Pierce v. Cannon: Tenth Circuit Applies Kansas COVID-19 Limitations Suspension to § 1983 Claims and Reaffirms Eleventh-Amendment Bar on Official-Capacity Damages
Introduction
In Pierce v. Cannon, No. 24-3183 (10th Cir. Mar. 25, 2025), a Tenth Circuit panel (Judges Matheson, Phillips, and McHugh; opinion by Judge Phillips) affirmed the dismissal of a pro se prisoner’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from a sexual assault by a cellmate at El Dorado Correctional Facility (EDCF), a Kansas state prison. The plaintiff, Morehei Pierce, alleged prison officials failed to protect him from a known sexual predator and then covered up the assault. The district court dismissed his official-capacity claims on Eleventh-Amendment grounds and his individual-capacity claims as time barred under Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations. The Tenth Circuit affirmed on both grounds.
The decision is notable for two reasons. First, it squarely applies Kansas’s COVID‑19 suspension of statutes of limitation to a § 1983 claim—explicitly concluding that employing the state’s tolling framework advances § 1983’s remedial goals and is therefore borrowed under established federal practice. Second, it reiterates the familiar but critical rule that Eleventh‑Amendment immunity bars suits for money damages against state officials sued in their official capacities absent a request for prospective relief addressing an ongoing federal violation.
Although the disposition is an unpublished order and judgment and therefore not binding precedent (except under law-of-the-case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel), it is citable for persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Summary of the Opinion
- The court affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) of Pierce’s official-capacity claims against EDCF personnel because the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages against state officials in their official capacities, and Pierce sought no prospective relief.
- The court affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the individual-capacity claims as time barred. Borrowing Kansas’s two-year limitations period (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60‑513(a)(4)), the panel held that federal accrual occurred no later than November 13, 2020, when Pierce signed a medical/incident report confirming the assault. Applying Kansas’s pandemic suspension of statutes of limitation (March 19, 2020 through April 15, 2021), the court concluded the limitations period began to run on April 15, 2021 and expired on April 15, 2023. Pierce filed on April 23, 2024—over a year too late.
- The court reviewed de novo both the jurisdictional and Rule 12(b)(6) determinations, applied liberal construction to the pro se pleadings, and, having affirmed on Eleventh-Amendment and limitations grounds, did not reach the Rule 12(b)(5) service issue.
Analysis
Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Influence
- Williams v. Utah Department of Corrections, 928 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2019): The panel relied on Williams for the proposition that Eleventh-Amendment immunity extends to arms of the state and to state officials sued for damages in their official capacities. This provided the doctrinal anchor for disposing of the official-capacity claims under Rule 12(b)(1).
- Kripp v. Luton, 466 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2006): Kripp supplies two critical rules for § 1983 timing: (1) federal courts borrow the forum state’s statute of limitations for § 1983 actions, and (2) accrual is governed by federal law and occurs when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action. This framework directed the court to Kansas’s two‑year period and to a federal accrual analysis focused on Pierce’s knowledge by November 13, 2020.
- Shrum v. Cooke, 60 F.4th 1304 (10th Cir. 2023), and Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978): These authorities explain that federal courts borrow state tolling rules in § 1983 cases unless doing so would undermine § 1983’s purposes. The panel expressly applied this principle to Kansas’s pandemic suspension orders, concluding that recognizing the suspension “advances § 1983’s goals” of compensating victims of constitutional violations and deterring abuses of power. This determination brought Kansas’s COVID-era suspension into the § 1983 analysis.
- Kansas Supreme Court Administrative Orders: The court cited Kan. Sup. Ct., Admin. Order No. 2021‑RL‑32 (Apr. 3, 2020) and Admin. Order No. 2021‑PR‑020 (Mar. 30, 2021), which collectively suspended all statutes of limitation from March 19, 2020 through April 15, 2021. The orders’ effect was to halt the running of limitations during that period and restart the clock on April 15, 2021.
- E.W. v. Health Net Life Ins. Co., 86 F.4th 1265, 1286 n.3 (10th Cir. 2023): Cited for the proposition that courts may consider documents attached to the complaint that are central to the claims and whose authenticity is not disputed. This allowed the panel to use the investigation status report Pierce signed on November 13, 2020 to fix the latest accrual date.
- Trackwell v. U.S. Government, 472 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2007): Provided the standards of review and the principle of liberal construction of pro se filings.
Legal Reasoning
1) Eleventh-Amendment Immunity and Official-Capacity Claims
The panel affirmed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal of official-capacity claims against the EDCF officer (Gorman), the EDCF investigator (Cannon), and the former warden (Waddington). Under Williams and the Eleventh Amendment, a suit for money damages against state officials in their official capacities is treated as a suit against the state and is barred absent consent or abrogation. An exception exists for suits seeking prospective relief to halt an ongoing violation of federal law (the familiar Ex parte Young doctrine), but Pierce sought only damages and alleged no ongoing violation suitable for prospective relief. Accordingly, dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was proper.
2) Statute of Limitations, Accrual, and COVID-Era Suspension
For § 1983 claims in Kansas, the court borrowed the two-year limitations period in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60‑513(a)(4). Accrual is governed by federal law: a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury. The panel identified November 13, 2020—when Pierce signed an investigation/medical status report confirming the assault—as the latest accrual date based on the attached exhibit.
Turning to tolling, the court borrowed Kansas’s pandemic suspension of statutes of limitation from March 19, 2020 to April 15, 2021 and expressly found that applying this suspension is consistent with, indeed furthers, § 1983’s goals (Shrum; Robertson). Because Pierce’s claim accrued during the suspension window, the limitations period did not run from November 13, 2020 until April 15, 2021. The panel articulated this by stating that “Pierce’s claims did not accrue until April 15, 2021,” which is best understood as shorthand for “the limitations period did not begin to run until the suspension ended on April 15, 2021.”
Either way, the arithmetic is the same: the two-year period effectively began to run on April 15, 2021 and expired on April 15, 2023. Pierce filed on April 23, 2024—over a year late—rendering his individual-capacity claims time barred under Rule 12(b)(6).
Key Timeline
- Assault and knowledge of injury: no later than November 13, 2020 (exhibit attached to complaint)
- Kansas suspension in effect: March 19, 2020 – April 15, 2021
- Running of limitations begins: April 15, 2021
- Two-year deadline: April 15, 2023
- Complaint filed: April 23, 2024 (untimely)
Impact and Practical Implications
1) Pandemic Tolling in § 1983 Actions
The court’s express application of Kansas’s COVID‑19 suspension to § 1983 claims provides persuasive authority that pandemic-related tolling or suspension measures in a forum state will be borrowed in § 1983 litigation so long as they do not undermine, and may even advance, § 1983’s compensatory and deterrent aims. Litigants bringing civil-rights claims in Kansas (and across Tenth Circuit states with comparable COVID orders) should carefully map their filing deadlines using any applicable suspension/tolling periods.
2) Clarifying the Limitations Clock When Accrual Falls Within a Suspension
Where a claim accrues during a suspension period, the limitations clock will not run until the suspension ends. The panel’s phrasing (“did not accrue until April 15, 2021”) may conflate accrual with the commencement of the limitations period, but the practical takeaway is clear: the plaintiff receives the full statutory period starting the day the suspension lifts. Counsel should compute deadlines accordingly.
3) Official-Capacity Claims: Pleading for Prospective Relief
Plaintiffs seeking relief from state officials in their official capacities must tailor their pleadings to request prospective injunctive or declaratory relief aimed at an ongoing violation of federal law to fit within the Ex parte Young pathway. Damages claims against official-capacity defendants will be dismissed on Eleventh-Amendment grounds.
4) Exhibits Can Fix Accrual
Attaching documents that timestamp knowledge of injury can fix the accrual date on the face of the complaint. Here, the plaintiff’s own exhibit supplied the latest possible accrual date and enabled a Rule 12(b)(6) time-bar dismissal. Plaintiffs should be judicious in what they attach; defendants should scrutinize attachments for accrual evidence.
5) Unreached Issues Remain Unresolved
- The panel did not reach Rule 12(b)(5) service-of-process arguments because the case was resolved on Eleventh-Amendment and limitations grounds.
- No merits analysis of the Eighth Amendment “deliberate indifference” claim or qualified immunity was undertaken due to the time bar.
- The opinion does not address whether additional equitable doctrines (e.g., equitable tolling beyond the COVID suspension) might apply; none were argued or found applicable here.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983: A federal statute allowing individuals to sue state actors for violations of federal rights (e.g., constitutional rights), typically in federal court.
- Official vs. Individual Capacity: Suing an official in their official capacity is essentially suing the state; money damages are generally barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Suing an official in their individual capacity seeks to hold the person personally liable; damages may be available (subject to defenses like qualified immunity).
- Eleventh-Amendment Immunity: Limits federal court suits against states and state officials acting in their official capacities for money damages. An exception allows suits seeking prospective relief to halt ongoing violations of federal law (Ex parte Young doctrine).
- Accrual: The moment a claim “comes into existence” for limitations purposes. For § 1983, accrual happens when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the claim.
- Statute of Limitations: The deadline for filing a lawsuit. In § 1983 cases, federal courts borrow the state’s analogous period (two years in Kansas for personal-injury-like claims).
- Tolling/Suspension: Legal doctrines or orders that pause the running of the limitations period. Kansas’s COVID orders suspended limitations from March 19, 2020 through April 15, 2021; time did not count against litigants during that window.
- IFP and Screening: In Forma Pauperis status permits filing without prepaying fees. Courts must screen IFP complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and can dismiss claims that fail to state a claim or target immune defendants.
- Deliberate Indifference (Eighth Amendment): A standard requiring proof that officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate. Although the magistrate judge initially found Pierce’s allegations sufficient against certain defendants, the appellate disposition did not reach the merits due to immunity and time bar.
Conclusion
Pierce v. Cannon reinforces two bedrock principles while providing a timely clarification for civil-rights litigation filed in the wake of the pandemic. First, official-capacity damages claims against state officials remain foreclosed by Eleventh-Amendment immunity absent a claim for prospective relief addressing an ongoing federal violation. Second, the Tenth Circuit confirms that Kansas’s COVID‑19 suspension of statutes of limitation applies in § 1983 actions—consistent with the statute’s compensatory and deterrent objectives—and that when a claim accrues during a suspension period, the limitations clock does not begin to run until the suspension ends.
The ruling offers clear, practical guidance: compute § 1983 deadlines by borrowing the forum state’s limitations and tolling rules; plead official-capacity claims, if any, in the form of prospective relief when appropriate; and be mindful that exhibits attached to complaints can conclusively establish accrual dates. While unpublished, the opinion is persuasive authority in the Tenth Circuit and will likely inform future limitations analyses for § 1983 claims arising in Kansas during the pandemic era.
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