People v. Thompson (2025 IL 129965)
Illinois Supreme Court Endorses Shall-Issue Licensing as Constitutional After Bruen

Introduction

In People v. Thompson, the Illinois Supreme Court confronted a sweeping Second-Amendment facial challenge to §24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A-5) of the Aggravated Unlawful Use of a Weapon statute (AUUW). The defendant, Tyshon Thompson, contended that the statute—and, by incorporation, Illinois’ “dual” Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) and Concealed Carry License (CCL) requirements—violate the Second Amendment as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022).

The case squarely asked whether an objective, nondiscretionary (“shall-issue”) licensing system for public carriage can be deemed unconstitutional on its face after Bruen. The Illinois Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Rochford, answered “no.” The majority held that Bruen, particularly footnote 9 and Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence, “expressly” approves shall-issue regimes, making a full-blown historical-analogues inquiry unnecessary in this context. Justice Overstreet’s dissent, by contrast, insisted that the majority misread Bruen and that the text-and-history methodology must still be conducted.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Court affirmed both the circuit and appellate courts, upholding Thompson’s AUUW conviction.
• The Court ruled that the AUUW statute’s ban on unlicensed concealed carry, together with the FOID + CCL prerequisites, is not facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.
• The majority relied heavily on Bruen’s treatment of “shall-issue” regimes, concluding that the U.S. Supreme Court has already blessed objective licensing systems in principle.
• The decision distinguishes between open carry (which remains banned in Illinois) and concealed carry, clarifying that Thompson’s conduct implicated only the latter.
• The dissent argued that the majority improperly sidestepped the required text-and-history analysis and over-read a footnote to create binding precedent where none exists.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. District of Columbia v. Heller (2008)
   Recognized an individual right to possess firearms in the home for self-defense and introduced the text-and-history approach.
2. McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010)
   Incorporated the Second Amendment against the states.
3. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022)
   Invalidated New York’s discretionary “may-issue” regime, clarified that courts must apply a text-and-history test, and in footnote 9 signaled that “shall-issue” licensing is presumptively permissible.
4. United States v. Rahimi (2024)
   Re-affirmed the text-and-history framework, showing how to analogize modern regulations to historical traditions.
5. Seventh Circuit’s Atkinson v. Garland (2023)
   Distinguished by the Illinois court; Atkinson rejected using footnote 9 to bypass history for felon-in-possession challenges.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Framing the Conduct: Thompson was convicted for possessing a loaded gun in a vehicle without a CCL, which the Court categorized as concealed carriage, not open carry. Therefore, the open-carry ban was irrelevant.

2. Presumption of Protection: Under Bruen, carrying a handgun for self-defense in public is within the Second Amendment’s plain text and is presumptively protected.

3. Bruen Footnote 9 as Decisive Authority: The majority treated footnote 9—and Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence—as an “express endorsement” of shall-issue systems. Because Illinois’ FOID/CCL scheme is objective, contains no “special-need” requirement, and limits officials’ discretion, it fits squarely within the permissible category identified by the U.S. Supreme Court.

4. No Need for Fresh Historical Survey: Once Bruen is read as already covering shall-issue regimes, the Illinois court felt bound, or at least strongly guided, to uphold the statute without re-conducting the text-and-history inquiry. This approach, the Court said, avoids redundant litigation and honors vertical precedent.

5. Rebuffing Ancillary Objections: The Court rejected arguments that (a) training requirements or police objections create discretionary denials; (b) “double licensing” is uniquely burdensome; and (c) other states’ permit-less carry models somehow render Illinois’ system unconstitutional.

C. Potential Impact of the Decision

• State-Level Precedent: The opinion cements the FOID + CCL architecture against facial challenges in Illinois. Litigants must now resort to as-applied challenges (e.g., excessive delay, arbitrary denial).
• Inter-jurisdictional Influence: Other “shall-issue” states may cite Thompson as persuasive authority for reading Bruen as already resolving the constitutional question, streamlining litigation.
• Federal–State Dialogue: The decision sets up a conflict with cases like Atkinson, heightening the probability of eventual U.S. Supreme Court review on whether footnote 9 truly forecloses historical analysis.
• Legislative Confidence: Illinois lawmakers gain judicial reassurance that incremental tweaks—fees, training, background checks—will survive, so long as they remain objective and non-discretionary.
• Dissent’s Warning: Justice Overstreet’s thorough dissent furnishes a roadmap for future petitioners arguing that the majority’s shortcut contradicts the U.S. Supreme Court’s own methodological commands.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Conclusion

People v. Thompson creates a powerful state precedent: Illinois’ objective FOID + CCL framework remains intact after Bruen. The majority interprets the U.S. Supreme Court’s dicta as dispositive authority approving shall-issue regimes and therefore sees no need to retread the historical path. The dissent cautions that this shortcut undermines the very methodology the high Court prescribed—foreshadowing future litigation.

Key takeaways are: (1) Illinois’ ban on unlicensed concealed carry survives facial attack; (2) objective licensing standards, including training and background checks, remain lawful; (3) challenges must now focus on implementation (delay, fees, discrimination) rather than on the statutory scheme itself; and (4) nationwide, courts and legislatures will watch closely whether the U.S. Supreme Court eventually blesses or repudiates this streamlined reliance on footnote 9.