People v. Mack: Broad Entitlement to a Justification Instruction and Reaffirmation of New York’s Ban on Cameras in the Courtroom

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I. Introduction

The Appellate Division, Third Department’s decision in People v. Mack, 2025 NY Slip Op 06757 (Dec. 4, 2025), is a significant clarification of New York’s law on jury instructions for the defense of justification (self-defense) in homicide cases, and a pointed reminder of the continued force of Civil Rights Law § 52’s prohibition on audiovisual coverage of testimonial court proceedings.

Demetrius L. Mack was convicted in Chemung County Court of second-degree murder (Penal Law § 125.25[1]) for fatally stabbing a man during an altercation at a bar in Elmira. The case turned on disputed questions of intent, identity, and justification. At trial, Mack’s principal strategy was to attack the sufficiency and reliability of the proof identifying him as the assailant and establishing his intent to kill. Only after the close of evidence did he request that the jury be instructed on the defense of justification; the trial court denied that request.

On appeal, Mack challenged his conviction on multiple grounds: the weight of the evidence supporting his intent to kill, several evidentiary rulings, the denial of a missing-witness charge, and most centrally, the refusal to instruct the jury on justification. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction on the factual and evidentiary issues, but reversed on the law because the trial court failed to give the requested justification charge. The court also identified an independent error: the trial court’s authorization of video and still photography of witness testimony, in violation of Civil Rights Law § 52.

The decision reinforces a core principle: if any reasonable view of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, would support a finding that the defendant acted in self-defense, the defendant is entitled to a justification instruction—even if the defendant’s trial theory otherwise denies involvement or intent. The opinion also underscores that New York’s statutory ban on cameras and broadcasting during testimonial proceedings in court remains firm.

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II. Summary of the Opinion

Court: Appellate Division, Third Department (Garry, P.J., Lynch, Ceresia, Fisher, and Mackey, JJ.; opinion by Fisher, J.)

Disposition: Judgment of conviction reversed on the law; case remitted for a new trial.

Key Holdings

1. Weight of the evidence (intent to kill): Although an acquittal would not have been unreasonable, the jury’s verdict finding intent to cause death was not against the weight of the evidence, given the location and nature of the fatal stab wound and the deference owed to the jury’s credibility determinations.
2. Evidentiary rulings: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting certain lines of cross-examination and in excluding or curtailing evidence relating to:
   • the crowd outside the hospital,
   • speculative questioning of the medical examiner about alternate causes of the fatal wound, and
   • testimony about the ownership of a boxcutter found in the bar.
3. Missing-witness charge: The trial court properly denied a missing-witness charge because the People demonstrated that the out-of-state eyewitness, though initially cooperative, had become unavailable and was not under their “control” in the legal sense.
4. Justification (self-defense) instruction: The trial court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on justification. When the evidence is viewed most favorably to the defendant, there was a reasonable basis for the jury to find that:
   • the victim may have been armed with a knife (supported by forensic evidence),
   • the victim was larger and physically dominant in the fight,
   • the use of deadly force by Mack might have been in response to deadly force or its imminent use, and
   • Mack may not have been able to retreat safely from the fenced patio area.
   Under McManus and its progeny, failure to give a justification instruction under these circumstances mandates a new trial.
5. Cameras in the courtroom: The trial court erred by allowing members of the press to take video and still photographs during witness testimony, in violation of Civil Rights Law § 52’s categorical prohibition on televising, broadcasting, or filming testimonial proceedings in New York courts. This error must be avoided on retrial.

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III. Detailed Analysis

A. Weight of the Evidence: Proving Intent to Kill

1. The appellate standard

Mack argued that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, particularly as to whether he intended to cause the victim’s death, as required for second-degree murder under Penal Law § 125.25(1). The court articulates the well-established Third Department standard, drawing on People v. DeCamp, 211 AD3d 1121 (3d Dept 2022), and People v. Harris, 206 AD3d 1063 (3d Dept 2022):

• The appellate court first asks whether, on all credible evidence, a different verdict would not have been unreasonable (i.e., could a reasonable jury have acquitted or convicted of a lesser offense?).
• It then weighs the relative strength of conflicting testimony and inferences to determine whether the jury’s actual verdict is against the weight of that evidence.
• The court reviews the evidence “in a neutral light” but gives “great deference” to the jury’s credibility determinations because jurors see and hear the witnesses directly.

In assessing intent, the court reiterates that intent to kill may be inferred from the “totality of the circumstances” and the “natural and probable consequences” of the defendant’s actions, citing People v. Green, 190 AD3d 1094 (3d Dept 2021), and People v. Terry, 196 AD3d 840 (3d Dept 2021).

2. Application to Mack’s case

The key facts bearing on intent were:

• A fist fight escalated in the bar’s dimly lit outdoor patio.
• The victim, larger than the defendant, knocked Mack down.
• When Mack got up, an eyewitness described him “swinging all recklessly,” saw a flash of silver in his hand, and observed Mack “hit” the victim near the left collarbone.
• The victim’s clothing showed blood; the victim urgently called for a gun.
• The autopsy revealed five stab wounds to the upper body, including a deeply penetrating 3½-inch wound to the left upper chest that severed a major artery—a clearly vital area.
• No murder weapon was recovered.

The court candidly acknowledges that “a different verdict would not have been unreasonable” because most wounds were superficial and Mack’s knife-swinging was described as “reckless.” These facts could support a view that Mack did not specifically target vital organs. However, the court emphasizes that:

• Repeated stabbing in the upper body, especially near the heart and major vessels, strongly suggests an intent to cause serious or fatal injury.
• Even if most wounds are not fatal, a deliberate thrust to the left upper chest is consistent with an intent to kill.

Giving deference to the jury’s decision to credit the forensic and eyewitness evidence over the defense’s characterization of the attack as non-targeted, the court holds that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence. It cites comparable decisions such as:

• People v. Terry, 196 AD3d at 845–846,
• People v. Green, 190 AD3d at 1096,
• People v. Greenfield, 167 AD3d 1060 (3d Dept 2018), and
• People v. Newland, 83 AD3d 1202 (3d Dept 2011),

all of which recognize that stabbing a victim in vital areas typically supports an inference of homicidal intent.

3. Significance

This portion of the opinion does not create new law but confirms existing doctrine:

• Appellate courts may acknowledge that the evidence was close, yet still affirm on weight-of-the-evidence grounds if the jury’s conclusion is reasonably supported.
• Even in a chaotic fight, a fatal stab to the chest can sustain a finding of intent to kill, notwithstanding some superficial wounds or testimony that the knife-wielding looked “reckless.”

Importantly, the court’s willingness to reverse the conviction later on instructional grounds, while simultaneously upholding the weight of the evidence, shows that factual sufficiency and legal error are distinct inquiries. Mack was not entitled to acquittal; he was entitled to a fair trial with all legally required charges.

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B. Evidentiary Rulings and the Missing-Witness Charge

1. Limits on cross-examination and the boxcutter

Mack argued that he was denied a fair trial by various evidentiary rulings:

• Precluding defense questions about a crowd forming outside the hospital,
• Limiting questions suggesting the victim might have fallen onto a knife, causing the fatal wound, and
• Admitting hearsay testimony about the ownership of a boxcutter found inside the bar.

The court relies on the well-settled principle that trial courts have “broad discretion” to limit cross-examination when the questions are only marginally relevant or risk misleading the jury, citing People v. Erfurt, 234 AD3d 1120 (3d Dept 2025), and similar cases such as People v. Doane, 212 AD3d 875 (3d Dept 2024), and People v. Jones, 184 AD3d 751 (2d Dept 2020).

Applying that principle:

• Crowd at the hospital: The court deems this line of inquiry “only marginally relevant” to the central issues (identity, intent, justification). Limiting it was within the trial court’s discretion.
• Boxcutter ownership and hearsay: The boxcutter was found on the bar floor, but investigators learned it belonged to a third party, and the pathologist testified it could not have caused the fatal wound. The court accepts that extensive focus on the boxcutter risked confusing or misleading the jury by inviting speculation about an irrelevant potential weapon.
• Speculation about falling on the knife: Given the eyewitness’s direct testimony that defendant “hit” the victim in the left chest with a knife, the court holds that the trial judge appropriately prevented the pathologist from speculating that the fatal wound might have resulted from the victim falling on a knife. Courts may limit expert testimony that is speculative or directly contradicts uncontroverted eyewitness accounts without a factual foundation.

The court finds no abuse of discretion and no denial of a fair trial from these rulings.

2. The missing-witness charge

Mack also sought a missing-witness charge because the People did not call another individual who:

• had been present at the bar during the fight, and
• rode in the vehicle transporting the victim to the hospital.

Under the Third Department’s framework, drawn from People v. Lorenz, 211 AD3d 1109 (3d Dept 2022), and People v. Ferguson, 193 AD3d 1253 (3d Dept 2021), a missing-witness charge requires the movant to show:

1. The witness has material knowledge relevant to the trial.
2. The expected testimony would be noncumulative (i.e., not merely repeating what other witnesses have already provided).
3. The witness is “under the control” of the opposing party and would be expected to testify favorably for that party.
4. The witness is available to that party.

Even assuming the first two factors were satisfied, the court focuses on “control” and availability. The People showed that:

• Detectives traveled out of state to interview the witness,
• The witness gave an account consistent with the main eyewitness’s account and showed a cell phone photo identifying Mack as the killer, and
• After the interview, the witness refused to answer calls or return voicemails, and the police were otherwise unable to locate him.

On these facts, the court upholds the finding that:

• The witness was not “under the People’s control,” because they could not secure his presence or cooperation at trial and had no leverage over him.
• Thus, the People successfully rebutted the presumption that they deliberately failed to call a favorable, available witness.

The denial of a missing-witness charge is therefore affirmed.

3. Significance

The court’s treatment of both the evidentiary rulings and the missing-witness issue reinforces familiar trial management doctrines:

• Trial judges can and should exclude marginal, confusing, or speculative lines of questioning, even in serious criminal trials, so long as core confrontation rights are preserved.
• A missing-witness charge is not automatic whenever the prosecution fails to call someone present at the scene; the defense must show actual “control” and likely favorability, and the prosecution can defeat the request by showing practical unavailability.

None of these rulings, either individually or cumulatively, warranted reversal. The conviction falls solely because of the erroneous denial of a justification instruction.

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C. The Central Holding: Entitlement to a Justification Instruction

1. Governing doctrine on justification charges

The defense of justification (self-defense) in New York is primarily governed by Penal Law article 35. In homicide cases, the key question is whether the defendant was justified in using “deadly physical force.” Although the statute itself is not quoted, the court grounds its analysis in a series of leading decisions:

• People v. McManus, 67 NY2d 541 (1986): The Court of Appeals held that a justification charge must be given “whenever there is evidence to support it,” and failure to do so is reversible error if any reasonable view of the evidence could support justification.
• People v. Saylor, 173 AD3d 1489 (3d Dept 2019), and People v. Sands, 157 AD3d 1136 (3d Dept 2018): These cases reiterate that a justification charge must be given “if there is any reasonable view of the evidence, when it is considered in the light most favorable to the defendant,” that would permit a jury to find the defendant’s actions justified.
• People v. Ramirez, 118 AD3d 1108 (3d Dept 2014): Clarifies that to merit a justification instruction for the use of deadly physical force, the record must contain evidence that:
  • the defendant reasonably believed the victim was using or about to use deadly physical force, and
  • the defendant could not safely retreat.
• People v. Huntley, 87 AD2d 488 (4th Dept 1982), affd 59 NY2d 868 (1983), and People v. Steele, 26 NY2d 526 (1970): These decisions recognize that a justification charge may be appropriate even if the defendant’s principal trial theory is inconsistent with justification (e.g., alibi or misidentification). The critical question is not defense strategy but whether the prosecution’s evidence, viewed most favorably to the defendant, permits a justified-acts scenario.
• People v. Brown, 33 NY3d 316 (2019): The Court of Appeals distinguished between being the “initial aggressor” with respect to non-deadly physical force and being the initial aggressor with respect to deadly physical force. A person may instigate a fist fight but later become justified in using deadly force if the opponent escalates to deadly force.

The Third Department also cites cases where failure to charge justification was held to be reversible error, including:

• People v. Powell, 101 AD3d 1369 (3d Dept 2012),
• People v. Zayas, 88 AD3d 918 (2d Dept 2011),
• People v. Fermin, 36 AD3d 934 (2d Dept 2007), and
• People v. White, 16 AD3d 440 (2d Dept 2005).

Collectively, these precedents emphasize:

• The threshold for giving a justification charge is low: “any reasonable view” of the evidence will suffice.
• Inconsistent defenses are allowed; defendants are not forced to choose between denying involvement and asserting justification.
• Whether the defendant was the initial aggressor in deadly force and whether safe retreat was possible are fact questions for the jury when the record supports competing inferences.

2. Key factual elements supporting a justification view

The Appellate Division identifies several aspects of the record that, when viewed in the light most favorable to Mack, support a justification instruction:

• Unclear initial aggressor in the fight: The evidence merely shows that a fight began after someone—“presumably defendant”—yelled derogatory remarks at the victim. It does not definitively establish who threw the first punch or otherwise initiated physical force.
• Victim’s superior size and dominance: It was undisputed that the victim was larger and that he “had gained the upper hand,” knocking Mack down with multiple blows. This could reasonably support a perception of serious danger on Mack’s part.
• Second knife with victim’s DNA:
  • The eyewitness said he did not see the victim with a knife and saw only Mack with a knife.
  • However, police found an open folding knife on the patio near a pool of blood and the picnic tables where the fight began.
  • A forensic technician observed what appeared to be two drops of blood on the knife.
  • DNA testing revealed only the victim’s DNA on that knife.
  • The medical examiner opined, based on wound shape, that this folding knife was not the weapon that caused the fatal injury.
  From this, the court finds that “a reasoned view of the evidence is that the victim had unfolded the knife prior to being stabbed by defendant.” That is, even if the eyewitness did not see it, the victim may have been armed with a deadly weapon during the altercation.
• Ambiguous conduct inside the bar and retreat issues:
  • The eyewitness testified that Mack followed the victim back into the bar.
  • However, the bar’s surveillance footage and other testimony did not clearly indicate whether Mack followed to continue the fight or to leave the establishment.
  • The patio was fully fenced; the only way in or out was through the bar’s interior. Thus, “retreat” required going through the bar, possibly near or past the victim and his group.
  Under these conditions, a jury could find that Mack lacked a safe avenue of retreat once the fight escalated.

These elements, taken together, satisfy the low evidentiary threshold required to charge justification:

• The victim may have been using or about to use deadly physical force (via the folding knife), especially given his dominating physical advantage.
• The patio’s configuration could make safe retreat difficult or impossible.
• The question whether Mack became the “initial aggressor with respect to deadly physical force” is genuinely debatable, making it a matter for the jury under Brown.

3. Inconsistent defenses and the jury’s role

One of the opinion’s most important clarifications is that Mack was entitled to a justification instruction even though his trial strategy largely centered on:

• challenging his identification as the assailant, and
• contesting his intent to kill.

The court explicitly invokes Huntley and Steele to reaffirm:

• A defendant may argue, “I wasn’t there” (or “I didn’t do it”) and still be entitled to a justification charge if the prosecution’s case, taken at face value but viewed in the defendant’s favor, would allow a finding of self-defense.
• The correctness of giving a justification charge does not depend on the internal consistency of the defendant’s trial theory; it depends on whether any reasonable jury could accept a justification scenario based on the evidence actually admitted.

The reasoning respects the jury’s autonomy:

• The jury is free to reject the defendant’s denial of involvement but nonetheless credit portions of the prosecution’s evidence that support a self-defense narrative.
• It is impermissible for the court to effectively narrow the jury’s options by withholding a legally available defense that the evidence would support.

Accordingly, the failure to provide a justification charge under these circumstances constitutes “reversible error warranting a new trial,” directly following McManus and decisions like People v. Austin, 134 AD3d 850 (2d Dept 2015).

4. Practical implications of this holding

The decision in Mack will likely have several concrete effects in future cases:

• Defense practice:
  • Defense counsel can more confidently request justification instructions even when running primary theories of misidentification, lack of intent, or total denial of involvement.
  • Counsel can rely on Mack to argue that forensic or circumstantial evidence (e.g., presence of another weapon with victim’s DNA) is sufficient to meet the “any reasonable view” threshold.
• Trial courts:
  • Judges must carefully examine the entire record—including evidence not aligned with either side’s preferred narrative—to determine whether a justification instruction is required.
  • Even thin or contested evidence supporting justification must be credited at the charging stage, because credibility and weight are for the jury.
• Prosecution strategy:
  • Prosecutors may need to anticipate justification charges more frequently, especially where any evidence suggests the victim was armed or physically dominant.
  • The People may choose to present additional evidence negating justification (e.g., showing safe avenues of retreat, or disproving that the victim was armed) where such issues possibly arise.

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D. Cameras in the Courtroom: Civil Rights Law § 52

1. Statutory prohibition

After resolving the justification issue, the court turns briefly but pointedly to another error “to be avoided” on retrial. The trial court had allowed members of the press to take video and still photographs during the testimony of certain witnesses.

Civil Rights Law § 52 provides:

No person, firm, association or corporation shall televise, broadcast, take motion pictures or arrange for the televising, broadcasting, or taking of motion pictures within this state of proceedings, in which the testimony of witnesses by subpoena or other compulsory process is or may be taken, conducted by a court, commission, committee, administrative agency or other tribunal in this state.

The statute is categorical: audiovisual coverage of testimonial judicial proceedings is forbidden in New York. There are no exceptions carved out in the text for criminal trials, public interest, or press applications, and prior experimental “cameras in the courtroom” programs have lapsed. The law remains in force.

2. Application and precedents

The Third Department holds that the trial court plainly erred in permitting audiovisual coverage of live witness testimony, citing:

• Matter of Heckstall v. McGrath, 15 AD3d 824 (3d Dept 2005), and
• People v. Nance, 2 AD3d 1473 (4th Dept 2003), lv denied 2 NY3d 764 (2004).

These cases similarly enforced Civil Rights Law § 52 and invalidated or disapproved orders or practices allowing such coverage.

Here, the error did not itself provide the basis for reversal because the court had already determined that the failure to charge justification warranted a new trial. Nonetheless, the panel expressly flags the issue so that the same violation does not recur.

3. Impact

Mack is a reminder that:

• Despite evolving norms nationwide toward greater courtroom transparency, New York’s statutory prohibition remains strict and enforceable.
• Trial courts may not authorize electronic media coverage of witness testimony absent legislative change to § 52.
• Press interests in photographing or filming trials cannot override this clear statutory command.

For retrials and future cases, judges, court administrators, and media outlets must ensure compliance with § 52 to avoid error and potential collateral challenges.

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IV. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. “Justification” (self-defense) and “deadly physical force”

In New York, “justification” is the legal term for self-defense. Broadly:

• A person may use physical force if they reasonably believe it is necessary to defend themselves from another’s unlawful physical force.
• They may use deadly physical force (force that can cause death or serious injury) only if they reasonably believe the other person:
  • is using or is about to use deadly physical force, or
  • is committing certain serious felonies (like robbery or burglary, in limited circumstances).

Even when deadly force might otherwise be justified, the person generally has a “duty to retreat” if they know they can do so safely—unless they are in their own dwelling and not the initial aggressor. The issues in Mack concern:

• whether Mack reasonably believed the victim was using or about to use deadly force (e.g., via a knife), and
• whether Mack could have safely retreated from the fenced patio area.

2. “Initial aggressor” vs. “initial aggressor of deadly force”

A critical nuance from People v. Brown and applied here:

• Someone can start a minor confrontation (e.g., shove, throw a punch) and thus be the “initial aggressor” in non-deadly force.
• But if the other person then escalates dramatically—say, by pulling a knife or gun—the original aggressor may be justified in using deadly force to defend themselves against that escalation.

So, even if Mack (or someone in his group) started the fist fight, the jury could still find he was justified in using a knife if the victim later produced a deadly weapon and Mack lacked a safe way out.

3. “Weight of the evidence” vs. “legal sufficiency”

New York distinguishes:

• Legal sufficiency: Whether the evidence, if believed, could allow any rational jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a minimum-threshold, prosecution-favoring standard.
• Weight of the evidence: Whether, after evaluating credibility and conflicts in a neutral light, the appellate court believes the jury’s verdict was against the greater weight of the credible evidence. This standard allows the appellate court to sit as a sort of “thirteenth juror,” but with deference to the trial jury’s observational advantages.

In Mack, the court addresses only the weight-of-the-evidence challenge (implicitly assuming legal sufficiency) and concludes the jury’s finding of intent to kill was supported.

4. “Missing-witness charge”

A missing-witness charge allows the jury to draw an adverse inference: if a party fails to call a witness whom:

• would be expected to testify favorably to that party,
• has relevant, noncumulative knowledge,
• is under that party’s “control” (meaning reasonably available and aligned with that party), and
• is available but not produced,

the jury may infer that the witness’s testimony would not have supported that party’s case. It is a tool to discourage “cherry-picking” witnesses. In Mack, the prosecution showed that the out-of-state witness became uncooperative and unreachable, defeating the defense’s attempt to invoke this doctrine.

5. Hearsay and speculative expert testimony

• Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for its truth, generally inadmissible unless an exception applies. Testimony about what others said concerning the boxcutter’s ownership could raise hearsay concerns but was also treated as marginal and potentially misleading.
• Speculative expert testimony is disfavored. Experts may not guess about possibilities unsupported by the facts and must ground opinions in evidence. The trial court’s refusal to let the pathologist speculate that the victim might have fallen on the knife, contradicting direct eyewitness testimony, fits this principle.

6. Civil Rights Law § 52 and cameras in the courtroom

Civil Rights Law § 52 broadly bans televising, broadcasting, or making motion pictures of proceedings where subpoenaed testimony may be taken. The statute embodies policy judgments about:

• protecting witnesses from intimidation or embarrassment,
• preserving the decorum and fairness of trials, and
• keeping the courtroom from becoming a media spectacle.

Mack reiterates that, absent legislative change, New York courts cannot authorize cameras or other audiovisual recording during live testimony.

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V. Broader Impact and Future Significance

1. Expansion and clarification of the right to a justification instruction

People v. Mack consolidates and extends several strands of justification law:

• It affirms that any reasonable view of the evidence—including forensic evidence such as a second knife bearing only the victim’s DNA—is enough to require a justification instruction.
• It underscores that justification must be charged even where the defendant’s primary trial theory is inconsistent (e.g., “I’m not the attacker”), reinforcing the holdings of Steele and Huntley.
• It brings Brown’s concept of an “initial aggressor of deadly force” into routine appellate analysis, emphasizing that aggression at the non-deadly level does not automatically forfeit all self-defense rights if the other party escalates.
• It highlights environmental factors (such as a fenced patio with only one exit) as bearing on the “duty to retreat” analysis, showing that physical layout can make safe retreat a contested jury question rather than a legal given.

2. Guidance for trial judges and practitioners

For trial courts:

• When in doubt about justification, the safer course—consistent with Mack—is to give the instruction and allow the jury to resolve factual disputes.
• Courts should analyze all evidence (not just eyewitness accounts but also physical and forensic proof) in deciding whether any justification scenario can reasonably be inferred.

For defense counsel:

• Mack is a powerful citation when arguing for justification instructions despite the defense’s nominal theory (identity, intent, or otherwise).
• Defense counsel should highlight any evidence suggesting the victim was armed or that retreat was impractical, even if such evidence comes primarily from the People’s case.

For prosecutors:

• The People should anticipate that even limited evidence of a victim’s weapon or dominant physical advantage may trigger a justification charge, and be prepared to negate justification beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Strategic decisions about which physical evidence to introduce may indirectly influence whether a justification instruction becomes unavoidable.

3. Reinforcing media restrictions in New York courtrooms

On the media and transparency front, Mack serves as a reminder that:

• New York is unusual in maintaining a firm statutory bar to televised or recorded testimony in court proceedings.
• Even well-intentioned trial-level efforts to accommodate media access can cross the legal line if they allow photography or filming of live witnesses.
• If policy-makers seek more openness, the path is legislative amendment, not judicial discretion.

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VI. Conclusion

People v. Mack is a significant Third Department decision that clarifies two important areas of New York criminal procedure:

• Justification Instructions: The case strongly reaffirms that whenever there is any reasonable view of the trial evidence—however contested or circumstantial—that could support a finding of self-defense, the defendant is entitled to a justification charge. This holds true even if the defendant’s primary defense is inconsistent with justification, such as misidentification or lack of intent. By reversing Mack’s conviction on this ground, the court underscores that failure to give such a charge is not a harmless procedural misstep; it is reversible error that requires a new trial.
• Cameras in the Courtroom: The opinion also sends a clear signal that Civil Rights Law § 52 remains fully operative. Trial courts may not authorize video or photographic coverage of witness testimony. While this error did not itself drive the reversal here, the court’s admonition ensures that the issue receives attention on retrial and in future cases.

Taken together, these holdings reinforce the central role of the jury in resolving factual disputes about self-defense, insist on adherence to legislative restrictions on courtroom media, and provide robust guidance to trial judges and practitioners navigating homicide trials in New York. People v. Mack will likely become a key citation on when justification instructions are required and on the continuing scope of New York’s ban on televised or recorded testimony in criminal proceedings.