Permissible Conditions of Release Under 18 U.S.C. § 4248(e): Beyond the Prescribed Treatment Regimen

Introduction

In United States v. Volungus, First Circuit No. 23-1684 (Apr. 15, 2025), the court addressed two novel questions under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006:

Whether a district court, when conditionally releasing a civilly committed “sexually dangerous person” under 18 U.S.C. § 4248, may impose non-treatment conditions that go beyond the “prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment.”
Whether the court may require the releasee to pay part or all of the costs associated with those conditions (for example, polygraph testing, electronic monitoring, substance-abuse testing, and computer-monitoring software).

John Charles Volungus is a convicted child-sex offender who, after completing his criminal sentence and violating supervised release, was civilly committed under the Adam Walsh Act as “sexually dangerous.” In 2022, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted his conditional release subject to a package of 46 numbered conditions (some treatment-related, some not) and required him to cover various monitoring and treatment costs. Volungus objected, contending that the Act permits only treatment-related conditions and that the court lacked authority to impose cost-recovery requirements. The district court overruled his objections and denied his motion to dismiss a parallel revocation proceeding. He appealed, and the First Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The First Circuit carefully parsed 18 U.S.C. § 4248(e), which directs a court granting conditional release to “order, as an explicit condition of release, that [the committed individual] comply with the prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment.” The text does not expressly forbid conditions other than those in the prescribed regimen. The court joined the majority of sister circuits (Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth) in holding that:

The statute does not limit the district court to treatment-only conditions. A court may impose additional, non-treatment conditions, provided they are related to the releasee’s mental illness or dangerousness and serve the Act’s public-safety purpose.
Congress is presumed to have known, when enacting § 4248(e) in 2006, that courts had long read parallel discharge provisions (§ 4243(f) and § 4246(e)) as permitting such additional conditions.
The court may require a conditionally released individual to pay all or part of the costs of court-ordered monitoring, testing, and treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 3672, because the Adam Walsh Act appears in Chapter 313—titled “Offenders with Mental Disease or Defect”—and the releasee is indisputably a sex offender.

The First Circuit rejected the minority Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Crape, 603 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2010), which had read identical language in § 4243(f) as confining the court to treatment-only conditions. It also dismissed Volungus’s constitutional concerns about “unbounded authority” by emphasizing that any extra conditions must be tailored to the person’s mental illness and the risk posed to the public. Finally, the court held that Volungus may appeal only the portion of the district court’s order denying his objections to the conditional-release conditions, not any denial of his motion to dismiss the first revocation proceeding (which the government had withdrawn before his notice of appeal).

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010): Recognized the Adam Walsh Act as an incremental addition to a long-standing federal scheme for civil commitment of “sexually dangerous persons.”
United States v. Jain, 174 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 1999): Held under § 4243(f) that courts may impose non-treatment conditions related to dangerousness and public safety.
United States v. Franklin, 435 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 2006): Approved broader conditions under § 4246(e), so long as they furthered the Act’s protective goals.
United States v. Phelps, 283 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2002): Endorsed discretionary non-treatment conditions at discharge to safeguard the community.
United States v. Crape, 603 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2010): Minority view reading § 4243(f) to prohibit any condition beyond the prescribed regimen; explicitly rejected here.
Circuit decisions in the Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits (Perkins, Williams, Livesay) have language consistent with the majority position, although they did not squarely confront the question.

2. Legal Reasoning

The First Circuit applied familiar tools of statutory interpretation:

Textual Reading: Section 4248(e)(2)(B) requires that a conditional-release order “order, as an explicit condition of release, that [the person] comply with the prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment.” Nothing in the text says that the court may not impose additional conditions.
Purpose and Context: The Adam Walsh Act’s core aim is public protection from mentally ill persons who pose a serious risk of sexual violence. Courts must have “great latitude” to craft conditions that mitigate that risk. A rigid treatment-only approach would frustrate the Act’s protective design.
Presumption of Consistency: When Congress enacted § 4248(e) in 2006, it “borrowed” language from preexisting discharge provisions (§ 4243(f), § 4246(e)) that courts had long interpreted to permit tailored non-treatment conditions. Congress is deemed to know and adopt established judicial interpretations of identical statutory language.
Limiting Principle: Any non-treatment condition must still be “related to the mental illness in question” or “reasonably necessary to assure the safety of the community,” thus preventing arbitrary or punitive restrictions.
Cost-Recovery Authority: Under 18 U.S.C. § 3672, courts may require offenders to pay costs of supervision or treatment programs. The Adam Walsh Act sits in Chapter 313—“Offenders with Mental Disease or Defect”—and Volungus undisputedly remains a sex offender subject to supervision. Thus the court validly assessed cost obligations for monitoring and treatment services.

3. Impact on Future Cases

This decision resolves a Circuit split in favor of broader judicial authority over conditional-release conditions under the Adam Walsh Act. Key repercussions include:

Affirmation that courts may deploy non-treatment measures—such as electronic monitoring, polygraph exams, and residency restrictions—whenever they have a rational nexus to mental illness or public safety.
Rejection of the Crape rule, ensuring consistency among the First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.
Clear endorsement of financial conditions under § 3672 for fee-related costs, reinforcing the notion that civil commitment under Chapter 313 does not insulate releasees from cost-sharing obligations normally associated with supervised release.
A reminder that future district courts must tailor all conditions—treatment-related or otherwise—so that they genuinely advance the dual goals of therapeutic intervention and community protection.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Civil Commitment vs. Criminal Sentence: Civil commitment under § 4248 is a non-punitive civil process distinct from criminal incarceration, aimed at treating mentally ill offenders who remain dangerous.
Sexually Dangerous Person: Under § 4247(a)(5)–(6), someone with a history of sexual violence or child molestation who currently suffers a serious mental disorder rendering them likely to reoffend unless confined or treated.
Conditional Release: Release from civil confinement under court-imposed conditions, revocable if the person fails to comply with the treatment regimen or endangers the public.
Prescribed Regimen: The specific medical, psychiatric, or psychological plan—usually developed by clinical professionals—that the confined person must follow upon release.
Revocation Mechanism: Under § 4248(f), the court can recommit a releasee who fails “to comply with the prescribed regimen” and remains dangerous.
Cost-Recovery Statute (18 U.S.C. § 3672): A general supervisory-release provision allowing courts to order offenders under supervision to pay fees for monitoring or treatment services.

Conclusion

United States v. Volungus confirms that the Adam Walsh Act’s conditional-release scheme empowers district courts to fashion a comprehensive set of conditions—treatment-related and otherwise—so long as each condition ties back to the person’s mental illness or the public’s safety. By rejecting the narrow reading of Crape and embracing the majority approach, the First Circuit ensures that judges retain the flexibility necessary to protect communities and address the complex needs of sexually dangerous individuals transitioning back into society. The court also validated the use of cost-recovery provisions under § 3672 in the civil-commitment context, providing clarity on financial obligations for releasees. This decision will guide lower courts in crafting and enforcing balanced, safety-focused conditional releases under Chapter 313 of Title 18.