Petersen v. Pedersen: Circumstantial Probable Cause and the Scope of Qualified Immunity in OWI Arrests

1. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Mark Petersen v. Stefanie Pedersen, No. 24-1206 (7th Cir. 2025), offers an important clarification on two recurring Fourth-Amendment themes: (i) when circumstantial evidence— bolstered by the arresting officer’s prior knowledge of a suspect—can create probable cause for Operating While Intoxicated (“OWI”) even without an eyewitness to driving, and (ii) the breadth of “arguable probable cause” that shields officers under qualified immunity. Mark Petersen sued Deputy Stefanie Pedersen under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and an allegedly unlawful, non-consensual blood draw. The district court granted summary judgment to the deputy; the Court of Appeals affirmed.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Maldonado held:

Probable cause existed to arrest Petersen for OWI based on the totality of the circumstances, even though nobody saw him drive.
The subsequent blood draw was legal because it was executed pursuant to a properly issued telephonic search warrant.
Regardless, Deputy Pedersen enjoyed qualified immunity because she had at least “arguable probable cause.”

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Smith v. Crounse Corp., 72 F.4th 799 (7th Cir. 2023) – reiterated the rule that facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant at summary judgment.
Mwangangi v. Nielsen, 48 F.4th 816 (7th Cir. 2022) – established that a false-arrest claim fails where probable cause (or even arguable probable cause) exists; served as the doctrinal backbone for dismissing Petersen’s § 1983 claims.
Jump v. Village of Shorewood, 42 F.4th 782 (7th Cir. 2022) & Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2015) – supplied the modern Seventh-Circuit formulation of probable cause as a “fluid” common-sense judgment, reinforcing that certainty is not required.
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018) – the Court borrowed Wesby’s “substantial chance” language, underscoring that even ambiguous facts can amount to probable cause.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) – invoked for the “totality of the circumstances” framework, and to validate consideration of the officer’s prior knowledge of the suspect.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) – applied to the attack on the search warrant; the court found Petersen lacked evidence that officer testimony was intentionally false.
Huff v. Reichert, 744 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 2014) & Abbott v. Sangamon County, 705 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2013) – expounded the “arguable probable cause” standard that undergirds qualified immunity.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Totality of Circumstances for Probable Cause – The panel catalogued multiple circumstantial factors:

Fresh tire tracks cutting through private property and a damaged vehicle immediately adjacent to the suspect.
Petersen’s visible intoxication (slurred speech, odor, swaying, glassy eyes) moments after the crash report.
Bystander statements that no one else was present at the scene.
The deputy’s prior knowledge of Petersen’s estrangement from his daughter (undercutting his alibi) and his prior OWIs/licence suspension.
Timing: Deputy arrived roughly 15 minutes after the 911 call—diminishing the likelihood that someone else drove and fled.

Collectively, these facts furnished “a substantial chance” Petersen had operated the vehicle while intoxicated, clearing the probable-cause threshold.

b) Qualified Immunity – Even if actual probable cause were debatable, the doctrine protects officers who possess arguable probable cause. Because everything Deputy Pedersen knew would cause any reasonable officer to believe an OWI had been committed, immunity applied.

c) Validity of the Blood-Draw Warrant – Employing Franks, the court emphasized how difficult it is to suppress evidence based on alleged misstatements in a warrant application. Body-camera footage and a court transcript disproved Petersen’s claim that the deputy lied about witnessing driving. Once the alleged falsity evaporated, the warrant’s validity—and the legality of the blood draw—remained unquestioned.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

• Clarification of Circumstantial Probable Cause: The opinion solidifies that officers may rely on commonsense inferences—bolstered by prior knowledge—to establish probable cause for OWI even absent a direct eyewitness. Wisconsin officers (and likely those in other Seventh-Circuit states) may arrest when a drunk, sole-occupant suspect is found next to a recently crashed vehicle.
• Qualified Immunity Parameters: The case reaffirms that “arguable probable cause” is a forgiving standard. Plaintiffs who rely on borderline factual disputes face an uphill battle at summary judgment.
• Franks Challenges: The decision underscores the evidentiary burden for plaintiffs attacking warrant veracity. Contemporaneous recordings (body-cams, telephonic transcripts) will usually doom such challenges unless stark evidence of intentional deceit exists.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable Cause: A commonsense assessment that there is a “fair probability” a crime was committed. Not certainty, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt—just a reasonable likelihood.
Qualified Immunity: A legal shield protecting officers from civil liability unless their conduct violates “clearly established” rights. If reasonable officers could disagree, immunity attaches.
Arguable Probable Cause: A subset of qualified immunity; asks whether a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed, even if a court later determines it did not.
Franks Hearing: A proceeding where a defendant seeks to invalidate a warrant by showing the affiant intentionally or recklessly included false material statements. Without solid proof of falsity, courts seldom grant a hearing.
Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion): Prevents re-litigation of an issue already decided by a final judgment. Here, the state court’s suppression ruling lacked final-judgment status, so it did not bind the federal court.

5. Conclusion

Petersen v. Pedersen is now a leading Seventh-Circuit authority for three propositions:

Probable cause for OWI can rest entirely on circumstantial evidence where the suspect’s intoxication, the scene dynamics, and bystander accounts point to recent operation of a vehicle.
When those circumstances would persuade “reasonable officers,” qualified immunity will bar § 1983 false-arrest suits even if hindsight might reveal gaps in the evidence.
Body-camera documentation and telephonic-warrant transcripts form potent barriers against Franks-type claims that officers misled magistrates.

Practitioners should read the opinion as both a blueprint for defending officers in similar fact patterns and a cautionary tale for plaintiffs who must marshal more than speculative inferences to survive summary judgment. For law-enforcement agencies, the case validates continued reliance on real-time circumstantial assessments—especially when supported by clear audio-visual records—to satisfy constitutional standards.