Pierce v. Cannon: Kansas’s COVID-19 Suspension Applies to § 1983 Deadlines, Delaying the Limitations Clock to April 15, 2021; Official-Capacity Damages Claims Barred by Eleventh Amendment
Introduction
In Pierce v. Cannon, No. 24-3183 (10th Cir. Mar. 25, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a pro se § 1983 action brought by a Kansas inmate who alleged an Eighth Amendment violation arising from sexual assault by his cellmate and officials’ deliberate indifference. The decision addresses two key issues:
- Whether Eleventh Amendment immunity deprives federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over official-capacity claims seeking money damages from state officials; and
- How to compute the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims under Kansas law in light of the Kansas Supreme Court’s COVID-19 administrative orders suspending statutes of limitation from March 19, 2020, through April 15, 2021.
The panel (Judges Matheson, Phillips, and McHugh) held that:
- Official-capacity damages claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and
- Individual-capacity claims were time barred because, even after applying Kansas’s pandemic suspension (which the court held applies to § 1983 claims), the two-year limitations period expired on April 15, 2023, and the complaint was not filed until April 23, 2024.
Although issued as a nonprecedential order and judgment, the opinion may be cited for its persuasive value. It provides a clear, practical template for calculating § 1983 limitations periods in Kansas given the COVID-19 suspension and reinforces the jurisdictional bar on official-capacity damages suits against state actors in federal court.
Summary of the Opinion
- Procedural posture: After in forma pauperis screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the District of Kansas allowed Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims to proceed against three El Dorado Correctional Facility (EDCF) officials (Cannon, Gorman, and former Warden Waddington), but dismissed claims against the Kansas Attorney General and the Secretary of Corrections. The remaining defendants then moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed official-capacity claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Eleventh Amendment) and individual-capacity claims as time barred. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
- Eleventh Amendment: The court agreed that official-capacity damages claims against state officials are barred absent waiver or valid abrogation, and the Ex parte Young-style exception for prospective relief did not apply because the plaintiff sought only money damages.
- Statute of limitations and tolling: The court borrowed Kansas’s two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims and federal accrual rules (claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury). It also borrowed Kansas’s pandemic suspension of statutes of limitation (March 19, 2020–April 15, 2021), concluding that applying that suspension is consistent with § 1983’s compensatory and deterrent goals. Because Pierce learned of his injury by November 13, 2020—within the suspension period—the panel treated the limitations clock as not beginning until April 15, 2021, and expiring on April 15, 2023. The April 23, 2024 complaint was therefore untimely.
- Other issues: Because the court affirmed on Eleventh Amendment and statute-of-limitations grounds, it did not reach defendants’ Rule 12(b)(5) service-of-process argument.
Analysis
Precedents Cited and Their Influence
- Trackwell v. U.S. Gov’t, 472 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2007) — Provides the standard of review: de novo review of dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(1)) and for failure to state a claim (Rule 12(b)(6)). The panel applied this framework to assess Eleventh Amendment immunity and the statute-of-limitations dismissal.
- Williams v. Utah Dep’t of Corrs., 928 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2019) — Reiterates that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states and arms of the state in federal court, and that immunity extends to state officials sued for damages in their official capacity. Williams also recognizes the prospective-relief exception for ongoing violations (Ex parte Young-style), which the panel referenced in describing the exception but found inapplicable because Pierce sought damages, not prospective relief.
- Kripp v. Luton, 466 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2006) — Establishes two bedrock § 1983 timing principles in this circuit: (1) federal law governs accrual (a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury), and (2) the forum state’s statute of limitations applies. The panel used Kripp to borrow Kansas’s two-year period and to fix accrual, then layered Kansas’s suspension on top for the timing calculation.
- Shrum v. Cooke, 60 F.4th 1304 (10th Cir. 2023) and Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978) — Confirm that courts generally borrow the forum state’s tolling rules for § 1983 unless doing so would defeat the statute’s goals (compensation and deterrence). The panel expressly concluded that applying Kansas’s COVID-19 suspension advances § 1983’s goals, and therefore it incorporated that suspension into the limitations analysis.
- E.W. v. Health Net Life Ins. Co., 86 F.4th 1265 (10th Cir. 2023) — Authorizes consideration, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, of documents attached to the complaint when they are central to the claims and undisputed in authenticity. Relying on E.W., the panel considered the investigation status report signed by Pierce on November 13, 2020 to establish the latest date by which he knew of his injury.
Legal Reasoning
1) Eleventh Amendment Immunity and Official-Capacity Claims
The Eleventh Amendment bars federal suits against states for damages. That immunity extends to “arms of the state” and to state officials sued for damages in their official capacities—functionally suits against the state itself. The Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) because:
- Pierce sued state officials in their official capacities for money damages;
- No waiver or congressional abrogation applies to § 1983 damages claims against states; and
- The limited exception for prospective relief to halt an ongoing violation (the Ex parte Young doctrine) did not apply because Pierce sought only damages, not forward-looking relief.
As a jurisdictional matter in the Tenth Circuit, such official-capacity damages claims cannot proceed in federal court.
2) Limitations Period, Accrual, and the COVID-19 Suspension
For § 1983 claims, federal law governs the accrual date: a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury. States supply the limitations period and generally the tolling rules. Applying these principles, the panel reasoned as follows:
- Applicable limitations period: Kansas’s two-year period for personal injury-type claims governs § 1983 claims. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4).
- Accrual: Pierce knew of his injury no later than November 13, 2020, the date he signed the prison investigation status report describing the assault.
- State tolling/suspension applies: The court borrowed Kansas’s pandemic suspension of all statutes of limitation from March 19, 2020, through April 15, 2021 (per Kansas Supreme Court Administrative Orders), concluding that this suspension “advances § 1983’s goals of compensating persons injured by a deprivation of federal rights and preventing future abuses of power.”
- Effect of suspension on the clock: Because Pierce’s accrual date fell within the suspension period, the panel treated the limitations clock as not beginning until April 15, 2021. Consequently, the two-year period expired on April 15, 2023.
- Untimely filing: Pierce filed on April 23, 2024—more than a year late—so his individual-capacity claims are time barred under Rule 12(b)(6).
Importantly, the court’s analysis provides a clear method for integrating Kansas’s suspension into § 1983 timing: if the claim accrued during the suspension, the limitations period does not begin until the suspension ends; if it accrued before March 19, 2020, any time elapsed before March 19 counts, the clock pauses during the suspension, and resumes after April 15, 2021; and if it accrued after April 15, 2021, the suspension has no effect.
3) Pro Se Pleading and Attached Exhibits
While the court liberally construed Pierce’s pro se filings, it still applied jurisdictional and limitations rules strictly. Under E.W., it considered the exhibit attached to the complaint (the signed investigative report) both to confirm accrual timing and to resolve the statute-of-limitations issue at the pleading stage.
Impact
- Practical deadline clarity for Kansas § 1983 suits: The opinion offers an authoritative template (within the Tenth Circuit) for applying Kansas’s COVID-19 suspension to § 1983 claims. Litigants should compute deadlines by placing the accrual date relative to the March 19, 2020–April 15, 2021 suspension window and adjusting the start or pause of the limitations clock accordingly. Many claims that accrued during the pandemic window would have expired on April 15, 2023 unless other tolling applies.
- Borrowing state tolling that aligns with § 1983’s purposes: The court’s express finding—that adopting Kansas’s suspension “advances” § 1983’s remedial and deterrent aims—signals a willingness to incorporate emergency state tolling measures in federal civil rights cases, so long as they do not undermine federal policy. That reasoning is persuasive for other tolling rules that expand access without frustrating § 1983’s purposes.
- Reinforced Eleventh Amendment boundaries: The decision underscores the familiar but often misunderstood rule that damages claims against state officials in their official capacities are jurisdictionally barred. Plaintiffs seeking systemic reform must plead and substantiate prospective injunctive relief against the appropriate state official for an ongoing violation; damages claims must be brought against officials in their individual capacities, subject to personal defenses (including qualified immunity and timeliness).
- Use of complaint exhibits in 12(b)(6) practice: The panel’s reliance on an exhibit attached to—and central to—the complaint emphasizes a tactical point for both plaintiffs and defendants: exhibits can and will be used to resolve threshold issues like timeliness early in litigation.
- Weight of authority: Although nonprecedential, the opinion may be cited for persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. Given the straightforward application of settled doctrine, district courts within the circuit are likely to follow its timing approach to Kansas’s COVID suspension absent contrary authority.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- Section 1983: A federal statute allowing individuals to sue state and local officials for violations of federal rights. It does not supply its own limitations period, so courts borrow the most analogous state statute of limitations and tolling rules.
- Accrual vs. limitations period vs. tolling/suspension:
- Accrual (federal law) is when the claim “comes into existence” for timing purposes—typically when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury.
- Limitations period (state law) is how long the plaintiff has to file after accrual—two years in Kansas for § 1983.
- Tolling or suspension (state law) pauses or delays the running of the limitations clock. Kansas’s COVID-19 orders suspended the running of all statutes of limitation from March 19, 2020 to April 15, 2021.
- Eleventh Amendment immunity: A constitutional protection that bars suits in federal court against states (and state officials sued in their official capacities for money damages), unless the state consents or Congress validly abrogates immunity. A narrow exception allows suits for prospective injunctive relief to stop an ongoing violation of federal law.
- Official-capacity vs. individual-capacity suits:
- Official capacity = the state is the real party in interest; damages claims are typically barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
- Individual capacity = the official’s personal liability for actions under color of state law; permitted under § 1983 but subject to defenses (e.g., qualified immunity) and procedural bars (e.g., limitations).
- Rule 12(b)(1) vs. Rule 12(b)(6):
- 12(b)(1) allows dismissal when the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction (e.g., Eleventh Amendment immunity in this circuit).
- 12(b)(6) allows dismissal when the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (e.g., because claims are time barred on the face of the pleadings).
- Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference: In the prison context, officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate. Although the magistrate judge initially found this theory sufficiently alleged against certain defendants for screening purposes, the claims ultimately failed for jurisdictional and timing reasons.
Conclusion
Pierce v. Cannon delivers two instructive takeaways for civil rights practice in Kansas federal courts. First, as to official-capacity damages claims, the Eleventh Amendment remains a hard jurisdictional bar; plaintiffs must either sue in individual capacities or seek properly framed prospective relief for ongoing violations. Second, the Tenth Circuit provides a clear and plaintiff-friendly method for integrating Kansas’s COVID-19 suspension into § 1983 limitations calculations: when a claim accrues during the suspension window, the limitations clock begins on April 15, 2021; when accrual occurs before or after that window, time is respectively paused or unaffected as appropriate. Even with that benefit, timeliness remains dispositive—Pierce’s filing came more than a year late.
Although nonprecedential, the opinion offers a practical, persuasive roadmap on pandemic-era tolling and familiar jurisdictional boundaries. Its reasoning will likely guide district courts facing similar timing issues in § 1983 litigation arising out of Kansas and inform litigants on how to frame and time their claims going forward.
Comments