (U.S. 1991): § 1983 enforces the Fourteenth Amendment against individuals who carry a badge of state authority; supports individual‑capacity liability.

Qualified Immunity and Clearly Established Law

Pearson v. Callahan (U.S. 2009); Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd (U.S. 2011); Anderson v. Creighton (U.S. 1987); United States v. Lanier (U.S. 1997); Hope v. Pelzer (U.S. 2002); Brosseau v. Haugen (U.S. 2004); Harlow v. Fitzgerald (U.S. 1982); D.C. v. Wesby (U.S. 2018): Canonical qualified‑immunity standards—no need for a case on all fours; principles must put the unlawfulness beyond debate; obvious clarity in context suffices.
Starnes v. Butler County (3d Cir. 2020): Recognizes a robust consensus that creating a hostile work environment can violate § 1983.
Zelinski v. Pennsylvania State Police (3d Cir. 2004); Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township (3d Cir. 1997); Markham v. White (7th Cir. 1999); David v. Denver (10th Cir. 1996); Shepherd v. Robbins (10th Cir. 2022); Johnson v. Martin (10th Cir. 1999); Hayut v. SUNY (2d Cir. 2003): Persuasive authority establishing that “supervisory” state power—even absent formal employment—satisfies state action and supports individual liability for hostile environment.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) State Action: Totality, Not Timeclock

The panel rejects the notion that state action is limited by time or setting. Considering the totality, Budd’s authority over Pike’s TRC work (ability to influence her duties, remove her from the team, affect her clients’ program participation, and impact Wellspring’s contract) and the “effectively required” nature of the conference place the interactions in the penumbra of state power. Budd’s own statements linked his judicial status to sexual attention and favoritism concerns about TRC clients—further tying his conduct to his office. Most decisively, the harassment continued in chambers, in robe, where he “summoned” Pike and again pursued her—classic misuse of judicial authority. While the court need not decide whether the conference conduct, standing alone, was under color of law, the in‑chambers episode cements state action.

2) Substantive Viability: Adapting Title VII’s Framework to § 1983

The First Circuit reiterates that Equal Protection claims alleging sex‑based harassment track Title VII’s analytical framework. It then makes an important doctrinal clarification: because § 1983 targets individual state actors, not statutory “employers,” the Title VII requirement of “some basis for employer liability” is replaced with “some basis for individual liability”—here, that the harasser acted under color of state law. This resolves the district court’s concern that Pike’s status as a private employee (rather than a state employee) precluded liability. It does not. The question is whether the state actor misused state authority to create a hostile environment in a shared workplace.

3) Severe or Pervasive: Authority-Infused Intimidation Counts

The court emphasizes that severity is context‑sensitive. Authority matters. Even fewer episodes can be actionable when a harasser wields significant power over the victim (Ellerth; Craig; Quantock). The conduct here was not “entirely verbal”: lying about room location to approach Pike’s door; holding the door; pressing for an invitation to enter; relentless following and looming behind; public and private sexualized comments; and later, a robe‑clad summons to chambers, approaching from behind as she attempted to leave. The allegations describe a physically intimidating pattern capable of altering work conditions, especially given Budd’s control over Pike’s TRC duties and the knock‑on impact on her employment with Wellspring (e.g., avoiding TRC, seeking accompaniment, skipping court). The court distinguishes Ponte, which involved two isolated incidents, no work effect, and only momentary discomfort, decided at summary judgment.

4) Clearly Established: Obvious from Existing Law

The panel synthesizes First Circuit and Supreme Court precedent to conclude that any reasonable judge would know that leveraging judicial authority to sexually harass a subordinate in a shared workplace violates Equal Protection. The building blocks have long been clear in this circuit:

Sex‑based discrimination violates Equal Protection (Reed v. Reed).
Title VII’s discriminatory‑treatment standards apply to Equal Protection claims (Vathally; Lipsett).
On‑the‑job sexual harassment is actionable under § 1983 (Pontarelli; Lipsett; Roy).
State action focuses on abuse of state power (West; Martinez; Lindke).
Invasions of physical space and looming intimidation can create a hostile environment, even over a short period (Vera; Cruz).

Although no prior case involved a state judge harassing a private contractor on a problem‑solving court team, qualified immunity does not require a case “on all fours.” The unlawfulness here follows with “obvious clarity” from established principles (Hope; Lanier; Anderson). The district court’s employer‑employee fixation is misplaced under § 1983.

Impact

Doctrinal Clarifications

New First Circuit formulation: In § 1983 hostile‑environment claims, Title VII’s sixth element (“employer liability”) is replaced by a requirement to show “some basis for individual liability,” satisfied by proving the harasser acted under color of law. This is a significant and clarifying adaptation for constitutional harassment claims brought by non‑employees.
State action in shared workplaces: Off‑site or after‑hours conduct linked to official duties and followed by in‑office misuse of power can constitute state action. Totality controls; time and place are not dispositive.
Authority magnifies severity: The decision underscores that a harasser’s control over the victim’s work conditions heightens the coercive character of misconduct; fewer incidents may suffice when the harasser wields significant supervisory power.

Practical Consequences

For judges and court‑based collaborative teams (e.g., treatment/recovery courts, specialty dockets): Judicial officers and other state actors who functionally supervise non‑employees (contractors, service providers, counselors) face personal § 1983 exposure for hostile environments created by misuse of state authority. Ethics and workplace training should expressly address interactions at conferences and off‑site events.
For governmental entities and their contractors: Non‑employee professionals embedded in governmental teams now have a clearer § 1983 pathway against individual state actors. Contract administrators should delineate authority structures and implement reporting and anti‑harassment protocols that span joint work settings, including travel and conferences.
Pleading and qualified immunity: Defendants should not expect early dismissal on qualified immunity merely because the plaintiff is a contractor or because some conduct occurred off‑site. Allegations tying conduct to state authority and describing work‑related impact will often defeat immunity at Rule 12(b)(6).
Litigation strategy: Plaintiffs can plead the Title VII framework while alleging color‑of‑law facts to satisfy the adapted § 1983 element. Defendants should focus on disputing the authority linkage and whether the conduct was severe or pervasive, reserving fact‑intensive defenses for summary judgment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Under Color of State Law: The defendant used power he had because of his government job. It is not about the location or time of day; it is about whether the conduct flowed from, or exploited, official authority.
Hostile Work Environment: A workplace polluted by intimidation, ridicule, or insult based on a protected trait (here, sex), so severe or pervasive that it changes the conditions of the victim’s work. The total picture matters: frequency, seriousness, whether it felt threatening or humiliating, and whether it disrupted work.
Title VII vs. § 1983: Title VII is a statute that lets employees sue employers. § 1983 is a constitutional tort that lets people sue individual state actors for violating federal rights. In § 1983 hostile‑environment claims, you don’t need the defendant to be your “employer”; you must show the individual acted under color of law.
Severe or Pervasive: Not a numbers game. A small number of episodes can be “severe” (e.g., cornering at a hotel room door, summoning to chambers in robe). Power dynamics (supervisor/subordinate) can make conduct more coercive.
Qualified Immunity: Shields officials unless precedent makes it clear to any reasonable officer that the conduct violates the Constitution. No “exact match” case is required; obvious applications of general rules defeat immunity.

Conclusion

Pike v. Budd materially advances the law of constitutional harassment in the First Circuit. It squarely holds that a non‑employee embedded in a shared government workplace can pursue an Equal Protection hostile‑environment claim against an individual state actor who misuses state authority. To harmonize Title VII’s framework with § 1983’s focus on individual state actors, the court clarifies that the “employer liability” element is replaced by a color‑of‑law individual‑liability requirement. Applying a totality‑of‑circumstances approach to state action and severity, the court finds Pike’s allegations plausible and the governing law clearly established, defeating qualified immunity at the pleading stage.

The opinion carries practical weight for problem‑solving courts and other interdisciplinary public settings where government officials functionally supervise private professionals. It signals that judicial and supervisory authority travels beyond the courtroom and can transform off‑site interactions into constitutional violations when that authority is abused, particularly where intimidation and control over work conditions are in play. As such, Pike v. Budd is likely to become a touchstone in future § 1983 hostile‑environment litigation involving contractors and shared workspaces.

Key Takeaways

New rule (First Circuit): For § 1983 hostile‑environment claims, replace Title VII’s “employer liability” element with “individual liability under color of law.”
Non‑employees embedded in government teams can sue state actors under § 1983 for hostile environments created by misuse of official authority.
State action is a totality inquiry; off‑site or after‑hours conduct connected to official power—and especially follow‑up misuse of authority in chambers—can be under color of law.
Authority magnifies coercion: fewer incidents can be severe when the harasser controls the victim’s work or prospects.
The right was clearly established; qualified immunity did not warrant dismissal at Rule 12(b)(6).