Persistent Assertions of Innocence Defeat Plea-Stage Prejudice: Eleventh Circuit Clarifies When § 2255 Petitioners Get an Evidentiary Hearing

Introduction

In Catrell Ivory v. United States (11th Cir. Oct. 3, 2025), a panel of Judges Jill Pryor, Grant (author), and Marcus affirmed the district court’s denial—without an evidentiary hearing—of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The case arises from a string of armed robberies at Florida Walmart stores in 2017, culminating in a 2019 jury conviction and a 319-month sentence. On collateral review, Ivory argued two Sixth Amendment theories: (1) trial counsel’s misrepresentations during plea negotiations induced him to reject favorable plea offers; and (2) counsel performed deficiently by failing to secure his cousin and co-robber, Bakari McCant, as an exculpatory defense witness.

The Eleventh Circuit held that even accepting counsel’s poor performance, Ivory’s claims fail for lack of prejudice. Two core holdings structure the opinion: first, where the record “affirmatively contradicts” a petitioner’s post hoc assertion that he would have accepted a plea—in particular, where the defendant persistently and publicly maintained actual innocence through trial and sentencing—courts may deny a hearing on a Lafler-based plea-rejection claim. Second, a failure-to-call-witness claim falters without a substantial probability of a different outcome, especially where the proposed witness is a co-defendant with clear Fifth Amendment exposure and the trial record contains substantial inculpatory evidence.

Summary of the Opinion

Standard of review: Denial of an evidentiary hearing under § 2255 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. A petitioner is entitled to a hearing only when he alleges specific, non-conclusory facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief; a hearing is not required where allegations are patently frivolous, unsupported, or affirmatively contradicted by the record.
Plea-stage ineffective assistance (Lafler claim): Although counsel’s performance was deficient (misleading Ivory that two defense witnesses had been secured), Ivory could not plausibly show prejudice because the record repeatedly and consistently documented his unwavering protestations of innocence before, during, and after trial, including at sentencing when he explained that his “mind wouldn’t let [him] admit to something [he] didn’t do.” That record “affirmatively contradicts” his later assertion that he would have accepted a plea.
Failure-to-call-witness claim: No prejudice. It was highly unlikely that co-defendant McCant would have testified due to Fifth Amendment risks and a pending appeal. Even if he had testified along the lines of his later letter, his partial exculpation (disclaiming Ivory’s role in the first robbery while remaining silent about the second and attempted third) would have undermined Ivory’s trial strategy of absolute innocence and likely harmed him. Substantial evidence corroborating guilt further foreclosed a reasonable probability of a different result.
Result: Affirmance. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing; the files and records “conclusively” showed Ivory was entitled to no relief.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): Governs ineffective assistance claims via the two-pronged test—deficiency and prejudice. The opinion treats deficiency as essentially conceded (given counsel’s misrepresentations), but emphasizes the demanding prejudice requirement: a “reasonable probability” sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012): Sets the framework for prejudice in plea-rejection cases. A defendant must show that, but for ineffective advice, he would have accepted the offer, the prosecution would not have withdrawn it, the court would have accepted it, and the resulting conviction or sentence would have been less severe. Ivory fails on the first: the record refutes that he would have accepted any plea.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011): Clarifies that a different-outcome likelihood must be “substantial, not just conceivable.” The court uses this standard to deny both the Lafler claim and the failure-to-call-witness claim.
Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2014): Articulates when a § 2255 petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing and when denial is proper because allegations are conclusory or “affirmatively contradicted by the record.” This principle is central to the court’s refusal to hold a hearing on Ivory’s plea-prejudice claim.
Rosin v. United States, 786 F.3d 873 (11th Cir. 2015): A defendant’s persistent refusal to accept responsibility and adamant protestations of innocence can defeat claims that he would have accepted a plea. The court analogizes Ivory’s record to Rosin to underscore why his after-the-fact plea claim is implausible.
Diaz v. United States, 930 F.2d 832 (11th Cir. 1991): “After-the-fact testimony” is insufficient to establish prejudice. The court uses Diaz to reject Ivory’s unsupported assertion that he would have pled guilty.
Sullivan v. DeLoach, 459 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 2006): Emphasizes the “heavy” burden to show prejudice in failure-to-call-witness claims because such allegations are often speculative. Guides the analysis of the McCant-witness claim.
Boyd v. Estelle, 661 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1981): Co-defendants typically will not waive the Fifth Amendment to testify; it was “highly unlikely” McCant would have testified here, particularly with a pending appeal and exposure risks.
Fortenberry v. Haley, 297 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2002): The absence of exculpatory testimony is more prejudicial when there is little record evidence of guilt. The converse is controlling here: substantial evidence negates any reasonable probability of a different verdict.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): Cited to describe prior direct-appeal posture (counsel withdrew, no arguable issues). Not outcome-determinative here, but provides procedural context.

Legal Reasoning

1) The § 2255 Evidentiary Hearing Threshold

The court starts at the gatekeeping function: a § 2255 movant gets a hearing only if the motion alleges specific, non-conclusory facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief. Allegations that are facially frivolous, generalized, or contradicted by the record do not trigger a hearing. Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the panel asks whether the district court used the wrong legal standard, misapplied correct law, followed improper procedures, or clearly erred factually. None of those were present.

2) Plea-Rejection Claim: Deficiency Conceded; Prejudice Not Shown

On the Strickland deficiency prong, the panel all but accepts Ivory’s showing: counsel told him she had secured two defense witnesses when she had not contacted either, a misstep the Florida Bar later referenced in disbarment proceedings. But deficiency alone does not warrant relief.

On prejudice, Lafler sets Ivory’s burden: he had to show a reasonable probability that he would have accepted a plea, the prosecution would not have withdrawn it, the court would have accepted it, and the outcome would have been less severe. The opinion focuses on the first link and concludes the record squarely refutes it. Across all phases—pretrial (alibi motions), trial testimony (complete innocence), and sentencing (sworn statements)—Ivory insisted he did not commit the robberies and explained he rejected offers because his “mind wouldn’t let [him] admit to something [he] didn’t do.” Under Winthrop-Redin and Rosin, such a developed record “affirmatively contradicts” a later, unsupported assertion that he would have pled guilty. Under Diaz, his post hoc claim is too little, too late.

3) Failure to Call Co-Defendant as Witness: No Prejudice

Ivory’s second theory—counsel’s failure to call cousin and co-actor McCant—also fails on Strickland prejudice. The court offers two independent reasons:

Testimony was unlikely: As a co-defendant whose own appeal was pending, McCant faced substantial Fifth Amendment exposure. Any competent lawyer would advise against testifying, and the district court had previously noted “significant” Fifth Amendment impediments. The record did not show he was willing to waive the privilege.
Testimony would not help—and might harm: McCant’s later letter disclaimed Ivory’s role in the first robbery but was silent about the second and attempted third, undermining Ivory’s trial posture of total innocence. Introducing a partial-exculpation from a co-robber—alongside overwhelming evidence (eyewitness cooperator testimony identifying Ivory on surveillance footage, corroborating cell-site records, suspicious pre-robbery call patterns, and jail-call admonitions to “stay where the [expletive] he at”)—does not yield a substantial probability of acquittal on any count. Fortenberry’s teaching applies: where evidence of guilt is substantial, the absence of a witness is unlikely to be prejudicial.

Either rationale defeats the prejudice showing; together, they make the lack of prejudice decisive. Consequently, there was no abuse of discretion in denying a hearing on this claim.

Impact and Implications

Reinforced evidentiary-hearing gatekeeping: The decision underscores that § 2255 courts may deny hearings where the record contradicts a petitioner’s essential claim. For Lafler claims, contemporaneous record evidence of persistent assertions of innocence can be dispositive.
Practical effect on plea-bargaining claims: Even egregious attorney deficiency during plea negotiations will not yield relief without a robust showing of prejudice. Defendants who publicly and repeatedly protest innocence face a higher hurdle to later assert they would have accepted a guilty plea.
Co-defendant witness claims remain disfavored: The opinion highlights the compounded speculation and Fifth Amendment barriers when the uncalled witness is a co-defendant with exposure. Counsel’s failure to secure such testimony is unlikely to establish Strickland prejudice absent unusually strong and credible proffers and minimal government proof.
Evidentiary symmetry matters: Where the trial record is strong—including corroborated cooperator testimony, electronic location data, and inculpatory communications—claims that a single witness’s testimony would have flipped the verdict become inherently less plausible.
Counsel deficiency is not destiny: The panel is clear that poor performance—even documented in bar discipline—is not self-executing under Strickland. Relief turns on a petitioner’s ability to demonstrate a substantial probability of a different outcome.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 2255 motion: A federal prisoner’s avenue to challenge the legality of his conviction or sentence in the sentencing court. Relief requires showing a constitutional violation or fundamental defect; a hearing is required only if well-pleaded facts, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief.
Strickland’s two-prong test:
- Deficiency: Counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
- Prejudice: A reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different—meaning a probability substantial enough to undermine confidence in the outcome.
Lafler prejudice for rejected pleas: The petitioner must show he would have accepted the plea, the prosecution and court would have accepted it, and the outcome (conviction/sentence) would have been less severe than after trial.
“Affirmatively contradicted by the record”: Courts need not hold hearings where the existing record directly refutes a petitioner’s factual claim—for example, when a defendant repeatedly swore he was innocent yet later claims he would have pled guilty.
Failure-to-call-witness claims: Courts treat these as speculative unless the petitioner can show the witness was available, willing to testify, and would have provided specific, material testimony likely to change the outcome.
Fifth Amendment privilege of co-defendants: A co-defendant typically cannot be compelled to testify if doing so risks self-incrimination; pending cases and potential exposure make voluntary testimony unlikely.
Anders brief: A mechanism allowing appointed counsel on direct appeal to withdraw after concluding there are no non-frivolous issues; the appellate court independently reviews the record before allowing withdrawal.
Writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum: A court order to produce an incarcerated witness to testify; late requests can be denied, especially where logistics and Fifth Amendment concerns loom.

Conclusion

Ivory confirms and clarifies several settled principles in a cohesive way. First, for Lafler claims premised on rejected plea offers, persistent assertions of actual innocence—memorialized throughout the record—can foreclose a finding that the defendant would have accepted a plea, justifying denial of a § 2255 evidentiary hearing. Second, failure-to-call-witness claims involving co-defendants typically founder on dual shoals: the unlikelihood of testimony in light of Fifth Amendment risks and the limited probative value (or even prejudice) when the proposed testimony conflicts with the defense theory and confronts strong government proof. Finally, the opinion exemplifies Strickland’s bottom line: deficient performance, even dramatically so, does not establish a Sixth Amendment violation absent a substantial probability of a different outcome. For litigants and courts alike, Ivory is a forceful reminder that § 2255 is a remedy for constitutional prejudice, not a vehicle for relitigating strategy or remedying every instance of poor lawyering after a record-backed conviction.