Permissible Disclosure of PSRs and Medical Records by Probation Officers Under Supervised Release: United States v. Harris

Introduction

United States v. Harris, 24-1099-cr (2d Cir. Apr. 8, 2025) concerns the interplay between supervised release conditions, privacy interests in presentence investigation reports (PSRs) and medical/mental‐health records, and the boundary of judicial versus probation‐officer authority. Defendant‐appellant Aimee Harris pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit interstate transportation of stolen property, 18 U.S.C. § 371, after stealing her relative’s personal property and transporting it across state lines. At sentencing, the district court imposed mandatory outpatient substance abuse and mental health treatment as special conditions of supervised release and authorized the probation officer to release Harris’s PSR and prior treatment records to her future service providers. On appeal, Harris argued that this authorization (1) invaded her privacy and patient‐physician privilege, and (2) impermissibly delegated judicial power to the probation officer. The Second Circuit unanimously affirmed, holding that (a) the record‐sharing authorization was “self-evidently” reasonably related to effective treatment and public safety, and (b) the limited delegation to the probation officer did not cross the line into unlawful delegation of judicial authority.

Summary of the Judgment

The district court had imposed a sentence of one month’s imprisonment and three years of supervised release—below the Guidelines range—on Harris. As part of her release conditions, Harris was required to participate in substance abuse and mental health treatment. The court further authorized her probation officer to share “available drug treatment evaluations and reports,” “available psychological and psychiatric evaluations and reports,” and her PSR with the approved treatment providers. On appeal, Harris challenged only (1) the district court’s authorization to disclose her PSR and medical records without her consent, and (2) the conditional delegation to the probation officer to decide which records to share.

Applying plain‐error review (Harris having failed to object below), the Second Circuit held:

No error in authorizing disclosure. The authorization was “self-evident” from the record as reasonably related to the district court’s § 3553(a)/U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(1) objectives of providing “needed . . . medical care” in the most effective manner and protecting the public by reducing recidivism.
No impermissible delegation. The district court retained decisionmaking over whether Harris would undergo treatment. It delegated only the “minor details” of selecting which records or portions of records to share with providers—a permissible administrative delegation under United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2015).

Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction and supervised‐release conditions.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2008): Upheld a probation‐officer‐authorized waiver of therapeutic confidentiality so that mental‐health professionals could share records with probation. The court reasoned that the record-sharing could advance treatment and public safety.
United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2018): Imposed an individualized‐assessment requirement and articulated that special conditions must be “reasonably related” to § 3553(a)/§ 5D1.3(b)(1) factors, but may be sustained if “self-evident in the record.”
United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2015): Distinguished between impermissible delegation (deciding if inpatient vs. outpatient treatment is required) and permissible delegation of administrative details (e.g., selecting a provider or schedule).

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning can be broken down as follows:

Standard of Review: Because Harris did not object at sentencing, the Court applied the four‐part plain‐error test. An error must be “clear or obvious,” affect substantial rights, and seriously affect fairness or integrity. Here, no such error existed.
Reasonable Relationship to Supervised Release Goals: Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(1), special conditions must be related to the offense, deterrence, public protection, or providing “needed . . . medical care . . . in the most effective manner.” Sharing PSR and past treatment records is integral to “effective” treatment and helps probation officers and providers tailor programs to Harris’s history.
Privacy and Privilege Considerations: Defendants serving supervised release have a diminished privacy expectation. The Court found no conflict with privilege because the shared information was limited to approved providers, who themselves are bound by confidentiality.
Delegation Doctrine: Although only the district court can impose special conditions, it may delegate “minor details” to probation officers. Here, the court retained the core decision (the mandatory treatment requirement) and delegated only which portions of available records to disclose—an administrative function consistent with Matta and Peterson.

Impact

United States v. Harris clarifies and cements a line of authority in the Second Circuit permitting:

Broad discretion for district courts to mandate mental‐health and substance‐abuse treatment as conditions of supervised release, including limited record‐sharing with providers;
Recognition that supervised‐release conditions may intrude on privacy and privilege without running afoul of due process or confidentiality norms, subject to reasonableness;
Permissible delegation of “minor details” to probation officers, distinguishing such delegation from forbidden transfers of core judicial power.

Future sentencing courts in this Circuit will cite Harris for the proposition that district courts need not articulate detailed reasons for record‐sharing when the nexus between disclosure and effective treatment is plain from the face of the record.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Presentence Investigation Report (PSR): A confidential report prepared by probation officers summarizing a defendant’s criminal history, background, and offense details. Courts use it to guide sentencing. Ordinarily private, but disclosure can be authorized under supervised‐release conditions.
Plain‐Error Review: A framework for appellate courts when a party failed to object below. The error must be “clear or obvious” and have harmed the defendant’s substantial rights to warrant reversal.
Improper Delegation: Courts may not vest probation officers with core sentencing decisions (e.g., whether to impose confinement). However, limited administrative tasks (e.g., choosing which approved records go to a treatment provider) are permissible.
Reasonably Related Requirement: 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(1) require that any special condition of supervised release be tied to the offense, deterrence goals, public protection, or the defendant’s rehabilitative needs.

Conclusion

United States v. Harris reaffirms district courts’ broad power to impose rehabilitative conditions—mental health and substance‐ abuse treatment—on supervised release and to authorize limited information‐sharing with service providers. It underscores that a defendant’s privacy interest in a PSR and medical records is attenuated once federal supervision commences, and that carefully circumscribed delegation to probation officers of logistical duties does not infringe the separation of powers. As a binding summary order, Harris will guide sentencing judges and probation departments in the Second Circuit and bolster public confidence that supervised‐release conditions remain within judicial authority while effectively promoting rehabilitation and public safety.