Per-Defendant Fee-Shifting After Rule 12(b) Dismissals: Implications of West-Helmle v. Denver District Attorney’s Office

Introduction

In West-Helmle v. Denver District Attorney’s Office, Nos. 24-1340 & 25-1020 (10th Cir. Aug. 12 2025), the Tenth Circuit disposed of a sprawling disability-discrimination suit brought by a pro-se law graduate against a host of institutional and individual defendants, upholding dismissals, a grant of summary judgment, and a fee award.

Although the opinion covers numerous procedural skirmishes, its lasting doctrinal significance lies in the per-defendant application of Colorado’s mandatory fee-shifting statute, C.R.S. § 13-17-201(1), when all claims against a particular defendant are dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). The panel also revisits established rules on absolute judicial immunity, the “qualified individual with a disability” pleading standard, page-limit enforcement, and the mechanics of recusal motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 & 455.

Summary of the Judgment

Appeal No. 24-1340: Affirmed the district court’s (i) Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals for failure to state ADA/Rehabilitation-Act and stigma-plus claims; (ii) grant of summary judgment on the remaining retaliation claim; (iii) denial of leave to amend to re-add a magistrate judge (absolute judicial immunity); and (iv) rejection of motions to recuse.
Appeal No. 25-1020: Affirmed a $62,430 attorneys’-fees award in favor of Professor Thomas Russell under § 13-17-201(1) and dismissed, for lack of a final order, the portion of the appeal challenging a bill of costs in favor of the University of Denver (DU).
Procedural rulings of note: Enforcement of page limits by striking argument beyond the first 35 pages; liberal—yet not unbridled—construction of pleadings by sophisticated pro-se litigants; and confirmation that a judge may rule on the legal sufficiency of recusal motions directed at himself.

Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Lewis v. City of Littleton, 855 F. App’x 448 (10th Cir. 2021) – Distinguished; held that § 13-17-201 applies only when an “entire action” against a defendant is dismissed under Rule 12(b). West-Helmle clarifies that “entire action” means “all claims against that defendant,” not all claims in the case overall.
Hinkle v. Beckham County, 962 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2020) – Used for stigma-plus doctrine (need for significant change in legal status).
Al-Turki v. Tomsic, 926 F.3d 610 (10th Cir. 2019) – Clarifies “plus” requirement in stigma-plus claims.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) & Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) – Authority for absolute judicial immunity.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) – Governs recusal standards under § 455.
Colorado cases: Colo. Special Districts Prop. & Liab. Pool v. Lyons, 277 P.3d 874 (Colo. App. 2012) and Schultz v. Laszlo & Assocs., LLC, 568 P.3d 458 (Colo. App. 2025) (both endorse per-defendant fee entitlement).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Fee-Shifting under § 13-17-201(1)
The statute compels a fee award to a defendant when “an action” against that defendant is dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b). The panel read “action” in a defendant-specific manner, rejecting the plaintiff’s reliance on Lewis. Because all claims asserted against Professor Russell (defamation & civil-conspiracy) were knocked out at the dismissal stage, fees were mandatory irrespective of the survival of claims against co-defendants.
Absolute Judicial Immunity
Attempting to add Magistrate Judge Annis for barring him from a courtroom, West-Helmle fell afoul of the well-settled rule that judges are absolutely immune from damages for “functions normally performed by a judge,” such as controlling courtroom access. The court emphasized that alleged malice or informal procedure does not strip immunity.
ADA/Rehabilitation-Act Pleading Defects
The court reaffirmed that plaintiffs must plausibly allege: (i) a qualifying physical or mental impairment; (ii) substantial limitation of a major life activity; and (iii) being a “qualified individual.” The complaint—framed largely in conclusory terms—failed at step (ii), despite voluminous medical materials submitted late in the process.
Stigma-Plus Claim
Because reputational harm without a concomitant, significant change in legal status cannot trigger procedural-due-process protections, dismissal was mandatory. Neither a failing grade from a private university nor the denial of a professional license never held qualified.
Recusal Motions
Section 144 allows but a single, timely, and fact-specific affidavit. The plaintiff’s affidavits—rooted in unfavorable rulings and conjecture—were insufficient. The judge was permitted to assess legal sufficiency himself and to continue presiding.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

Fee Litigation: Litigants in Colorado federal courts can expect routine fee petitions when their particular claims are Rule 12(b)-dismissed—even if the broader case proceeds. Plaintiffs contemplating multi-defendant suits must therefore weigh cost exposure defendant-by-defendant.
Pleading Standards: The case illustrates the Tenth Circuit’s unwillingness to sift through voluminous, untimely medical records to salvage deficient disability pleadings. Early, clear articulation of major-life-activity limitations is essential.
Judicial-Immunity Barrier: Any damages theory premised on courtroom-management decisions by a judge is effectively foreclosed in this circuit.
Pro-Se Sophistication Spectrum: The panel affirms a middle path for law-educated pro-se litigants—affording some liberality while insisting on rule compliance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 12(b) Dismissal: A procedural mechanism to throw out claims at the pleading stage—for example, when a complaint fails to state a legally cognizable claim.
Absolute Judicial Immunity: A doctrine shielding judges from personal liability for actions taken in a judicial capacity and within jurisdiction, even if alleged to be malicious or erroneous.
Stigma-Plus Doctrine: Reputational injury (“stigma”) must be coupled with a tangible alteration of legal status (“plus”)—such as losing a license—to trigger constitutional due-process protections.
C.R.S. § 13-17-201(1): Colorado statute mandating an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to a defendant when a tort action against that defendant is dismissed under Rule 12(b).
Qualified Individual with a Disability: Under the ADA/Rehabilitation Act, a person who (a) has a physical or mental impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, and (b) is otherwise able to meet essential program requirements, with or without reasonable accommodation.

Conclusion

West-Helmle reaffirms familiar federal doctrines—judicial immunity, recusal standards, and robust pleading requirements—while making a notable contribution to Colorado fee-shifting jurisprudence: once a defendant escapes via Rule 12(b), fees follow, regardless of the fate of co-defendants. Future plaintiffs must assess the viability of each claim at the outset, for tactical over-inclusiveness may come with a hefty price tag. Meanwhile, defendants can invoke § 13-17-201(1) with renewed confidence, and courts have a clear roadmap for parsing multi-party fee requests.