Personal Jurisdiction as Basis for 28 U.S.C. §1782 Assistance and the Mootness of Protective Order Appeals Post-Voluntary Dismissal

Introduction

In Re: Request of Susan Devine for Judicial Assistance Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1782 for the Liechtenstein Princely Court (11th Cir. Mar. 11, 2025) brings into relief a complex procedural history spawned by hedge‐fund investors’ RICO lawsuit against their former fund manager, Susan Elaine Devine. The litigants fought over discovery materials under a stipulated protective order—materials Devine had to deposit with the clerk once the Funds voluntarily dismissed their suit. When a foreign tribunal in Liechtenstein sought those same documents, Devine turned to both the district court and a separate mutual-legal-assistance petition under 28 U.S.C. §1782. Four consolidated appeals raised (1) the court’s authority to order destruction or return of confidential files post-dismissal, (2) the ability to enforce or modify a protective order once a case is voluntarily dismissed, (3) the propriety of staying a return order, and (4) the reach of §1782’s “resides or is found” requirement.

Parties & Context:

Plaintiffs-Appellees: Nine Cayman-incorporated hedge funds (“the Funds”).
Defendant-Appellant: Susan Elaine Devine, ex-wife of fund founder Florian Homm.
Procedural Posture: RICO and fraud claims in Middle District of Florida → voluntary dismissal → protective-order disputes → §1782 petition transferred to Florida court → appeal.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit resolved four appeals:

Appeals Nos. 21-13587 & 22-11313 & 22-11590 (protective-order matters): Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or mootness because (a) the court cannot grant meaningful relief once the documents were lost or destroyed, and (b) a voluntary dismissal strips the district court of authority to enforce or modify the protective order except by contempt or sanctions.
Appeal No. 22-13207 (§1782 petition): Affirmed. The Middle District of Florida properly exercised jurisdiction over Spears & Imes LLP—“found” in the district because personal-jurisdiction contacts met due-process standards. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying §1782 relief after weighing Intel factors, including the protective order, foreign-proof-gathering policies, and the burdensomeness of another forum fight.

Analysis

1. Post-Dismissal Jurisdiction & Mootness

Voluntary Dismissal Rule: Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i), a plaintiff may unilaterally dismiss its case without court order. Once that happens, “the district court is immediately deprived of jurisdiction over the merits.” (Devine I, 998 F.3d 1258, 1263.)
Collateral Matters Exception: The court retains ancillary jurisdiction only for a narrow set of issues—costs, attorney’s fees, contempt or Rule 11 sanctions, and confirmation of arbitration awards. A post-dismissal motion to modify or enforce a protective order is not one of them. (Id. at 1265–69.)
Mootness: If a court cannot provide “meaningful relief”—for instance, when confidential files have been irrevocably lost—a challenge to their return or destruction is moot. (Nyaga v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 906, 913 (11th Cir. 2003).)

2. Limits on Enforcement of Protective Orders

A stipulated protective order is treated like a contract. Enforcement post-dismissal requires an independent breach-of-contract action (under diversity or in state court) or contempt proceedings, not an appeal from the now-inactive case. (Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 378–81 (1994); Devine I, 998 F.3d at 1268–69.)
Contempt remains the proper mechanism to enforce compliance with court orders once a case has ended. (Hyde v. Irish, 962 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2020).)

3. Section 1782 Jurisdictional and Discretionary Analysis

a. Statutory Requirements (“May order”)

§1782(a) authorizes a district court “in which a person resides or is found” to compel testimony or production for use in a foreign or international tribunal.
Applicants must show (1) the target is within the district (“resides or is found”), (2) the materials are for use in a non-U.S. proceeding, and (3) the request comes via letter rogatory or on application of an “interested person.”

b. “Resides or Is Found” = Personal Jurisdiction

The Eleventh Circuit adopts the Second Circuit’s approach: §1782’s reach extends as far as constitutional due-process permits personal jurisdiction. (In re Del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520, 528 (2d Cir. 2019).)
Spears & Imes had sufficient Florida contacts—years of substantive litigation work in the Middle District—so it was “found” there. (Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253, 255–60 (11th Cir. 1996).)

c. Discretionary Intel Factors

Foreign-Tribunal Participation: Relief is more readily granted when the target is not a party to the foreign proceeding. Here Spears is a non-participant, but other factors overrode.
Receptivity: Evidence that the Liechtenstein court invited U.S. assistance weighed in Devine’s favor, but the district court noted conflicting orders in the underlying Florida litigation.
Circumvention & Policies: A scheme to bypass Florida rulings by reenlisting the same documents in a new forum justified denial.
Intrusiveness & Burden: The court found additional litigation in a host district unduly burdensome given prior rulings and the potential for repetitive judicial fights.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Protective Order: A court-approved agreement limiting who may see certain discovery materials and under what circumstances they must be returned or destroyed.
Ancillary Jurisdiction: A court’s power to decide issues closely tied to an action it has formally dismissed, typically to enforce its own decrees (e.g., contempt), but not to revive or modify the merits of a dismissed case.
Letter Rogatory: A formal request from a foreign court to a U.S. court asking for judicial assistance, such as document production or depositions.
Voluntary Dismissal (Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i)): A plaintiff’s right to dismiss its case without a court order—after which the court normally loses authority over the merits and most ancillary disputes.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit holds that once a civil suit is voluntarily dismissed, district courts lack jurisdiction to enforce or modify stipulated protective orders—absent contempt or an independent breach action.
Appeals of protective-order return or destruction orders are moot if the court cannot afford meaningful relief (e.g., documents are lost or destroyed).
Under 28 U.S.C. §1782, “resides or is found” aligns with due-process personal-jurisdiction principles. A non-party law firm with prolonged, purposeful litigation contacts in the forum district may be compelled to produce or return materials for foreign tribunals.
Even where jurisdiction exists, district courts retain broad discretion—guided by Intel factors—to deny §1782 petitions that risk abusing U.S. procedures to relitigate protective-order fights abroad.

This decision clarifies procedural boundaries in cross-border evidence gathering and underscores the narrow scope of post-dismissal judicial power over protective‐order disputes.