People v. Smart (2025 IL 130127): Admissibility of Other-Acts Evidence to Prove Intent in Specific-Intent Crimes and Harmless-Error in Bench Trials

Introduction

This Supreme Court of Illinois decision, People v. Smart (2025 IL 130127), addresses two central questions in evidence law. First, when may the State introduce evidence of a defendant’s prior uncharged misconduct to prove intent in a prosecution for a specific-intent offense? Second, if the trial court erroneously admits “propensity” evidence, under what circumstances is that error harmless when the case is tried before a judge rather than a jury? The appellant is the People of the State of Illinois; the appellee is Cecil Smart, charged with aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a 16-year-old.

Case Background and Key Issues

In July 2018 the victim (J.P.) spent two overnights at defendant’s home during outings with the defendant’s nephews.
In October 2018 the victim reported that, on the second visit, Smart had sexually abused him in Smart’s bed.
Smart was indicted on three counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(d)).
Pretrial, the State sought to admit three prior incidents; the trial court allowed evidence of one (an incident in which Smart allegedly touched another teenage boy’s buttocks).
Smart denied any sexual contact; he introduced character evidence of his morality. The prosecutor cross-examined him and his witnesses about prior reprimands and elicited a stipulation that Smart had been terminated for policy violations involving two other boys.
The trial court found Smart guilty of two counts and sentenced him to probation. On appeal the Illinois Appellate Court reversed, holding that, because Smart never placed intent “in issue,” the prior-acts evidence was inadmissible to prove intent.
The People petitioned for leave to appeal to resolve a conflict among appellate decisions about whether intent must be “expressly contested” before other-acts evidence may be admitted in a specific-intent prosecution.

Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

The Court held that in a prosecution for a specific-intent offense (here, aggravated criminal sexual abuse), the State automatically places intent at issue by virtue of the indictment. A defendant’s choice not to contest intent does not bar the State from proving intent; intent remains an essential element.
Nonetheless, evidence of other misconduct offered to prove intent must be relevant without reliance on a forbidden “propensity” inference, or it must meet the narrowly drawn statutory exceptions (e.g., 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3–.4, 115-20) that authorize propensity evidence in sex-offense cases.
The trial court erred by admitting evidence of Smart’s prior touching of another boy’s buttocks to prove intent, because the relevance of that prior act depended solely on the inference that Smart had a sexual propensity toward teenage boys—a use forbidden by Rule 404(b) and not justified by any statutory exception.
Despite the error, the Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment of reversal. In a bench trial there is a rebuttable presumption that the judge considered only properly admitted evidence, and no record evidence here showed the trial court relied on the inadmissible testimony when finding Smart guilty.
The State carried its burden to show that, absent the error, there was no reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome for Smart. The cause is remanded to the Appellate Court for consideration of Smart’s other claims (including ineffective assistance of counsel).

Analysis

1. Precedents and Appellate Conflict

The Court surveyed Illinois and federal precedents that diverge on whether intent must be “genuinely contested” before other-acts evidence is admissible in a specific-intent prosecution:

Bobo (Ill. App. 1996) and other courts held that if a defendant flatly denies the act and never raises intent (or mistake), other-acts evidence is excluded as impermissible character propensity evidence.
Davis (Ill. App. 2019) and some federal circuits held that intent is always at issue in a specific-intent crime, so the State may introduce other-acts evidence for intent without waiting for the defendant to contest intent.
Wilson (2005 IL 2d) acknowledged the split, applied an “issue by conduct” test in a case where the defendant offered a benign explanation for touching students, and left the general conflict unresolved.

2. Statutory and Rule 404(b) Constraints on Propensity Evidence

Rule 404(b) of the Illinois Rules of Evidence prohibits introducing other misconduct “to prove action in conformity therewith” (i.e., propensity) unless:

the evidence is offered for a non–propensity purpose (motive, opportunity, intent, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident), and the relevance does not depend on drawing a propensity inference; or
the evidence meets the precise criteria of the statutory sex-offense exceptions in 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3–.4, 115-20.

The Court adopted the Seventh Circuit’s tripartite test in United States v. Gomez (763 F.3d 845):

Determine relevance apart from propensity inference.
If relevant for a proper purpose, confirm that any inference does not rely on “bad character” reasoning.
Balance probative value against unfair prejudice under Rule 403.

3. Application to the Smart Case

The State introduced Smart’s prior misconduct only after he introduced character evidence. Cross-examination on specific acts of misconduct was also governed by Rule 405, but Smart forfeited objections by failing to object at trial or in posttrial motions.
By stipulation, the prosecution proved Smart had been fired for two policy-violation incidents involving teenage boys. The State relied on these prior acts to suggest a “pattern” and prove Smart’s intent toward J.P.
Neither incident was one of the enumerated offenses in section 115-7.3, so the stipulation did not meet the statutory exception for propensity evidence in sex cases.
The trial court therefore erred under Rule 404(b) by admitting that stipulation to prove intent, because its relevance turned on a forbidden propensity inference.

4. Harmless-Error Analysis in Bench Trials

Erroneous admission of non–constitutional evidence (such as Rule 404(b) violations) is harmless unless there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome without the error (In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172 (2006)). In bench trials a rebuttable presumption exists that the judge disregarded inadmissible evidence (People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584 (2008)). The defendant may show the judge relied on the error—but in Smart’s case:

The trial court’s written ruling on the pretrial motion was based solely on the prosecutor’s proffer and did not rest on live testimony.
At sentencing and in the written findings of guilt, the judge never referenced the prior misconduct evidence; she relied on the victim’s credible testimony.
Nothing in the record affirmatively shows the judge weighed the inadmissible stipulation in her credibility determination.

Accordingly, the People carried their burden to show a reasonable probability of the same result even without the erroneous evidence, and the error was harmless.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Specific-Intent Crime: A crime that requires the State to prove the defendant intended a particular outcome (e.g., touching for sexual gratification).
Propensity Evidence: Evidence that a person did something bad before, used to suggest they have a “bad character” and likely did it again.
Rule 404(b): The Illinois rule that bars propensity evidence except for narrow non-propensity purposes or statutory exceptions.
Harmless Error: Even if the trial court made a mistake in admitting evidence, the conviction stands if the mistake likely had no effect on the outcome.
Bench Trial Presumption: When a judge (not a jury) decides a case, we assume the judge ignored any wrongly admitted evidence unless the record shows otherwise.

Conclusion

Key Takeaways:

In specific-intent prosecutions, intent is inherently “at issue,” but other misconduct evidence may not be used as propensity proof unless it qualifies under Rule 404(b)—by a non-propensity inference or a statutory exception.
Evidence introduced solely to show a defendant’s “bad character” remains inadmissible absent a clear legislative carve-out.
If a trial court admits forbidden propensity evidence over objection in a bench trial, the reviewing court must presume the judge disregarded it—unless the record affirmatively shows reliance.
Such an evidentiary error is harmless if the State demonstrates no reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the error.

People v. Smart thus clarifies the limits on introducing other-acts evidence to prove intent and reaffirms the harmless-error rule’s operation in bench trials. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s order granting a new trial, reinstated the convictions, and remanded for further appellate consideration of unaddressed issues.