Personal Allocution Requirement and Harmless Hearsay Admission in Supervised Release Revocations

Introduction

United States v. Deonte M. Wright, 23-14107 (11th Cir. Feb. 3, 2025), addresses two recurring issues in supervised‐release revocation proceedings: the admissibility of hearsay evidence under minimal due‐process guarantees and the defendant’s right of allocution. Deonte Wright, a federal offender on supervised release for firearms possession, was accused of domestic battery, property destruction, and prohibited post‐incarceration contact with his estranged wife. The district court admitted body‐camera footage over Wright’s objection, found multiple violations by a preponderance of the evidence, revoked his release, and imposed 24 months’ imprisonment without personally inviting Wright to allocute. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed revocation but vacated the sentence for plain error in denying allocution.

Summary of the Judgment

1. The court held any due‐process confrontation error in admitting hearsay statements (from the victim and her brother on bodycam) was harmless because the remaining evidence—photographs of injuries, officer testimony, Wright’s admissions, and his violent criminal history—overwhelmingly supported the revocation.
2. The court concluded that the district judge committed plain error by failing to personally address Wright and afford him the opportunity to allocute before sentencing. Defense counsel alone was invited to speak, which does not satisfy Eleventh Circuit precedent.
3. The judgment of revocation was affirmed; the 24-month sentence was vacated; and the case was remanded solely for resentencing after personal allocution.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110 (11th Cir. 1994): Established minimal due‐process rights—including a limited confrontation guarantee—and the balancing test for admitting hearsay in revocation hearings.
• United States v. Reese, 775 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2015): Confirmed that Federal Rules of Evidence and the Sixth Amendment do not strictly apply in revocation proceedings but that due‐process safeguards remain.
• United States v. Taylor, 931 F.2d 842 (11th Cir. 1991): Articulated the harmless‐error standard for due‐process violations in revocation evidence admission.
• Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000): Clarified the standard of proof—preponderance of the evidence—for supervised‐release revocation findings.
• United States v. Carruth, 528 F.3d 845 (11th Cir. 2008): Defined the defendant’s right of allocution at revocation sentencing.
• United States v. Doyle, 857 F.3d 1115 (11th Cir. 2017): Held that allocution errors not raised below are reviewed for plain error.
• United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2014): Set out the elements for plain‐error review.
• United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568 (11th Cir. 2011): Emphasized that counsel speaks for the client but cannot substitute for the defendant’s personal allocution.
• United States v. George, 872 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2017): Limited remand relief to the opportunity to allocute, without a full resentencing.

Legal Reasoning

1. Hearsay Admission and Harmless‐Error Analysis
Although revocation proceedings are not bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, minimal due‐process protections require a balancing of the defendant’s right to confront with the government’s justification for admitting hearsay and an assessment of the statement’s reliability (Frazier). Here, the court assumed arguendo that the bodycam hearsay might have been erroneously admitted but applied Taylor’s harmless‐error framework. Given the copious reliable evidence—injury photos, direct observations, Wright’s own admissions, and his violent history—no impact arose from the hearsay inclusion.

2. Allocution Requirement and Plain‐Error Review
Federal law mandates that before imposing a sanction for revocation, the judge must “directly address” the defendant and offer a personal opportunity to speak in mitigation (Carruth). Wright’s failure to object below triggers plain‐error review (Doyle). The Eleventh Circuit found that omitting a direct address to Wright was “plain” because clear precedent requires it, and “affected substantial rights” since the sentence imposed (24 months) exceeded the Guidelines’ bottom range (21 months). Finally, the omission undermines the integrity and fairness of the proceeding.

Impact

United States v. Wright reaffirms two important rules in supervised‐release revocation practice:

1. District courts may admit hearsay statements if reliability is established and the defendant’s confrontation interest is weighed, but any due‐process error will be harmless when ample independent evidence supports the violation.
2. A judge’s personal invitation for allocution is non-waivable; even if counsel speaks, the defendant must be addressed directly. Failure to do so requires vacatur and remand for allocution only.

Trial courts should meticulously document their confrontation balancing and explicitly address defendants before sentencing to avoid unnecessary remands.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard in revocation hearings: more likely than not that the violation occurred.

Hearsay

An out‐of‐court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Normally barred, but admissible in revocations under a due‐process balancing test.

Confrontation Rights in Revocations

Although not governed by the Sixth Amendment, defendants can challenge hearsay through a minimal due‐process right to cross‐examine adverse witnesses.

Harmless Error

An error that did not affect the outcome because the remaining evidence overwhelmingly supports the decision.

Allocution

The defendant’s personal right to address the sentencing judge before a sentence is imposed, in order to offer mitigating information or express remorse.

Plain‐Error Review

An appellate standard for unpreserved errors requiring (1) error, (2) plainness, and (3) a substantial effect on rights, plus a fourth factor—serious effect on fairness, integrity, or public reputation of proceedings.

Conclusion

United States v. Wright crystallizes key procedural protections in supervised‐release revocation hearings. It underscores that—even where hearsay may slip in under an evidentiary balancing test—courts must ensure that its admission is harmless in light of the total proof. More critically, the decision reaffirms the non-delegable nature of the right of allocution: only a personal invitation by the judge suffices. Practitioners and trial judges should heed these mandates to promote fair, efficient, and final revocation proceedings.