People v. Reaves: New York Tightens Admissibility of Rap Lyrics—Qualified Expertise, Specific Nexus, and Molineux Balancing Required

Introduction

In People v. Reaves, 2025 NY Slip Op 05107 (App Div, 2d Dept), the Second Department reversed a conviction for criminal facilitation in the second degree, ordering a new trial after concluding that the trial court erroneously admitted a defendant’s jailhouse rap performance through an unqualified “slang” expert. The case arises from an August 29, 2016, Brooklyn shooting in which an unidentified gunman fired into a van and fled in a gray Nissan allegedly driven by defendant Idrissa Reaves. Although the jury acquitted Reaves of second-degree murder, it convicted him of second-degree criminal facilitation, a charge that turns on the defendant’s belief that he was aiding someone intending to commit a class A felony (here, murder).

The prosecution’s key direct evidence of Reaves’s mental state was a rap song he performed over recorded jail calls. The trial court allowed a Detective Investigator from the Kings County District Attorney’s Office—who had never before been qualified as a slang or rap expert—to deliver line-by-line interpretations of the lyrics. Those interpretations, in the appellate court’s view, were speculative, internally inconsistent, and ultimately tracked the prosecution’s theory with “remarkable” precision. Worse still, the testimony suggested uncharged crimes, including credit-card fraud and a murder-for-hire “hit,” without the Molineux balancing required for evidence of prior bad acts.

Against this backdrop, the Second Department announced an important set of constraints on the use of creative expression—especially rap lyrics—at criminal trials: (1) law-enforcement “slang” expertise does not automatically qualify a witness to interpret rap lyrics as artistic expression; (2) admissibility requires a reliable, qualified foundation and a specific factual nexus to the charged conduct; and (3) where interpretations imply uncharged criminality, the court must conduct the Molineux balancing analysis to guard against undue prejudice.

Summary of the Opinion

The appellate court affirmed the legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting the facilitation conviction but reversed on evidentiary grounds, holding that the admission of the rap lyrics—interpreted by an unqualified expert—deprived Reaves of a fair trial. The court emphasized:

• The purported expert lacked specialized training or credentials in interpreting rap as an artistic medium; generic exposure to “gang lingo,” YouTube videos, and jail calls was insufficient to ensure reliable, non-speculative interpretations.
• The witness acknowledged that rap employs metaphors, similes, double meanings, and artistic license, yet offered interpretations that shifted and then crystallized to mirror the People’s theory of accomplice liability (e.g., that Reaves supplied a gun and aided a planned shooting).
• The interpretations also suggested uncharged crimes (fraudulent “swiping,” paid hit/murder-for-hire), which should have triggered a People v. Molineux balancing analysis. No such analysis occurred. The prosecutor compounded the prejudice by referring to a “hit” 12 times during summation.
• Because the rap interpretation was the only direct evidence of Reaves’s mental state, its erroneous admission was not harmless. The court reversed “on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice” and remitted for a new trial on criminal facilitation in the second degree.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The court carefully positioned its analysis within New York and federal evidentiary doctrine:

• Expert testimony generally:
  • People v. Taylor, 75 NY2d 277; People v. Hill, 85 NY2d 256: Expert opinion is appropriate when the subject is beyond the ken of the average juror.
  • People v. Inoa, 25 NY3d 466: Meaning of coded communications is a proper subject for expert testimony.
  • Matott v. Ward, 48 NY2d 455; People v. Menendez, 50 AD3d 1061; People v. Allweiss, 48 NY2d 40; Ghazala v. Shore Haven, 229 AD3d 447: An expert must have reliable qualifications and express opinions with an acceptable level of certainty.
• Law-enforcement “slang” and coded language expertise:
  • People v. Barksdale, 129 AD3d 1497; People v. Williams, 146 AD3d 410: Courts have admitted law-enforcement testimony interpreting “street slang.”
  • People v. Artis, 63 AD3d 1173; People v. Contreras, 28 AD3d 392; People v. Washington, 217 AD3d 532; People v. Goldman, 189 AD3d 698; People v. Trantham, 225 AD3d 714: Experts may interpret coded trafficking, gang, or pimp-prostitute lexicons.
  The court distinguished these lines of authority, underscoring that this case did not involve gangs and that interpreting rap as art requires different, specialized expertise.
• Rap lyrics as evidence:
  • People v. Green, 92 AD3d 953; People v. Wallace, 59 AD3d 1069; People v. Goldman, 35 NY3d 582; United States v. Foster, 939 F2d 445: Rap lyrics can be admissible to show intent, knowledge, or consciousness of guilt when properly linked to the crime.
  • United States v. Pierce, 785 F3d 832; United States v. Herron, 762 Fed Appx 25; United States v. Jordan, 714 F Supp 3d 158; United States v. Carpenter, 2022 WL 16960577: The federal “rule of thumb” requires a specific factual nexus between the lyrics and the charged conduct and weighs probative value against unfair prejudice.
  • United States v. Wiley, 610 F Supp 3d 440; United States v. Williams, 2017 WL 4310712; State v. Skinner, 218 NJ 496: Courts caution that rap’s aggressive, hyperbolic, and often fictional content risks undue prejudice if jurors conflate art with autobiography.
  Reaves harmonizes with these authorities by requiring a qualified foundation and a concrete nexus to the facts, and by warning against conflating artistry with criminal admissions.
• Prior bad acts (Molineux):
  • People v. Molineux, 168 NY 264; People v. Leonard, 29 NY3d 1: Evidence of uncharged crimes demands careful balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect. The absence of such balancing in Reaves was a central error.
• Standards of review:
  • People v. Contes, 60 NY2d 620; People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342; People v. Mateo, 2 NY3d 383; People v. Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490; People v. Romero, 7 NY3d 633: The court upheld sufficiency and weight of the evidence but reversed in the interest of justice (CPL 470.15[6][a]) due to the evidentiary error’s trial-level impact.

Legal Reasoning

The Second Department’s reasoning proceeds in three steps.

1. Qualification deficit for interpreting rap lyrics: The prosecution was given “ten minutes” to “get somebody,” and tendered a Detective Investigator who had never been qualified as a slang expert. His experience consisted of debriefings, gang-related work, and listening to jail calls and music videos. That background, the court held, did not translate into expertise in interpreting rap as an artistic genre that trades in metaphor, double meaning, hyperbole, and nonliteral expression. Rap interpretation is not equivalent to translating coded criminal communications. An expert’s credentials must align with the task; here, they did not.
2. Speculative, shifting interpretations that ultimately mirrored the prosecution: The witness offered multiple, sometimes inconsistent interpretations and conceded he was “guessing” at points. Yet his “ultimate” opinions—e.g., that the defendant supplied a firearm or assisted a planned “drill” (shooting)—mapped with “remarkable” precision onto the People’s theory of accomplice liability. The court found this alchemy—from acknowledged ambiguity to accusatory certainty—improperly bolstered the People’s case, especially where the rap was the only direct proof of mental state.
3. Molineux error and compounded prejudice: The interpretations introduced uncharged criminality (credit-card “swiping,” paid-hit theory akin to first-degree murder for hire) without the required Molineux balancing. The prejudice was aggravated when the prosecutor referred to a “hit” a dozen times during summation. Because these insinuations went beyond the indictment’s second-degree murder theory, the risk of unfair prejudice was acute and unmitigated by any limiting analysis or instruction.

The court stressed that while rap lyrics may be admissible under proper circumstances—especially where a specific factual nexus is shown—the proponent must (a) present a truly qualified expert when jury comprehension requires expert assistance, (b) avoid speculative or conclusory translations that “fit” a theory rather than reliably elucidate meaning, and (c) conduct Molineux balancing where interpretations suggest uncharged crimes. Absent such safeguards, the evidence’s probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

Reaves will likely reshape trial practice in New York whenever prosecutors seek to use rap lyrics or other creative expressions:

• Expert selection and foundation: Law-enforcement exposure to “street slang” will not, by itself, qualify a witness to interpret rap lyrics. Parties will need to marshal specialized expertise—linguists, scholars of rap/hip-hop culture, or other qualified professionals—with demonstrable training and methodology suited to artistic interpretation.
• Specific factual nexus requirement: Echoing federal “rule of thumb” reasoning, Reaves effectively requires a concrete linkage between the words and the charged conduct. Generic references to violence or money in rap will not suffice; the proponent must establish a case-specific connection without bootstrapping it through speculative “translations.”
• Molineux vigilance: If lyric interpretations imply other crimes (fraud, gang activity, contract killing), the court must conduct Molineux balancing. Failure to do so risks reversal, particularly where the challenged evidence serves as the only direct window into a contested mental state.
• Summation discipline: Prosecutorial rhetoric that capitalizes on improperly admitted interpretations (e.g., repeatedly invoking “hit”) will heighten prejudice and jeopardize verdicts, even when sufficiency and weight are otherwise sustainable.
• Alignment with legislative trends: The opinion notes proposed New York legislation seeking to limit admissibility of creative expression by imposing a presumption of inadmissibility overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of literal meaning, strong factual nexus, relevance to a disputed fact, and distinct probative value. Reaves moves the common law in a parallel direction by tightening gatekeeping in the absence of a statute.
• Broader fairness concerns: The decision recognizes the unique risk that juries will treat performative boasting and violent tropes common in rap as autobiographical confessions. Courts must be alert to the possibility that such evidence invites improper character reasoning and cultural stereotyping.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Criminal facilitation in the second degree: A person is guilty when, believing it probable that they are helping someone who intends to commit a class A felony, they engage in conduct that provides the means or opportunity and that in fact aids the commission of that felony (Penal Law § 115.05).
• Acting in concert (accomplice liability): A defendant can be liable as an accomplice if they intentionally aid another person in committing a crime, even if they do not personally perform the criminal act.
• Expert testimony “beyond the ken”: Expert witnesses can explain matters that average jurors are unlikely to understand without specialized knowledge (e.g., technical jargon, coded language).
• Matott standard for expert qualification: An expert must have appropriate skill, training, education, knowledge, or experience, and must express opinions with an acceptable level of certainty—not guesses or speculation.
• Molineux balancing: Before admitting evidence of uncharged bad acts, courts weigh its probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice. Such evidence is inadmissible if it primarily shows propensity rather than legitimately proves motive, intent, identity, common scheme, or other permissible purposes.
• Interest-of-justice review: Even if an evidentiary objection was not fully preserved at trial, an appellate court may reverse in the interest of justice if an error undermined the fairness of the proceedings (CPL 470.15[6][a]).
• Specific factual nexus: To use rap lyrics as evidence, there must be a concrete link between the words and the specific charged crime, rather than a mere thematic overlap with criminality or violence.

Practice Notes and Takeaways

• For prosecutors:
  • Consider whether jurors truly need expert assistance to understand lyrics; if yes, retain experts with demonstrable training in interpreting rap as art (e.g., cultural, linguistic, or musicological expertise), not just “street slang.”
  • Establish a strong factual nexus and avoid speculative translations. Where multiple plausible meanings exist, recognize the heightened risk of unfair prejudice.
  • Conduct and document a Molineux analysis whenever interpretations imply uncharged acts. Tailor summation to avoid leveraging contested interpretations as if they were established facts.
• For defense counsel:
  • Demand a robust foundation for expert qualification, methodology, and certainty. Emphasize the difference between decoding slang and interpreting artistic expression.
  • Insist on Molineux balancing and limiting instructions where interpretations imply other crimes. Object to summation rhetoric that treats ambiguous lyrics as admissions.
  • Highlight authorship ambiguity, collaborative writing, lack of timeline, and the ubiquity of nonliteral tropes in rap to undercut probative value.
• For trial courts:
  • Gatekeep rigorously. Require credentials tied to rap-as-art interpretation, not merely law-enforcement exposure to slang.
  • Probe the expert’s methodology and the certainty of proposed interpretations; exclude speculative or guess-based opinions.
  • Perform on-the-record Molineux balancing when uncharged crimes lurk within the interpretations, and craft precise limiting instructions if any such evidence is admitted.

How Reaves Refines the Law

The opinion does not ban the use of rap lyrics. Instead, it tightens the conditions for admissibility:

• Qualifications must match the task: interpreting rap as creative expression is not the same as decoding criminal argot.
• Expert opinions must show methodological rigor and acceptable certainty; speculative or “theory-fitting” translations are inadmissible.
• Courts must guard against backdoor propensity evidence by conducting Molineux balancing whenever interpretations suggest uncharged misconduct.
• A specific factual nexus between the creative work and the charged crime is essential; absent a reliable foundation, lyrics are likely irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.

Conclusion

People v. Reaves marks a significant recalibration of evidentiary practice in New York regarding the use of rap lyrics and other creative expressions at criminal trials. The Second Department’s message is clear: the courtroom is not a venue for speculative cultural translation that neatly dovetails with a prosecution theory. Where the State seeks to use artistic expression to prove intent, knowledge, or consciousness of guilt, it must present genuinely qualified expertise, demonstrate a concrete nexus to the charged conduct, and carefully navigate the Molineux safeguards against unfair prejudice. Because the prosecution failed on these fronts—and compounded the error in summation—the court reversed and ordered a new trial, even while acknowledging that the underlying evidence was otherwise legally sufficient and supported by the weight of the evidence.

Reaves will influence trial strategies statewide, narrowing the admissibility of lyric-based evidence and reinforcing the judiciary’s role as a vigilant gatekeeper. It also signals judicial sensitivity to the special risks posed by interpreting rap—a form in which exaggeration and metaphor are artistic staples—as if it were a literal confession. Going forward, parties should expect a more demanding foundational showing, a stricter nexus requirement, and robust Molineux analysis whenever creative expression is offered to prove criminal liability.