Permissible Consideration of §3553(a)(2)(A) Factors in Supervised Release Revocation Sentencing

Introduction

United States v. Deandre Lamont Blackman is a Sixth Circuit decision addressing the scope of district‐court discretion when revoking supervised release and imposing a new sentence. Deandre Blackman, after serving a federal drug sentence and repeatedly violating the terms of his supervised release, faced a fourth revocation. The district court imposed the statutory maximum of 24 months’ imprisonment followed by seven years of supervised release with electronic monitoring. Blackman appealed, arguing that (1) the court improperly considered the punishment‐oriented factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), which are not incorporated by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), and (2) the length of his post‐revocation term of supervised release (and its electronic monitoring condition) was procedurally unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The court confirmed that revocation of supervised release and a new term of imprisonment is governed by § 3583(e), which cross‐references most § 3553(a) factors—but omits the punishment‐specific factors of § 3553(a)(2)(A).
Blackman argued plain error, asserting the district court nonetheless used § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors (“seriousness,” “respect for law,” “just punishment”) in setting his sentence. The Sixth Circuit rejected that claim, finding no clear or obvious reliance.
The court reviewed the record and concluded the district court expressly limited itself to the authorized § 3583(e)/§ 3553(a) factors—public safety, deterrence, breach of trust—and thus committed no procedural error.
With respect to the seven‐year supervised release term and electronic monitoring condition, the court again found that the district court properly considered the necessary § 3553(a) factors (safety, deterrence) and that Blackman himself had proposed monitoring.
The Sixth Circuit declined to disturb the district court’s sentencing discretion on substantive‐reasonableness grounds.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2007): Held that it is not reversible error for a court to consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors when imposing a revocation sentence, despite their omission from § 3583(e).
United States v. Esteras, 88 F.4th 1163 (6th Cir. 2023): Reiterated that district courts may consider punishment‐related factors in supervised release revocations.
United States v. Price, 901 F.3d 746 (6th Cir. 2018): Summarized the statutory framework for revocation of supervised release and incorporation of § 3553(a) factors under § 3583(e).
United States v. Jaimez, 95 F.4th 1004 (6th Cir. 2024): Emphasized that drug‐related conduct post‐conviction is a breach of trust warranting appropriate sanction.
United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc): Established the four‐prong plain error standard on unpreserved challenges.
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000): Noted that supervised release violations confirm the need for continued supervision.

2. Legal Reasoning

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), a district court revoking supervised release must consider the § 3553(a) factors explicitly incorporated by § 3583(e). Section 3583(e) omits subsection (a)(2)(A) – the factors concerning “seriousness of the offense,” “respect for the law,” and “just punishment.” Blackman contended that the district court nevertheless relied on those omitted factors. The Sixth Circuit performed a close textual analysis of the sentencing transcript:

The district court expressly stated it relied on the § 3553(a) factors incorporated by § 3583(e), focusing on deterrence (§ 3553(a)(2)(B)), protection of the public (§ 3553(a)(2)(C)), and Blackman’s repeated breaches of trust.
Passages Blackman cited – e.g., that he was “saved by the statutory maximum” or that his conduct “justifies a greater sentence” – were contextually tied to breach‐of‐trust sanctions, not impermissible punishment goals.
On plain error review, ambiguity or equivocal remarks do not suffice to show clear, prejudicial error.

Similarly, in reimposing supervised release (seven years) with electronic monitoring, the court:

Considered the same § 3553(a) factors (public safety and deterrence) when choosing the supervision length;
Granted the monitoring condition at Blackman’s own suggestion;
Resisted inferring improper motive solely from the length of the term.

3. Impact

This decision reinforces three important points for future supervised‐release revocation proceedings:

District courts retain broad discretion to impose the statutory maximum upon revocation when justified by deterrence, public safety, and breach of trust.
It is not reversible error to consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors, although sound practice is to focus solely on the specific factors cross‐referenced in § 3583(e).
On unpreserved claims, defendants face a rigorous plain error standard: they must show clear, prejudicial error that undermines the fairness of proceedings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised Release Revocation: When a defendant on supervised release violates its terms, the court can revoke the release, impose new prison time, and reimpose supervision.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e): Governs revocation of supervised release and cross‐references most—but not all—of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A): Directs courts to consider punishment‐oriented goals (“seriousness,” “respect for law,” “just punishment”) when initially sentencing—but is omitted in revocation proceedings.
Plain Error Review: An appellate standard for unpreserved claims requiring (1) an error that is (2) clear or obvious, (3) affecting substantial rights, and (4) affecting the fairness or integrity of proceedings.

Conclusion

United States v. Blackman clarifies that, in supervised release revocation cases, district courts may lawfully consider public‐safety and deterrence factors—and even certain punishment‐oriented considerations—so long as they remain within the bounds of § 3583(e) and the heightened plain error standard is not met. The decision affirms broad judicial discretion to sanction repeat violators, underscores the high bar for appellate reversal on procedural grounds, and provides a roadmap for litigants and judges in framing and defending revocation‐sentencing decisions.