Introduction

In People v. Riddick, the Third Department affirmed convictions for second-degree murder, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree arising from a June 18, 2020 shooting in the City of Albany. Writing for a unanimous panel, Pritzker, J.P., addressed a constellation of recurring criminal procedure and evidence issues: when digital and video evidence, combined with DNA, suffices to establish identity; when a defendant has standing to challenge the seizure of a cell phone found in a public street; how particular a warrant must be when authorizing seizure of “trace evidence” including DNA from a vehicle; and the scope of Molineux and “opening-the-door” doctrines where identity is the only contested element at trial.

The opinion both consolidates existing doctrine and offers practical clarifications. Most notably, it reaffirms that a search warrant describing “trace evidence, including but not limited to DNA” can, when read with common sense and purpose, authorize seizure of clothing from a vehicle to process for DNA, and that a phone retrieved from a public street is not within a defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy absent competent proof establishing standing. The court also provides a careful application of Molineux to admit limited text-message and social-media evidence tied to identity and consciousness of guilt, and it explains how a defendant’s testimony can “open the door” to otherwise precluded prior bad-act evidence to correct a misleading impression.

The appeal followed a jury verdict and a sentence imposing concurrent indeterminate terms of 25 years to life on the murder and CPW2 counts, and a consecutive term of 3½ to 7 years on CPW3, with the defendant adjudicated a persistent felony offender.

Counsel: Steven M. Sharp, Albany, for appellant; Lee C. Kindlon, District Attorney, Albany (Emily Schultz of counsel), for respondent. The trial court was Supreme Court, Albany County (McDonough, J.).

Summary of the Opinion

• Sufficiency and weight of the evidence (identity): The court held that surveillance footage, bank records, DNA evidence on a straw and ski mask found in the defendant’s mother’s car, a cell phone of the defendant recovered at the scene, and motive/consciousness of guilt evidence provided legally sufficient proof of identity, and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.
• Standing to challenge cell phone seizure: The defendant lacked standing to suppress the seizure of his cell phone found in a public street; there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the location of the seizure, and the defense produced no competent proof to support a contrary abandonment theory.
• Particularity of vehicle search warrant for DNA: A warrant authorizing the seizure of “trace evidence, including but not limited to DNA” was sufficiently particular. Seizing clothing from the vehicle to process for DNA was permissible given the stated purpose of identifying the shooter.
• Facebook warrant: The warrant for the defendant’s Facebook account was supported by a sufficient basis to believe evidence of a crime would be found.
• Molineux evidence (identity and consciousness of guilt): Limited text messages about a “Nina” (9mm handgun) and .38 ammunition and a Facebook post tagging a cooperating witness (“rat”) were admissible to prove identity and consciousness of guilt; probative value outweighed prejudice because identity was the sole disputed element on the homicide and CPW2 counts.
• Opening the door: The defendant’s testimony that “Nina” meant sneakers, not a 9mm, that “38” meant marijuana weight, that he was unfamiliar with guns, and that he had not been selling guns opened the door to otherwise precluded evidence of gun trafficking conversations and to limited impeachment about a prior weapon-related conviction (clarified as attempted CPW).
• Remote testimony and confrontation: The Confrontation Clause challenge to a Facebook custodian’s remote appearance was unpreserved because the defendant argued only lack of “exceptional circumstances,” not a constitutional confrontation violation.
• Sentence: The sentence, including persistent felony offender treatment and the consecutive CPW3 term, was not unduly harsh or severe.

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Identity, Sufficiency, and Weight

• People v Slivienski, 204 AD3d 1228 (3d Dept 2022), lv denied 38 NY3d 1136 (2022): Cited repeatedly to anchor the sufficiency standard and to support admission of identity-focused Molineux evidence. The court followed Slivienski in viewing the mosaic of evidence in the light most favorable to the People and in finding that identity was sufficiently proven through non-eyewitness means (surveillance, digital, and DNA).
• People v Grady, 233 AD3d 1369 (3d Dept 2024), lv denied 43 NY3d 963 (2025): Reinforces that circumstantial and digital proof can establish identity beyond a reasonable doubt.
• People v Moore, 223 AD3d 1085 (3d Dept 2024), lv denied 41 NY3d 1003 (2024): Invoked for weight-of-the-evidence review standards, emphasizing deference to the jury’s credibility assessments.

Standing and Public-Street Seizure

• People v Lee, 120 AD2d 678 (2d Dept 1986), lv denied 68 NY2d 669 (1986); People v Fabelo, 277 AD2d 130 (1st Dept 2000), lv denied 96 NY2d 799 (2001): These cases establish that an object seized in a public street implicates no reasonable expectation of privacy in the location. Relying on them, the court held the defendant lacked standing to challenge the phone’s seizure from the roadway.

Particularity of Warrants (DNA/Trace Evidence)

• People v Thomas, 155 AD3d 1120 (3d Dept 2017), lv denied 31 NY3d 1018 (2018): Restates that warrant particularity is measured by common sense, not hypertechnical precision, and that affidavits and purpose inform what is sufficiently definite for searchers.
• People v Harris, 29 AD3d 1027 (3d Dept 2006): Supports using purpose-oriented descriptions to guide reasonable seizure of evidence consistent with the warrant’s parameters.
• People v Dominique, 229 AD2d 719 (3d Dept 1996), affd 90 NY2d 880 (1997): Confirms that a warrant’s descriptive scope includes practical steps to obtain the evidence specified, when tied to an identified rationale.

Social Media Warrant

• People v Alexander, 207 AD3d 878 (3d Dept 2022), lv denied 39 NY3d 984 (2022): Applied as the standard that a warrant is valid where there is a reasonable basis to believe a Facebook account contains evidence of a crime.

Molineux and Consciousness of Guilt

• People v Henehan, 238 AD3d 1336 (3d Dept 2025), lv denied 43 NY3d 1055 (2025): Reiterates Molineux’s exceptions (motive, intent, absence of mistake, common plan, identity) and the allowance for background/inextricably interwoven evidence.
• People v Smith, 237 AD3d 1367 (3d Dept 2025), lv denied 43 NY3d 1059 (2025): Emphasizes the trial court’s discretion in balancing probative value against prejudice.
• People v Ruffin, 191 AD3d 1174 (3d Dept 2021), lv denied 37 NY3d 960 (2021): Supports admitting social media posts that corroborate identity or consciousness of guilt.

Opening the Door; Sandoval Interface

• People v Kane, 232 AD3d 1064 (3d Dept 2024): Clarifies that “opening the door” is not a Molineux analysis; the question is whether the defense created a misleading impression warranting corrective evidence.
• People v Fardan, 82 NY2d 638 (1993); People v Lowndes, 167 AD3d 1228 (3d Dept 2018): Provide the governing approach for when testimony contradicts precluded topics, permitting limited corrective impeachment consistent with Sandoval constraints.
• People v Hebert, 218 AD3d 1003 (3d Dept 2023), lv denied 40 NY3d 1080 (2023); People v George, 199 AD3d 1064 (3d Dept 2021), lv denied 37 NY3d 1146 (2021): Endorse tight tailoring, brevity, and limiting instructions when admitting “opened” evidence.

Preservation (Confrontation)

• People v Davis, 200 AD3d 1200 (3d Dept 2021): Demonstrates that constitutional claims must be specifically raised to be preserved for appellate review.

Sentencing Review

• People v Alvarez, 238 AD3d 1266 (3d Dept 2025), lv denied 44 NY3d 981 (2025); People v Brisman, 236 AD3d 1092 (3d Dept 2025): Applied to decline interest-of-justice sentence reduction where the record supports the sentence.

Legal Reasoning and Application

1) Identity Proven by a Digital–DNA Mosaic

The panel’s sufficiency analysis is notable for synthesizing multiple strands of evidence into a coherent whole:

• Surveillance footage shows the shooter exiting a vehicle owned by the defendant’s mother; an object falls as the shooter exits.
• A phone registered to the defendant is found in the street near the scene, aligning with the falling object in the video.
• Additional serial surveillance tracks the same car back 30 minutes to a Stewart’s where the defendant purchased a milkshake, corroborated by bank records.
• DNA from the straw in the cup found in the car matches the defendant; a ski mask matching the shooter’s face covering, also found in the car, bears DNA consistent with the defendant.
• Evidence of motive and consciousness of guilt completes the narrative.

Applying Slivienski and related Third Department cases, the court holds that a rational juror could find identity beyond a reasonable doubt. Weight review is equally straightforward: while the defense posited that an acquaintance borrowed the mother’s car and was the shooter, the jury credited the People’s evidence; viewed neutrally, the verdict is supported by the weight of the credible evidence.

2) Standing to Suppress: No Privacy in a Public Street

The court’s standing analysis is crisp. A defendant bears the burden to show a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or thing seized. Although defense counsel asserted ownership and non-abandonment, there were no sworn facts or evidence at the Mapp hearing to support the claim that the phone was merely dropped accidentally and retained a privacy expectation. Echoing Lee and Fabelo, the panel held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a phone lying in a public street; without standing, the challenge to seizure fails.

Importantly, the court’s reasoning focuses on the location-based privacy lens: the public street is a non-private locus. This holding underscores the need for defendants to establish standing with competent proof and to recognize that ownership alone does not suffice where the seizure occurs in a place devoid of privacy expectations.

3) Particularity of a DNA/Trace-Evidence Warrant Applied to a Vehicle

The vehicle warrant authorized seizure of “evidence, consisting of trace evidence, including but not limited to DNA,” to identify the shooter. Invoking Thomas’s common-sense approach and Harris/Dominique, the court held that such language is sufficiently particular because it:

• Specifies the category and type of evidence (trace evidence, DNA),
• Connects that category to a circumscribed investigative purpose (identity of shooter), and
• Guides officers to seize items of clothing to enable DNA testing consistent with the warrant’s purpose.

The takeaway is practical but significant: a warrant need not itemize every physical substrate (e.g., “mask,” “bandana,” “shirt”) when it targets trace evidence; clothing reasonably susceptible to DNA testing is within scope. The court did not need to reach standing for the car (assuming it arguendo), underscoring its confidence in the warrant’s particularity.

4) Social Media Warrant Sufficiency

Applying Alexander, the panel found a sufficient basis to believe the defendant’s Facebook account contained evidence of the crimes. Although details are not elaborated, the holding signals continuity: investigators who can articulate why an account likely holds relevant posts, messages, or photos will satisfy the standard.

5) Molineux: Identity and Consciousness of Guilt in an Identity-Only Trial

The court carefully cabins the scope of admitted prior bad-act evidence. Three categories were central:

• Gun-access texts (“Nina”/“.38”): Messages between the defendant and a codefendant about obtaining a “Nina” (9mm) and discussing .38 ammunition were admitted to prove identity by demonstrating access to the very type of murder weapon used. Because identity was the sole contested element, probative value was high and outweighed any prejudicial effect.
• Looting conversations: Limited texts about hoping for riots to loot gun and jewelry stores were admitted to shed light on the relationship between the defendant and codefendant and to assist in identifying them in surveillance footage.
• Facebook “rat” post: A post tagging a cooperating witness and labeling them a “rat” was admitted as consciousness of guilt and to corroborate identity.

Notably, the court emphasized tailoring: repetitive or cumulative material was screened out to reduce unfair prejudice, and the trial court deployed limiting instructions in tandem with the narrow purposes for which the evidence was offered.

6) Opening the Door: Correcting Misleading Testimony

On cross-examination, the defendant’s testimony reframed the gun-related texts as innocuous slang (sneakers and marijuana amounts), claimed unfamiliarity with guns, and asserted he was not involved in gun sales. After bench conferences, the court permitted the People to introduce previously precluded texts about buying and selling firearms and to impeach with a prior weapon-related conviction (clarified in a footnote as attempted CPW).

Citing Kane, Fardan, Hebert, and George, the panel holds this was a proper “opening the door” scenario: the defense created a misleading impression that required correction. The admitted material was brief, targeted, and was framed by a limiting instruction that it was not propensity evidence, but went to familiarity with firearms, the codefendant relationship, and credibility.

7) Confrontation and Remote Testimony: Preservation Matters

The defense did not preserve a Confrontation Clause challenge to a Facebook custodian’s two-way closed-circuit testimony, having argued only the absence of “exceptional circumstances” at trial. Under Davis, constitutional claims must be specifically raised to be preserved for appellate review. The panel therefore declined to entertain the confrontation argument.

8) Sentencing

Applying Alvarez and Brisman, the panel declined to reduce the sentence as harsh or excessive. The court noted the persistent felony offender adjudication and found no basis to disturb the concurrent 25-to-life terms on murder and CPW2 or the consecutive 3½–7 years on CPW3.

Impact and Practical Implications

For Prosecutors and Law Enforcement

• Warrant drafting: When seeking evidence from vehicles, drafting language authorizing seizure of “trace evidence, including but not limited to DNA,” and expressly tying the seizure to identity can satisfy particularity. Officers may seize clothing and similar items as substrates for DNA, consistent with the warrant’s purpose.
• Digital–DNA identity proofs: Riddick endorses identity proofs that combine surveillance timelines, financial records, device recovery, and DNA. Assembling a “continuous string” of video anchored by objective records is a model of corroboration.
• Molineux in identity-only cases: Where identity is the only contested element, narrowly tailored evidence of access to the weapon type and social media posts indicating consciousness of guilt will have elevated probative weight.
• Opening-the-door readiness: Be prepared to promptly request admission of corrective evidence when a defendant gives testimony that recasts inculpatory communications as innocuous or claims naiveté about weapons.

For Defense Counsel

• Standing proofs at suppression: Ownership assertions via attorney affirmations are inadequate. Submit sworn, fact-specific affidavits to establish standing—particularly where the item was found in a public space. Recognize the location-based privacy analysis: a public street typically defeats standing to suppress a seizure.
• Preserve constitutional claims: Raise Confrontation Clause objections expressly, not only “exceptional circumstances” arguments, to preserve federal and state constitutional issues for appeal.
• Manage Molineux exposure: When identity is the sole issue, anticipate broader admissibility of identity-connected texts and posts. Consider pretrial stipulations or strategic concessions to narrow probative value or to limit scope, and insist on precise limiting instructions.
• Testifying risks—door-opening: Testimony minimizing familiarity with guns or recasting coded language risks opening the door to damaging prior bad acts and convictions. Calibrate testimony carefully against likely impeachment materials flagged in pretrial rulings.

For Trial Courts

• Particularity adjudications: Riddick supports a pragmatic reading of warrants, especially where purpose-focused language ties categories of evidence (DNA) to the theory of the case (identity). Clear rulings help guide officers and preserve admissibility.
• Tailored Molineux and limiting instructions: Limiting repetitive material and delivering tailored instructions enhance the legitimacy of admitting sensitive evidence and guard against unfair prejudice.
• Door-opening management: When defendants introduce misleading impressions, narrow corrective admissions—kept brief and accompanied by instructions—strike the appropriate balance between fairness and prejudice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Legal sufficiency vs. weight of the evidence: Sufficiency asks whether any rational juror could convict when viewing evidence most favorably to the People. Weight asks whether, viewing the record neutrally and deferring to credibility findings, the verdict is supported by the greater weight of credible evidence.
• Standing to suppress: A defendant must show a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or item searched/seized. Finding an item in a public street typically negates such an expectation for seizure at that location.
• Particularity (search warrants): Warrants must describe what is to be seized with enough specificity—assessed with common sense—to prevent general rummaging. A purpose-linked category like “trace evidence, including DNA” can suffice to capture related items (e.g., clothing) used to obtain that evidence.
• Molineux: New York’s rule limiting evidence of prior crimes or bad acts to non-propensity purposes—such as motive, intent, plan, absence of mistake, or identity—and to context/background. Courts must balance probative value against prejudice.
• Consciousness of guilt: Post-offense behavior (e.g., threatening or shaming a witness online) can be admitted to show awareness of wrongdoing and identity involvement.
• Opening the door: When one party creates a misleading impression (often via testimony), the court may allow otherwise inadmissible evidence to correct that impression, in a limited and targeted way.
• Sandoval: Pretrial rulings governing how a defendant’s prior convictions or bad acts may be used to impeach credibility if the defendant testifies. If the defendant testifies inconsistently with the ruling’s constraints, corrective evidence may be permitted.
• Persistent felony offender: A sentencing status enabling enhanced indeterminate life sentences based on prior felony history, applied here to the murder and CPW2 convictions (concurrent terms).
• “Nina” and “.38” slang: In context, the court credited the interpretation that “Nina” refers to a 9mm handgun and “.38” to .38 caliber ammunition—reinforcing identity via access to the murder weapon type.
• Remote testimony and preservation: Objections must be specific: a claim that exceptional circumstances were not shown is different from a constitutional confrontation claim; the latter must be distinctly raised to preserve it for appeal.

Conclusion

People v. Riddick provides a cohesive restatement and practical sharpening of several criminal procedure and evidence principles in New York:

• When identity is the focal trial issue, a well-corroborated digital–DNA mosaic can satisfy sufficiency and withstand weight-of-the-evidence scrutiny.
• Defendants cannot suppress seizures of items found in public streets without competent proof of a legitimate privacy expectation; ownership alone does not confer standing.
• Warrants that authorize seizure of “trace evidence, including DNA,” tied to an identity purpose, are sufficiently particular to permit seizure of clothing as DNA substrates.
• Molineux evidence, carefully limited, may be admitted for identity and consciousness-of-guilt purposes; and defense testimony can open the door to corrective prior bad-act evidence to dispel misleading impressions.
• Confrontation challenges must be explicitly preserved, and sentences within statutory frameworks—especially for persistent felons—will rarely be disturbed absent compelling equities.

The opinion’s enduring contribution lies in its commonsense application of particularity to DNA-focused warrants, its clear guidance on public-street seizures and standing, and its disciplined, purposive use of Molineux and opening-the-door doctrines in identity-driven prosecutions. These clarifications will inform investigative practices, trial rulings, and strategic decision-making on both sides of the aisle in cases where digital footprints, surveillance, and trace forensics converge to prove identity.

Note: The court observes in a footnote that the prior weapon conviction referenced on cross-examination was in fact for attempted criminal possession of a weapon.