People v. Martin: Forward-Looking Suppression Rule for Pre-MRTA Searches

Introduction

In People v. Martin, 2025 NY Slip Op 03842 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t June 26, 2025), the Third Department confronted a question expressly left open by the Court of Appeals in People v. Pastrana, 41 NY3d 23 (2023): Does Penal Law § 222.05(3)(a)—added by the Marihuana Regulation and Taxation Act (MRTA) and barring probable-cause findings “based solely” on the odor of cannabis—apply at a suppression hearing held after the statute’s effective date when the underlying search occurred before that date?

The appellant, Darnell M. Martin, was a passenger in a vehicle searched in September 2020 when a trooper claimed to smell marihuana. Cocaine discovered in Martin’s backpack led to multiple drug charges. Although the search was lawful under then-existing law, Martin moved (post-MRTA) to suppress the evidence. County Court denied the motion; Martin pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and received five years’ probation. On appeal, the Third Department reversed, holding that § 222.05(3)(a) governs any suppression hearing conducted on or after March 31, 2021, regardless of the search date. The decision vacated the guilty plea and ordered suppression of all physical evidence.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Appellate Division (Lynch, J.) holds Penal Law § 222.05(3)(a) applies prospectively to court proceedings, not to the underlying police conduct; therefore, it governs a suppression hearing conducted after MRTA’s effective date.
• Because County Court’s probable-cause ruling relied solely on cannabis odor, § 222.05(3)(a) required suppression.
• The guilty plea was vacated; the prosecution must proceed without the suppressed evidence.
• Garry, P.J., and Clark, J., concurred; Egan Jr., J., dissented, joined by Mackey, J.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. People v. Pastrana (NY 2023)
   • Held MRTA does not retroactively invalidate pre-enactment convictions that were final before March 31, 2021.
   • Left open the “post-enactment suppression / pre-enactment search” scenario addressed here.
   • Martin builds directly on this gap, answering it in the affirmative.
2. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994) & Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth CSD, 91 NY2d 577 (1998)
   • State the default presumption against retroactivity absent clear legislative intent.
   • Majority distinguishes “retroactivity” from statutes regulating current court processes.
3. Matter of Regina Metro. Co. v. DHCR, 35 NY3d 332 (2020)
   • Defines retroactive statutes as those impairing vested rights or imposing new duties for past acts.
   • Majority uses this analytical framework to declare § 222.05(3)(a) purely procedural.
4. Matter of Abrams v. Brady, 77 NY2d 741 (1991) & People v. Konono, 9 NY2d 924 (1961)
   • Recognize that statutes altering courtroom evidentiary rules may apply immediately to pending cases.
5. Dissent’s Authorities:
   – Matter of Jeter v. Poole, 43 NY3d 241 (2024) – People v. Boyd, 206 AD3d 1350 (3d Dep’t 2022)
   • Used to argue § 222.05(3) substantively alters rights and thus cannot apply retroactively.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The majority frames the inquiry through a classic Landgraf/Regina lens: Does the statute “attach new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment,” or does it merely regulate the forum’s present conduct? Key points:

• Textual anchor. § 222.05(3)(a) speaks in the present tense (“no finding… shall be based solely…”) and expressly references CPL § 710.20 suppression motions. This, the majority says, is a directive to courts, not police, about what evidence can support probable cause today.
• No impairment of vested rights. The People had no vested right to introduce evidence obtained from an arguably unlawful search; § 222.05(3)(a) merely withdraws one basis for a probable-cause ruling.
• Procedural–substantive distinction. Because the statute affects evidentiary standards at an ongoing proceeding, it is deemed procedural. Under New York retroactivity doctrine, procedural statutes apply immediately unless specified otherwise.
• Legislative purpose. MRTA sought to end disproportionate criminal consequences from cannabis laws; a forward-looking suppression rule aligns with that remedial purpose.

3. Dissent’s Reasoning

Justice Egan Jr. characterizes § 222.05(3) as substantive because it “effectively alter[s] the standard applicable at the time of the search” and curtails evidence “perhaps fatally” at trial. He also invokes General Construction Law § 94, which preserves pending cases under repealed statutes absent specific contrary language. The dissent stresses consistency with pre-MRTA criminal prohibitions and warns against “freezing” officers’ probable-cause judgments through post-hoc evidentiary rules.

4. Impact on Future Litigation and Law Enforcement

• Suppression Landscape. Any suppression motion heard after March 31, 2021 now cannot rely solely on cannabis odor—even if the search occurred years earlier. Prosecutors must marshal additional facts (e.g., admission, visible contraband, or other indicia of crime) to defend pre-2021 vehicle searches.
• Case Backlog. Numerous still-pending cases (indictments, appeals, unresolved suppression motions) involving pre-MRTA searches may be reopened or see evidence suppressed.
• Law-Enforcement Training. Although police may still detect odor as a factor, they must be trained that odor alone is never sufficient probable cause under New York law—regardless of search date.
• Retroactivity Doctrine. Martin clarifies that a statute limiting judicial evidentiary authority is “prospective” even when applied to antecedent facts, potentially influencing future debates over retroactivity in other contexts (e.g., discovery rules, expert-testimony standards).
• Appellate Guidance. Until the Court of Appeals addresses Martin, trial courts statewide may follow its reasoning; some may choose to await higher-court confirmation, generating a likely split among Departments.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Suppression Hearing (CPL § 710.20)

A pre-trial proceeding where a defendant asks the court to exclude evidence obtained in violation of constitutional or statutory rights.

Probable Cause vs. Reasonable Cause

New York’s “reasonable cause” mirrors constitutional “probable cause”—a reasonable belief that a crime has been, is being, or will be committed, based on facts and circumstances.

Retroactivity

Application of a new law to events that occurred before the law took effect. Courts presume laws apply only prospectively unless the legislature clearly indicates otherwise.

Procedural vs. Substantive Law

Procedural rules govern how courts operate (evidence, jurisdiction); substantive rules define rights and duties (crimes, defenses). Procedural changes generally apply to pending cases.

General Construction Law § 94

New York’s “savings clause” preserves actions and proceedings commenced under repealed statutes unless the new statute explicitly provides otherwise.

Conclusion

People v. Martin establishes a pivotal precedent: Penal Law § 222.05(3)(a)’s bar on using cannabis odor as the sole basis for probable cause applies to all suppression hearings held after MRTA’s effective date, even when the search preceded the statute. The ruling treats the provision as a procedural evidentiary limitation, not a retroactive substantive change. Consequently, prosecutors must reassess cases relying exclusively on odor-based searches, and New York’s retroactivity jurisprudence gains a nuanced distinction between regulations of judicial fact-finding and rules that alter parties’ substantive rights. Whether the Court of Appeals will affirm this approach remains to be seen, but for now, Martin significantly shifts the balance in suppression litigation involving historical cannabis-odor searches.