Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• People v. Ortega, 40 NY3d 463 (2023), and People v. Mairena, 34 NY3d 473 (2019): These cases supply the harmless-error framework for constitutional errors: (1) consider whether the evidence of guilt is overwhelming; and if so, (2) whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. The Court applied this two-part test to assume arguendo the identification error and nonetheless affirm the conviction.
• Riley v. County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455 (2000), People v. Galindo, 38 NY3d 199 (2022), People v. Mobil Oil Corp., 48 NY2d 192 (1979), and Squadrito v. Griebsch, 1 NY2d 471 (1956): These authorities guide statutory interpretation. The Court emphasized plain meaning, reading the statute as a whole, and the interpretive role of titles when text is ambiguous. Applying these principles to CPL 400.15(3), the Court concluded that the statute’s text and structure require a personal colloquy with the defendant regarding whether to controvert the predicate statement.
• People v. Felix, 58 NY2d 156 (1983), and Matter of Peters v. New York City Hous. Auth., 307 NY 519 (1954): The Court invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance, underscoring that it would not reach Wright’s state constitutional claim because the statutory ground under CPL 400.15 was dispositive.
• Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024): While not decided here, Erlinger frames an emerging federal constitutional issue about jury factfinding for recidivist enhancements beyond the “fact of a prior conviction.” The Court flagged Erlinger and permitted Wright to raise its implications for tolling calculations on remand.

Legal Reasoning

1) Trial Issue: Eyewitness Identification and Harmless Error

The pretrial record showed a suggestive pre-lineup encounter: the eyewitness saw Wright in handcuffs in the District Attorney’s reception area for a second or two and expressed 100% certainty that he was the perpetrator before later failing to identify him in a six-person lineup that same day. The trial court nonetheless permitted an in-court identification after an independent-source hearing during trial.

The Court of Appeals declined to resolve whether the independent source finding was erroneous. Assuming error, it applied the constitutional harmless-error standard. It emphasized:

• Multiple witnesses consistently described the altercation and shooter’s clothing matching Wright’s attire.
• The first victim personally knew Wright, identified him in court, and placed him in the argument immediately preceding the shooting; he felt the gunshot moments after turning away from Wright.
• The second victim identified Wright as a participant in the argument and described his clothing consistent with others.
• Physical and forensic corroboration: a zipper recovered at the scene carried DNA that was “18.7 billion times more likely” to include Wright; cell-site data placed Wright at the scene and then traveling to an acquaintance’s home afterward; surveillance video corroborated movements and the presence of a gun.
• Two admissions: an acquaintance and the acquaintance’s girlfriend testified that Wright told them he had shot someone, with details about “smoking” pockets that matched eyewitness observations (smoke rising from the shooter’s jacket pocket).
• The prosecution barely relied on the challenged in-court identification at summation, noting it only in the context of other identifications.

In light of the “quantity and quality” of that evidence, the Court found the record overwhelmingly established guilt and concluded there was no reasonable possibility the assumed error affected the verdict. The conviction therefore stands.

2) Sentencing Issue: A Personal Right to Controvert Under CPL 400.15(3)

The predicate statement alleged a violent felony conviction more than a decade earlier, and the People sought to toll the 10-year lookback under Penal Law § 70.04(1)(b)(v) based on Wright’s prior periods of incarceration (including 196 days in a New Jersey facility). When the court asked defense counsel if he wished to be heard, counsel said “not on this matter.” Wright immediately interjected: “Yes, I controvert on that,” and specifically challenged the tolling calculation. The court refused to hear him, adjudicated him a second violent felony offender, and imposed enhanced sentences.

The Court of Appeals held that CPL 400.15(3) assigns the controversion decision to the defendant personally:

• Textual command and structure: The statute requires that the defendant be given the predicate statement and that “the court must ask [the defendant] whether [they] wish[] to controvert any allegation made therein.” The use of personal pronouns in this subsection—distinct from the statute’s otherwise impersonal diction—signals a direct colloquy with the individual defendant.
• Consequences and capacity: The decision to controvert has profound, lifelong consequences, including present enhancement and binding effect in future proceedings (CPL 400.15[8]). The defendant, not counsel, typically holds critical personal knowledge about prior convictions and incarceration periods relevant to tolling.
• Procedural design: Reading CPL 400.15 “as a whole,” the preliminary examination and the availability of a hearing (CPL 400.15[5]) make sense only if the defendant’s personal decision controls whether allegations are deemed admitted by virtue of silence. The Model Colloquy published by the New York Unified Court System likewise directs courts to address the defendant personally about whether to deny or controvert the statement.

Because CPL 400.15(3) confers a personal right that the court must honor, the sentencing court erred by refusing to hear Wright’s specific objections and by proceeding on defense counsel’s noncontroversion. The remedy is to modify and remit for proper CPL 400.15 proceedings—allowing Wright to controvert, and, if warranted, to obtain a hearing under CPL 400.15(5). The Court did not reach Wright’s state constitutional claim given the statutory disposition (constitutional avoidance).

3) Reserved Constitutional Question: Jury Factfinding after Erlinger

The Court expressly declined to address whether, under Erlinger v. United States, the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find tolling facts (periods of incarceration) that extend Penal Law § 70.04’s 10-year lookback. That issue remains open in New York. Wright may raise the argument on remand, creating a potential vehicle for harmonizing New York’s recidivist sentencing procedures with the U.S. Supreme Court’s evolving Apprendi-line jurisprudence.

Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Trial Courts

• Mandatory personal colloquy: Judges must directly ask the defendant whether they wish to controvert any allegation in the CPL 400.15 predicate statement. Defense counsel’s noncontroversion does not substitute for the defendant’s decision.
• Record-making: Courts should ensure the record reflects that the defendant received the predicate statement, was personally addressed, and was given a meaningful opportunity to specify controverted items (including tolling periods, places of incarceration, conviction dates, and identity).
• Hearing protocol: If the defendant controverts and the remaining uncontroverted allegations do not suffice to support the predicate adjudication, the court must conduct a hearing under CPL 400.15(5).

B. For Prosecutors

• Robust predicate statements: CPL 400.15(2) requires listing not just predicate convictions, but also each incarceration period used for tolling with dates and facilities. Anticipate controversion by assembling certified records, DOC documentation, and, where necessary, witnesses to establish tolling.
• Out-of-state records: Where tolling relies on out-of-state confinement (as here), prosecutors should be prepared to authenticate and explain those records to satisfy CPL 400.15’s requirements.

C. For Defense Counsel

• Client-controlled decision: Advise clients that they personally control the decision to controvert. Ensure the court conducts the required colloquy and that any client objections are heard and specified on the record.
• Substantive challenges: Scrutinize tolling computations under Penal Law § 70.04(1)(b)(iv)-(v). Verify custody dates, facilities, credit calculations, and any gaps. Be prepared with documentary rebuttal.
• Preserving constitutional claims: Consider raising Erlinger-based Sixth Amendment arguments that tolling facts must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt if such facts increase the statutory range or mandatory minimum exposure.

D. Systemic Effects

• Uniform procedure: People v. Wright effectively standardizes predicate colloquies statewide. The ruling aligns with the Judiciary’s Model Colloquy and will likely reduce appellate litigation by producing clearer records.
• Collateral review: Because CPL 400.15(8) makes predicate findings binding in future proceedings, Wright may spur collateral challenges (e.g., CPL 440.20 illegal sentence motions) where prior predicate adjudications were entered without a proper personal colloquy or where the court refused to hear a defendant’s controversion.
• Open constitutional frontier: The Court has invited focused litigation on whether Erlinger reshapes aspects of New York’s recidivist procedures, particularly with respect to tolling and other facts beyond the “fact of a prior conviction.”