Permissible Disclosure of Presentence Reports and Medical Records to Treatment Providers under Supervised Release: United States v. Harris

1. Introduction

United States v. Harris, 24-1099-cr (2d Cir. Apr. 8, 2025), addresses the scope of a district court’s authority to impose special conditions of supervised release—specifically, whether a court may authorize a probation officer to share a defendant’s Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) and prior medical and psychological records with mental health and substance-abuse treatment providers without the defendant’s separate consent. The defendant, Aimee Harris, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit interstate transportation of stolen property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, after stealing personal journals and other items from a family member of a public‐office candidate and transporting them across state lines. At sentencing, Harris emphasized her ongoing mental‐health struggles and sought a non-custodial sentence. The district court imposed one month of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release, requiring outpatient mental‐health and substance-abuse treatment and authorizing her probation officer to share her PSR and treatment records with those providers. On appeal, Harris challenged that authorization as unauthorized delegation and as violating her privacy and the physician-patient privilege. The Second Circuit affirmed.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit held by summary order that:

District courts have broad discretion under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(d) and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b) to impose special conditions of supervised release “reasonably related” to the defendant’s needs and the factors set forth in § 3553(a).
Authorizing a probation officer to provide a defendant’s PSR and prior mental‐health or substance-abuse evaluations to treatment providers is “self-evidently” tailored to facilitate effective care and to protect the public by reducing recidivism.
The defendant’s privacy interests are diminished during supervised release, and treatment providers will remain bound by confidentiality obligations.
The court’s authorization did not constitute an impermissible delegation of judicial power because the court itself mandated treatment; it merely allowed the probation officer to make limited decisions about which portions of the records to furnish.
Because Harris failed to object below, the plain‐error standard applied, and she could not show any clear error affecting her substantial rights or the fairness of proceedings.

Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court’s judgment.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The court’s reasoning drew on several key precedents:

United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2008): Upheld a waiver of therapeutic confidentiality to allow a probation officer to access mental‐health treatment records, given the rehabilitative and public‐safety benefits.
United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2018): Held that a district court must give an individualized explanation for special conditions but may rest on “self-evident” reasoning in the record.
United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2015): Explained the boundary between permissible delegation (minor details like provider selection) and impermissible delegation (making liberty contingent on probation‐officer discretion to impose or remove a condition).
United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001): Held that requiring treatment “only if directed” by a probation officer impermissibly delegates the court’s authority.
United States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298 (2d Cir. 2024): Recognized that supervised‐release conditions diminish a defendant’s expectation of privacy.
United States v. Kunz, 68 F.4th 748 (2d Cir. 2023): Clarified the abuse‐of‐discretion standard for special conditions of supervised release.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The court applied the following analytical framework:

Statutory and Guidelines Authority. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b), a district court may impose special conditions of supervised release that are “reasonably related” to the nature of the offense, the defendant’s history, deterrence, protection of the public, and the need to provide medical care or correctional treatment.
Standard of Review. Because Harris did not object at sentencing, the panel reviewed for plain error: (1) an error that is clear or obvious; (2) affecting substantial rights; and (3) seriously affecting fairness, integrity, or public reputation.
Facilitating Effective Treatment. It is “self-evident” that a treatment provider benefits from access to a defendant’s PSR and prior evaluations to address underlying mental‐health conditions and substance abuse—objectives squarely within § 5D1.3(b)(1)(D).
Privacy and Privilege. A defendant on supervised release has a diminished expectation of privacy. Treatment providers are bound by professional confidentiality obligations, and sharing records with them does not undermine privilege.
Delegation Boundaries. The court itself imposed the treatment requirement. It only allowed the probation officer to determine which portions of Harris’s records were necessary to transmit—an exercise of “minor details” authority consistent with Matta.

3.3. Impact

United States v. Harris clarifies several points for district courts and practitioners:

It confirms that authorizing the sharing of PSRs and medical records with treatment providers is a permissible—and indeed often necessary—component of supervised‐release conditions aimed at rehabilitation and public safety.
It underscores that such disclosure need not be justified at length if the reason is self-evident from the treatment requirement itself.
It delineates the permissible scope of delegation to probation officers—minor logistical decisions versus substantive discretion over liberty-depriving conditions.
It reaffirms that defendants’ privacy expectations are limited once supervised release begins, easing concerns about privilege invasion in this context.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Presentence Investigation Report (PSR): A confidential report prepared by probation officers after a guilty plea or conviction. It summarizes the offense, the defendant’s background, criminal history, and any mitigating factors to assist judges in sentencing.
Supervised Release Conditions: After imprisonment, a defendant may be subject to restrictions on liberty—regular check-ins, drug testing, treatment programs, and other requirements—to promote reintegration and protect the public.
Plain Error Review: When a defendant fails to object at trial or sentencing, appellate courts review only for “plain error”: clear mistakes that affected substantial rights and the fairness of proceedings.
Delegation of Judicial Authority: Courts may delegate logistical details (e.g., selecting a treatment provider) to probation officers, but not the core decision to impose or lift a supervised‐release condition.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Harris reaffirms the district court’s broad discretion to tailor supervised‐release conditions for rehabilitation and public safety under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and the Sentencing Guidelines. By holding that authorizing a probation officer to share a defendant’s PSR and medical or psychological records with mental‐health and substance-abuse providers is both reasonable and nondelegative of judicial power, the Second Circuit provided clear guidance to sentencing courts. This decision strengthens rehabilitative sentencing practices while preserving defendants’ fair‐process rights under plain‐error review.