People v. Vilella: “Almost Verbatim” Jury-Note Notice Can Satisfy CPL 310.30 When Counsel Knows the Note’s Substance and the Court’s Intended Response

1. Introduction

People v Vilella (Appellate Division, First Department, Jan. 13, 2026) addresses a recurring New York criminal trial issue: how strictly a trial court must adhere to the notice-and-record procedures of CPL 310.30 when responding to deliberating jurors’ written requests (“jury notes”). The defendant, Brandon Vilella (a/k/a “Mookie”), was convicted after a joint jury trial of attempted murder in the first and second degrees and assault in the first degree, arising from a machete attack allegedly committed in retaliation for the victim’s testimony in another criminal matter.

On appeal, defendant sought reversal primarily on the ground that the court committed a mode of proceedings error under CPL 310.30 and People v O'Rama by failing to provide “meaningful notice” of the actual specific contents of two jury notes— particularly the second note—before responding. Defendant also challenged several evidentiary rulings (911 call, gang evidence, voice identification, mistrial denial, codefendant statement) and argued the trial court erred in summarily denying his CPL 440.10 motion to resettle the transcript.

The First Department affirmed, holding the trial court’s handling of both notes satisfied CPL 310.30’s “meaningful notice” requirement because counsel was informed of the notes’ substance and knew the court’s intended response; any deviations were at most preservable error. A dissent would have reversed, insisting that Court of Appeals precedent requires a verbatim disclosure (or record proof the note was shown) and rejecting an “almost verbatim” standard.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Majority (Mendez, J.)

No CPL 310.30 / O’Rama mode of proceedings error: the court read each note “almost verbatim” to counsel and again in open court; omissions (“hear” and “again”) in the second note were insignificant and did not change meaning.
No reversible evidentiary error: rulings were proper; any errors were unpreserved or harmless given overwhelming proof. One part of the 911 call (identifying “Mookie”) was improperly admitted, but harmless.
CPL 440.10 denial affirmed: defendant did not provide “substantial evidence” to overcome the presumption of regularity; reporter affidavit and notes conclusively refuted mistranscription claims under CPL 440.30(4)(c).

Dissent (Michael, J.)

Would find mode of proceedings error because the second jury note was not read verbatim and there was no record proof it was shown to counsel before the court responded; “almost verbatim” is not a Court of Appeals standard.
Emphasized Court of Appeals insistence on verbatim reading/precise content for meaningful notice, citing decisions such as People v Parker, People v Nealon, and People v Silva.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Core CPL 310.30 “meaningful notice” framework

The majority anchors its analysis in People v O'Rama (78 NY2d 270 [1991]), which construed CPL 310.30’s “notice” requirement to mean “meaningful” notice—notice of the “actual specific content” of the jury’s request—so counsel can offer input when it matters most. O’Rama also referenced a best-practice procedure (derived from United States v Ronder (639 F2d 931, 934)).

The majority then relies on later Court of Appeals cases emphasizing that O’Rama’s procedure is not a rigid checklist: People v Silva (24 NY3d 294, 299 [2014]) and People v Walston (23 NY3d 986, 989 [2014]) are cited to support flexibility so long as counsel receives the note’s substance and can participate meaningfully.

2) When deviations become “mode of proceedings error”

To define the narrow class of nonwaivable, per se reversible errors, the majority cites People v Mack (27 NY3d 534, 540-541 [2016]) for the proposition that mode-of-proceedings status is reserved for “the most fundamental flaws” tainting the validity of the trial.

The majority recognizes that mode errors typically arise where:

The court withholds the note (People v O'Rama; People v Silva).
The court substantially alters/omits key terms (People v Walston; People v Kisoon (8 NY3d 129, 135 [2007]); People v Dennis (192 AD3d 1137, 1138-1139 [2d Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 964 [2021])).
The record does not show the note was conveyed or read (People v Parker (32 NY3d 49, 59 [2018])).

The dissent uses these same authorities to argue that verbatim disclosure is the line separating mode error from preservable error. In particular, the dissent highlights People v Parker for rejecting the “presumption of regularity” where the record lacks proof the note’s full contents were shared, and cites People v Salas (- NY3d -, 2025 NY Slip Op 03603, *2 [2025]) to underscore the continuing insistence on a record of compliance.

3) “Almost verbatim” and preservation-based departures

The majority leans heavily on a line of First Department cases treating minor deviations as non-mode errors if meaning is unchanged: People v Ramirez (60 AD3d 560 [1st Dept 2009], affd 15 NY3d 824 [2010]), People v Matthews (228 AD3d 521 [1st Dept 2024, lv denied 42 NY3d 1021 [2024]]), People v Carter (201 AD3d 551 [1st Dept 2022], lv denied 42 NY3d 949 [2022]), People v Jackson (192 AD3d 486 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 957 [2021]), People v Ramos (164 AD3d 1154 [1st Dept 2018], lv denied 33 NY3d 1107 [2019]), People v Almonte (81 AD3d 564 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 892 [2011]), and People v Donoso (78 AD3d 129 [1st Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 952 [2010]).

The dissent sharply contests that this “almost verbatim” approach has been endorsed by the Court of Appeals, and invokes People v Meyers (33 NY3d 1018, 1027 [2019] [Garcia, J. concurring]) to stress that even a single omitted word could trigger reversal under a strict verbatim regime.

4) Timing of counsel consultation

The majority distinguishes cases where the note is read precisely in open court even if counsel was not consulted beforehand, citing: People v Wiggs (28 NY3d 987, 988 [2016]) (quoting People v Nealon (26 NY3d 152, 160-162 [2015])), and People v Morris (27 NY3d 1096, 1097-1098 [2016]). These cases support the proposition that failure to discuss the note before recalling the jury is not necessarily a mode error if the note’s precise contents are placed on the record with counsel present.

The majority also cites People v Williams (21 NY3d 932, 934-935) and People v Starling (85 NY2d 509, 516 [1995]) for the principle that where counsel is aware of the substance of the intended response and has notice of the note’s contents, objections must be timely or the issue is unpreserved.

5) Substantive evidence rulings and postconviction practice

Excited utterance / 911 call: People v Herndon (41 AD3d 130 [1st Dept 2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 876 [2007]), People v Hernandez (28 NY3d 1056, 1057 [2016]), People v Cummings (31 NY3d 204, 209 [2018]), and harmless error under People v Crimmins (36 NY2d 230, 242 [1975]).
Gang evidence / motive / relationship: People v Cain (16 AD3d 288, 288-289 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 884 [2005]), People v Weinstein (42 NY3d 439, 457 [2024]), People v Wilson (14 AD3d 463, 463 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 857 [2005]), and expert testimony approval in People v Sanders (202 AD3d 573, 575-576 [1st Dept 2022]).
Coded slang interpretation: People v Vanegas (243 AD2d 261, 262 [1st Dept 1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 882 [1997]), and contextual understanding in People v Ruiz (166 AD3d 544, 545 [1st Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1209 [2019]); preservation note in People v Goldman (189 AD3d 698, 699 [1st Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 1097 [2021]).
Voice identification / analyst testimony: People v Adrian (173 AD3d 431, 431 [1st Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1125 [2020]) and preservation in People v Unger (223 AD3d 536, 536 [1st Dept 2024]).
Mistrial discretion: People v Corey (190 AD3d 620, 621 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 964 [2021]) and curative-instruction practice in People v Karim (185 AD3d 464, 464-465 [1st Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 973 [2020]).
Codefendant statement / limiting instruction: preservation and limiting instructions in People v Nicholson (26 NY3d 813, 830 [2016]) and no sua sponte requirement under People v Lombard (4 AD2d 666, 668 [1st Dept 1957]).
CPL 440.10 summary denial / presumption of regularity: People v Wright (27 NY3d 516, 518 [2016]), People v Velasquez (1 NY3d 44, 48-49 [2003]), and the problem of stale fact-finding in People v Bethune (29 NY3d 539, 543 [2017]).

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The majority’s operational rule: substance + context can satisfy “meaningful notice”

The majority’s key move is to treat CPL 310.30’s “meaningful notice” as satisfied where the record demonstrates that counsel: (i) received the substantive contents of the note; and (ii) understood the court’s intended response—especially where the second note is a logical follow-up to a prior note and to prior on-the-record discussions.

Applying that approach, the majority reasons that:

For the first note, the court effectively followed O’Rama’s best practices: near-verbatim reading to counsel, colloquy about response, and near-verbatim recitation in open court.
For the second note, the court’s comment “I know they want to read the charges,” combined with the later on-the-record near-verbatim description (“asks for a recharge on the charges”), conveyed the note’s substance; the omitted words “hear” and “again” did not alter meaning.
Because counsel had already debated whether the jury should be recharged immediately or send another note, counsel was aware of the court’s intended response; thus, the lack of a second separate pre-readback consultation did not undermine meaningful participation.

Having found no mode error, the majority frames the claim as subject to preservation: counsel’s failure to object when the court proceeded makes appellate review unavailable, consistent with People v Morris, People v Starling, and People v Ramirez.

2) The dissent’s competing rule: verbatim (or record proof of disclosure) is mandatory for meaningful notice

The dissent insists the Court of Appeals has drawn a bright line: “meaningful notice” requires a verbatim reading (or showing the note with record proof), and the failure to do so is a nonwaivable mode of proceedings error. It views “almost verbatim” as a First Department gloss inconsistent with the Court of Appeals’ insistence on a complete record of compliance, emphasizing that appellate courts cannot fill gaps with inference or presumed regularity (particularly after People v Parker).

3) Evidentiary and postconviction rulings: deference, preservation, and harmless error

On the evidentiary points, the majority largely applies conventional appellate review principles: it upholds trial-level discretion (gang motive evidence; expert decoding; analyst familiarity foundation; mistrial denial), enforces preservation rules (failure to object or request limiting instructions), and applies People v Crimmins harmless-error analysis to the one conceded mistake (the sister’s “Mookie” identification during the 911 call).

On the CPL 440.10 transcript-resettlement claim, the majority applies the presumption of regularity and requires “substantial evidence” to warrant a hearing (People v Velasquez), finding the reporter’s affidavit and notes to be “unquestionable documentary proof” justifying summary denial under CPL 440.30(4)(c).

C. Impact

1) Practical effect on CPL 310.30 litigation in the First Department

The decision reinforces a pragmatic First Department approach: minor deviations from a verbatim reading that do not change meaning, especially where the context shows counsel understood the request and the court’s intended response, may be treated as non-mode errors subject to preservation. This positions “almost verbatim” recitations as potentially sufficient to satisfy meaningful notice—at least where the record shows the note’s substance was communicated and counsel had a genuine chance to object or offer input.

2) Continued fault line with the Court of Appeals’ verbatim rhetoric

The dissent underscores an unresolved tension: Court of Appeals decisions often describe compliance in terms of “verbatim,” “precise,” or “actual specific” disclosure, and People v Parker warns against salvaging incomplete records by inference. If this case reaches the Court of Appeals (or if a similar record arises), the central question will be whether “meaningful notice” tolerates any omission, even one that does not change meaning, or whether verbatim disclosure is treated as the administrable bright line.

3) Trial practice takeaway

Regardless of which standard ultimately prevails statewide, People v Vilella increases the practical importance of: (i) making a clear record that the note was read verbatim or shown to counsel; and (ii) lodging a timely objection if the defense believes the note’s contents were not fully disclosed or if counsel was not afforded an opportunity to be heard. Under the majority’s approach, silence may convert a potentially reversible issue into an unpreserved one.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

CPL 310.30 (jury note procedure): When jurors ask for legal guidance, evidence readbacks, or other help, the judge must notify the prosecutor and defense counsel, bring the jury into court, and respond appropriately in the defendant’s presence.
“Meaningful notice” (People v O'Rama): Counsel must be told the actual specific content of what the jurors asked so counsel can suggest how the judge should answer.
Mode of proceedings error: A fundamental procedural defect that requires reversal even without objection (because it undermines the structure of the trial process itself).
Preservation: Many errors can only be reviewed on appeal if counsel objected at the time—so the trial judge had a chance to fix the problem.
Excited utterance: A hearsay exception allowing admission of statements made under the stress of a startling event, before the speaker has time for reflective fabrication.
Harmless error (People v Crimmins): Even if the judge made a mistake, the conviction stands if the appellate court concludes the error did not affect the verdict given the strength of the proof.
CPL 440.10 / transcript resettlement: A postjudgment motion that can challenge certain defects not adequately addressed on direct appeal; a hearing is not required if documentary proof conclusively refutes the claim.

5. Conclusion

People v Vilella affirms convictions while clarifying, in the First Department, a functional approach to CPL 310.30 compliance: a trial court may satisfy “meaningful notice” where it communicates the substance of jury notes “almost verbatim,” especially when prior on-the-record discussions make counsel aware of the court’s intended response and the jury’s request is a logical follow-up. The decision also underscores that, absent a true mode of proceedings error, counsel must object timely or risk forfeiting appellate review.

The dissent highlights a persistent doctrinal tension—whether Court of Appeals precedent effectively requires verbatim disclosure (or record proof the note was shown) as a bright-line rule. Until that tension is resolved, Vilella’s practical significance is twofold: it strengthens the First Department’s “no-meaning-change” approach to minor note-recitation variances, and it serves as a warning that meticulous record-making (and prompt objections) remains the safest path for trial courts and counsel.