People v. Williams (1st Dep’t 2025): Handcuffing by DHS Is a De Facto Arrest Requiring Probable Cause; “Distinctive Clothing” and Murky Video Do Not Supply Probable Cause; Unpreserved Attenuation Cannot Save the Prosecution

Introduction

In People v. Williams (2025 NY Slip Op 04526), the Appellate Division, First Department, reversed a conviction and dismissed the indictment after concluding that the Department of Homeless Services (DHS) effected a de facto arrest of the defendant in a city shelter without probable cause. The case addresses three interlocking issues: (1) when non-police government actors convert an investigative stop into an arrest by handcuffing and detaining a suspect; (2) the insufficiency of “distinctive clothing” seen on surveillance footage near, but not of, the crime to establish probable cause where the complainant’s description and the crime video are inconclusive; and (3) the strict preservation rules that prevent the People from, on appeal, advancing new theories such as intervening or attenuating probable cause that were not argued below.

Darnell Williams pled guilty to multiple counts of first-degree assault and attempted first-degree robbery after a suppression court ruled that a detective’s “confirmatory” viewing of Williams at a DHS shelter converted reasonable suspicion into probable cause. On appeal, the First Department held that DHS’s conduct—handcuffing Williams to a bench in a shelter office at police request before any confirmatory procedure—was a warrantless arrest requiring probable cause, which the People neither established nor defended on the correct theories at the suppression hearing. Because all critical evidence (his statements and recovered clothing) flowed from that illegality, it was suppressed, and the remaining proof was insufficient to proceed, warranting dismissal.

Summary of the Judgment

• DHS officers, acting on police-distributed surveillance stills, detained Williams at a shelter, handcuffing him to a bench while awaiting a detective. This restraint constituted a de facto arrest, not a mere investigative detention, and required probable cause.
• The People failed to present evidence or argument below that DHS had probable cause to arrest, and they did not raise an attenuation or intervening probable cause theory at the suppression hearing. Those theories were therefore unpreserved and could not be invoked on appeal.
• All evidence obtained as a result of DHS’s unlawful arrest—including Williams’s post-Miranda statements and the pants found in his bag—was suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.
• Because suppressed items were the only links connecting Williams to the crime (the complainant could not identify the assailant; the crime video was “murky” and unidentifiable; and “distinctive pants” appeared only on non-crime footage near the scene), the remaining proof was insufficient to make out a prima facie case. The court vacated the conviction and dismissed the indictment.

Factual Background

The underlying incident occurred near an Armenian church at 630 Second Avenue. The complainant, attacked from behind, could only report that the assailant wore a black nylon jacket. Surveillance videos of the attack itself were short, “blurry,” and “murky,” making the assailant’s features and clothing impossible to discern beyond “dark” clothing. Other, clearer footage captured a male in “distinctive ripped and patched pants” near the scene before/after the incident, but not engaged in the crime or any incriminating conduct.

A detective sent stills of the man in the distinctive pants (not the murky crime footage) to a nearby DHS shelter. DHS staff later detained Williams at the shelter in handcuffs, based on their belief that he was the individual from the stills. When the detective arrived, he swapped the cuffs, seized a bag, and transported Williams to the precinct, where a search revealed pants matching the surveillance stills. Williams admitted he was the person in the non-crime surveillance imagery but denied being the attacker on the murky crime video.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• People v. Robinson, 282 AD2d 75 (1st Dept 2001): The court relied on Robinson’s framework to determine when a detention becomes a de facto arrest: use of handcuffs, transport, duration, safety justifications, and the availability of less intrusive means. Here, DHS’s handcuffing of Williams to a bench for a significant period, without safety or flight-risk details and in the absence of an identification procedure, matched the hallmarks of an arrest.
• People v. Bailey, 216 AD2d 1 (1st Dept 1995): Bailey held that placing a suspect in a holding cell for about an hour transformed an investigative detention into an arrest. The Williams panel cited Bailey to emphasize that custodial restraints over time are constitutionally significant and require probable cause.
• People v. Dodt, 61 NY2d 408 (1984) and progeny (People v. Wilson, 175 AD2d 15; People v. Johnson, 64 NY2d 617): Dodt stands for the preservation rule that the People cannot salvage a search or seizure by advancing a new theory on appeal that they did not raise at the suppression hearing. In Williams, the People failed to argue that DHS had probable cause and failed to argue attenuation/intervening probable cause below; thus, those theories were foreclosed on appeal.
• People v. Daniel, 122 AD3d 401 (1st Dept 2014) and People v. Skinner, 220 AD2d 350 (1st Dept 1995): Both cases reinforce that attenuation or intervening probable cause arguments are discrete legal theories that must be raised and litigated at the hearing; otherwise, the Appellate Division cannot affirm on those grounds. Williams follows Daniel and Skinner to reject unpreserved attenuation arguments.
• People v. Garrett, 23 NY3d 878 (2014): The court explained Garrett’s limited footnote: where an issue is part of a single, multipronged ruling, related sub-issues may be reviewed. But whether intervening probable cause attenuates an unlawful arrest is “clearly separate and analytically distinct” from whether probable cause existed in the first instance, so Garrett did not open the door for the People’s new attenuation theory on appeal.
• CPL 470.15(1) as applied in People v. Daniel: The First Department underscored it lacked the power to affirm on an alternative ground not raised below and not addressed by the suppression court.
• People v. Payton, 51 NY2d 169 (1980): The People were denied a remand to try new theories because they had a full and fair opportunity to make their record at the original hearing, but chose not to.
• People v. Rossi, 80 NY2d 952 (1992) and People v. Hargroves, 303 AD2d 766 (2d Dept 2003): These cases support the remedy of dismissal when suppression removes the only link connecting the defendant to the charged conduct. With the “distinctive pants” and the statements suppressed, the remaining evidence in Williams was inadequate to establish a prima facie case.

Legal Reasoning and Path to Decision

1. DHS’s handcuffing was a de facto arrest. The court focused on objective custodial features: Williams was handcuffed to a bench in a confined DHS office, while officers waited for a detective. The People offered almost no evidence about the duration, necessity, safety rationale, voluntariness, or less intrusive alternatives. Under Robinson and Bailey, that combination constitutes an arrest, not a mere stop.
2. Probable cause was not established at the time of the DHS arrest. The complainant could describe only a black nylon jacket; the crime footage was too “murky” to identify the assailant or clothing beyond “dark.” The clearer footage showed a person in distinctive pants near the scene, heading northbound, but not committing a crime. Nothing beyond proximity linked the pants-wearer to the attack. The detective himself issued only a “suspect” I-card, expressly noting lack of probable cause. On this record, DHS lacked probable cause when it arrested Williams.
3. Preservation strictly enforced: No new theories on appeal. The People did not argue below that DHS had probable cause, nor that the detective’s later “confirmatory” viewing attenuated the initial illegality by providing intervening probable cause. Under Dodt and Daniel, those arguments were unpreserved and therefore unavailable on appeal.
4. Intervening probable cause/attenuation is a separate doctrine, not subsumed in “probable cause” generally. The panel rejected reliance on Garrett’s footnote: whether intervening events purge the taint of an unlawful arrest is analytically distinct and must be raised and litigated at the hearing.
5. Fruit of the poisonous tree: suppression of statements and the pants. Because the arrest was unlawful, Williams’s statements and the pants seized from his bag were suppressible fruits. Miranda warnings did not cure the antecedent Fourth Amendment violation.
6. Dismissal, not remand, as the appropriate remedy. With the key links suppressed, the remaining evidence—the non-crime surveillance showing a person in distinctive pants near the scene, and the detective’s in-person “confirmatory” viewing—could not establish a prima facie case. Following Rossi and Hargroves, the court vacated the conviction and dismissed the indictment rather than remanding, particularly because the People had a full chance to build their record and argue alternatives at the hearing (Payton).

Impact and Forward-Looking Significance

• Non-police detentions are constitutionally policed. DHS (and similar agencies) act as state actors when they detain suspects at police request. Handcuffing and custodial restraint in agency offices will be treated as arrests requiring probable cause. Agencies must train staff and coordinate with police to ensure constitutional compliance.
• “Distinctive clothing” near the scene is not enough for probable cause. In the absence of a matching complainant description or identifiable crime footage, clothing-based proximity evidence supports, at best, reasonable suspicion. Investigators must obtain additional corroboration before directing or relying on custodial restraints.
• Preservation is outcome-determinative. Prosecutors must present all potential grounds at suppression hearings—probable cause, attenuation, intervening probable cause—and develop a full factual record (call agency witnesses; document duration, safety reasons, voluntariness, and procedures). Failure to do so can foreclose appellate salvaging and lead to dismissal.
• Appellate limits under CPL 470.15(1). The decision reinforces that the Appellate Division cannot affirm on unpreserved theories not reached below. This encourages thorough litigation at the trial level and prevents post hoc rationalizations on appeal.
• Video-era investigations need more than murky imagery. Reliance on ambiguous or non-crime footage is insufficient. Investigators should corroborate with eyewitnesses, track direction-of-flight evidence, or identify unique, crime-linked features beyond generic clothing in the vicinity.
• Remedy discipline: suppression can mean dismissal. When suppressed evidence constitutes the only link to the defendant, courts will dismiss rather than remand, particularly where the People had their chance to make the record.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• De facto arrest: Even without formal words of arrest, certain restraints (handcuffs, confinement, prolonged detention) are so intrusive that they amount to an arrest in fact, triggering the requirement of probable cause.
• Reasonable suspicion vs. probable cause: Reasonable suspicion permits brief investigative detentions (a stop) based on specific, articulable facts suggesting involvement in crime. Probable cause is a higher standard needed for arrest—facts sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe the suspect committed the offense.
• Fruit of the poisonous tree: Evidence obtained through, or as a direct result of, an unconstitutional search or seizure is generally inadmissible, as are its derivatives (e.g., statements made following an illegal arrest).
• Attenuation/intervening probable cause: A later, independent event (e.g., a reliable identification) may sometimes purge the taint of an initial illegality. But this must be litigated at the hearing; it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
• Preservation: Parties must present specific legal theories to the trial court. Appellate courts will not consider new, unraised arguments to sustain a ruling.
• CPL 470.15(1): Limits the Appellate Division’s review to questions of law and fact that were raised and decided below; it cannot affirm on grounds the People never argued at the suppression hearing.
• I-card (investigation card): A police notice indicating a person is a suspect. An “I-card” that explicitly notes “no probable cause” is a red flag; it does not authorize an arrest by other agencies.
• Confirmatory viewing: An officer’s in-person observation used to verify that a detained person matches a surveillance image. While such observation can contribute to probable cause, it cannot retrospectively sanitize an unlawful arrest unless properly litigated as attenuation.

Practice Pointers

• For law enforcement and partner agencies (e.g., DHS): - Do not handcuff or confine suspects absent probable cause (or compelling, articulable safety needs narrowly tailored in time and scope).
  - If a stop is necessary, use the least intrusive means and document reasons, duration, safety concerns, and alternatives considered.
  - Treat “suspect” notices without probable cause as insufficient for arrest; coordinate promptly with police to conduct noncustodial inquiries.
• For prosecutors: - Build a complete suppression record: call agency witnesses; elicit the who, what, when, where, and why of any detention; establish safety rationales and timing.
  - Argue every plausible basis: probable cause, attenuation, intervening probable cause, and inevitable discovery (if applicable). Preservation is critical.
  - If evidence is thin (e.g., ambiguous video, clothing-only matches), reassess charging decisions or invest in corroboration.
• For defense counsel: - Scrutinize non-police detentions for de facto arrest factors (handcuffs, confinement, duration, lack of safety rationale).
  - Emphasize weak links between non-crime footage and the offense (especially where complainant descriptions do not match).
  - Press preservation failures and oppose remands when the People had a full opportunity to litigate below.

Conclusion

People v. Williams establishes a clear, multi-part message for New York practice. First, when non-police government personnel handcuff and hold a suspect at the request of law enforcement, they are effecting a de facto arrest that demands probable cause. Second, distinctive clothing observed on surveillance near the scene, without more—and especially where the complainant’s description and crime footage are inconclusive—does not suffice for probable cause. Third, preservation rules are rigid: the People cannot rescue an unlawful arrest on appeal by invoking unraised theories like attenuation or intervening probable cause. Finally, when suppression removes the only connecting evidence, dismissal—not remand—is appropriate.

The decision refines constitutional boundaries in the age of ubiquitous surveillance and interagency collaboration, ensuring that expedient investigative shortcuts do not eclipse the bedrock requirements of probable cause and properly preserved litigation. It is a significant precedent for urban policing, shelter operations, and prosecutorial practice in New York.

Note: This commentary is for informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice.