Permissive Intervention by Foster Parents Restored: Connecticut Supreme Court Overrules In re Ryan C. and Clarifies the Statutory “Right to Be Heard”

Introduction

In a far-reaching decision for Connecticut child protection practice, the Supreme Court of Connecticut in In re Jewelyette M. (officially released March 21, 2025) restored trial courts’ authority to grant permissive intervention to foster parents in the dispositional phase of neglect proceedings and defined the substantive contours of a foster parent’s statutory “right to be heard.” The Court overruled the Appellate Court’s 2023 decision in In re Ryan C., which had barred nonrelative foster parent intervention based on General Statutes § 46b-129 (p).

The case presents two interlocking issues: (1) whether § 46b-129 (p)—which gives qualifying foster parents “the right to be heard and [to] comment on the best interests” of the child—implicitly prohibits permissive intervention under Practice Book § 35a-4 (c) in the dispositional phase; and (2) what the “right to be heard” guarantees in practice during revocation and other dispositional hearings. Against a detailed factual backdrop—including a prior denial of revocation, removal of the foster parents as intervenors under In re Ryan C., a contested but abbreviated revocation hearing that excluded the foster parents, and the biological father’s death while the appeal was pending—the Court issued clear rulings on both questions and provided guidance for remand.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that § 46b-129 (p) does not bar permissive intervention by foster parents in the dispositional phase of neglect proceedings. Practice Book § 35a-4 (c) remains fully operative, allowing courts to grant intervention to nonrelatives—including foster parents—if it is in the child’s best interests or in the interests of justice.
The Court overruled In re Ryan C., 220 Conn. App. 507 (2023), to the extent it held otherwise.
The Court clarified that the statutory “right to be heard” under § 46b-129 (p) is independent of, and in addition to, any right to seek intervention. Ordinarily, that right includes:
- The right to be present throughout the proceeding; and
- The right to comment on the child’s best interests at an appropriate time in light of the evidence presented.
It does not include party rights such as calling or cross-examining witnesses or the right to appeal—unless the foster parent is granted intervenor status.
Applying these principles, the Court reversed the trial court’s order removing the foster parents as intervenors, granted the writ of error in part, vacated the November 4, 2024 revocation order, and remanded for a new revocation hearing consistent with the decision.
The Court rejected mootness arguments premised on an interim, ex parte order entered after the father’s death; practical relief remained available, including restoration of intervenor rights and a new hearing on the child’s best interests.

Background

The child, born in 2015 and committed to the Commissioner of Children and Families shortly after birth, lived continuously with preadoptive foster parents from 2017 until July 2024. For years, the permanency plan contemplated termination of the father’s rights and adoption; in 2020, the Department changed course to pursue reunification with the father.

The trial court initially granted the foster parents permissive intervention to oppose revocation. After a multi-day trial, the court (C. Taylor, J.) denied revocation in May 2023, finding both that cause for commitment persisted and, alternatively, that best interests favored remaining with the foster family.

Days later, the Appellate Court decided In re Ryan C., holding that § 46b-129 (p) barred intervention by nonrelative foster parents. Relying on that decision, the trial court removed the foster parents as intervenors and later conducted a brief revocation hearing (Daniels, J.), at which the foster parents were permitted to make a short statement at the outset but were then excluded from the hearing. Commitment was revoked, guardianship transferred to the father with six months of protective supervision. While the appeal and writ of error were pending, the father died; an interim, ex parte order transferred guardianship to the paternal aunt pending a full hearing. The Supreme Court denied motions to dismiss as moot, stayed the revocation order, and proceeded to decide the merits.

Issues Presented

Does General Statutes § 46b-129 (p) prohibit a trial court from granting a foster parent’s motion for permissive intervention during the dispositional phase of a neglect proceeding under Practice Book § 35a-4 (c)?
What does a foster parent’s statutory “right to be heard and [to] comment on the best interests” under § 46b-129 (p) entail in practice? Specifically, does it include the right to attend the entire dispositional hearing and to comment after hearing the evidence?
Are the foster parents’ appellate challenges to (a) the removal of their intervenor status and (b) the revocation order moot in light of the father’s death and an intervening ex parte modification order?

Holdings

Section 46b-129 (p) does not bar permissive intervention. Trial courts retain discretion to grant foster parent intervention in the dispositional phase pursuant to Practice Book § 35a-4 (c) when doing so serves the child’s best interests or the interests of justice. In re Ryan C. is overruled to the contrary.
A foster parent’s § 46b-129 (p) “right to be heard” ordinarily includes (i) presence throughout the proceeding and (ii) an opportunity to comment on best interests at an appropriate time, informed by the evidence. It does not include party rights to call/cross-examine witnesses or to appeal. The trial court retains discretion, for good cause shown, to reasonably broaden or restrict the timing and manner of the right to be heard to safeguard the proceeding’s objectives and confidentiality.
The foster parents’ challenges are not moot. The interim, ex parte modification did not nullify or vitiate the relief sought; practical relief—restoring intervenor status and conducting a new revocation hearing—remains available notwithstanding the father’s death.

Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Influence

In re Ryan C., 220 Conn. App. 507 (2023): Held § 46b-129 (p) replaced foster parent “standing” with a limited right to be heard, thereby precluding intervention. The Supreme Court rejects this reading, finding the statute’s text expands foster parents’ participation (as a baseline right), not restricts permissive intervention. Ryan C. is overruled on this point.
Practice Book § 35a-4 (c), (d), (f): Authorizes permissive intervention by “persons unrelated to the child” during the dispositional phase upon a best-interests or interests-of-justice finding, with factors for courts to weigh (timeliness, distinct interest, adequacy of representation, delay/prejudice, necessity/value, child’s best interests), and permitting later modification or termination of intervention.
Practice Book § 26-1 (m) (3): Defines “parties” to include permitted intervenors, clarifying party rights upon intervention.
Practice Book § 35a-14A and cases such as In re Santiago G., 318 Conn. 449 (2015); In re Shanaira C., 297 Conn. 737 (2010): Confirm revocation hearings are dispositional, focused on best interests.
General Statutes § 46b-129 (p): Grants foster parents (and certain others) notice and a “right to be heard and [to] comment” on best interests in any proceeding under § 46b-129 within one year of their caregiving. The Court reads this as an automatic minimum participation right that coexists with, and does not displace, permissive intervention.
General Statutes § 46b-129 (d): Allows relatives to intervene for the limited purpose of seeking temporary custody at the early stage (post-preliminary hearing). The Court rejects the Commissioner’s argument that this provision impliedly occupies the field and excludes all other intervention; rather, it addresses early placement, not dispositional-phase permissive intervention by nonrelatives.
General Statutes §§ 46b-122 and 46b-124: Juvenile confidentiality and attendance provisions. The Court harmonizes these with the right to be heard: judges can admit persons with a legitimate interest (including foster parents) and can manage confidentiality by order, while § 46b-122 (d) prevents use of confidentiality to impair foster parents’ right to be heard.
General Statutes § 1-2z: Plain meaning rule. The Court finds § 46b-129 (p) unambiguous as to not prohibiting intervention, but reviews legislative history to address the Appellate Court’s contrary reliance.
Legislative History (P.A. 01-142, § 8): Floor exchange between Sen. Handley and Sen. McKinney; confirms change from “standing” to “right to be heard” was to conform to the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), and was not intended to preclude judicially granted standing (permissive intervention) when appropriate.
Legislative History (P.A. 09-185, § 3): Focused on prioritizing early relative placement; not a global intervention code.
ASFA, 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(G): Requires states to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard to foster and pre-adoptive parents and relative caregivers, explicitly clarifying that such notice/opportunity does not make them parties solely on that basis. Connecticut’s 2001 amendment aligns with this model.
Out-of-State Authorities:
- Decisions construing “right to be heard” as coexisting with permissive intervention: e.g., F.W. v. T.M. (Ala. Civ. App. 2013); Dept. of Health & Social Services v. Zander B. (Alaska 2020); State ex rel. C.H. v. Faircloth (W. Va. 2018).
- Decisions cited by the Commissioner found distinguishable (e.g., Roberto F. (Ariz.), In re Doe (Idaho), In re Interest of Enyce J. (Neb.), In re G.C. (Pa.)) given differing rules, court structures, or explicit statutory schemes.
Connecticut precedents permitting dispositional-phase intervention: In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263 (1992); In re Shanaira C., 297 Conn. 737 (2010); In re Vincent D., 65 Conn. App. 658 (2001).
Parental rights, due process, and best interests: The Court distinguishes between adjudicatory and dispositional phases; best interests govern the dispositional phase, and permissive intervention at that stage does not infringe constitutional parental rights. See In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648 (1979); In re Ava W., 336 Conn. 545 (2020).
Nye v. Marcus, 198 Conn. 138 (1985), and legislative response in P.A. 88-332 codified at § 52-466 (f) (habeas standing for foster parents): Demonstrates legislative willingness to expand foster parent participation when judicial doctrine is perceived as too restrictive.
Mootness authorities: Los Angeles County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979); RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates, 278 Conn. 672 (2006); Thunelius v. Posacki, 193 Conn. App. 666 (2019); J.Y. v. M.R., 215 Conn. App. 648 (2022). The Court holds the interim order did not moot the appeal; practical relief remained available.

2) Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeds along textual, structural, and historical lines:

Text and structure: Section 46b-129 (p) “expressly expands rather than restricts” foster parents’ rights by conferring an automatic right to be heard on best interests in any § 46b-129 proceeding. The text neither mentions nor prohibits intervention. Practice Book § 35a-4 (c) independently authorizes permissive intervention by nonrelatives at the dispositional phase. Because revocation is a dispositional hearing and because § 46b-129 (p) does not conflict with § 35a-4 (c), both provisions can and do operate together: the statute sets a floor (the right to be heard), the Practice Book rule empowers courts to grant party status when appropriate.
2001 amendment (P.A. 01-142 § 8): Legislative history confirms the change from “standing” to a “right to be heard” was intended to align with ASFA and not to withdraw judicial authority to permit intervention when warranted. The Appellate Court in Ryan C. inferred too much from the loss of automatic standing; removing automatic party status does not imply a prohibition on permissive party status.
2009 amendment (now § 46b-129 (d)): The Commissioner’s argument that this created a comprehensive, exclusive intervention regime for relatives only is rejected. The provision addresses early, relative-centered temporary custody within a specific window; it does not silently repeal or foreclose dispositional-phase permissive intervention by nonrelatives.
Contours of the “right to be heard”: The Court pinpoints what meaningful participation requires:
- Eligible foster parents must be permitted to attend the entire dispositional hearing and to comment at an appropriate time on best interests in light of the evidence.
- They are not parties by virtue of § 46b-129 (p) alone, and thus do not have the rights to call or cross-examine witnesses or to appeal adverse rulings—unless granted intervenor status.
- Trial courts retain discretion, for good cause and within reasonable limits, to broaden or restrict aspects of the right to be heard to protect confidentiality or the integrity of proceedings (e.g., tailored protective orders, limited redactions, timing adjustments), consistent with §§ 46b-122 and 46b-124.
Mootness and relief: The father’s death and the interim, ex parte transfer to an aunt did not moot the appeal; relief—restoring intervenor status and a new dispositional hearing—remains meaningful. The new hearing must focus on present best interests at the time of that hearing, taking account of changed circumstances.

3) Impact

The decision reshapes Connecticut’s child protection landscape in several ways:

Permissive intervention restored: Trial courts can again grant foster parents party status in the dispositional phase upon a best-interests or interests-of-justice showing, aligning practice with long-standing Connecticut precedents and with ASFA-consistent approaches in other states.
Operational definition of “right to be heard”: Courts must, in ordinary practice, allow eligible foster parents to attend dispositional hearings and to comment after hearing the evidence. This will change hearing management in courts that had previously treated the right as satisfied by a preliminary, unsworn statement.
Case management and confidentiality: The Court provides a roadmap for balancing confidentiality with participation through § 46b-122 and § 46b-124—admissions orders, protective orders, and tailored limitations for good cause—without denying presence and meaningful comment.
Appellate posture and remedies: Improper denial of intervention or infringement of the statutory right to be heard will support reversal or vacatur of dispositional orders and remand for a new hearing.
Legislative dialogue: If the General Assembly prefers to narrow or expand foster parents’ participation further, it must do so expressly. The Court declines to infer broad prohibitions from silence or unrelated textual changes.
Practice effects:
- DCF and counsel should anticipate requests for intervention where foster parents have substantial, distinct information bearing on best interests, especially in long-term placements.
- Courts should explicitly address Practice Book § 35a-4 (d) factors and record reasons when granting or denying intervention, and when tailoring the “right to be heard.”
- Children’s counsel and GALs should be prepared for foster parent presence and comment and consider how to integrate or distinguish those views within a child-directed best-interests analysis.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Neglect proceeding: A court case addressing whether a child is neglected, abused, or uncared-for, and—if so—what disposition (custody, services, placement, permanency planning) best serves the child’s interests.
Dispositional phase: The stage after the court finds neglect (or in hearings like revocation) where the focus is entirely on the child’s best interests (as distinct from proving neglect itself).
Revocation of commitment: A request to end DCF custody by showing cause for commitment no longer exists (preponderance standard). If proven, the opposing party may still defeat revocation by clear and convincing evidence that revocation is not in the child’s best interests.
Permanency plan: DCF’s plan for a child’s long-term living arrangement (e.g., reunification, adoption, guardianship), subject to court review; any party (including intervenors) may contest the plan.
Permissive intervention: A court-authorized way for a nonparty to become a party in a case when their participation will aid resolution and is in the child’s best interests or in the interests of justice. Intervenors gain party rights (e.g., to present and challenge evidence, and to appeal).
“Right to be heard” (without intervention): An automatic right for qualifying foster parents to receive notice, attend dispositional hearings, and give their views on best interests after hearing the evidence; it does not include party rights unless intervention is granted.
Protective supervision: A time-limited period during which the court oversees a child’s welfare while in a parent’s custody, with conditions and services, after revocation is granted.
Juvenile confidentiality: Statutory limits on access to juvenile proceedings and records. Judges can admit persons with a legitimate interest (such as foster parents exercising the right to be heard) and can order appropriate protections.

Application to the Case

The trial court erred when it removed the foster parents as intervenors solely on the authority of In re Ryan C. Because that decision is now overruled, the previous order removing intervention was reversed, and intervention must be restored on remand (subject to the trial court’s ordinary discretion to revisit intervention for other, properly grounded reasons).

Independently, the trial court violated the foster parents’ statutory “right to be heard” by allowing only a preliminary statement and then excluding them from the rest of the revocation hearing. Under § 46b-129 (p), the right ordinarily includes the right to attend the entire hearing and to comment on best interests in light of the evidence—precisely what the court disallowed. The Court therefore vacated the revocation order and directed a new hearing.

The Court rejected mootness given that the interim, ex parte order following the father’s death neither nullified the challenged revocation order nor provided complete relief. The remand hearing must assess best interests at the time of the new hearing, incorporating the changed circumstances.

Responses to Dissenting Concerns

Parental rights and comparisons: Permissive intervention at the dispositional phase does not infringe constitutional parental rights; the best-interests standard governs that phase, and courts have long weighed the child’s established placement and relationships without conducting improper “comparisons” in the constitutional sense. The adjudicatory/dispositional distinction remains intact.
Delay: Practice Book § 35a-4 (d) directs courts to consider delay and prejudice in deciding intervention. The timeline in this case reflected multiple factors unrelated to intervention (e.g., pandemic delays, counsel withdrawal). Courts retain tools to manage proceedings efficiently.
Reunification interference: The statutory scheme itself contemplates that parties and intervenors may oppose permanency plans, and trial courts can and do discern between reasonable and unreasonable conduct when assessing interference under § 17a-112 (k)(7) in termination cases.
Regulatory role of foster parents: Statutes and regulations that guide foster parent responsibilities coexisted with automatic standing before 2001 and do not imply a ban on permissive intervention. If the legislature wishes to impose categorical limits, it must do so expressly.

Practical Guidance for Future Cases

For trial courts:
- When faced with a foster parent motion to intervene at the dispositional phase, apply Practice Book § 35a-4 (d) factors on the record.
- Even without intervention, ensure qualifying foster parents receive notice, may attend the entire hearing, and can comment on best interests after the evidentiary presentation—unless, for good cause, specific, tailored limitations are necessary.
- Use § 46b-122 and § 46b-124 tools (admission orders, protective orders, limited redactions) to balance confidentiality and meaningful participation.
For DCF and counsel:
- Plan for foster parent participation; provide timely notice and, where appropriate, access to pertinent materials by court order.
- Anticipate evidentiary presentations that equip the court to make a best-interests determination cognizant of the child’s attachments and current functioning.
For children’s counsel / GALs:
- Prepare to incorporate or distinguish foster parents’ perspectives in a child-centered view of best interests, including recommendations on conditions such as protective supervision.

Conclusion

In re Jewelyette M. establishes two pivotal propositions in Connecticut juvenile law. First, it restores the trial court’s authority to grant permissive intervention to foster parents during the dispositional phase of neglect proceedings, rejecting the contrary reading of § 46b-129 (p) in In re Ryan C. Second, it gives real content to the statutory “right to be heard,” confirming that—absent good cause for tailored limits—qualifying foster parents must be allowed to attend the entirety of dispositional hearings and to comment on the child’s best interests after hearing the evidence.

The decision harmonizes statutory text, Practice Book rules, and ASFA’s framework, ensuring that courts have the full, relevant perspective of those who have lived with and cared for a child when making consequential, best-interests determinations. It provides judges with principled discretion to protect confidentiality and the integrity of proceedings, while safeguarding meaningful participation by foster parents. On remand, the trial court must now conduct a new revocation hearing—focused on the child’s present best interests—with the foster parents’ intervenor status restored and their statutory right to be heard fully respected.

Key Takeaways

Section 46b-129 (p) does not bar foster parent intervention; Practice Book § 35a-4 (c) authorizes it at the dispositional phase.
In re Ryan C. overruled on this point.
The “right to be heard” ordinarily includes presence throughout the hearing and informed comment on best interests; it does not confer party rights absent intervention.
Trial courts may tailor the manner of participation for good cause, consistent with juvenile confidentiality statutes.
Improper denial of intervention or truncation of the right to be heard warrants vacatur and remand for a new hearing.