People v. Reynolds (2025): Refining “Due Diligence” Under CPL Article 245 and the Role of Defense-Caused Delay in CPL 30.30 Speedy-Trial Analyses

Introduction

People v. Reynolds, 2025 NY Slip Op 03607, is a Third Department decision that affirms the first-degree perjury conviction of Laura Johnson Reynolds. The opinion is noteworthy for two primary reasons:

It fleshes out the confines of “due diligence” required of the prosecution when filing a Certificate of Compliance (COC) under Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) article 245, especially where a single discovery item is belatedly produced.
It clarifies how defense inaction can be weighed when courts decide whether the People’s statement of readiness under CPL 30.30 is “illusory.”

Additionally, the decision addresses mistrial standards for inadvertent references to a defendant’s prior record, ineffective-assistance claims tied to discovery redactions, and recusal timing—all in the context of a perjury prosecution that arose from the defendant’s attempt to shield her brother in a DWI case.

Summary of the Judgment

The Appellate Division unanimously upheld the conviction, rejecting every defense argument:

Speedy Trial / Discovery Challenge: The court ruled that the late production of a single trial transcript did not negate the People’s COC or readiness because the prosecution had exercised “due diligence” and the defense itself contributed to the delay.
Mistrial Motion: The trial court’s denial of a mistrial—after an unredacted reference to the defendant’s “record” was read to the jury—was deemed a proper exercise of discretion. The remark was relevant to the narrative and limiting instructions sufficed.
Ineffective Assistance: Though defense counsel missed the redaction issue at first, counsel’s overall performance was constitutionally adequate.
Judicial Recusal: The defendant failed to preserve her objection, and no manifest bias was shown.
Sentence: The imposed terms—2–4 years (count 1) and 1–3 years (count 2), concurrent—were the statutory minima.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200 (2023) – A Court of Appeals landmark that articulated the current framework for assessing “due diligence” and “reasonable efforts” under CPL article 245. Reynolds applies Bay and extends it by stressing that a defendant’s silence about a known discovery gap can tip the scales against dismissal under CPL 30.30.
People v. Contompasis, 236 AD3d 138 (3d Dept 2025) and People v. Drayton, 231 AD3d 1057 (2d Dept 2024) – Both cases upheld readiness where isolated or technical discovery lapses occurred despite substantial compliance. Reynolds relies on the same rationale.
Mistrial / Uncharged-Acts Line: People v. Hebert, Hodge, Scaringe, Kendricks, and Silver – These decisions collectively outline when otherwise inadmissible propensity evidence can be admitted because it is “inextricably interwoven” with the crime or completes a narrative. The court invoked them to hold that Reynolds’ own mention of her “record” was probative, not propensity-based.
Mistrial Standard: People v. Conway, People v. Dawson – Highlight the trial court’s discretionary power and the deferential abuse-of-discretion review applied on appeal.
Ineffective Assistance Framework: People v. Colter; People v. Valentin – Provide the “meaningful representation” test rather than perfect advocacy. Reynolds follows this benchmark.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

2.1 Speedy Trial & Discovery

Under CPL 30.30(1)(a) the People have six months to announce readiness in a felony case. An on-time COC (CPL 245.50) is essential. The substantive thrust of Reynolds is in applying the Bay factors:

“Due diligence” is flexible and fact-specific. It demands reasonable efforts, not perfection.
Belated Disclosure ≠ Automatic Dismissal. A single overlooked transcript, quickly supplied once discovered, will not vitiate readiness if the prosecution can articulate specific efforts made to obtain and disclose it.
Defense Contribution Matters. If the defense learns of the omission but waits months to alert the People, that delay becomes a factor in the “reasonableness” calculus.

Because the prosecution in Reynolds timely produced voluminous discovery, immediately forwarded the transcript upon receipt, and the defense stayed silent for nearly four months, the court found the COC “proper” and the readiness statement valid. Therefore, no excludable delay was chargeable to the People, and dismissal under CPL 30.30 was denied.

2.2 Mistrial & Evidentiary Balance

New York’s long-standing Molineux framework disfavors evidence of uncharged bad acts. Yet, when the evidence completes the story or explains conduct, the trial court may admit it after balancing probative value against prejudice. In Reynolds:

The unredacted word “record” explained why the defendant did not disclose her involvement to police, directly bearing on the perjury narrative.
The court issued a limiting instruction restricting the jury’s use of the statement, curing potential prejudice.
Because the defense ultimately conceded the stipulation did not require this redaction on the record, the trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying a mistrial.

2.3 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC)

The Reynolds panel evaluated IAC under the “meaningful representation” standard (People v. Baldi; People v. Colter). Although counsel momentarily missed the redaction issue, he:

Promptly objected and aggressively sought a mistrial.
Filed pre-trial motions and raised objections throughout trial.

Given the defensible strategic value of leaving the “record” reference (it supported her explanation), the court found counsel’s performance objectively reasonable.

2.4 Judicial Recusal

Recusal in New York is discretionary unless a statutory mandate exists (Judiciary Law §14). Since the record did not show the trial judge’s prior role advantaged or prejudiced either party, and the defense never renewed the objection, the issue was unpreserved and substantively baseless.

3. Likely Impact of the Decision

Discovery / Readiness Post-Bay: Reynolds supplies trial courts with a practical checklist: (a) assess prosecution effort; (b) measure defense conduct; (c) weigh the scale item-by-item rather than adopting a per-se rule that any missing discovery defeats readiness. Future litigants can expect closer scrutiny of defense contributions to delays.
Evidentiary Practice: The case reinforces that inadvertent references to a defendant’s criminal past can be harmless if they are integral to the narrative and if the court issues immediate (or prompt) curative instructions.
Strategic Considerations for Defense Counsel: Reynolds cautions defense attorneys to raise discovery omissions quickly. Waiting may forfeit speedy-trial leverage and even be used against dismissal motions.
Trial Courts’ Role: The decision blesses brief adjournments to investigate stipulation disputes before ruling on mistrial motions, providing judges with procedural flexibility.

Complex Concepts Simplified

CPL 30.30 “Speedy Trial” Clock: A statutory timeline (not constitutional) requiring the prosecution to declare readiness. Time “chargeable” to the People stops only when they are genuinely ready.
Certificate of Compliance (COC): A sworn statement by the prosecutor that all required discovery has been delivered or is unavailable despite due diligence.
Due Diligence (Discovery): Reasonable, case-specific efforts to locate and turn over material. It does not demand omniscience.
Mistrial: Termination of a trial in mid-course due to fundamental error that would prevent a fair verdict. Granting one allows a new trial; denying one is reviewed for “abuse of discretion.”
Molineux Rule: New York doctrine restricting evidence of uncharged crimes to avoid prejudice, subject to limited exceptions.
Meaningful Representation: New York’s state-law analogue to the federal “Strickland” standard; focuses on overall fairness rather than isolated missteps.
Recusal: When a judge steps aside because her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. It is mandatory only in narrow circumstances; otherwise it is discretionary.

Conclusion

People v. Reynolds cements a pragmatic approach to CPL article 245 compliance and CPL 30.30 readiness: courts will not reward defendants who sit silently on known discovery omissions, and minor, swiftly corrected oversights will rarely topple a prosecution if diligent effort is shown. The decision also showcases the Appellate Division’s deference to trial-level discretionary rulings regarding mistrials, evidentiary balance, and recusal. Lawyers—both prosecutors and defense counsel—should view Reynolds as a cautionary guidepost: document stipulations meticulously, raise discovery issues promptly, and expect courts to examine their own conduct when assessing speedy-trial motions. Ultimately, Reynolds contributes a significant gloss on the Bay standard, refining New York’s evolving discovery and readiness regime in the post-reform era.