People v. Yankaway: Automatic Commencement of 160-Day Speedy-Trial Term Under Section 103-5(e) and the Prejudice Requirement in Ineffective Assistance Claims

Introduction

The Supreme Court of Illinois decided People v. Yankaway on April 24, 2025. Defendant Jatterius L. Yankaway had been arrested for the 2019 shooting of his cousin, Robert Hunter, and charged with attempted first-degree murder, aggravated battery, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (UPWF). While serving a sentence on an unrelated weapons conviction, Yankaway remained in custody and awaited trial on the shooting charges. Key issues on appeal included: counsel’s alleged failure to invoke Yankaway’s speedy-trial rights under the intrastate detainers statute; application of the one-act, one-crime doctrine; and whether the circuit court misunderstood the applicable sentencing range.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the appellate court’s holding that (1) counsel’s failure to file an intrastate detainers demand was not deficient, because Yankaway’s 160-day term under section 103-5(e) started automatically, and (2) the circuit court did not err in sentencing. The court vacated the appellate court’s remand for sentencing on the UPWF conviction. On the ineffective-assistance claim, the Court found counsel’s agreement to a February 2022 continuance deficient but held that Yankaway could not show Strickland prejudice. Finally, any misapprehension of the sentencing range for attempted murder did not affect the outcome and did not warrant resentencing.

Analysis

1. Statutory Framework and Section 103-5(e)

Illinois’s speedy-trial statute (725 ILCS 5/103-5) provides different time frames:

Subsection (a): 120 days from arrest for in-custody defendants.
Subsection (b): 160 days after demand for defendants on bail or recognizance.
Subsection (e): 160 days to try “remaining charges” after judgment on the first prosecuted charge where a defendant is “simultaneously in custody upon more than one charge pending against him in the same county.”

In Yankaway, the Court held that section 103-5(e) operates like subsection (a): the 160-day period begins automatically—here, on September 28, 2020, when defendant was sentenced on his first charge—without a separate demand under the intrastate detainers statute (730 ILCS 5/3-8-10). Because Yankaway was in the county jail (not in DOC custody) when the State elected to proceed on his second weapons case, the intrastate detainers statute did not apply. His speedy-trial term thus commenced automatically when the speedy-trial suspension lifted on October 1, 2021.

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the Prejudice Requirement

Yankaway argued that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for agreeing to a February 28, 2022 continuance—rather than objecting and forcing the State to proceed. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a defendant must show both:

Counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and
Prejudice: a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have differed.

The Court found that, although counsel’s acquiescence was deficient, Yankaway failed the prejudice prong: he could only speculate that, but for counsel’s conduct, his motion to dismiss would have succeeded. The record showed the circuit court was repeatedly concerned about the 160-day term and would have denied a dismissal motion regardless. Speculation as to alternate strategy cannot satisfy Strickland prejudice.

3. Court’s Discretion in Attributing Delay

The circuit court attributed the 133-day period from February 28 to July 11, 2022, to Yankaway, noting logistical complications (defendant and his victim were in different facilities, COVID-19 lockdowns, court calendar pressures) and the parties’ agreement on a new date. The Supreme Court held there was no abuse of discretion: affirmative agreement to a continuance—expressly recorded—properly tolls the statutory term.

4. Sentencing Range Misapprehension and Plain Error

At sentencing, the circuit court misstated the attempted-murder range as “26 to 50 years” (20-year enhancement) when only a 15-year enhancement applied (yielding a 21–45 year range). The Court held this was not reversible plain error because the judge’s remarks made clear the sentence was driven by the gravity of shooting one’s cousin and victim impact, not by the range calculation. A sentencing court’s misunderstanding of its range is harmless if it did not influence the ultimate sentence.

5. Precedents Cited

In re Illinois Courts Response to COVID-19 Emergency (M.R. 30370) – tolling speedy-trial terms during pandemic.
Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81 – automatic start of 160-day term under subsection (e).
Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419 – distinction between subsections and intrastate detainer applicability.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 – two-prong test for ineffective assistance.
Eddington, 77 Ill. 2d 41 – plain-error review of sentencing range misapprehension.

6. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in logical sequence:

Interpretation of section 103-5(e) without demanding a detainer request when not DOC-committed.
Application of Strickland to defense counsel’s conduct.
Deference to circuit court’s attribution of delay as non-arbitrary.
Harmless-error analysis under the plain error framework for sentencing range mistakes.

7. Impact on Future Cases

People v. Yankaway clarifies that:

Under section 103-5(e), the 160-day period for multiple charges begins automatically when a first-case judgment is entered—no intrastate detainers demand is necessary unless the defendant is in DOC custody on detainer.
A defendant must affirmatively object to any proposed continuance to prevent it from tolling the statutory term; mere speculation cannot establish Strickland prejudice.
Misstatements of sentencing ranges are reversible only if they actually influence the sentence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 103-5(e): When you are already in jail on one charge, and more charges are pending in the same county, the clock for trying those extra charges runs for 160 days after you are sentenced on the first one.
Intrastate Detainers Statute: A rule that applies only when you’re serving time in an Illinois prison (DOC) and have other pending charges elsewhere in the state. It lets you demand a speedy trial in those other counties.
Strickland Prejudice: You must show more than “maybe things would have gone better.” You need a reasonable likelihood your case’s outcome would change.
Plain Error in Sentencing: Even if a judge slips up on the math of the allowed sentence range, it’s not reversible if the final sentence clearly reflected the judge’s independent judgment.

Conclusion

People v. Yankaway establishes that when a defendant is simultaneously in local custody on multiple charges, the 160-day speedy-trial clock under section 103-5(e) starts automatically once the first case concludes—without requiring a detainer demand—unless the defendant is in DOC. It underscores counsel’s duty to object to continuances and the necessity of demonstrating actual prejudice for an ineffective assistance claim. Finally, it confirms that sentencing errors in calculating ranges are harmless absent any influence on the judge’s ultimate decision. The decision will guide practitioners and courts in applying speedy-trial provisions, assessing counsel performance, and reviewing sentencing explanations in Illinois criminal law.