People v. Torres: Course-of-Investigation Testimony, Jury Note Procedure, and the Modern Harmless-Error Framework in New York Criminal Appeals

I. Introduction

People v. Torres, 2025 NY Slip Op 06341 (App Div 2d Dept, Nov. 19, 2025), is a multi-issue criminal appeal arising from a Suffolk County jury trial in which the defendant, Paul A. Torres, was convicted of:

Burglary in the first degree (two counts),
Burglary in the second degree (three counts),
Robbery in the first degree (two counts), and
Robbery in the second degree (two counts).

The prosecution’s theory centered on a violent home-invasion style burglary and robbery carried out with a codefendant, involving at least two firearms and supported by testimony from a cooperating witness, police officers, and physical evidence.

On appeal, Torres advanced a broad array of challenges attacking virtually every stage and dimension of the trial:

Legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence,
Admission of a detective’s testimony recounting conversations with a cooperating witness,
Denial of severance from his codefendant,
Denial of a missing witness charge and failure to charge a key witness as an accomplice as a matter of law,
Several motions for mistrial based on allegedly prejudicial testimony and a jail call,
Admission of a disassembled gun recovered from the codefendant’s car and reference to an alleged uncharged crime,
Handling of jury notes under People v. O’Rama and CPL 310.30, including a request for a readback of defense counsel’s summation, and
Excessiveness of the sentence.

The Second Department affirmed the conviction and sentence in all respects. While the decision does not announce a dramatic doctrinal shift, it is a teaching case in several key areas of New York criminal practice:

It reinforces the limits of what counts as improper hearsay or bolstering when a detective explains his investigative steps through “course-of-investigation” testimony.
It clarifies, once again, that not every departure from the ideal handling of jury notes amounts to a mode-of-proceedings error under O’Rama; preservation still matters where the trial court has given counsel “meaningful notice.”
It underscores the stringency of timeliness and preservation rules for missing witness charges, severance motions, and objections to jury instructions.
It exemplifies New York’s robust use of harmless error analysis, especially when the evidence of guilt is “overwhelming.”

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Appellate Division, Second Department (Chambers, J.P., Dowling, McCormack & Quirk, JJ.) unanimously affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence. The key holdings are:

Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence:
Though some sufficiency arguments were unpreserved (CPL 470.05[2]), the court held that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the convictions (People v Contes). Independently reviewing the weight of the evidence (People v Danielson; People v Bleakley; People v Romero), the panel found that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.
Detective’s Testimony / Hearsay and Bolstering:
Testimony by a detective about what a cooperating witness told him was properly admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of explaining investigative steps and completing the narrative, not for the truth of the statements. It did not constitute improper bolstering, especially in light of a limiting instruction (People v Prince; People v Speaks; People v Rosario; cf. People v Bacenet).
Severance from Codefendant:
The claim that Torres should have been tried separately was unpreserved. In any event, joinder was proper because the crimes were part of a common scheme or plan (CPL 200.40[1][b]; People v Wright), the same witness supplied the evidence against both (People v Wallace), and the codefendants’ defenses were not irreconcilably conflicting (People v Caldwell; People v Lau).
Missing Witness Charge & Accomplice as a Matter of Law:
Torres’s request for a missing witness charge was untimely because made only at the close of all evidence (People v Anderson, affd 36 NY3d 1109), and in any event the witnesses were not under the People’s “control” (Anderson; People v Picart; People v Roseboro). His claim that a witness should have been charged as an accomplice as a matter of law (CPL 60.22) was unpreserved; although the charge should have been given (People v Chestnut), the error was harmless under People v Crimmins because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and there was no significant probability of a different verdict.
Mistrial Motions:
The court upheld denial of three mistrial motions:
- A spontaneous statement by Torres, admitted through the arresting officer, was properly used to show the relationship between Torres and his codefendant as accomplices in the home invasion (People v Harris, affd 26 NY3d 1). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a mistrial (People v Williams; People v Dunbar).
- Two fleeting references by the arresting officer—to working in “gang enforcement” and knowing of Torres’s “violent history”—were cured when the court sustained objections and gave a prompt curative instruction; any error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence (Williams; People v Bianchi; Crimmins).
- The jury’s brief exposure to indications that Torres had been incarcerated pretrial, via a jail telephone call recording and transcript, did not warrant a mistrial. The offending portion of the call was not played, the transcript was removed, and the jury was told to disregard it; such evidence can threaten the presumption of innocence (People v Zelaya), but here the corrective steps and jury instructions sufficed (People v Stone; People v Louime).
Firearm Evidence and Uncharged Crime Reference:
Testimony that a disassembled gun was recovered from the codefendant’s car was properly admitted because it was relevant to show that multiple guns were used and to link the car to the crime scene (Harris). A witness’s stray reference to an alleged uncharged crime did not deprive Torres of a fair trial, as any prejudice was cured by the court’s direction to disregard the testimony (People v Colon).
Jury Notes, O’Rama, and CPL 310.30:
Torres’s argument that the court mishandled Jury Note 1 under People v O’Rama, 78 NY2d 270, was unpreserved (People v Martinez). The court held that the alleged misstep was not a mode-of-proceedings error because the judge fulfilled the “core responsibilities” under CPL 310.30 by giving defense counsel meaningful notice of the note and the court’s proposed response (People v Nealon; People v Price; Martinez). The judge’s refusal to provide the jury with a “print-out of what [was] read” earlier did not constitute an abuse of discretion, particularly since the jury later sent a new note properly requesting a reread of part of the charge (People v Bohn).
Readback of Defense Summation (Jury Note 3):
The claim that the court mishandled Jury Note 3, which requested a readback of defense counsel’s summation, was unpreserved. In any event, the court acted within its broad discretion in refusing to read back a closing argument (People v Velasco; People v Smith), and the jury did not seek further instruction afterward (People v Aguilar).
Sentence:
The sentence was not excessive under the Appellate Division’s discretionary sentence review standard (People v Suitte).

The panel concluded that all preserved claims lacked merit, and all unpreserved or waived claims did not justify reversal.

III. Analysis

A. Evidence: Legal Sufficiency vs. Weight of the Evidence

1. Legal sufficiency (Contes)

The court first addressed the familiar two-step evidentiary review: legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence.

Under People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621:

Evidence is legally sufficient if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court notes that Torres’s legal sufficiency claims were “only partially preserved” under CPL 470.05(2) — meaning that he had not made sufficiently specific trial motions (e.g., a detailed CPL 290.10 motion to dismiss) targeting all of the deficiencies he later asserted on appeal. This is a recurring and important practice point: a general motion to dismiss usually does not preserve specific sufficiency challenges.

Nonetheless, the court reaches the merits and, applying Contes, holds that the record contained enough evidence to permit a rational trier of fact to find Torres guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all counts. The opinion does not detail the evidence, but by referencing “overwhelming evidence” in multiple contexts, it signals:

Strong eyewitness or cooperating witness testimony,
Corroborating physical or circumstantial evidence (such as the firearms and vehicle), and
Possibly incriminating statements by Torres (e.g., the spontaneous statement and jail call).

2. Weight of the evidence (Danielson, Mateo, Bleakley, Romero)

Unlike legal sufficiency, the Appellate Division has a constitutional obligation to conduct an independent weight-of-the-evidence review in felony cases (see NY Const, art VI, § 4[k]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490).

The court cites:

People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348, describing the two-step approach to weight review,
People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410, emphasizing deference to the jury on issues of credibility, and
People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, reaffirming the appellate court’s independent factual review power.

The panel emphasizes that while it independently weighs the evidence, it gives “great deference” to the jury’s ability to see and hear the witnesses. That means:

The court may set aside a conviction as against the weight of the evidence even if it is legally sufficient, but
It will only do so if, after its own review, it concludes that the jury’s resolution of credibility and inferences is manifestly wrong.

After reviewing the record (which the slip opinion does not detail), the panel finds the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. The repeated invocation of “overwhelming evidence” in the harmless-error analysis strongly suggests that the appellate judges found the prosecution case not merely adequate but powerful.

B. Detective’s Testimony: Nonhearsay “Course of Investigation” Evidence and Bolstering

1. The issue

Torres argued that a police detective improperly testified about conversations with a cooperating witness, amounting to:

Hearsay (out-of-court statements admitted for their truth), and
Improper “bolstering” of the cooperating witness’s credibility by repetition of that witness’s story through law enforcement testimony.

2. Precedents cited

The court relied on a well-developed line of Second Department cases upholding limited “course-of-investigation” testimony:

People v Prince, 128 AD3d 987: Held that testimony about statements by others can be admitted not for their truth but to explain why the police took certain investigative steps; accompanied by proper limiting instructions, this is nonhearsay.
People v Speaks, 124 AD3d 689, 691: Similar reasoning; establishes that such testimony is admissible where it completes the narrative or explains “why we did what we did.”
People v Rosario, 100 AD3d 660, 661: Holds that limited references to a witness’s out-of-court statements by a police officer do not qualify as improper bolstering when used to explain police action rather than vouch for credibility.
People v Bacenet, 297 AD2d 817, 818 (cf.): A cautionary case where similar testimony did cross the line, illustrating when such statements can become impermissible.
People v Johnson, 40 AD3d 1011, 1012: Emphasizes the importance of limiting instructions that make clear the nonhearsay purpose of the testimony.

3. The court’s reasoning

The key doctrinal point: Not all testimony about out-of-court statements is hearsay. It depends on the purpose for which it is offered.

The Second Department characterizes the detective’s testimony as follows:

It was “properly admitted for the relevant, nonhearsay purpose of establishing the reasons behind the detective’s actions, and to complete the narrative of events leading to the defendant’s arrest” (Prince).
The trial court specifically instructed the jury that the testimony was not admitted for its truth and could only be used to understand why the detective acted as he did.

On that basis, the panel concludes:

The detective’s testimony was not hearsay, because it was not offered to prove that what the cooperating witness said was true; and
It did not amount to improper “bolstering,” because the purpose was not to repeat and reinforce the witness’s narrative but to explain the investigation and arrest.

This is a reaffirmation of the now-settled New York doctrine allowing course-of-investigation testimony in limited, carefully instructed form. Torres adds another data point that prosecutors can cite to defend similar testimony, and defense counsel can scrutinize with an eye to whether the evidence in a given case truly stays within these limits.

C. Joinder and Severance: Common Scheme or Plan & Irreconcilable Defenses

1. Joinder under CPL 200.40(1)(b)

Torres complained that he should have been tried separately from his codefendant. The court finds the issue unpreserved (no timely and specific motion or renewal at trial), but still proceeds to explain why joinder was proper under CPL 200.40(1)(b):

Defendants may be joined in a single indictment and trial when the offenses charged are part of a “common scheme or plan.”

The panel cites People v Wright, 166 AD3d 1022, 1023–24, which upheld joinder where the offenses were interconnected by circumstances and participants.

2. Evidence from the same witness & non-conflicting defenses

Two additional joinder factors were highlighted:

Same chief witness: The evidence against both Torres and his codefendant was “supplied by the same witness” (People v Wallace, 261 AD2d 493). When a single cooperating witness or victim’s testimony underlies the charges against multiple defendants, joint trial is often more efficient and avoids repetitive testimony.
No irreconcilable conflict of defenses: The defenses of Torres and his codefendant were not in “irreconcilable conflict” (People v Caldwell, 150 AD3d 1021, 1022; People v Lau, 148 AD3d 932, 935). This matters because severance is most compelling when each defendant’s strategy is to blame the other in a way that renders joint trial unfairly prejudicial.

The court thus reaffirms the principle: even when defendants are jointly tried for serious crimes (here, armed burglary and robbery), severance is not required as long as:

The charges stem from a unified criminal episode or plan,
Evidence overlaps significantly, and
Defenses are not mutually exclusive to the point that the jury cannot fairly consider each defendant individually.

Practice implication: Defense counsel must raise and renew severance arguments with specificity during pretrial and at trial, and must show more than general “spillover prejudice.” Absent truly antagonistic defenses or a showing that the joint trial prevented a fair verdict, the Appellate Division is unlikely to disturb the trial court’s exercise of discretion.

D. Missing Witness Charge & Accomplice-as-a-Matter-of-Law Instruction

1. Missing witness charge: timeliness and “control”

A missing witness charge allows the jury to draw an adverse inference when a party fails, without explanation, to call a witness under its control who would be expected to provide non-cumulative testimony favorable to that party.

The Second Department upheld the County Court’s denial of Torres’s request for such a charge as to two witnesses. The reasoning:

Untimeliness: The request was made only at the close of all evidence, which Anderson (180 AD3d 923, 924–925, affd 36 NY3d 1109) treats as too late. The logic is that timeliness allows the People, if they choose, to cure the problem by calling the witness.
No “control” by the People: The prosecution demonstrated that the uncalled witnesses were not under their “control” within the meaning of the missing witness doctrine (Anderson; People v Picart, 171 AD3d 799, 800; People v Roseboro, 127 AD3d 998, 999). “Control” generally requires more than mere knowledge or access; it implies a relationship or circumstance making the witness naturally aligned with the party and available through reasonable efforts.

Key takeaway: A missing witness charge is a powerful but carefully cabined tool. The defendant must:

Request it before resting his case, and
Show that the witness is under the People’s control, expected to be favorable, and not cumulative.

2. Accomplice as a matter of law: error but harmless (Chestnut; Crimmins)

Under CPL 60.22, a defendant may not be convicted solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. If a key witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, the court must charge the jury accordingly and instruct it on the need for corroboration.

In Torres:

The defendant’s argument that a certain witness should have been charged as an accomplice as a matter of law was technically unpreserved (CPL 470.05[2]).
Nonetheless, the panel states that the court should have so charged the jury under People v Chestnut, 24 AD3d 463, 464.
However, the error was harmless under People v Crimmins because:
- The evidence of guilt was overwhelming, and
- There was no significant probability that the error contributed to the verdict.

This is doctrinally significant even though the conviction is affirmed. The court signals that:

When a witness undeniably participated in the crime with the defendant, the safer and more correct approach is often to charge them as an accomplice as a matter of law.
Appellate courts will sometimes find the failure to give such a charge “error” but still affirm where independent corroborative evidence renders the error non-prejudicial.

For defense lawyers, Torres is a reminder to:

Explicitly request an accomplice-as-a-matter-of-law instruction,
Preserve objections if the court refuses, and
Build the appellate record to show how critical the accomplice’s testimony was to the People’s case.

E. Mistrial Motions: Spontaneous Statement, “Gang Enforcement” & “Violent History,” and Jail Call

1. Standard for granting a mistrial (Williams)

The court quotes People v Williams, 214 AD3d 828, 830:

The decision to grant a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, which is in the best position to determine whether a mistrial is necessary to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

This sets an abuse-of-discretion standard. Appellate courts will almost always defer to the trial judge’s on-the-spot judgment unless the challenged event was so prejudicial that curative instructions could not realistically fix it.

2. Spontaneous statement showing relationship with codefendant (Harris; Dunbar)

Torres sought a mistrial when the arresting officer testified about a “spontaneous statement” he made. The opinion is brief on content, but reveals that:

The statement was admitted to show the nature of Torres’s relationship with his codefendant in the context of the home invasion.
The prosecution relied on People v Harris, 117 AD3d 847, 854 (affd 26 NY3d 1), which upheld the admission of co-participant evidence to prove an accomplice relationship or joint criminal enterprise.

The court holds that:

The statement had substantial probative value in proving accomplice liability, and
Its probative value outweighed any prejudice, consistent with People v Dunbar, 74 AD3d 1227, 1228 (a case emphasizing the balancing of probative worth against potential unfair prejudice).

As a result, denial of a mistrial was a proper exercise of discretion.

3. “Gang enforcement” and “violent history” comments (Bianchi; Crimmins)

The arresting officer also testified that:

He was working in the “gang enforcement” unit when he surveilled Torres; and
He approached Torres with his gun drawn because he knew of Torres’s “violent history.”

These comments risk suggesting prior criminal conduct and gang involvement—both potentially highly prejudicial.

The trial court:

Sustained the defendant’s objections, and
Directed the jury to disregard those comments.

Relying on Williams, Bianchi, and Crimmins, the Second Department holds:

The curative instructions ameliorated any prejudice (People v Bianchi, 34 AD3d 690).
Any remaining error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt (Crimmins).

This is an important practical point: New York appellate courts are generally reluctant to reverse when:

The objection was sustained,
The remark was brief or “fleeting,” and
The record otherwise shows powerful evidence of guilt.

4. Pretrial incarceration revealed via jail call (Zelaya; Stone; Louime)

Torres also argued that the jury’s exposure to the fact that he was incarcerated before trial compromised his presumption of innocence.

The People introduced a recording of a jailhouse call in which Torres participated, accompanied by a written transcript. The opinion notes:

“Evidence indicating a defendant was incarcerated pending trial may impair a defendant’s presumption of innocence” (People v Zelaya, 170 AD3d 1206, 1207).

However, the trial court took significant steps:

The jury was not played the portion of the call explicitly indicating incarceration.
The transcript was promptly taken away from the jury.
The jury was instructed that the transcript itself was not evidence and that they were to disregard it.

Citing People v Stone, 29 NY3d 166, 171, and People v Louime, 209 AD3d 1038, 1040, the court applies the strong presumption that jurors follow the court’s instructions.

Balancing that presumption, the limited exposure, and the overall strength of the People’s case, the panel concludes that no mistrial was necessary and the presumption of innocence was not meaningfully impaired.

F. Firearm Evidence and Reference to an Uncharged Crime

1. Relevance of disassembled gun in codefendant’s car (Harris)

The court upheld admission of an officer’s testimony that a disassembled gun was recovered from the codefendant’s car. This evidence was:

Relevant, because other testimony showed at least two guns were used during the burglary, and
Probative of linking the vehicle—and hence the codefendant and Torres—to the crime (People v Harris, 117 AD3d at 854).

This application of basic evidence law underscores that physical evidence need not be found in pristine condition; the fact of finding even a disassembled firearm associated with the suspect’s vehicle can be significant when the crimes involved weapons.

2. Stray reference to an uncharged crime (Colon)

Torres also challenged a witness’s reference to an alleged uncharged crime as so prejudicial as to deny him a fair trial. The court disagreed, indicating that:

The reference was brief,
The court gave a curative instruction to disregard it, and
That instruction sufficed to ameliorate any potential prejudice (People v Colon, 189 AD3d 875).

This is yet another illustration of New York appellate courts’ reliance on:

The curative power of immediate limiting instructions, and
The Crimmins framework to treat minor evidentiary missteps as harmless where the overall case is strong.

G. Jury Notes, O’Rama, and CPL 310.30

1. The O’Rama framework and “mode of proceedings” errors

People v O’Rama, 78 NY2d 270, established procedures for handling substantive jury notes:

The court must give counsel notice of the content of a jury note,
Must give counsel an opportunity to suggest a response, and
Must respond meaningfully to the jury’s inquiry.

In some circumstances, a failure to comply fully with O’Rama can be a mode-of-proceedings error—a fundamental error that does not require preservation and mandates reversal. But later cases like People v Nealon, 26 NY3d 152, and People v Martinez, 186 AD3d 1530, have clarified that not every deviation from best practices falls into this category.

2. Jury Note 1: meaningful notice and jury’s understanding (Nealon; Price; Martinez; Bohn)

Torres argued that the County Court mishandled Jury Note 1 in a way that violated O’Rama. The Second Department holds:

The claim is unpreserved (CPL 470.05[2]; Martinez, 186 AD3d 1530, 1531).
The alleged defect is not a mode-of-proceedings error because the record shows the trial court fulfilled its “core responsibilities” under CPL 310.30 by:
- Providing defense counsel with meaningful notice of the note’s content, and
- Engaging with the note in open court (Nealon, 26 NY3d 152, 160–161; People v Price, 197 AD3d 1182, 1184; Martinez, 186 AD3d at 1532).

Factually, the exchange unfolded as follows:

The jury was unclear and, upon the court’s request for clarification, responded that it wanted a “print-out of what you read to us this morning.”
The court answered: “You can’t get that. So, if you need something else with respect to that send me another note.”
Later, the jury sent another note requesting that the court re-read a portion of the jury charge, which the court did.

The Second Department reasons that:

The court did not abuse its discretion by declining to give the jury a “print-out” of what had been read earlier, particularly since the jury was not asking for a written copy of a statutory text, which CPL 310.30 specifically addresses.
The subsequent note and reread show the jury understood the court’s direction and obtained the clarification it sought (People v Bohn, 198 AD3d 669).

This is a refinement of O’Rama doctrine: Torres confirms that as long as defense counsel is meaningfully informed of jury communications and participates, errors in how exactly a request is met will usually be deemed ordinary (and waivable) trial error, not a structural breakdown requiring automatic reversal.

H. Jury Note 3: Readback of Defense Counsel’s Summation (Velasco; Smith; Aguilar)

Jury Note 3 requested a readback of defense counsel’s closing statement. The trial court refused.

The Second Department holds:

The issue was unpreserved because Torres did not object to the court’s response (CPL 470.05[2]).
In any event, the refusal was a proper exercise of discretion under People v Velasco, 77 NY2d 469, 474, and People v Smith, 4 AD3d 378, which recognize that courts have much more leeway with respect to closings than with respect to testimony or legal instructions.
After the court’s response, the jury did not send further notes seeking additional instruction (People v Aguilar, 41 NY3d 335, 339), suggesting that it was satisfied with the response.

This aspect of the decision:

Confirms that summations are advocacy, not evidence; readbacks of summations are not on the same footing as readbacks of trial testimony.
Places the decision firmly within the trial court’s discretion, subject to preservation rules and deferential appellate review.

I. Sentencing and “Excessive Sentence” Review (Suitte)

Finally, the court addresses the defendant’s claim that his sentence was excessive. Under People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80:

The Appellate Division has the power to reduce a sentence “in the interest of justice,”
But that power is used sparingly, particularly where the sentence falls within the statutory range and there is no showing of extraordinary mitigating circumstances.

In Torres, the court simply states that the sentence “was not excessive,” implying that:

It fell within statutory bounds for the violent felonies at issue, and
The record did not present compelling circumstances warranting reduction in the interest of justice.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Legal sufficiency vs. weight of the evidence

Legal sufficiency:
- Asks: Could a rational jury convict on this evidence?
- Evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
- If any rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard is met.
Weight of the evidence:
- Asks: Should the jury have convicted, given the entire record?
- The appellate court reviews the record itself and considers credibility and conflicts.
- Even if legally sufficient, a verdict can be reversed as against the weight of the evidence if the jury’s conclusion is clearly wrong.

2. Hearsay vs. nonhearsay “course-of-investigation” testimony

Hearsay: An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of what it asserts.
Nonhearsay “course-of-investigation” testimony:
- Testimony about out-of-court statements offered merely to explain why an officer took certain steps (whom they arrested, where they searched, etc.).
- The jury is instructed not to consider the statements as true, only as background.

3. Bolstering

“Bolstering” refers to improperly enhancing a witness’s credibility, usually by:

Repeating their prior consistent statements through another witness, or
Allowing one witness (especially a police officer) to vouch for another’s truthfulness.

New York generally bars such evidence unless a limited exception applies (e.g., to rebut a claim of recent fabrication). In Torres, the court held that the detective’s testimony did not cross this line because:

It was offered to explain his conduct, not to reinforce the witness’s story; and
It was accompanied by a limiting instruction.

4. Missing witness charge and “control”

A missing witness charge allows the jury to infer that a missing witness would have testified unfavorably to the party who naturally would have called that witness. Key elements:

The witness must be under the control of the party (e.g., a close associate of the prosecution or defense, or someone the party could readily call but chose not to).
The testimony must be expected to be noncumulative and favorable to that party.
The request must be made in a timely fashion so that the party can cure by calling the witness.

5. Accomplice as a matter of law (CPL 60.22)

An accomplice is someone who may be criminally liable for the same offense as the defendant— someone who shared in the planning, commission, or concealment of the crime.
If a witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, the judge must so instruct the jury and explain that:
- The witness’s testimony cannot alone support a conviction; it must be corroborated by other evidence connecting the defendant to the crime.

In Torres, the appellate court suggests that a key witness clearly met this standard, but the trial court failed to so instruct; that failure was ultimately deemed harmless.

6. Mode-of-proceedings errors and O’Rama

Mode-of-proceedings error: A fundamental defect in how the trial is conducted; it does not require an objection to be raised on appeal and generally mandates reversal (e.g., complete failure to respond to a substantive jury note).
O’Rama obligations:
- Tell counsel about each substantive jury note, and
- Allow counsel to participate in formulating the response.

Nealon and Martinez, followed in Torres, make clear that:

Errors short of total non-disclosure—such as imperfect wording of a response when counsel is still informed—are ordinarily not mode-of-proceedings errors,
Therefore, such claims must be preserved by contemporaneous objection.

7. Harmless error (Crimmins)

Under People v Crimmins, an error is harmless if:

There is no “reasonable possibility” that the error affected the verdict (for constitutional errors), or
There is no “significant probability” that the error contributed to the verdict (for non-constitutional errors).

The frequent refrain in Torres—that the “evidence of guilt was overwhelming” and the errors did not affect the verdict—illustrates how Crimmins is used to uphold convictions despite identified mistakes, particularly when:

There were multiple, independent strands of evidence connecting the defendant to the crime.

V. Impact and Practical Significance

1. Reinforcing the boundaries of nonhearsay “investigative narrative” evidence

People v. Torres adds to the robust Second Department case law allowing law enforcement officers to describe what they were told during an investigation—provided:

The statements are not offered for their truth, but only to explain subsequent actions, and
The trial court gives clear, on-the-record limiting instructions.

For prosecutors, this case provides another citation to defend such testimony. For defense lawyers, it highlights the need to:

Press courts to strictly enforce the limits on such testimony,
Insist on precise limiting instructions, and
Object when the testimony drifts into recounting the substance of accusations in a way that effectively bolsters the accusing witness.

2. Preservation as a gatekeeping principle

A striking feature of the opinion is the number of issues deemed unpreserved under CPL 470.05(2):

Parts of the legal sufficiency challenge,
The severance claim,
The accomplice-as-a-matter-of-law charge,
The O’Rama/Jury Note 1 issue, and
The response to Jury Note 3.

Torres is thus a powerful reminder that:

A lawyer who fails to object contemporaneously—or to place the grounds of objection clearly on the record—frequently forfeits appellate review on the merits.
Even arguably serious claims, like jury-note mismanagement or missing charges on accomplice law, are subject to this preservation requirement unless they rise to true mode-of-proceedings errors.

3. Emphasis on harmless error and curative instructions

The decision takes a consistent line: where the trial court sustains objections and promptly instructs the jury to disregard improper or prejudicial remarks, the Appellate Division will generally:

Presume that the jury followed the instruction, and
View any residual prejudice as harmless in the face of strong evidence.

In the modern New York appellate landscape, reversal is reserved for:

Errors that go to the core fairness of the trial (e.g., denial of the right to counsel), or
Errors that, on a realistic view of the record, could have made a difference to the verdict.

4. Clarifying O’Rama after Nealon and Martinez

Torres is particularly important in the ongoing evolution of O’Rama jurisprudence. It:

Applies Nealon and Martinez to hold that imperfections in the handling of jury notes are not automatically mode-of-proceedings errors; and
Emphasizes “meaningful notice” to defense counsel and evidence that the jury’s subsequent notes and actions show understanding of the court’s responses.

This narrows the scope for defendants to secure reversal based solely on technical O’Rama violations, unless they can show that counsel was effectively shut out of the process or that the jury’s substantive request was ignored.

5. Accomplice charge errors as reversible vs. harmless

By recognizing that the trial court should have charged a particular witness as an accomplice as a matter of law, yet still affirming, the court:

Signals its willingness to recognize doctrinal errors without necessarily overturning convictions.
Demonstrates that the presence of strong corroborative evidence will often cure even serious mistakes in jury instruction relating to accomplice testimony.

Going forward, this will likely be cited to support affirmance in cases where accomplice instructions were ambiguous or incomplete but the record contains substantial independent evidence of guilt.

VI. Conclusion

People v. Torres is not a watershed ruling introducing a brand-new doctrine, but it is highly instructive as a synthesis and application of several important strands of New York criminal appellate law:

It reaffirms the high bar for overturning convictions on sufficiency or weight-of-the-evidence grounds when the record is strong.
It clarifies—and somewhat narrows—the circumstances in which O’Rama errors will be treated as unpreserved, non-structural errors rather than automatic-reversal mode-of-proceedings violations.
It strengthens the doctrinal foundation for admitting limited, nonhearsay “course-of-investigation” testimony by detectives, so long as appropriate limiting instructions are given.
It underscores the strict enforcement of preservation rules under CPL 470.05(2), especially as to severance motions, missing witness requests, jury instructions, and jury-note procedures.
It illustrates the pervasive use of Crimmins harmless-error analysis, particularly where the prosecutorial case is characterized as “overwhelming.”

For practitioners, Torres functions as:

A checklist of recurring appellate issues in complex, multi-defendant violent felony cases, and
A cautionary tale on the need for timely, specific objections and requests at trial to preserve issues for meaningful appellate review.

In the broader legal context, People v. Torres continues the Appellate Division’s trend toward:

Substantial deference to trial courts on discretionary calls (mistrials, evidentiary rulings, jury-note management),
Robust enforcement of procedural preservation rules, and
Frequent reliance on harmless-error analysis where the record supports the jury’s verdict in a compelling way.

As such, Torres will likely be cited less as a source of novel legal principles and more as a representative example of how established New York doctrines on evidentiary sufficiency, hearsay limits, accomplice instructions, jury-note procedure, and harmless error interact in the review of a multi-issue criminal appeal.