Permissibility of Specialized Lay Opinion under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 701

Introduction

Devon Romick v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. 57, is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of Arkansas addressing the admissibility of lay‐witness opinion testimony when that witness possesses specialized training and experience. The appellant, Devon Romick, was convicted of raping a five-year-old child after a jury heard testimony from a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE nurse). On appeal, Romick argued that the trial court improperly allowed that nurse—Bethany Greene—to testify about studies, statistics, and medical observations without formal expert qualification. The central issue on appeal was whether Greene’s statements went beyond permissible lay opinion under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 701 and crossed into unqualified expert testimony under Rules 702–703. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the conviction and clarified the scope of lay‐opinion testimony under Rule 701.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Arkansas, in a majority opinion delivered by Associate Justice Nicholas J. Bronni, affirmed the circuit court’s decision and Romick’s conviction and life sentence. The court held:

Romick failed to preserve objections to most of the challenged testimony by not contemporaneously objecting at trial.
The only properly preserved objection—concerning Greene’s reference to a 2009 study—was admissible lay opinion under Rule 701.
Even if the testimony had been expert in nature, any error in its admission was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
The court reaffirmed that lay witnesses with specialized training may offer rationally based, helpful opinions under Rule 701, and explicitly overruled conflicting court of appeals authority.

In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Baker stressed that, even assuming error, Romick could not demonstrate prejudice because the testimony was cumulative of other unobjected‐to evidence.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Ark. Rule Evid. 701 – Lay‐opinion testimony must be rationally based on the witness’s perception and helpful to understanding.
Ark. Rule Evid. 702–703 – Expert testimony requires specialized knowledge, qualifications, and a proper foundation.
McClain v. State, 361 Ark. 133 (2005) – Necessity of contemporaneous objection.
Crow v. State, 306 Ark. 411 (1991) – Rule 701 displaces the old common‐law prohibition on lay opinions.
Navarro v. State, 371 Ark. 179 (2007) – Police investigators may give opinion testimony based on training and experience.
Felty v. State, 306 Ark. 634 (1991) – Lay‐opinion testimony is permissible when rationally based on perception.
Russell v. State, 306 Ark. 436 (1991) – Treating paramedics may testify as lay witnesses about wounds they observed.
Flowers v. State, 373 Ark. 127 (2008) – Lay witnesses with experience may offer opinions rationally based on that experience.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolds in three principal steps:

Preservation of Error: Under Arkansas law, an appellant must contemporaneously object to evidentiary rulings or risk waiver. Romick objected only to Greene’s reference to a 2009 study; the other challenged statements went unpreserved.
Lay vs. Expert Testimony: • Rule 701 permits lay‐witness opinions if they (a) are “rationally based on the perception of the witness” and (b) are helpful. • Expert opinions under Rules 702–703 require formal qualification and may rest on data not personally observed. • Greene’s statements about study findings and the lack of physical indicators in child‐abuse cases were grounded in her direct examinations, training, and experience as a SANE nurse. These met the “perception” requirement (firsthand knowledge plus informed inference) and the “helpfulness” requirement (assisting the jury in understanding the absence of injury does not disprove abuse).
Harmless Error Analysis: Even assuming error, admission of Greene’s reference to the 2009 study was cumulative of her earlier, unobjected‐to testimony and that of a detective who confirmed the same proposition. Given the graphic direct testimony from the victim, the mother’s eyewitness account, and Romick’s inconsistent statements, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Impact

This decision has three major implications:

Expansion of Lay Testimony: Clarifies that witnesses with specialized training—such as SANE nurses, detectives, or medical personnel—may testify under Rule 701 based on their informed perceptions and need not be formally qualified as experts.
Limitation on Court of Appeals Precedent: Overrules decisions (e.g., Vasquez v. State, 2022 Ark. App. 328) that excluded specialized‐knowledge testimony from lay opinion under Rule 701.
Evidence‐Preservation Reminder: Reinforces the critical importance of contemporaneous objections to preserve appellate review of evidentiary rulings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Lay Opinion vs. Expert Opinion: • Lay Opinion (Rule 701): Witnesses speak from firsthand perception—what they saw, felt, or experienced. It may include reasonable inferences. • Expert Opinion (Rule 702–703): Requires formal credentials and allows reliance on outside data or studies. Experts help the jury understand specialized or technical matters beyond common experience.

“Perception” under Rule 701: Not limited to bare observation; includes informed appreciation or cognition derived from experience and training.

Harmless Error Doctrine: Even if a trial court makes a mistake in admitting evidence, an appellate court will not reverse if the overall evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the error did not prejudice the defendant’s substantial rights.

Conclusion

Devon Romick v. State of Arkansas (2025 Ark. 57) settles an important question in Arkansas evidence law: specialized‐knowledge lay witnesses may offer helpful opinions under Rule 701 without formal expert qualification, provided their testimony is rooted in their own perceptions and assists the jury. The decision strengthens trial courts’ discretion to admit informed lay testimony and underscores the need for timely objections. Its broader significance lies in ensuring that fact‐finders receive practical, experience‐based insights—particularly in sensitive prosecutions involving child victims—while preserving the expert‐opinion safeguards of Rules 702–703.