Perkins v. Fhuere and the Limits of Actual Innocence Claims Under Oregon’s Post‑Conviction Hearing Act

I. Introduction

The Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Perkins v. Fhuere, 374 Or 575 (2025), addresses a question of intense practical and theoretical importance: whether Oregon’s Post‑Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), ORS 138.510–138.680, permits a freestanding claim of actual innocence based solely on newly discovered evidence, here a victim’s full recantation of her trial testimony.

The relator, Jordon Perkins, was convicted of multiple serious sex offenses and assault arising from an incident in 2014. Years after his conviction became final, the complaining witness executed a sworn statement asserting that the sexual encounter with Perkins had been consensual and that she had “lied and exaggerated” about the non‑consensual aspects because she was angry about being hit. Relying on that recantation, Perkins filed a second, untimely petition for post‑conviction relief asserting a stand‑alone claim that he is actually innocent of the crimes of conviction.

The post‑conviction court dismissed the petition as “meritless” under ORS 138.525, reasoning that Oregon law recognizes no stand‑alone actual innocence claim under the PCHA. Because ORS 138.525(3) makes a “meritless” dismissal unappealable, Perkins sought extraordinary relief by mandamus in the Oregon Supreme Court, asking the court to compel the post‑conviction court to vacate the dismissal and proceed on the merits of his innocence claim.

Formally, therefore, the question before the Supreme Court was procedural: Was the post‑conviction court required, as a matter of law, to deny the State’s motion to dismiss? Substantively, that inquiry turned on a knotty statutory and constitutional issue: does the PCHA provide any cognizable pathway for a prisoner to obtain relief based solely on newly discovered evidence of innocence, without showing a constitutional defect in the original criminal proceedings?

The court’s answer was no. In an opinion by Justice Bushong, the court:

Dismissed the alternative writ of mandamus;
Held that newly discovered evidence of innocence in the form of a victim’s recantation, standing alone, does not state a ground for relief under ORS 138.530(1)(a) (“substantial denial” of constitutional rights “in the proceedings”) or ORS 138.530(1)(c) (unlawful or unconstitutional “sentence”); and
Reaffirmed that, under federal due process doctrine, a conviction based on perjured testimony is constitutionally defective only where the State knowingly used or failed to correct the false testimony.

At the same time, the court explicitly acknowledged the systemic problem of wrongful convictions and the unsettling possibility that the current statutory scheme can leave Oregon courts “powerless to remedy a manifestly erroneous conviction.” It pointedly invited the legislature to consider a statutory solution.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

The court recounts in detail the evidence at Perkins’s 2014 criminal trial. In brief:

The victim testified that she was pressured into a car with three men, including Perkins and a codefendant; after drinking and drug use, she was forcibly undressed, raped, sodomized, and forced to perform oral sex; when she resisted, she was punched and choked; her debit card and PIN were taken; she was then “tossed” out of the SUV and struck again.
Neighbors and the victim’s sister testified to her immediate distress and visible injuries (blood, disheveled clothing, hysterical crying, “zombie‑like” demeanor).
A patrol officer and a sexual assault nurse examiner documented significant physical injuries consistent with assault.
A detective testified about the victim’s account and her photographic identification of Perkins and the codefendant.
An OSP forensic scientist testified that semen from the victim’s jaw and mouth showed multiple contributors; the codefendant (but not Perkins) was definitively identified.
The codefendant, having pleaded guilty to kidnapping, sodomy, and robbery charges, testified that the victim performed oral sex on all three men under implicit coercion and that Perkins punched her and forced her out of the SUV.
Perkins testified that sexual activity was consensual, that he digitally penetrated the victim’s anus, that she attempted to perform oral sex on him but he did not ejaculate, and that he hit her after feeling “disrespected.” He admitted lying to police when he initially claimed no sexual activity occurred.

The jury convicted Perkins of multiple counts of first‑degree rape, first‑degree sodomy, first‑degree unlawful sexual penetration, first‑degree sexual abuse, and third‑degree assault, while acquitting him of several kidnapping and robbery charges. He received a total sentence of 575 months’ incarceration. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review.

Perkins later filed a timely first post‑conviction petition raising various constitutional claims, which was largely denied, although the Court of Appeals granted partial relief and remanded on unrelated grounds. In 2024, he filed a second, untimely petition asserting a single new ground: that he is actually innocent, based primarily on the victim’s sworn recantation stating that:

“I had only consensual sex with [relator] and was not forced to do anything sexual that night. Afterwards, we got into an argument and he pushed me in the face and when we were outside of the truck, he punched me in the face. That is what I was really mad about and why I lied and exaggerated about the non‑consensual sex.”

The State moved to dismiss under ORCP 21 A(1)(h) for failure to state a claim, arguing that “actual innocence” is not a cognizable ground for relief under the PCHA. The post‑conviction court reluctantly agreed, characterizing Perkins’s record as “excellent” and expressing hope that a “higher court will provide some guidance,” but dismissing the petition with prejudice as “meritless” under ORS 138.525.

Because ORS 138.525(3) renders such a dismissal unappealable, Perkins petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for mandamus, seeking an order compelling the post‑conviction court to vacate its dismissal and adjudicate his actual innocence claim. The Supreme Court issued an alternative writ but, after briefing (including extensive amicus participation), ultimately dismissed the writ.

B. Holding

The court holds:

Mandamus standard: Mandamus lies only to enforce a “known, clear legal right” (Gollersrud v. LPMC, LLC). Therefore, the question is not abstractly whether the PCHA could encompass a freestanding actual innocence claim but whether the post‑conviction court was required by law to deny the State’s motion to dismiss.
No cognizable claim under ORS 138.530(1)(a): ORS 138.530(1)(a) allows relief when there has been a “substantial denial in the proceedings resulting in petitioner’s conviction” of federal or state constitutional rights that rendered the conviction void. The statute and its history show that:
- The PCHA does not recognize “newly discovered evidence” as an independent ground for relief;
- While a conviction obtained through knowingly procured perjured testimony can violate federal due process (Mooney–Napue–Glossip line of cases), a mere post‑trial recantation, without allegations that the State knowingly used or failed to correct false testimony, does not state a constitutional violation “in the proceedings.”
Because Perkins did not allege that prosecutors knew the victim’s trial testimony was false or allowed known falsehoods to stand, his claim falls outside ORS 138.530(1)(a).
No cognizable claim under ORS 138.530(1)(c): ORS 138.530(1)(c) provides relief for a “sentence in excess of, or otherwise not in accordance with, the sentence authorized by law” or an unconstitutional sentence. The court holds that:
- This provision, grounded in the pre‑PCHA habeas corpus tradition, concerns the legality of the sentence itself (e.g., habitual offender enhancements, sentencing irregularities), not the factual correctness of the underlying conviction;
- A claim of innocence attacking the validity of the conviction cannot be repackaged as a challenge to the “sentence” under paragraph (1)(c).
Therefore, Perkins’s innocence claim does not state a challenge to his “sentence” within the meaning of ORS 138.530(1)(c).
Result: Because Perkins’s second post‑conviction petition fails, even when liberally construed, to state any claim upon which relief can be granted under ORS 138.530(1)(a) or (c), the post‑conviction court acted within its authority in dismissing it as “meritless” under ORS 138.525. There is no clear legal right to a different result; the Supreme Court therefore dismisses the alternative writ of mandamus.

The opinion closes with two important caveats:

It expressly does not foreclose other avenues by which “innocence” might be implicated in a cognizable claim—e.g., a due process challenge based on the State’s knowing use of false evidence; and
It reiterates that the “problem of newly discovered evidence should be the subject of additional legislation,” echoing the drafters of the PCHA (Collins & Neil).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Mandamus: Gollersrud v. LPMC, LLC

The court’s threshold framework comes from Gollersrud v. LPMC, LLC, 371 Or 739, 541 P3d 864 (2023), which reiterates that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only to enforce a “known, clear legal right.” This standard sharply cabins the court’s role: Perkins cannot use mandamus as a vehicle for establishing novel legal rights; he must show that the post‑conviction court’s refusal to entertain his actual innocence claim violated a legal right already clearly recognized.

That posture is important: the court is not formally deciding whether Oregon should recognize a freestanding actual innocence claim; it is deciding whether existing law already compels the post‑conviction court to do so. Nonetheless, the statutory interpretation the court undertakes is broadly precedential for all PCHA litigation.

2. The PCHA and its Drafters: Collins & Neil and Earlier Supreme Court Use

The core interpretive tool is a 1960 law review article by Jack G. Collins and Carl R. Neil, The Oregon Postconviction‑Hearing Act, 39 Or L Rev 337, written by lawyers who helped draft the statute. The Supreme Court has repeatedly treated this article as an authoritative exposition of legislative intent, citing it in:

Watkins v. Ackley, 370 Or 604, 523 P3d 86 (2022);
Strasser v. State of Oregon, 368 Or 238, 489 P3d 1025 (2021);
Verduzco v. State of Oregon, 357 Or 553, 355 P3d 902 (2015).

In Perkins, the court leans heavily on Collins & Neil’s explicit statement:

“Newly discovered evidence is not a ground for relief under the act.” (39 Or L Rev at 346.)

The article recognizes that sometimes:

“a conviction, procedurally regular in all respects and supported by otherwise substantial evidence, can later be shown to be erroneous and innocence established.”

Yet the drafters acknowledged that, where this occurs after the time for a motion for a new trial has expired, “there is presumably no judicial relief available to correct the wrong,” particularly because the PCHA explicitly abolishes the common‑law writ of coram nobis in criminal cases (now ORS 138.540(1)). Their conclusion is terse and stark:

“The problem of newly discovered evidence should be the subject of additional legislation.”

The Perkins court treats that statement as strong contextual evidence that the 1959 legislature intentionally excluded newly discovered evidence—including post‑trial recantations—as a substantive ground for PCHA relief.

3. Anderson v. Gladden and the Unresolved “Newly Discovered Evidence” Question

The court revisits Anderson v. Gladden, 234 Or 614, 383 P2d 986 (1963), where a petitioner sought post‑conviction relief in part on “newly discovered evidence that there was perjury in his first trial.” The Anderson court:

Noted Collins & Neil’s suggestion that further legislation might be needed for newly discovered evidence cases;
Left open “whether newly discovered evidence can ever give rise to any kind of common‑law post‑conviction judicial relief,” given that the PCHA abolished coram nobis; and
Ultimately avoided the issue by holding the affidavits inadequate on the facts, so there was “no need” to decide “what sort of relief might lie if there were convincing evidence that an innocent person wrongfully had been imprisoned.”

Perkins both invokes and essentially answers the question Anderson left open—albeit confined to claims under the PCHA itself. The court acknowledges again that the absence of a remedy for “manifestly erroneous conviction” does not “adorn the administration of justice” but insists that the statute, as written, does not authorize relief.

4. Federal Due Process and Perjured Testimony: Mooney, Hysler, Napue, Glossip

The Court’s analysis of ORS 138.530(1)(a)’s “substantial denial” of constitutional rights turns on longstanding federal due process doctrine regarding convictions obtained through perjured testimony:

Mooney v. Holohan, 294 US 103 (1935), held that due process is violated when a state obtains a conviction “through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured.”
Hysler v. Florida, 315 US 411 (1942), reiterated that a conviction obtained “through the use of perjured testimony” with the “active conduct or connivance of the prosecution” violates due process, but also emphasized that “mere recantation” of testimony, standing alone, does not itself invoke the Due Process Clause.
Napue v. Illinois, 360 US 264 (1959), broadened the rule:
- Any “conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment.”
- The duty extends even when the prosecution “although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears,” and even when the falsehood “goes only to the credibility of the witness.”
Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 US 226 (2025), reaffirmed this doctrine, emphasizing that due process is violated when “the prosecution knowingly solicited false testimony or knowingly allowed it to go uncorrected when it appeared.”

Importantly, the United States Supreme Court has never held that a post‑trial recantation, by itself, establishes a due process violation; and it has declined to find constitutional error absent proof of prosecutorial knowledge, though individual Justices have argued for broader relief (e.g., Justice Stevens’ dissent in Jacobs v. Scott, 513 US 1067 (1995); Justice Douglas’s dissent in Durley v. Mayo, 351 US 277 (1956)).

Perkins imports that federal standard into the interpretation of ORS 138.530(1)(a): under the PCHA, a petitioner alleging conviction based on false testimony must also allege that the prosecution knowingly used the false evidence or allowed it to go uncorrected. Without that element, there is no “substantial denial” of federal due process “in the proceedings” for PCHA purposes.

5. Sentence Challenges and Habeas Tradition: Landreth, Barber, Macomber

To interpret ORS 138.530(1)(c), the court again turns to Collins & Neil and pre‑PCHA case law governing habeas corpus and writs of review:

Landreth v. Gladden, 213 Or 205, 324 P2d 475 (1958), held that habeas corpus could be used to challenge the validity of a prior conviction that formed the basis of a habitual offender sentence, but that habeas was limited to testing the legality of confinement, not to correcting trial “errors” reviewable on direct appeal.
Barber v. Gladden, 210 Or 46, 309 P2d 192 (1957), and Macomber v. State, 181 Or 208, 180 P2d 793 (1947), similarly confined habeas to jurisdictional or sentencing defects, barring its use as a substitute for direct appeal to correct trial errors.

Collins & Neil understood paragraph (1)(c) as codifying and channeling this habeas‑based remedy into PCHA proceedings: permitting attack on “unconstitutional or irregular sentences,” including those enhanced by prior invalid convictions. The key point is that such challenges focus on the sentence (e.g., its length, legality, basis) rather than disputing the factual correctness of the underlying conviction itself.

Perkins adopts this view: a challenge to the factual basis of a conviction is not, simply by virtue of its consequences, a challenge to the “sentence” within the meaning of ORS 138.530(1)(c). The statute presumes a valid conviction and asks whether the resulting sentence is authorized or constitutional.

6. Out‑of‑State Precedent on Actual Innocence

Perkins and amici urged the court to look to jurisdictions that allow freestanding actual innocence claims in post‑conviction or habeas proceedings. The court reviews several:

Schmidt v. State, 909 NW2d 778 (Iowa 2018) (Iowa statute allowing relief where new evidence “requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice”).
State ex rel Amrine v. Roper, 102 SW3d 541 (Mo 2003) (Missouri Supreme Court using its extraordinary writ power to correct a “manifest injustice” supported by overwhelming evidence of innocence).
Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, 242 Conn 745, 700 A2d 1108 (1997), building on Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn 397, 641 A2d 1356 (1994), construing a statute authorizing habeas courts to dispose of cases as “law and justice require.”
Montoya v. Ulibarri, 142 NM 89, 163 P3d 476 (2007), and People v. Washington, 171 Ill 2d 475, 665 NE2d 1330 (1996), recognizing actual innocence claims grounded in state due process clauses.

The Oregon Supreme Court distinguishes these cases on two principal grounds:

Other states’ statutes often contain broad “interest of justice” or “manifest injustice” language that Oregon’s PCHA lacks; and
Several decisions rest on state constitutional due process clauses; the Oregon Constitution, by contrast, contains no general due process clause, and Perkins did not identify another constitutional provision playing an equivalent role (see Hans Linde, “Without ‘Due Process’: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon,” 49 Or L Rev 125 (1970)).

Accordingly, the court views these decisions as policy analogues rather than binding or persuasive authority under Oregon’s markedly different constitutional and statutory framework.

B. Legal Reasoning in Detail

1. The Mandamus Lens: Narrow Question, Broad Consequences

Because the case comes up by mandamus, the court’s formal inquiry is narrow: did the post‑conviction court violate a known, clear legal right when it granted the State’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim? If reasonable legal disagreement exists about the proper scope of the PCHA, mandamus ordinarily would not lie.

Nonetheless, to answer this question the court must interpret the PCHA’s substantive grounds for relief. Its statutory construction therefore effectively sets a binding precedent for all future PCHA cases—even though the direct holding is framed in terms of mandamus.

2. ORS 138.530(1)(a): “Substantial Denial … in the Proceedings”

ORS 138.530(1)(a) requires a “substantial denial in the proceedings resulting in petitioner’s conviction or in the appellate review thereof, of petitioner’s rights under the Constitution of the United States, or under the Constitution of the State of Oregon … and which denial rendered the conviction void.”

The court reads this text as focused on the fairness and legality of the process by which the conviction was obtained—errors in trial or appellate proceedings—not on the factual correctness of the outcome. Several steps underlie this conclusion:

Linguistic focus on “in the proceedings” suggests procedural violations (e.g., ineffective assistance of counsel, improper jury instructions, denial of counsel, biased judge), not later‑discovered evidence bearing on accuracy.
Statutory silence about newly discovered evidence—when read in light of Collins & Neil’s explicit discussion—indicates a deliberate legislative choice not to make new evidence a substantive ground for post‑conviction relief.
Acknowledged federal due process violations do fit within (1)(a): under Mooney–Napue–Glossip, prosecutors’ knowing use of perjury (or failure to correct known falsehoods) is a defect “in the proceedings” that voids a conviction. Collins & Neil likewise recognized that newly discovered evidence revealing such a constitutional violation could support PCHA relief.

Applying this framework, the court reasons:

Perkins’s claim is not that the prosecutors knowingly presented or tolerated false testimony; he alleges only that the victim’s trial account was false and that she has now recanted it.
Under federal constitutional law, “mere recantation” is not itself a due process violation. Without state knowledge or participation, a defendant’s conviction based on a witness who later changes testimony does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment as currently interpreted.

Thus, even assuming the recantation is truthful and fully exculpatory, Perkins has not alleged any constitutional denial “in the proceedings.” His petition therefore fails to state a claim under ORS 138.530(1)(a).

3. ORS 138.530(1)(c): Limits of “Sentence” Challenges

Perkins alternatively argued that incarcerating an innocent person constitutes an unconstitutional “sentence,” invoking ORS 138.530(1)(c), which covers:

“Sentence in excess of, or otherwise not in accordance with, the sentence authorized by law for the crime of which petitioner was convicted; or unconstitutionality of such sentence.”

The court rejects that characterization, distinguishing between:

A challenge to whether the sentencing court had authority to impose the sentence it did for the crime of conviction (for example, using an invalid prior conviction to enhance a sentence, imposing a term exceeding the statutory maximum, or applying an unconstitutional sentencing statute); and
A challenge to whether the person should have been convicted in the first place.

Through Collins & Neil and pre‑PCHA habeas cases, the court demonstrates that paragraph (1)(c) was intended to codify the former type of claim, not the latter. Although a later‑enacted statute, ORS 138.005(5), defines “sentence” as “all legal consequences established or imposed by the trial court after conviction,” the court treats that as consistent with—though not determinative of—the original legislative intent: “sentence” presupposes a valid conviction.

On this view, Perkins’s petition does not assert that his 575‑month sentence exceeded statutory maximums, was imposed under an unconstitutional statute, or rested on invalid prior convictions. He challenges, fundamentally, the lawfulness of the conviction. That challenge cannot be shoehorned into paragraph (1)(c) merely because the conviction resulted in incarceration.

4. The Role of Newly Discovered Evidence and Statutory Barriers

The opinion touches on two related procedural provisions:

ORS 138.510(3) requires that a PCHA petition be filed within two years of the final criminal judgment, but provides that the time limit does not apply if the petitioner raises grounds “which could not reasonably have been raised” earlier.
ORS 138.550(3) generally bars successive petitions but contains a parallel exception for grounds that could not reasonably have been raised in the original petition.

The court notes that these exceptions are gatekeeping mechanisms: newly discovered evidence can justify bringing an otherwise time‑barred or successive petition. But a petitioner must still state a substantive claim recognized by ORS 138.530. In other words, that new evidence can explain “why now?” but does not, by itself, supply the “what is your legal claim?” necessary under the PCHA.

In Perkins’s case, the State did not even press the timeliness or successiveness bars, focusing solely on lack of a cognizable substantive claim. That posture allowed the Supreme Court to reach and resolve the core statutory question.

5. Coram Nobis, Article I, Section 10, and Unresolved Constitutional Questions

Historically, the common‑law writ of coram nobis provided relief where facts existing at the time of judgment (but not appearing in the record) would have prevented the judgment—classic terrain for claims of newly discovered evidence, such as proof that key testimony was false. The PCHA, however, abolished “relief in the nature of coram nobis” in criminal cases (now ORS 138.540(1)).

Amici argued that eliminating coram nobis, while simultaneously failing to provide any equivalent post‑conviction remedy for newly discovered evidence of innocence, may violate Article I, section 10 of the Oregon Constitution (the “remedy clause” or “open courts” provision). They effectively contended that a person wrongfully convicted, who later uncovers clear proof of innocence, must have some judicial remedy; the legislature cannot constitutionally close all doors.

Perkins himself did not raise that Article I, section 10 argument in his opening mandamus petition and joined it only in his reply brief. The court therefore declined to reach it, leaving the constitutional question unresolved. The opinion signals that:

The tension between abolished coram nobis and an absence of a statutory innocence remedy remains open for future litigation; and
Any such challenge would likely require a direct constitutional attack on ORS 138.540(1) and the remedial structure of the PCHA, not merely an expansive reading of existing statutory language.

6. Legislative Responses to Actual Innocence: DNA and Compensation Statutes

The court points to two Oregon statutes as evidence that the legislature has recognized—but only partially addressed—the problem of wrongful convictions:

ORS 138.696 permits courts to set aside a conviction based on exonerating DNA evidence that meets specified criteria. This is a targeted innocence remedy keyed to scientific proof, separate from the PCHA’s general grounds for relief.
ORS 30.657 authorizes compensation for individuals who were wrongfully convicted and later exonerated. This is a remedial and compensatory mechanism for those already exonerated, not a procedural path to overturn a conviction.

The existence of these statutes underscores two things:

The legislature acknowledges that wrongful convictions occur and warrant both correction and compensation in some contexts; yet
It has not amended the PCHA to allow a general actual innocence claim based on newly discovered non‑DNA evidence (such as recantations or third‑party confessions).

The court expressly notes that the legislature could follow other states by amending the PCHA to allow relief where newly discovered evidence is necessary to prevent a “manifest injustice” or where proof of actual innocence is as compelling as exonerating DNA. But until such amendments are enacted, courts lack statutory authority to grant relief on Perkins’s theory.

C. Impact and Implications

1. Immediate Consequences for Perkins

Perkins remains convicted and incarcerated; his second post‑conviction petition is dismissed with prejudice and unappealable. His victim’s recantation—however persuasive one might find it—does not, under current Oregon law, entitle him to judicial review of his conviction unless he can reframe his claim under a cognizable theory (for example, that the State knew or should have known the testimony was false, or that counsel was constitutionally ineffective in investigating inconsistencies).

2. Doctrinal Impact on Oregon Post‑Conviction Practice

The decision has several broader effects on the practice of post‑conviction litigation in Oregon:

No freestanding actual innocence under PCHA: Petitioners cannot obtain PCHA relief solely by alleging that they are innocent based on new evidence, absent a constitutional defect in the original proceedings or in the sentencing process.
New evidence as “gatekeeper,” not a ground: Newly discovered evidence remains relevant to overcoming timeliness and successiveness bars (ORS 138.510(3), 138.550(3)), but only to open the door for otherwise cognizable claims—not as a substantive claim in its own right.
Heightened importance of Mooney–Napue claims: Where new evidence indicates that trial testimony was false, post‑conviction litigators will now be strongly incentivized to plead and prove that the prosecution knew or should have known of the falsity and failed to correct it, to bring the case within the ambit of federal due process as incorporated by ORS 138.530(1)(a).
Creative use of other constitutional theories: Petitioners may frame “innocence” evidence as:
- Showing prior ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel (e.g., failure to investigate recantation‑related impeachment evidence);
- Establishing Brady‑type violations (withholding exculpatory or impeachment material); or
- Demonstrating structural defects (e.g., undisclosed conflicts of interest) that tainted the trial.
In such cases, the new evidence does not itself create a ground for relief but shows that a cognizable constitutional violation occurred “in the proceedings.”

3. Risk to Factually Innocent Prisoners

The opinion candidly recognizes the troubling possibility that some innocent persons may remain imprisoned without an effective state judicial remedy. Citing the National Registry of Exonerations, the court notes thousands of exonerations nationwide (including 43 in Oregon since 1989), highlighting that wrongful convictions are not hypothetical.

Perkins makes clear that, unless a petitioner can connect new innocence evidence to a recognized constitutional defect (e.g., prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance), the PCHA offers no relief. For prisoners whose convictions were procedurally regular by prevailing standards but factually erroneous, the only currently available remedies may be:

DNA‑based relief under ORS 138.696 (if applicable);
Executive clemency (pardon or commutation) from the Governor; or
Potential future legislative changes.

The court acknowledges that such a gap “obviously would not adorn the administration of justice” but treats closing it as a policy decision reserved to the legislature.

4. Legislative Reform Pressure

By emphasizing Collins & Neil’s 1960 exhortation that newly discovered evidence “should be the subject of additional legislation,” the court effectively renews that call 65 years later. Several potential legislative responses are implicitly endorsed:

Adding a PCHA ground for relief based on “newly discovered evidence” that clearly establishes actual innocence or would likely result in acquittal upon retrial.
Creating a “manifest injustice” or “interest of justice” safety valve, allowing courts to revisit otherwise final convictions in extraordinary innocence cases, whether through the PCHA or a separate remedy.
Extending DNA‑type relief principles to equally reliable non‑DNA evidence, including credible recantations corroborated by other evidence or indisputable alibi proof.

Until such reforms occur, Oregon’s post‑conviction landscape will remain out of step with jurisdictions that have expressly authorized freestanding innocence claims.

5. Future Constitutional Litigation

Although the court sidestepped the Article I, section 10 argument, the opinion sets the stage for future constitutional challenges focused on the “remedy clause.” A petitioner might argue that:

The combination of abolishing coram nobis (ORS 138.540(1));
Excluding newly discovered evidence as a PCHA ground; and
Limiting DNA‑based relief to narrow circumstances

results in a de facto denial of any meaningful “remedy by due course of law” for a wrongfully convicted person who can prove actual innocence through non‑DNA evidence. If such a case squarely presents and preserves that constitutional question, the court will eventually have to decide whether the Oregon Constitution itself requires some judicial avenue for innocence claims, regardless of statutory silence.

D. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Post‑Conviction Relief vs. Direct Appeal vs. Habeas vs. Coram Nobis

Direct Appeal: Immediately after conviction and sentencing, a defendant can appeal to challenge legal errors made during trial (incorrect evidentiary rulings, bad jury instructions, insufficient evidence, etc.). Appeals review the trial record; they are not a vehicle for new evidence.
Post‑Conviction Relief (PCHA): After the appeal process, an Oregon prisoner can file a civil petition under ORS 138.510–138.680. This focuses on constitutional violations affecting the validity of the conviction or sentence (e.g., ineffective assistance of counsel, lack of jurisdiction, prosecutorial misconduct). It can involve evidence outside the trial record but must fit within ORS 138.530’s recognized grounds.
Habeas Corpus (pre‑PCHA and limited now): Historically used to test the legality of a person’s detention—mainly jurisdictional defects or plainly illegal sentences. It was not supposed to relitigate trial errors or function as a second appeal.
Coram Nobis: A now‑abolished common‑law writ that allowed a court to correct its own judgment based on facts existing at the time of judgment but not known or presented (e.g., proof that a key witness was lying or that the defendant was insane at trial). Oregon’s PCHA explicitly abolished relief “in the nature of coram nobis” in criminal cases, contributing to today’s remedial gap for newly discovered innocence evidence.

2. “Freestanding” Actual Innocence vs. “Gateway” Innocence

Freestanding Actual Innocence Claim: A claim that, irrespective of any constitutional violations, the petitioner is factually innocent and is entitled to relief because the State may not incarcerate an innocent person. This is what Perkins asserted.
Gateway Innocence Claim: A claim that strong evidence of innocence should allow a court to reach otherwise procedurally barred constitutional claims (e.g., ineffective assistance) that, if proven, warrant relief. The innocence evidence functions as a “gateway” to consider those claims, not as an independent ground for relief.

Under Perkins, Oregon’s PCHA does not recognize freestanding actual innocence; innocence may still act as a “gateway” by helping satisfy the “could not reasonably have been raised” exception to timing and successive‑petition bars, but the petitioner must couple it with a recognized constitutional violation.

3. Due Process and False Testimony: What Must Be Shown?

To claim a federal due process violation based on perjured testimony, a petitioner must show:

The testimony at trial was actually false.
The false testimony was material. It must have had a reasonable likelihood of affecting the jury’s verdict.
The prosecution knew, or should have known, of the falsity or allowed it to go uncorrected.

A post‑trial recantation may help prove elements (1) and (2), but it does not inherently establish (3), which is where many such claims fail. Without state knowledge or involvement, federal due process is typically not violated; Perkins applies this principle via ORS 138.530(1)(a).

4. “Meritless” Post‑Conviction Petitions and Non‑Appealability

ORS 138.525 permits a post‑conviction court to dismiss a petition as “meritless” if, “when liberally construed,” it “fails to state a claim upon which post‑conviction relief may be granted.” A judgment dismissing a “meritless petition” is expressly “not appealable” (ORS 138.525(3)).

That harsh consequence amplifies the significance of Perkins: if a post‑conviction court now concludes that an innocence‑only petition is meritless under the PCHA, the petitioner has no ordinary appellate route. Mandamus, as attempted here, provides an extraordinary—but narrow—potential workaround, hinging on the existence of a clearly established legal right.

IV. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

Perkins v. Fhuere crystallizes a major limitation in Oregon’s post‑conviction framework:

The PCHA, as currently written and historically understood, does not recognize a freestanding claim of actual innocence based solely on newly discovered evidence such as a victim’s recantation.
Relief under ORS 138.530(1)(a) requires a constitutional violation “in the proceedings” resulting in the conviction—most pertinently, under Mooney–Napue–Glossip, the State’s knowing use of or failure to correct false testimony. Recantation alone, absent state knowledge or misconduct, is insufficient.
Relief under ORS 138.530(1)(c) targets unlawful or unconstitutional sentences, not the factual correctness of the underlying conviction. An innocence claim can’t be reframed as a sentence challenge under this provision.
Newly discovered evidence can justify filing otherwise untimely or successive petitions, but only to bring forward claims that already fit within ORS 138.530’s recognized grounds.

At the same time, the decision underscores—and leaves unresolved—serious policy and constitutional questions:

The abolition of coram nobis and the absence of a general innocence remedy under the PCHA create a real possibility that courts may be unable to correct some provably wrongful convictions.
Article I, section 10’s guarantee of a remedy for injuries remains a potential constitutional basis for challenging this remedial gap, but that question was not decided and awaits appropriate litigation.
The legislature has already taken partial steps—DNA exoneration and compensation statutes—but has not broadly authorized actual innocence claims in post‑conviction proceedings. The court invites such legislative attention, particularly in light of the empirical reality of wrongful convictions.

In sum, Perkins simultaneously clarifies, constrains, and exposes. It clarifies the limited scope of ORS 138.530(1)(a) and (c); constrains the use of freestanding innocence claims in Oregon post‑conviction practice; and exposes a profound gap between procedural regularity and factual justice that the legislature, and perhaps future constitutional litigation, will be pressed to address.

Perkins v. Fhuere and the Limits of Actual Innocence Claims Under Oregon’s Post-Conviction Hearing Act