Introduction

In In re Jewelyette M., the Supreme Court of Connecticut confronted a recurring and consequential question in child protection law: may nonrelative foster parents participate as parties in neglect proceedings via permissive intervention, or is their role limited to the statutory “right to be heard”? The majority answered that trial courts retain authority to allow permissive intervention by foster parents in appropriate cases. Justice Elgo, joined by Justice D’Auria, issued a comprehensive dissent warning that this new allowance conflicts with the statutory scheme, undermines constitutional protections for family integrity, and threatens timely permanency for children.

The case arrives against a complicated procedural backdrop:

• Child Jewelyette M. was adjudicated neglected and placed with licensed, nonrelative foster parents who at one point were preadoptive caregivers.
• The Department and the Commissioner of Children and Families (petitioner) initially pursued termination and adoption, then later shifted to reunification with the child’s father after a favorable course of rehabilitation documented by a court-appointed psychologist.
• The foster parents sought to intervene to oppose reunification and to litigate allegations that they had interfered with reunification efforts. They also obtained a temporary injunction barring removal.
• Following the Appellate Court’s decision in In re Ryan C., 220 Conn. App. 507 (2023), which held nonrelative foster parents lack standing to intervene in the dispositional phase under § 46b-129, the trial court removed the foster parents as intervenors. The foster parents appealed and also filed a writ of error claiming the court denied their “right to be heard” under § 46b-129 (p) during a later disposition modifying custody to the child’s paternal aunt (after the father’s death).

The key issues crystallized as:

• Whether § 46b-129 authorizes foster parent permissive intervention, or instead limits them to a statutory “right to be heard.”
• How the constitutional right to family integrity of parents and children constrains foster parent participation.
• What process satisfies the foster parents’ § 46b-129 (p) right “to be heard.”
• Whether the court’s management of the November 4, 2024 hearing complied with § 46b-129 (p).

Summary of the Opinion

Although the majority opinion is not reproduced, the dissent states the majority concluded that the legislature, in enacting and amending § 46b-129, did not intend to prohibit trial courts from granting permissive intervention to nonrelative foster parents. In the majority’s view, there is no conflict between § 46b-129 and Practice Book § 35a-4, and trial courts retain discretion to allow foster parents to participate as parties when appropriate.

Justice Elgo’s dissent advances a contrary statutory and constitutional reading:

• Foster parents are state-licensed caregivers whose rights are a creature of statute and regulation; they have no independent liberty interest in a family unit with a foster child.
• Section 46b-129 (p) provides foster parents a “right to be heard” (i.e., to make a statement or comment on best interests), not a right to intervene.
• Permissive intervention is incompatible with the statutory and regulatory framework requiring foster parents to cooperate with reunification and permanency plans; any legitimate interest they have is already represented by the Commissioner/DCF and by the child’s attorney (AMC) and, where appointed, the guardian ad litem (GAL).
• Allowing foster parents to intervene invites impermissible comparisons between biological parents and foster parents, jeopardizing constitutional rights and tainting best-interest determinations.
• Such intervention will cause unacceptable delays in achieving permanency, complicate litigation, and risk undermining subsequent termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) proceedings through § 17a-112 (k)(7) findings (“unreasonable act of any other person”).
• On the writ of error, the dissent would hold the trial court satisfied § 46b-129 (p) by allowing the foster parents to be heard through counsel by a brief statement, and thus would deny the writ.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Influence

• Hunte v. Blumenthal, 238 Conn. 146 (1996): The Court recognized foster parents as state actors subject to DCF control and concluded they hold no liberty interest in the “integrity of their family unit.” This bedrock proposition anchors the dissent’s view that foster parent participation is strictly a matter of statute and regulation, not constitutional entitlement.
• Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977): The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that rights associated with foster family relationships arise from state law and contracts, unlike the fundamental liberty interest in family integrity enjoyed by biological/adoptive families. The dissent uses this to underscore the constitutional hierarchy.
• In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263 (1992); In re James O., 322 Conn. 636 (2016): Both decisions warn against “impermissible comparisons” between biological parents and foster/adoptive families in TPR proceedings, because such comparisons can distort statutory analyses. The dissent reasons that the same danger is present—perhaps greater—at neglect dispositions, where the parent’s rights remain intact and standards of proof are lower.
• In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276 (1983); In re Davonta V., 285 Conn. 483 (2008): These cases stress the deleterious effects of prolonged temporary care and the system’s imperative to act expeditiously toward permanency. The dissent repeatedly returns to how permissive intervention risks systemic delay.
• In re Joshua S., 127 Conn. App. 723 (2011): The Appellate Court held foster parents have a narrow statutory role and no right to intervene in related proceedings. The dissent reads § 46b-129 (p) as codifying this limited participation.
• In re Ryan C., 220 Conn. App. 507 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 901 (2023); In re Andrew C., 229 Conn. App. 51 (2024): Both illustrate the timeline distortions when foster parents intervene to litigate against reunification or for transfer of guardianship. The dissent argues that the majority’s contrary rule will normalize such delays statewide.
• Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); In re Zakai F., 336 Conn. 272 (2020): These authorities reaffirm parents’ fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children—which persists despite prior neglect adjudications. The dissent frames this as the constitutional baseline that legislative and judicial choices must preserve.
• Statutes and Regulations: The dissent relies on a detailed reading of § 46b-129, especially subsections (d) and (p); § 17a-111b; § 17a-112; and DCF regulations (e.g., Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 17a-145-149), which require foster parents to support reunification and permanency plans. It also invokes § 1-2z for textual primacy, § 4-183 for UAPA appeals, and § 52-466 (f) regarding habeas post-termination.
• Horton v. Meskill, 187 Conn. 187 (1982): Provides the Connecticut factors for permissive intervention (timeliness, interest, adequacy of existing representation, prejudice/delay, and value to resolution). The dissent argues foster parents cannot satisfy these because their interests are aligned by law with DCF, AMC, and GAL.

The Dissent’s Legal Reasoning

1) Statutory Text and Structure

• Section 46b-129 (p) explicitly gives “a foster parent, prospective adoptive parent or relative caregiver” notice and “the right to be heard” in any proceeding concerning the child, including former caregivers for up to one year after care ends, to “comment on the best interests of [the] child.”
• Section 46b-129 (d) specifically authorizes and carefully regulates intervention by relatives, including timelines, assessment directives, hearing scheduling, and burdens of proof for temporary custody or later guardianship motions. The legislature knows how to grant intervention and did so expressly for relatives. It did not do so for nonrelative foster parents.
• Practice Book provisions cannot create substantive rights beyond statute. Because § 46b-129 (p) limits foster parents to being heard, the Rules of Practice cannot enlarge that role into party status. The dissent thus sees a separation-of-powers problem in reading “permissive intervention” into § 46b-129.

2) Legislative History

• 1977: The legislature first granted foster parents “standing” limited to placement issues. 1979: It expanded standing to include revocation-of-commitment matters.
• 1998: The legislature permitted former foster parents to comment on the child’s best interests, reflecting the goal of hearing from those with experience caring for the child, but still limiting the role.
• 2001: The legislature replaced “standing” with the “right to be heard,” again signaling a limited, nonparty role. The dissent views this change as intentionally narrowing participation to voice—not party litigation rights.

3) Constitutional Baseline: Family Integrity

• Parents (and children) have a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship. That right does not evaporate with a neglect adjudication.
• Foster parents have no comparable constitutional right; their role and obligations are statutory and regulatory. It is precisely because foster parents are entrusted with extraordinary access to the child that DCF must carefully supervise them—including ensuring they support reunification and permanency plans.
• Interjecting foster parents as parties invites impermissible comparisons between biological parents and caregivers who are providing day-to-day care at the time of litigation—a risk long recognized in TPR jurisprudence and, the dissent argues, equally corrosive at neglect disposition.

4) Permissive Intervention is Doctrinally Incompatible

• Under Horton v. Meskill, permissive intervention turns on whether the intervenor’s interest is distinct and inadequately represented. But foster parents’ lawful role is to support DCF’s plan and reunification efforts; any interest they have vis-à-vis the child is, by design, represented by DCF (legal interests), the AMC (child’s legal interests), and the GAL (child’s best interests).
• If foster parents disagree with DCF’s characterization of their conduct (e.g., accusations of interference), the proper forum is administrative—through licensing proceedings and UAPA review—not as a party in the child’s neglect case.

5) Practical Harms: Delay and Systemic Costs

• Party status enables foster parents to call and cross-examine witnesses, move for injunctive relief, seek discovery of confidential records, and file appeals—all of which extend proceedings. The cases of In re Ryan C. and In re Andrew C. are case studies of multi-year detours.
• Extended litigation is antithetical to children’s needs for stable, permanent placements and compounds trauma. It also strains a juvenile docket already managing heavy caseloads with limited judicial resources.

6) Downstream Impact on TPR

• The TPR statute requires findings regarding “the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by ... the unreasonable act of any other person.” § 17a-112 (k)(7).
• A foster parent’s litigation as a party—especially where it impedes contact or reunification—can become compelling proof supporting a § 17a-112 (k)(7) finding, weakening or defeating a subsequent TPR case and closing adoption pathways.

What the “Right to Be Heard” Means in Practice

• The dissent construes § 46b-129 (p) to guarantee foster parents an opportunity to “be heard and comment on the best interests” of the child—through a statement (sworn or unsworn, oral or written) at a time the trial court deems appropriate.
• It does not entail the right to present or cross-examine witnesses, introduce evidence, or otherwise litigate as a party.
• This calibrated role allows courts to benefit from foster parents’ insights while avoiding the constitutional and systemic risks of party status.

Application to the November 4, 2024 Hearing (Writ of Error)

• The trial court allowed the foster parents, through counsel, to make a brief statement at the outset of the hearing on the Commissioner’s motion to open and modify disposition (transferring custody to the paternal aunt under protective supervision).
• The court declined to allow them to attend the entire hearing or to present sworn testimony, and it proceeded to consider the views of the parties (Commissioner/DCF, AMC, and GAL).
• The dissent would uphold this case-management decision as a reasonable implementation of § 46b-129 (p), satisfying the statutory right to be heard and avoiding undue delay or taint.

Impact: What This New Precedent May Mean

The majority’s recognition of trial court discretion to permit foster parent intervention will likely have immediate and long-term effects:

• Increased motions to intervene: Foster parents may more frequently seek party status to oppose reunification or to pursue transfer of custody/guardianship, especially in preadoptive contexts.
• Greater litigation complexity and delay: Additional parties entail more witnesses, discovery, motions, and appeals, prolonging the arc from neglect adjudication to permanency.
• Heightened constitutional risk: Courts will need strong guardrails to prevent impermissible comparisons and to keep focus on statutory criteria, with careful record-making to avoid reversible error.
• TPR vulnerability: Where foster parent litigation impedes contact, respondents can invoke § 17a-112 (k)(7) to argue they were unreasonably prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship.
• Role of AMC and GAL: Expect intensified emphasis on the AMC’s and GAL’s duties as the institutional mechanisms for surfacing child-centered information that foster parents might otherwise seek to litigate themselves.
• Potential legislative response: The General Assembly may revisit § 46b-129 to clarify the scope of foster parent participation, as it did after Nye v. Marcus (leading to § 52-466 (f)).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Family Integrity: A constitutional right protecting the reciprocal relationship between parent and child. It persists unless and until parental rights are lawfully terminated.
• Foster Parents as State Actors: Licensed caregivers who operate within DCF’s regulatory framework; their rights are created and limited by statute and regulation, not by constitutional family liberty interests.
• Adjudication vs. Disposition: Adjudication decides whether neglect occurred. Disposition decides the remedy (e.g., commitment, reunification, guardianship) based on the child’s best interests.
• Permissive Intervention: A nonparty’s request to join a case; granted when the person’s distinct interest is inadequately represented and intervention aids resolution without undue prejudice or delay.
• Right to Be Heard (§ 46b-129 (p)): A statutory guarantee that foster parents can provide comments on the child’s best interests—typically via a statement at a time the judge sets—not a right to litigate as a party.
• Relative Intervention (§ 46b-129 (d)): The legislature expressly permits relatives to intervene for limited purposes (temporary custody early; later guardianship), with defined procedures and burdens.
• TPR “Unreasonable Act” Factor (§ 17a-112 (k)(7)): In deciding TPR disposition, courts must consider whether a parent’s relationship was thwarted by the unreasonable act of another person—an avenue that can be implicated by foster parent conduct.
• Protective Supervision: A disposition allowing a child to live with a parent or caregiver while DCF supervises, often after revocation of commitment.
• Administrative Remedy: Foster parents can contest licensing actions or findings (e.g., alleged interference) through DCF administrative processes and UAPA appeals, rather than intervening in the child’s case.

Conclusion

The Court’s new allowance for permissive intervention by nonrelative foster parents in neglect proceedings marks a significant shift in Connecticut juvenile practice. Justice Elgo’s dissent is a sustained argument that the statutory scheme—particularly § 46b-129 (p) and (d)—was deliberately designed to limit foster parents to a structured, nonparty voice, in order to safeguard the constitutional right to family integrity, avoid impermissible comparisons, preserve the roles of DCF, AMC, and GAL, and, above all, achieve timely permanency for children.

Whether trial courts can mitigate the risks the dissent identifies will depend on vigilant case management:

• Applying Horton v. Meskill factors rigorously, especially adequacy of representation and prejudice/delay.
• Cabining the scope of any granted intervention to prevent party-driven comparisons and ensure focus on statutory criteria.
• Utilizing § 46b-129 (p) to obtain the benefit of foster parent insights without converting them into parties.
• Documenting careful best-interest analyses that avoid “better foster home” reasoning and that respect parental constitutional rights.

Key takeaways:

• The majority recognizes judicial discretion to permit foster parent intervention; the dissent urges strict adherence to the statutory “right to be heard” and nothing more.
• The dissent grounds its view in constitutional doctrine (family integrity), statutory text (§ 46b-129), legislative history, and the practical imperatives of permanency.
• Expect intensified litigation and appeals unless firm guardrails are employed—or unless the legislature clarifies the statutory limits on foster parent participation.

In short, the dissent frames a cautionary blueprint for courts and counsel in navigating this new terrain: preserve constitutional priorities, honor statutory design, and avoid turning neglect disposition into a contest between foster and biological households that delays, and potentially derails, the child’s path to stability.