People v. Morris: The Michigan Supreme Court Clarifies that OV-19 Requires Fact-Specific Proof of an Actual Security Threat, Not Mere Drug Possession During Jail Intake

Introduction

On 9 July 2025, the Supreme Court of Michigan issued an order in People of the State of Michigan v. Curtis Allen Morris. The case centers on how sentencing courts score Offense Variable 19 (OV-19) when a defendant possesses a controlled substance at the time of jail intake. The trial court originally imposed 25 points under OV-19—reserved for conduct that “threatened the security of a penal institution”—solely because 0.33 grams of methamphetamine fell from Mr. Morris’s clothing while he was being booked into jail. That single scoring decision inflated the guideline range from 5-23 months to 19-38 months, and ultimately drove a 38- to 120-month prison sentence. The Michigan Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ affirmance and remanded, holding that a sentencing court must make case-specific factual findings demonstrating how the defendant’s conduct actually threatened institutional security; categorical reliance on “any drug equals a threat” is impermissible.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision and remanded to the Branch Circuit Court.
• On remand the trial court must
  • accept additional briefing,
  • hold a hearing if necessary,
  • issue a written opinion analyzing whether 25 points under OV-19 are justified by “the particular facts of the case,” and
  • resentence Mr. Morris if zero points should have been assessed. (People v. Francisco, 474 Mich 82 (2006)).
• The Court reaffirmed its recent decision in People v. Dixon, 509 Mich 170 (2022): context matters; courts must avoid turning OV-19 into a “boundless variable.”
• No categorical rule was created either for or against scoring controlled-substance possession at intake; instead the Court requires fact-intensive analysis.
• Justice Bernstein (joined by Justice Zahra) dissented, arguing the majority undervalued the inherent danger of methamphetamine.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. People v. Dixon, 509 Mich 170 (2022)
   

   – Held that mere possession of a cell phone in prison, without more, is insufficient to justify 25 points under OV-19. – Introduced the “context is critical” principle to prevent boundless application of OV-19.

   Influence: Morris extends Dixon to drug-possession cases, emphasizing that particular facts beyond possession must support the conclusion that institutional security was threatened.

2. People v. Dickinson, 321 Mich App 1 (2017)
   

   – 5.68 grams of heroin smuggled into prison during a visit warranted 25 OV-19 points.

   Influence: The trial court used Dickinson as a blanket authority. The Supreme Court held that Dickinson involved additional culpable conduct—surreptitious delivery deep into the facility—and is not analogous to inadvertent possession discovered during intake.
3. People v. Carpenter, 322 Mich App 523 (2018)
   

   – Defendant smuggled drugs and assaulted an inmate; 25 points affirmed.

   Influence: Carpenter shows that drug smuggling combined with violence is sufficient, but does not support an automatic 25-point score for mere possession.
4. People v. Smith, 488 Mich 193 (2010)
   – Permits scoring OV-19 based on conduct occurring after the sentencing offense.
5. People v. Francisco, 474 Mich 82 (2006)
   – Requires resentencing if guideline scoring is later found erroneous.
6. Other cited authorities: Hardy (standard of review), Deweerd (reaffirming Dixon), and statutory comparisons in MCL 777.31-.49a to show legislative gradations of harm.

2. Legal Reasoning

The majority applies a two-step statutory test drawn from MCL 777.49(a):

1. Identify the defendant’s conduct.
2. Determine whether that conduct actually threatened the security of a penal institution.

Key aspects of the Court’s reasoning include:

• “Context” requirement. OV-19 is not a strict-liability variable. Even items that can be dangerous (cell phones, drugs) do not automatically threaten security; courts must specify how the security was threatened in the concrete circumstances.
• Proportionality to legislative hierarchy. The Court compared OV-19 (25 points) to other OVs scored at 25, 15, and 10 points, noting that the Legislature reserved 25-point scoring for conduct analogous in gravity to terrorism support or severe bodily injury. Routine intake possession of small drug quantities may not rise to that level.
• Rejection of categorical rules. The Court refused both extremes:
  • No automatic 25 points for any intake drug possession (the trial court’s view).
  • No blanket prohibition against scoring intake possession (the defendant’s alternative).
  The path forward is a case-by-case, record-based inquiry.
• Demand for specific findings: Trial courts must articulate “the particular facts of the case” connecting possession to a real threat—e.g., quantity, concealment method, likelihood of distribution, or potential to trigger violence—before imposing the highest OV-19 score.

3. Potential Impact

a. Sentencing Practice. Trial courts statewide must now:

• Make an on-the-record explanation linking the defendant’s conduct to institutional security;
• Refrain from citing Dickinson or Carpenter as per se authority without comparing factual severity;
• Expect defense counsel to challenge OV-19 more aggressively; “mere possession” will often support 0 or 10 points, not 25.

b. Pending and Future Appeals. Defendants with OV-19 scores based solely on intake possession of controlled substances may seek resentencing, invoking Morris and Dixon. Michigan appellate courts will likely remand numerous cases for specific-finding hearings.

c. Prosecutorial Strategy. Prosecutors may introduce more detailed evidence—quantity, purity, concealment method, gang affiliation, or intent to distribute—to justify 25-point scoring. They may also charge separate contraband offences to bolster the factual record.

d. Broader Legal Developments. The decision continues a recent trend in Michigan jurisprudence favoring granular sentencing analysis and restraining guidelines inflation. It also signals a willingness to police trial courts’ narrative explanations, not just math, in sentencing.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Offense Variable (OV). Michigan’s legislative sentencing guidelines contain 20+ “Offense Variables.” Each measures a different dimension of harm or aggravation. Points are totalled to place the defendant in a guideline range.
• OV-19 (Threat to Sobriety or Security). Subsection (a) assigns 25 points when a defendant’s conduct “threatened the security of a penal institution or court.” Lesser subsections (b) & (c) score 15 or 10 points for obstructing justice in other ways.
• “Preponderance of the Evidence.” The sentencing court need not find proof beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, it must believe a fact is more likely than not true (greater than 50%).
• Guideline Range. Once total points are calculated, the sentencing grid provides a minimum-sentence range (months). Courts may depart, but must justify departures on the record.
• Remand. An appellate court’s instruction sending a case back to the trial court for further action, often with specific tasks—new findings, new hearings, or resentencing.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Morris fortifies the principle that Michigan’s sentencing variables must be applied with precision and contextual sensitivity. It rejects a “one-size-fits-all” approach that equates any drug possession during jail intake with a direct threat to institutional security, yet leaves open the possibility of a 25-point score when the facts genuinely support it. Trial courts are now on notice: they must articulate how and why the defendant’s conduct endangered security, rather than relying on generalized fears or precedents with materially different facts. In the broader legal landscape, Morris signifies continued judicial oversight of guideline scoring, promoting fairness and proportionality in Michigan sentencing.