Permissible Disclosure of Presentence Reports and Medical Records in Supervised Release: United States v. Harris

Introduction

United States v. Harris is a Second Circuit summary order, decided April 8, 2025, that clarifies the scope of a district court’s authority to impose special conditions of supervised release—specifically, to authorize the disclosure of a defendant’s Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) and prior medical and psychological records to treatment providers. The case arises from Aimee Harris’s conviction for conspiracy to commit interstate transportation of stolen property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. At sentencing, the district court imposed a below‐guidelines one‐month custodial sentence plus three years of supervised release, conditioning Harris’s release on participation in outpatient substance‐abuse and mental‐health treatment. As part of those conditions, the court authorized the Probation Office to share Harris’s PSR and treatment records with her future treatment providers. On appeal Harris argued that the court lacked authority to permit those disclosures and improperly delegated judicial power to the probation officer. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s imposition of the special conditions. It held that:

The authorization to disclose Harris’s PSR and prior treatment records to her substance‐abuse and mental‐health providers was a reasonable exercise of the court’s broad discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(1).
Such disclosure is “self-evidently” related to “providing the defendant with needed … medical care … in the most effective manner” and to protecting public safety by reducing recidivism.
Harris’s diminished privacy expectations during supervised release and the confidentiality obligations of treatment providers mitigate any concerns about undermining physician‐patient privilege.
The district court did not impermissibly delegate judicial power to the probation officer. The court imposed the treatment mandate itself and only delegated “minor” decisions—namely, which portions of the PSR or medical records to release.
No plain error occurred: Harris failed to object below, and even under plain‐error review, the conditions were lawful and supported by binding precedents.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Kunz, 68 F.4th 748 (2d Cir. 2023): Standard of abuse‐of‐discretion review for supervised‐release conditions.
United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2008): Upholding a waiver of therapeutic confidentiality for probation officers to access mental‐health records, as advancing treatment and public safety.
United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2018): Requirement that district courts articulate individualized reasons for special conditions, but allowing self‐evident reasoning on the record.
United States v. Abrar, 58 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 1995): A condition is permissible if reasonably related to any one of the § 3553(a)/U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b) factors.
United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2015): Prohibiting delegation of core sentencing choices that affect liberty, while allowing delegation of minor logistical details.
United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001): Preventing probation officers from making threshold decisions about whether a defendant must comply with a court‐ordered mental‐health intervention.

Legal Reasoning

The court began by noting that a district judge has broad discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(1) to impose special conditions of supervised release so long as they are reasonably related to any of four factors: the offense and defendant’s history, deterrence, public protection, and the defendant’s need for medical care or correctional treatment. Here, the requirement of outpatient substance‐abuse and mental‐health treatment plainly advanced Harris’s rehabilitation and public safety.

The key question was whether authorizing the Probation Office to share Harris’s PSR and medical records with treatment providers without her consent and delegating that sharing decision violated her rights or improperly delegated judicial power. The court held that:

Record-Sharing Is Reasonably Related. As in Dupes, sharing treatment records furthers effective care and public safety. It would frustrate the treatment mandate if providers lacked full information about a supervisee’s criminal conduct, mental‐health history, or substance‐use background.
Privacy Interests Are Diminished. A convicted individual on supervised release has reduced privacy expectations. The release of records was confined to approved treatment providers who themselves are bound by confidentiality obligations.
No Improper Delegation. The district court imposed treatment as a matter of law and only authorized the probation officer to release particular records. That delegation involves logistical decisionmaking—akin to selecting a provider or scheduling sessions—not the core decision whether treatment is required.

Impact

United States v. Harris solidifies a district court’s power to tailor supervised-release conditions by:

Authorizing limited, supervised disclosures of PSRs and medical records to treatment providers when treatment is court-ordered.
Confirming that such disclosures do not breach confidentiality or patient-privilege norms so long as treatment providers are obligated to similar confidentiality.
Clarifying that delegation to probation officers of minor logistical decisions (what specific records to release) does not transgress the non-delegation doctrine for sentencing.

Future sentencing courts may rely on Harris when imposing mental-health or substance-abuse treatment conditions, ensuring that treatment professionals have the information necessary to provide effective care, and thus better rehabilitate individuals and protect the public.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Special Conditions of Supervised Release: Extra requirements a judge can impose beyond standard terms (e.g., drug testing, treatment programs) if they relate to sentencing goals.
Presentence Investigation Report (PSR): A report prepared by probation officers detailing a defendant’s background, offense conduct, and sentencing guidelines calculation.
Plain Error Review: When a defendant fails to object at trial or sentencing, appellate courts will only correct “clear or obvious” errors that affect substantial rights and undermine the fairness of proceedings.
Delegation vs. Core Sentencing Power: Judges can give probation officers authority over minor, technical details (who to contact, scheduling), but cannot delegate the decision whether to impose a condition or the selection of fundamental treatment modalities that affect liberty.

Conclusion

United States v. Harris reinforces the principle that district courts may reasonably tailor supervised-release conditions to include mental-health and substance-abuse treatment, and may authorize the sharing of a defendant’s PSR and past medical records with treatment providers so long as confidentiality safeguards remain in place. The decision further delineates acceptable boundaries of delegation, preserving judicial control over core sentencing choices while permitting probation officers to manage implementation details. Harris thus provides clear guidance to sentencing courts seeking to balance rehabilitative needs, public safety, and procedural fairness.