Personal Motives, Corporate Shields: Alabama Supreme Court Narrows Vicarious Liability and Clarifies Causation in Intentional-Interference Claims – Commentary on Flickinger v. King (2025)

1. Introduction

The decision in Daniel Flickinger v. Lawrence Tracy King and King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C., 2025 Ala. LEXIS ___ (May 9, 2025) marks the second appellate visit of a politically-charged employment fallout that began with a controversial Facebook post in the wake of George Floyd’s death. At stake were three core issues: (1) whether an Alabama law firm can be vicariously liable for the personal social-media actions of a partner, (2) what quantum of causal connection is necessary in an intentional tort of interference with business relations, and (3) the boundaries of the “truthful-information” justification defense under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 772.

The parties:

Appellant: Daniel Flickinger – a former associate at Wainwright, Pope & McMeekin, P.C. (“WPM”), who resigned under pressure after his employer was confronted with a screenshot of his personal social-media post.
Appellees: (i) Lawrence Tracy King – a partner in the plaintiff-side firm King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C.; (ii) the firm itself (collectively, “the King defendants”).
Trial Court: Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-21-226 – granted summary judgment to both King and his firm and denied discovery motions.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the summary judgment as to the firm, finding no vicarious liability, but reversed as to King individually, holding that genuine issues of fact remained on causation and justification. The Court also sustained the trial court’s discovery and continuance rulings.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Corporate Liability Eliminated. Because King’s disclosure of Flickinger’s post was motivated by personal friendship and not undertaken within the line and scope of employment, the firm cannot be held liable under respondeat superior. Summary judgment for King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C. is therefore affirmed.
Individual Liability Revived. The Court held that a jury could find King’s transmission of the post to be a “substantial factor” in causing Flickinger’s forced resignation, satisfying the more lenient causation standard applicable to intentional torts. Accordingly, summary judgment for King is reversed and the case remanded.
Justification Defense Not Established as a Matter of Law. King’s conduct is not insulated by Restatement § 772 because he forwarded a “counterfeit” screenshot that falsely associated Flickinger’s post with the employer. Whether the interference was “proper” under Restatement § 767 factors is for a jury.
Discovery & Continuance. Denial of a subpoena for cell-phone records and a related continuance was affirmed; the Court found the requested data irrelevant or speculative.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Flickinger v. King, 385 So. 3d 504 (Ala. 2023) – The first appeal, which reinstated the tortious-interference claim. The present judgment builds on that opinion, especially its characterization of the “counterfeit” screenshot as false information.
White Sands Group, L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 32 So. 3d 5 (Ala. 2009) – Reaffirmed the five-element test for tortious interference, adopted here.
Cobbs, Allen & Hall, Inc. v. EPIC Holdings, Inc., 335 So. 3d 1115 (Ala. 2021) – Adopted Restatement §§ 767 and 772 for justification analysis; court relies on it to frame King’s defense.
Shades Ridge Holding Co. v. Cobbs, Allen & Hall Mortgage Co., 390 So. 2d 601 (Ala. 1980) – Critical for the relaxed or extended causation standard in intentional torts; Court quotes extensively to reject the trial court’s proximate-cause ruling.
Respondeat-superior line-and-scope cases: QHG of Enterprise v. Pertuit, 323 So. 3d 1171 (Ala. 2020); East Alabama Behavioral Medicine v. Chancey, 883 So. 2d 162 (Ala. 2003); USA Petroleum Corp. v. Hines, 770 So. 2d 589 (Ala. 1999).
Intentional-tort causation authorities: Rondini v. Bunn, 338 So. 3d 749 (Ala. 2021).

3.2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Vicarious Liability / Scope of Employment

The Court framed the dispositive corporation question as whether King’s act was within the line and scope of employment or conferred a benefit on the firm. Key factual cues:

Time: 9 p.m., well outside business hours;
Motive: longstanding friendship with Wainwright, concern for WPM’s reputation;
No firm business purpose or benefit demonstrated.

Absent evidence that the firm profited or even encouraged the conduct, the Court held King acted from wholly personal motives. Hence, personal motives, corporate shields.

b) Causation in Intentional Interference

Unlike negligence, intentional torts do not require the tight foreseeability-proximate-cause nexus. Under Shades Ridge, remote but substantial factors suffice when the actor’s conduct is intentional. The Court highlighted:

King’s screenshot was the first alert the partners received;
Immediate calls to King for damage control ensued;
Termination discussion began before partners conducted independent research.

The jury could thus reasonably infer King’s act was a substantial motivating cause.

c) Justification Defense

King invoked Restatement § 772(a) (truthful information). The Court, citing its 2023 opinion, has already labeled the screenshot not truthful because it contained a forged employer attribution. Therefore § 772 is inapplicable; the more flexible § 767 balancing test controls, leaving justification as a classic jury issue.

d) Discovery Rulings

The Court found no abuse of discretion: (i) phone records would not show content, hence no relevance; (ii) geolocation or contact metadata was speculative; (iii) the continuance was tethered to the same speculative discovery.

3.3. Impact on Future Litigation and Legal Doctrine

Law-Firm Liability. Even equity partners’ conduct can fall outside the scope of employment if motivated purely by personal relationships. Firms should revisit social-media policies and indemnity clauses.
Intentional-Tort Causation. Trial courts must apply the “substantial factor” test, not negligence-style foreseeability, at the summary-judgment stage. Plaintiffs may survive dispositive motions with thinner causal chains when intentional conduct is alleged.
Section 772 Narrowed. A communication “truthful on its face” may still be “false” if context (e.g., a counterfeit profile) creates a misleading impression. Lawyers and employers cannot rely mechanically on the truthful-information safe harbor.
Discovery Strategy. The Court signals limited patience for fishing expeditions into phone metadata absent a concrete link to contested issues.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Tortious Interference with Business Relations: Intentionally disrupting someone else’s employment or contract expectancy, causing economic harm.
Respondeat Superior / Scope of Employment: An employer is liable for an employee’s tort only if the act was done in furtherance of the employer’s business or for its benefit.
Summary Judgment: A pre-trial ruling that no genuine dispute of material fact exists, entitling the movant to win as a matter of law.
Substantial Factor Test: A relaxed causation standard for intentional torts: Did the defendant’s act play a significant role in producing the harm, even if other factors also contributed?
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 vs. § 772: § 767 lists seven factors for deciding whether interference is “improper” (a balancing test). § 772 provides an absolute defense when the defendant merely passes on truthful information or honest advice—provided the information is accurate and contextually truthful.
At-Will Employment: Employer or employee may terminate employment at any time for any legal reason; still, third parties cannot maliciously induce termination.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Alabama’s latest installment in Flickinger v. King crystallizes two significant doctrinal messages:

Corporate entities are not automatic guarantors of partners’ personal crusades. Acts spawned by friendship or personal ideology, detached from firm business, fall outside the vicarious-liability net.
Causation in intentional interference is generous to plaintiffs. If the defendant’s conduct lights the spark—even amid other fuses—a jury normally decides liability.

By re-affirming the primacy of the jury in balancing § 767 factors and evaluating substantial-factor causation, the opinion re-anchors Alabama tort law in its longstanding policy: intentional wrongdoers bear the risk of the consequences their acts set in motion. Meanwhile, employers obtain clarity that they remain protected when rogue partners act solely for personal reasons, but only if the facts truly support that disconnect.