People v. T.P. (2025): Elevating the Standard for Effective Assistance—Defense Counsel Must Object to Prosecutorial Summation Misstatements that Undermine a Justification Defense

1. Introduction

People v. T.P. is a landmark New York Court of Appeals decision that fortifies defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in the context of prosecutorial summation misconduct. T.P., a survivor of a documented history of intimate-partner violence, was convicted of first-degree manslaughter after fatally stabbing her boyfriend. She asserted justification (self-defense) under Penal Law § 35.15, testifying that she feared for her life during a violent sexual and physical assault.
At summation, however, the prosecutor (i) falsely told the jury that T.P. never testified she feared for her life and (ii) repeatedly denigrated her as a “liar,” using the word “lies” fourteen times. Defense counsel did not object. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that counsel’s failure to challenge these misstatements deprived T.P. of meaningful representation and tainted the fairness of the trial.
Beyond correcting the injustice to this individual defendant, the decision crystallises a new, explicit rule: where prosecutorial summation misstatements mischaracterise evidence central to the defence and there is no strategic reason for silence, failure to object constitutes ineffective assistance per se.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Holding. The Court (Halligan, J.) reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) because counsel did not object to (a) the prosecutor’s flat misstatement that T.P. never expressed fear for her life and (b) the repeated branding of her testimony as “lies.” These remarks were contrary to the evidence, struck at the heart of the justification defence, and were not curable by the court’s generic instruction that counsel’s comments are not evidence.
• Reasoning. Applying the “meaningful representation” standard (People v. Baldi; Caban), the Court concluded that (i) the prosecutor’s comments violated well-settled limits on summation (Ashwal; Wright; Bailey), (ii) no tactical motive justified counsel’s silence, and (iii) the cumulative effect undermined the reliability of the verdict.
• Disposition. Appellate Division order reversed; new trial ordered. The Court expressly declined to reach alternative arguments concerning jury-charge errors and the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA), though concurring opinions debated those points.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• People v. Baldi, 54 NY2d 137 (1981) – Established “meaningful representation” as the New York IAC standard (more protective than Strickland). T.P. applies Baldi’s holistic inquiry but finds prejudice on the narrow summation point.
• People v. Benevento, 91 NY2d 708 (1998) – Emphasised that IAC focuses on overall fairness, not outcome certainty.
• People v. Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105 (1976) – Defined “four corners of the evidence” rule for summation. Halligan J. cites Ashwal to show the prosecutor strayed outside permissible commentary.
• People v. Wright, 25 NY3d 769 (2015) – Closest analogue. Held that counsel’s failure to object to a “pattern” of summation misstatements may be IAC. T.P. extends Wright by declaring that misstatements targeting the heart of a justification defence necessarily meet the Wright threshold.
• People v. Bailey, 58 NY2d 272 (1983) & People v. Shanis, 36 NY2d 697 (1975) – Forbade prosecutors from asserting personal belief that a witness “lied.” Invoked to show settled law the prosecutor flouted.
• United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) – Federal analogue prohibiting vouching or personal belief; demonstrates that T.P. harmonises state and federal standards.
• People v. Fisher, 18 NY3d 964 (2012) – Cited for proposition that limiting instructions may be insufficient in “highly charged” cases.
• Concurring opinions discuss People v. Goetz (1986), Wesley (1990), and Miller (1976) in the context of jury-charge adequacy, signalling potential future doctrinal development but not forming the majority’s ratio decidendi.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Identification of Impropriety. The prosecutor: (a) affirmatively misrepresented testimony (claiming no expression of fear) and (b) injected personal opinion by calling T.P. a “liar” repeatedly. Both acts violate Ashwal and Bailey.
2. Centrality to the Defence. The misstatement undermined the only live defence—justification—because fear for one’s life is the statutory linchpin (Penal Law § 35.15[2][a]). Thus, prejudice was self-evident.
3. Counsel’s Inaction. The Court found “no apparent strategic explanation.” Counsel objected elsewhere, proving willingness to interrupt, so silence here could not be tactical.
4. Insufficiency of Curative Instruction. Generic admonitions that attorney remarks are not evidence cannot neutralise a direct falsehood about pivotal testimony, especially in an emotionally charged domestic-violence setting.
5. IAC Conclusion. Under Wright and Benevento, the failure to preserve an argument against central prosecutorial misconduct necessarily deprived T.P. of meaningful representation, warranting reversal without harmless-error analysis.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation and Practice

• Heightened Vigilance Duty. Defence attorneys must contemporaneously object to summation misstatements that (i) contradict record evidence, (ii) label a defendant/witness as a liar, or (iii) erode a statutory defence. Silence will presumptively equal ineffectiveness absent a clear record of strategy.
• Prosecutorial Conduct. Prosecutors must police their own rhetoric; repeated accusations of “lies” or fact-free statements risk reversal even if unobjected to.
• Domestic-Violence Contexts. While the holding rests on IAC, the facts highlight systemic sensitivity to survivor-defendants. Future cases may pair T.P.’s IAC rule with expanding jurisprudence on appropriate jury instructions in intimate-partner-violence defences (see Rivera J. concurrence).
• Appellate Strategy. T.P. provides a clear template for raising IAC when preservation is lacking. Practitioners should mine summations for unchallenged misconduct impacting core defences.
• Training & Ethics. Public-defender offices and bar associations will likely revise trial-skills curricula to stress prompt summation objections, and District Attorneys may issue guidance curbing inflammatory rhetoric.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Justification (Self-Defence) – Penal Law § 35.15
  A legal excuse permitting the use of deadly force when the defendant reasonably believes such force is necessary to repel another’s imminent deadly force.
• Summation
  The closing argument each lawyer gives after evidence is closed. It is not evidence; its purpose is to comment on and marshal the evidence within set ethical constraints.
• Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC)
  Under New York’s “meaningful representation” test, a conviction is reversed if counsel’s performance, viewed in totality, fails to provide adequate legal representation and prejudices the fairness of the proceeding.
• Misstatement vs. Proper Argument
  A lawyer may draw inferences from evidence but may not assert facts not in evidence or express personal belief in a witness’s truthfulness.
• Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA)
  A 2019 statute allowing sentencing leniency for defendants whose crimes were significantly related to domestic violence victimisation.

5. Conclusion

People v. T.P. powerfully reaffirms that the constitutional right to counsel encompasses an affirmative obligation to object when the prosecutor distorts critical evidence during summation. The decision integrates and extends prior case law (especially Wright) by creating a near-per se rule in situations where the misstatement undercuts the defendant’s sole statutory defence. In doing so, the Court not only safeguards the integrity of jury deliberations but also sends a broader message: fair trials demand active, vigilant advocacy, particularly when the narrative involves survivors of intimate-partner violence. Future litigants and courts will rely on T.P. as both shield and compass—shielding defendants from unchallenged prosecutorial overreach and guiding trial counsel on the non-negotiable duty of objection when a client’s liberty hangs in the rhetorical balance.