Permanent Neglect Without Prior Article 10 Adjudication: Incarcerated Parents, Diligent Efforts, and Realistic Planning in Matter of Jack V. (Jack U.)

I. Introduction

The Appellate Division, Third Department’s decision in Matter of Jack V. (Jack U.), 2025 NY Slip Op 06574 (Nov. 26, 2025), is a significant addition to New York’s jurisprudence on permanent neglect and termination of parental rights under Social Services Law § 384-b.

The case squarely addresses a recurring but often misunderstood question: may a parent be found to have permanently neglected a child, and have parental rights terminated, even if there was never a formal neglect adjudication or dispositional order against that parent under Family Court Act article 10? The Third Department answers yes, making clear that an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) and the subsequent dismissal of an article 10 neglect petition do not insulate a parent from a later permanent neglect proceeding.

At the same time, the court applies and synthesizes recent Court of Appeals guidance on “diligent efforts” and parental planning, particularly for incarcerated parents, emphasizing:

The breadth of the agency’s duty to make diligent efforts even when a parent is incarcerated.
The stringent requirement that a parent must present a realistic and feasible plan for the child’s future, not simply wait for release from prison while the child remains in foster care.
The overriding importance of children’s need for permanency once they have spent most of their lives in a stable foster (here, pre-adoptive) home.

The court ultimately affirms the termination of the father’s parental rights, holding that the children were permanently neglected and that freeing them for adoption was in their best interests.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The respondent father is the incarcerated parent of twin boys born in 2016. The children were removed and placed in foster care at one month old due to the mother’s substance abuse; the father was incarcerated at the time. In the 2016–2017 neglect proceeding:

The mother was found to have neglected the children and later surrendered her parental rights.
The father received an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) for one year under Family Ct Act § 1039, conditioned on his engagement in services and his execution of releases to allow contact with prison officials.
In May 2018, when the ACD period expired without restoration of the petition, the neglect petition against the father was deemed dismissed.

Years later, in June 2023, after repeated but withdrawn abandonment petitions, the Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a permanent neglect petition under Social Services Law § 384-b seeking to terminate the father’s parental rights. Following fact-finding and dispositional hearings, Family Court (Levine, J.) found permanent neglect and terminated his parental rights. The father appealed.

The father’s principal arguments were:

Because there had never been a neglect adjudication or dispositional order against him in the earlier article 10 proceeding, he could not lawfully be found to have permanently neglected the children.
DSS failed to make the required diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, particularly in light of his incarceration.
He had, in fact, adequately planned for the children’s future.
Even if permanent neglect was established, the court should have granted a suspended judgment or fashioned some Article 6-based settlement allowing him continuing contact with the children after adoption.

The Third Department, per Clark, J.P., rejected all of these arguments and:

Held that Social Services Law § 384-b(7)(a) does not require an underlying article 10 neglect adjudication or dispositional order as a prerequisite to a permanent neglect finding.
Affirmed that DSS made “affirmative, repeated and meaningful” diligent efforts toward the incarcerated father, including:
- Developing a service plan tailored to prison-based services.
- Communicating regularly about available programs and how to access them.
- Seeking releases to confirm his participation in services.
- Trying to identify relative resources.
- Facilitating written and telephonic contact with the children.
Found that the father failed to substantially plan for the children’s future for the statutory period, as his sole “plan” was to leave the children in foster care until his release from prison, with a girlfriend merely “checking in” on them – a plan the Court of Appeals has repeatedly held is not feasible.
Upheld the dispositional finding that termination of parental rights and freeing the children for adoption was in their best interests, given:
- The children’s nearly lifelong placement in the same pre-adoptive home.
- Their strong bond with their foster parents and half-siblings.
- Their stated desire to be adopted.
- The father’s minimal contact and lack of relationship with them.
Rejected the father’s request for a suspended judgment and clarified that, once parental rights are terminated, Family Court has no authority to impose an Article 6 settlement to guarantee post-adoption contact.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Initial Removal and Neglect Proceeding (2016–2018)

The twin boys, born in 2016, were removed in December 2016 at one month old and placed in foster care. At removal:

The father was incarcerated.
The mother was struggling with substance abuse, leading to a neglect finding against her.

DSS filed a neglect petition against both parents under Family Ct Act article 10. That proceeding concluded in June 2017 when:

Family Court (Pines, J.) found the mother had neglected the children.
The father was granted an ACD for one year under Family Ct Act § 1039, with conditions including:
- Engagement in services requested by DSS.
- Execution of releases so that caseworkers could communicate with prison officials about his participation in services.

Under the ACD statute, if no motion to restore the petition was filed during the adjournment period, the petition would be deemed dismissed at its expiration. Here, no such restoration petition was filed, and in May 2018 the neglect petition against the father was dismissed by operation of law.

B. Post-ACD Litigation History (2018–2023)

Between 2018 and 2023, DSS sought to pursue other grounds to free the children:

DSS filed three separate abandonment petitions against the father, which it later withdrew (reason not specified in the opinion).
The children remained continuously in foster care – in the same foster home from the time they were two months old.
The father was incarcerated periodically throughout their lives and was incarcerated continuously during the four years prior to the filing of the permanent neglect petition.

In June 2023, DSS commenced a permanent neglect proceeding under Social Services Law § 384-b, seeking:

A determination that the children were permanently neglected as to the father.
Termination of the father’s parental rights.
Commitment of guardianship and custody to DSS for the purpose of adoption.

C. Family Court Hearings and Findings

Family Court (Levine, J.) held:

A fact-finding hearing in March 2024 on the permanent neglect allegations.
A dispositional hearing to determine the appropriate outcome after a neglect finding.

The evidence showed, among other things:

The father had been incarcerated for multiple periods since the children’s birth and had been incarcerated for at least the four years preceding the filing of the permanent neglect petition.
The children had been in the same pre-adoptive foster home almost their entire lives, living with half-siblings adopted by the foster parents and thriving in that placement.
The father had not seen the children in person since 2019 and had seen them only 19 times in person between 2016 and 2018, even during periods when he was not continually incarcerated.
The father engaged in only sporadic written and telephonic contact with the children after his most recent incarceration.

Family Court found that DSS had made diligent efforts, that the father failed to substantially plan for the children’s future, and that termination of parental rights and freeing the children for adoption was in their best interests. It rejected the possibility of a suspended judgment.

On appeal, the Third Department affirmed in all respects.

IV. Legal Framework

A. Definition of Permanent Neglect – Social Services Law § 384-b(7)(a)

Under Social Services Law § 384-b(7)(a), a “permanently neglected child” is, in relevant part:

a child who is in the care of an authorized agency and whose parent or custodian has failed for a period of at least one year or fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months following the date the child came into the care of the agency to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child, although physically and financially able to do so, notwithstanding the agency’s diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship.

The Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Matter of K.Y.Z. [W.Z.], 2025 NY Slip Op 05781, reaffirms that in permanent neglect cases the petitioner must prove, by clear and convincing evidence:

That the agency made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship; and
That the parent failed to plan adequately for the child’s future during the relevant statutory period.

B. Procedural Rules for Termination – Family Ct Act § 614 and §§ 631–634

Family Ct Act § 614(1) sets out the necessary allegations in a petition to terminate parental rights, including permanent neglect, but does not require an existing article 10 neglect adjudication or dispositional order as a predicate.
Family Ct Act § 631 governs the dispositional phase after a permanent neglect finding. The court must determine what disposition is in the child’s best interests, without any presumption favoring return to the parent.
After a finding of permanent neglect, the court may:
- Dismiss the petition (§ 632);
- Enter a suspended judgment for up to one year (§ 633), giving the parent a final opportunity to meet court-ordered conditions; or
- Commit guardianship and custody to the agency (§ 634), effectively terminating parental rights and freeing the child for adoption.

C. Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal – Family Ct Act § 1039

In an article 10 neglect case, Family Court may grant an ACD for up to one year. If the parent complies with conditions and no motion to restore is filed, the neglect petition is deemed dismissed at the end of the adjournment period. Importantly, as this case clarifies, such dismissal does not bar a later permanent neglect proceeding under § 384-b.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. No Underlying Neglect Adjudication Required for Permanent Neglect

The father’s threshold argument was that, because there had been no neglect finding and no dispositional order against him in the 2016–2017 article 10 proceeding (only an ACD followed by dismissal), he could not properly be found to have permanently neglected the children.

The Third Department rejects this argument as “unavailing,” holding that:

Social Services Law § 384-b(7)(a) defines permanent neglect solely in terms of the parent’s failure to maintain contact or plan for the child during the statutory period, in spite of the agency’s diligent efforts.
The statute does not condition a permanent neglect finding on:
- a prior neglect adjudication under article 10, or
- compliance (or noncompliance) with an article 10 dispositional order.
Family Ct Act § 614(1), which governs termination petitions, also contains no such prerequisite.

Doctrinally, this is an important clarification. It confirms that a permanent neglect proceeding is an independent statutory mechanism focused on:

The length of time the child has been in foster care.
The agency’s efforts to assist the parent.
The parent’s response – in particular, whether the parent maintained contact and developed a realistic plan.

Thus, an ACD and subsequent dismissal of a neglect petition is not a “shield” against later termination; it merely concludes the article 10 case. If, thereafter, the child remains in foster care and the parent still fails to engage meaningfully or plan, a § 384-b permanent neglect petition may properly be brought.

B. Diligent Efforts Toward an Incarcerated Parent

After addressing the threshold statutory issue, the court turns to the two substantive elements of permanent neglect, beginning with diligent efforts.

1. Governing Standards

Drawing on Matter of K.Y.Z. [W.Z.], Matter of Gina P. [Shannon O.], Matter of Walter DD. [Walter TT.], and other precedents, the court restates the standard:

“Diligent efforts” are practical and reasonable efforts to remedy the problems preventing reunification and to strengthen the family relationship, which may include:
- Assisting with visitation.
- Providing information about the child’s development and progress.
- Offering appropriate services (counseling, substance abuse treatment, parenting programs, etc.).
These efforts must be tailored to the parent’s specific circumstances, including incarceration.
An agency’s obligation to make diligent efforts “extends to incarcerated parents,” as emphasized by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Hailey ZZ. [Ricky ZZ.], 19 NY3d 422 (2012).

In the context of incarceration, as the court notes (quoting Walter DD. and Arianna I.), diligent efforts may include:

Keeping the parent informed of the children’s well-being.
Developing a prison-appropriate service plan.
Investigating relative resources identified by the parent.
Responding to the parent’s inquiries.
Facilitating telephone or written contact between parent and children.

The appellate court also reiterates the standard of review: it gives “great weight” to Family Court’s factual and credibility findings and will not disturb them unless they lack a “sound and substantial basis in the record.”

2. Application to the Facts

The caseworker assigned in October 2021 identified the principal barrier to reunification as the father’s failure to develop an appropriate plan. The father’s stated “plan” was:

That the children would remain in foster care until his release from prison.
That his girlfriend would merely “look in” on the children during that time.

The caseworker:

Repeatedly informed the father that this was not a feasible plan and that he needed to identify a real custodial resource.
Attempted to contact individuals the father had initially named, but was unable to reach them.
Developed a service plan that included:
- Substance abuse counseling.
- Mental health counseling.
- Parenting classes.
- Anger management.
Confirmed that the correctional facilities where the father was housed offered these services (one facility offering all but parenting classes, the later facility offering parenting classes).
Communicated with the father about how to access these services in prison.
Sent him releases to sign so that DSS could verify his participation in services.
Provided notice of service plan review meetings and invited him to participate, including by virtual means, which he never did.
Facilitated contact with the children by sending return envelopes for letters and checking with foster parents when he alleged his calls were blocked.

Crucially, the father:

Did not meaningfully engage in the required prison-based classes or services during the relevant time period.
Executed only one properly signed release, and that covered only a single month of communication with his prison social worker.
Did not participate in service plan reviews.
Later claimed that an aunt could have brought the children for in-person visits but never provided her information to DSS to make this possible.

While DSS did not facilitate in-person visits, the court treats this as understandable in context:

The father had not identified a reliable transport resource (like the aunt) at the relevant time.
DSS made substantial efforts through letters, phone contact, and service planning.

On this record, the Third Department finds “clear and convincing evidence” that DSS made “affirmative, repeated and meaningful efforts to strengthen and encourage the parental relationship” and upholds Family Court’s diligent-efforts finding.

C. Failure to Substantially Plan for the Children’s Future

1. Governing Standards on Planning

Once the agency meets its threshold burden on diligent efforts, the focus shifts to the parent’s obligation to plan. The court quotes and relies on precedents such as Matter of Desirea F. [Angela H.], Matter of Daimeon MM. [Laurie MM.], and Matter of Jase M. [Holly N.]:

“Planning” requires the parent to take meaningful steps to correct the conditions that led to the child’s placement in foster care.
The parent’s plan must be realistic and feasible in light of the child’s needs and the passage of time; good faith alone is insufficient.
Examples of adequate planning may include:
- Engaging in services to address substance abuse, mental health, or parenting deficiencies.
- Identifying safe and stable relatives or other custodial resources.
- Maintaining consistent contact and building a relationship with the child.

2. The Father’s “Plan” and Why It Fails Legally

The father’s plan, as he articulated it, was:

To let the children remain in foster care until he was released from prison.
To have his girlfriend merely “check in” on the children during his incarceration (and, notably, he did not identify her to DSS as a custodial resource).

The court, following the Court of Appeals in Matter of Hailey ZZ. [Ricky ZZ.], 19 NY3d 422 (2012), and Matter of Michael B., 80 NY2d 299 (1992), holds that such a plan is legally insufficient because:

It contemplates an unnecessarily protracted stay in foster care, which is contrary to the child’s best interests and to the statutory aim of securing permanent homes.
It does not identify any actual custodial caretaker or resource it is realistic to implement.
It does not reflect engagement with services to address any underlying issues or to support eventual reunification.

The court also notes that the father:

Failed to complete or substantively engage in the prison-based services DSS urged him to pursue, despite their availability.
Did not maintain consistent contact with the children or participate in case planning meetings.
Did not propose any credible alternative plan (such as a suitable relative) for the children’s care during his incarceration.

On these facts, the court concludes that DSS proved by clear and convincing evidence that the father failed to substantially plan for the children’s future for the statutory period, thus satisfying the second element of permanent neglect.

D. Best Interests and Disposition: Termination vs. Suspended Judgment

1. Best Interests Analysis Under Family Ct Act § 631

Once permanent neglect is established, the court’s “sole concern” at disposition is the best interests of the children, with no presumption that returning the children to the parent is preferable. Relying on cases such as Matter of Asiah S. [Nancy S.] and Matter of Nevaeh N. [Heidi O.], the Third Department reiterates this principle.

Here, several factors weighed heavily in favor of termination and adoption:

The children were 7½ years old at the time of the dispositional hearing.
They had been in foster care virtually their entire lives, in the same home since they were two months old.
They were living with their half-siblings, who had already been adopted by the same foster parents, and were thriving there.
They were strongly bonded to their foster parents and half-siblings and had expressed a desire to be adopted.
They had very limited relationship with the father:
- The father had not seen them in person since 2019.
- Between 2016 and 2018, he saw them in person only 19 times, even during intervals when he was not continuously incarcerated.
- During his most recent incarceration, his written and telephonic contact was sporadic.
The father remained incarcerated at the time of fact-finding, had no realistic release-linked plan, and had not meaningfully engaged in services.

Given the children’s strong long-term ties in the foster/adoptive home and their lack of an ongoing relationship with the father, the court holds that terminating the father’s parental rights and freeing the children for adoption has a “sound and substantial basis in the record.”

2. Rejection of Suspended Judgment

The father argued that the court should have entered a suspended judgment – a final, time-limited chance for him to avoid termination by complying with strict conditions. The Third Department, citing Matter of Jason O. [Stephanie O.], rejects this argument, concluding that a suspended judgment “was not warranted under the circumstances.”

The critical reasons include:

The father’s prolonged failure over years to plan or engage in services, even during periods when he had opportunities to do so.
The children’s long tenure – nearly eight years – in a stable pre-adoptive home, where they desired permanency.
The absence of any realistic, near-term arrangement that would safely transition the children into the father’s care.

In effect, offering a suspended judgment would further prolong the children’s uncertainty and undermine the permanency they had almost achieved with the foster parents.

E. Post-Adoption Contact and Article 6 “Settlements”

Finally, the father asked for remittal to Family Court to negotiate a “Family Ct Act article 6 settlement” that would preserve some level of contact with the children following adoption. The Third Department, relying on Matter of Hailey ZZ., states that:

Once parental rights have been terminated, Family Court lacks authority to craft such an Article 6 disposition.
A post-adoption contact arrangement is not available as part of the disposition in an involuntary termination proceeding.

This underscores an important procedural reality: post-adoption contact must be addressed through separate mechanisms (such as voluntary post-adoption contact agreements under other statutes) and cannot be imposed by the court over the agency’s and adoptive parents’ objection after termination.

VI. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. Recent Clarifications: Matter of K.Y.Z. [W.Z.] and Matter of Gina P. [Shannon O.]

Matter of K.Y.Z. [W.Z.], 2025 NY Slip Op 05781 (Court of Appeals), is cited for:
- The statutory definition and structure of permanent neglect under Social Services Law § 384-b(7)(a).
- The requirement that the agency prove, by clear and convincing evidence, both:
  1. diligent efforts, and
  2. the parent’s failure to plan.
- The notion that diligent efforts must be “realistic and tailored” to the parent’s individual circumstances.
Matter of Gina P. [Shannon O.], 2025 NY Slip Op 05726 (3d Dept), is cited for:
- Reiterating the two-part burden in permanent neglect cases.
- Emphasizing that agency efforts must be tailored to the respondent’s situation.

Jack V. (Jack U.) is an application of these recent clarifications in the specific context of an incarcerated father.

B. Diligent Efforts and Incarcerated Parents: Hailey ZZ., Walter DD., Arianna I.

Matter of Hailey ZZ. [Ricky ZZ.], 19 NY3d 422 (2012), is central for two propositions:
- Agencies must make diligent efforts even when a parent is incarcerated, with reasonable flexibility given the constraints of imprisonment.
- Leaving a child in foster care to wait for a parent’s eventual release is not a feasible plan for the child’s future.
Matter of Walter DD. [Walter TT.], 152 AD3d 896 (3d Dept 2017), lv denied 30 NY3d 905 (2017), and Matter of Arianna I. [Roger I.], 100 AD3d 1281 (3d Dept 2012), elaborate on what diligent efforts look like for incarcerated parents, including:
- Updating the parent on the child’s status.
- Developing attainable prison-based service plans.
- Facilitating written and telephonic contact.
- Pursuing relative resources suggested by the parent.

In Jack V., the Third Department explicitly draws on these principles to evaluate DSS’s efforts and to reject the father’s claims of agency inaction.

C. Planning and Feasible Alternatives: Michael B., Alex C., Jr., James J.

Matter of Michael B., 80 NY2d 299 (1992), remains a key authority for the proposition that indefinite foster care or a plan that delays permanency for the child is inconsistent with statutory goals.
Matter of Alex C., Jr. [Alex C., Sr.], 114 AD3d 1149 (4th Dept 2014), lv denied 23 NY3d 901 (2014), and Matter of James J. [James K.], 97 AD3d 936 (3d Dept 2012), apply Michael B.’s reasoning to similar factual scenarios in which the parent proposed that the child remain in foster care until the parent’s circumstances improved.

Jack V. continues this line, treating a plan to leave the children in long-term foster care until the father’s release as inherently inadequate.

D. Best Interests and Dispositional Standards: Asiah S., Nevaeh N., Zaiden P., Isabella H., Brielle UU., Jason O.

Matter of Asiah S. [Nancy S.], 228 AD3d 1034 (3d Dept 2024), and Matter of Nevaeh N. [Heidi O.], 220 AD3d 1070 (3d Dept 2023), stress that:
- After a permanent neglect finding, there is no presumption favoring any particular disposition, including return to the parent.
- The only guiding principle is the child’s best interests.
Matter of Zaiden P. [Ashley Q.], 211 AD3d 1348 (3d Dept 2022), lv denied 39 NY3d 911 (2023), Matter of Isabella H. [Richard I.], 174 AD3d 977 (3d Dept 2019), and Matter of Brielle UU. [Brandon UU.], 167 AD3d 1169 (3d Dept 2018), illustrate the importance of:
- The length of time children have been in foster care.
- The strength of bonds with foster parents and siblings.
- The degree of contact and relationship with the biological parent.
Matter of Jason O. [Stephanie O.], 188 AD3d 1463 (3d Dept 2020), lv denied 36 NY3d 908 (2021), provides a template for rejecting a suspended judgment when:
- The parent’s history shows prolonged noncompliance and lack of progress.
- The children’s need for permanency is pressing.

Drawing on these decisions, the Third Department in Jack V. concludes that additional delay through a suspended judgment would unjustifiably postpone permanency for children who have already spent nearly their entire lives in foster care.

E. Standard of Review: Nikole V., Carmela D.

Matter of Nikole V. [Norman V.], 224 AD3d 1102 (3d Dept 2024), lv denied 41 NY3d 909 (2024), is cited for the well-established principle that the Appellate Division accords “great weight” to Family Court’s factual findings and credibility determinations in permanent neglect cases.
Matter of Carmela D. [Shameeka G.], 232 AD3d 1126 (3d Dept 2024), lvs denied 43 NY3d 903 (2025), reiterates the deference owed to Family Court in these fact-intensive matters.

This framework shapes the Third Department’s approach to the father’s challenges, confining its role to determining whether Family Court’s findings were supported by a “sound and substantial basis” in the record – which it concludes they were.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

The opinion uses several technical concepts that are helpful to explain in plainer terms:

1. Permanent Neglect

“Permanent neglect” does not mean a one-time failure to care for a child. Instead, it refers to a sustained pattern over at least a year (or 15 of the most recent 22 months) in which:

The child is in foster care.
The agency has tried hard (diligent efforts) to help the parent reunify with the child.
The parent, though able to do so, either:
- Fails to stay in regular contact with the child, and/or
- Fails to create a realistic plan for the child’s care, either with the parent or with some other safe caregiver.

2. Diligent Efforts

“Diligent efforts” means the agency must do more than just open a case and wait. They must actively:

Offer programs that address the parent’s issues (like drug treatment, parenting classes, counseling).
Keep the parent informed about the child’s health, schooling, and development.
Encourage and facilitate visits, phone calls, or letters, as appropriate.
Help the parent work on a plan for housing, employment, or identifying responsible relatives who could care for the child.

For incarcerated parents, it means:

Adjusting plans to the prison setting (for example, using programs offered in prison, arranging phone or letter contact).
Staying in contact through mail or virtual means.

3. Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal (ACD)

An ACD in a neglect case is essentially a “probationary pause.” The court puts the case on hold and tells the parent:

If you follow certain conditions for a set period (such as one year), we will dismiss the neglect petition at the end.
If you violate conditions, the case can be restored and proceed to a full neglect finding and disposition.

In this case, the father’s ACD period ended without restoration, so the earlier neglect petition was automatically dismissed. However, that dismissal did not prevent DSS from later bringing a new permanent neglect petition based on the ongoing foster care situation and lack of planning.

4. Suspended Judgment

A suspended judgment is a kind of “last chance” disposition after a permanent neglect finding. The court:

Formally finds permanent neglect but does not immediately terminate parental rights.
Sets out specific conditions (attend treatment, complete parenting class, maintain steady contact, etc.) for a fixed period (up to one year).
Warns the parent that failure to comply will result in termination at the end of that period.

The court will only grant a suspended judgment when there is a realistic prospect that the parent can and will meet these conditions and that further delay will not unduly harm the child’s need for stability and permanency.

5. Article 6 Settlement / Post-Adoption Contact

“Article 6” refers to Family Court Act article 6, which governs custody and visitation. Sometimes, in the context of child welfare cases, parties discuss:

Negotiating a settlement that provides for ongoing contact between a biological parent and a child even if adoption is contemplated.

However, as Hailey ZZ. and now Jack V. reaffirm, once parental rights are terminated in an involuntary TPR proceeding, Family Court cannot use article 6 to order post-adoption contact. Any openness in the adoption becomes a matter between the adoptive parents and the former parent, governed by separate statutes or private agreements, not by the termination judgment.

VIII. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Clarification of the Relationship Between Article 10 ACDs and Permanent Neglect

One of the most important doctrinal contributions of Matter of Jack V. (Jack U.) is its straightforward holding that:

A prior neglect adjudication under article 10 is not a prerequisite to a permanent neglect finding under Social Services Law § 384-b(7)(a).
An ACD followed by dismissal of the neglect petition does not bar a later permanent neglect petition if the statutory criteria are met.

This has several practical consequences:

Parents and counsel must understand that obtaining an ACD is not a long-term shield; if the child remains in foster care and the parent does not plan or maintain contact, a future termination case remains a real possibility.
Agencies are free to shift from the article 10 framework to the § 384-b framework when permanency concerns arise, without needing to reestablish neglect in an article 10 proceeding.
Courts and practitioners should treat permanent neglect cases as driven primarily by:
- Time in foster care.
- Agency efforts.
- Parental response.
rather than by the procedural posture of earlier neglect cases.

B. Reinforcement of Standards for Incarcerated Parents

Jack V. reinforces and applies the Court of Appeals’ guidance in Hailey ZZ. and K.Y.Z. by:

Confirming that agencies must tailor diligent efforts to incarceration, but that incarceration does not lessen parents’ obligations to participate in services, plan, and maintain contact.
Clarifying that when a prison offers relevant services, the parent’s failure to participate (or to authorize the agency to verify participation) can be treated as a failure to plan.
Highlighting that a vague plan to keep children in foster care until release, without naming reliable custodial resources or pursuing services, is legally inadequate.

For incarcerated parents and their counsel, the message is clear: incarceration is not an automatic bar to reunification, but it also is not a legal excuse for passivity. Proactive engagement with available services and realistic planning for the child’s present and future placements are essential to avoid a finding of permanent neglect.

C. Strong Emphasis on Permanency for Long-Term Foster Children

The decision gives substantial weight to the children’s:

Lengthy stay in the same foster home.
Bonds with foster parents and adopted half-siblings.
Expressed desire for adoption.

This continues a trend in New York law consonant with federal policy (notably the Adoption and Safe Families Act) – favoring:

Timely permanency over indefinite foster care.
Children’s attachment and stability over speculative future improvements in parental circumstances.

Where, as here, children have spent nearly their entire lives in a pre-adoptive home, courts are increasingly unwilling to prolong foster care through suspended judgments or other interim dispositions, absent compelling evidence that reunification is realistically imminent and in the children’s best interests.

D. Limits on Post-Adoption Contact Orders in Involuntary TPRs

By reaffirming that article 6 “settlements” for post-adoption contact are unavailable after involuntary termination, Jack V. underscores:

The finality of termination judgments.
The limited role of courts in dictating openness in adoptions resulting from TPRs.

This may prompt counsel, in appropriate cases, to consider:

Negotiating voluntary surrender agreements that incorporate post-adoption contact terms, where statutorily permitted, rather than contesting TPR to judgment.
Advising parents more clearly about the consequences of litigating to a termination instead of exploring negotiated outcomes.

IX. Conclusion

Matter of Jack V. (Jack U.) is a consequential decision in New York child welfare law, particularly for:

Clarifying that no prior article 10 neglect adjudication is required to support a permanent neglect finding under Social Services Law § 384-b(7)(a), even where a father previously received an ACD and the neglect petition was later dismissed.
Reaffirming and applying stringent standards of diligent efforts and realistic planning in the context of incarcerated parents.
Emphasizing the primacy of children’s need for permanency, especially when they have spent nearly their entire lives in a stable, pre-adoptive home and have little relationship with the biological parent.
Reiterating the limited role of the courts in shaping post-adoption contact after an involuntary termination of parental rights.

The decision sends a clear signal: time in foster care, coupled with a parent’s prolonged failure to engage in services or to craft a feasible plan, can and will support a permanent neglect finding and termination, even absent a prior neglect adjudication. For agencies, parents, and practitioners, Jack V. underscores the urgency of early, meaningful engagement and realistic planning whenever children enter care – and the high stakes when those efforts and plans do not materialize.