People v. Lloyd F.: Second Department sets a stringent “extraordinary circumstances” bar under CPL 722.23(1)(d) for retaining adolescent-offender cases in the Youth Part

Introduction

In People v. Lloyd F. (2025 NY Slip Op 04583, Appellate Division, Second Department), the court squarely addressed what qualifies as “extraordinary circumstances” under New York’s Raise the Age statute (CPL 722.23[1][d])—the pivotal standard that permits a Youth Part to prevent removal of an adolescent-offender case to Family Court. The matter involved a 16-year-old charged with weapon possession offenses. The Youth Part granted the People’s motion to prevent removal, relying on the seriousness of the charged conduct, a prior youthful offender adjudication, and a social-media livestream showing the youth with a firearm. On appeal from a judgment entered after a guilty plea, the Second Department reversed, holding that none of the identified factors—alone or in combination—met the high threshold of “extraordinary circumstances” envisioned by the Legislature.

The decision offers a detailed statutory interpretation grounded in dictionary definitions, U.S. Supreme Court juvenile jurisprudence (Roper v. Simmons; Graham v. Florida), the Governor’s 2014 Executive Order establishing the Commission on Youth, Public Safety, and Justice, and floor debates on the Raise the Age legislation. It crystallizes a rigorous presumption favoring removal of adolescent-offender cases to Family Court and explains that only truly exceptional, aggravating circumstances should justify criminal-court retention.

Summary of the Judgment

The defendant, 16 at the time of the alleged conduct, was charged with second-degree criminal possession of a weapon (a loaded .40 caliber pistol, one round chambered and 15 in the magazine), criminal possession of a firearm, and fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon. At the six-day appearance contemplated by CPL 722.23(2)(c), the People did not pursue retention based on the “violent felony” retention criteria (e.g., that the firearm was displayed in furtherance of the offense) and instead conceded the case was legally eligible for removal. They then moved under CPL 722.23(1) to prevent removal, arguing “extraordinary circumstances.”

The Youth Part granted the People’s motion, emphasizing the defendant’s prior youthful offender adjudication for a group assault at age 14 and the ADA’s affirmation describing a prior social-media livestream in which the defendant allegedly pointed a gun at the camera while smoking marijuana. The Youth Part concluded that—despite documented engagement with services, mentorship, and programs—the rearrest for weapon possession showed the defendant was not amenable to Family Court intervention.

The Second Department reversed. Applying an abuse-of-discretion-as-a-matter-of-law standard (because that was the argument raised on appeal), the court held that the record did not reasonably support a finding of “extraordinary circumstances.” The court emphasized that:

• Mere unlawful possession of a loaded firearm by a 16-year-old, without display or use in furtherance of another offense and with no harm to persons or property, is not extraordinary under the Raise the Age framework.
• The ADA’s unsourced allegations regarding an earlier livestream did not transform the case into an exceptional one; there was no nexus to use in furtherance of another crime, and no harm occurred.
• A prior youthful offender adjudication at age 14 and a single rearrest did not establish a pattern of recidivism or “strong proof” that the youth was beyond the reach of Family Court services.

The court ordered that the People’s motion to prevent removal be denied and directed entry of an order removing the case to the Family Court, Richmond County. In light of that disposition, it did not reach suppression or sentencing claims raised from the plea.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

The decision is notable for its synthesis of statutory interpretation principles, juvenile sentencing jurisprudence, and legislative history:

• Statutory interpretation framework:
  • Nadkos, Inc. v Preferred Contrs. Ins. Co. Risk Retention Group LLC (34 NY3d 1) and People v Andujar (30 NY3d 160) for using ordinary meaning and dictionaries where statutory terms are undefined.
  • People v Badji (36 NY3d 393), Lubonty v U.S. Bank N.A. (34 NY3d 250), and Bank of Am., N.A. v Kessler (39 NY3d 317) to confirm that legislative purpose and history may illuminate statutory meaning even where text is facially clear.
• Juvenile culpability and development:
  • Roper v Simmons (543 US 551), Johnson v Texas (509 US 350), and Graham v Florida (560 US 48) to underscore the scientific and moral bases for treating juveniles differently: diminished responsibility, greater susceptibility to peer pressure, and transitory character traits that are amenable to reform.
• New York juvenile justice history and policy:
  • Executive Order No. 131 (2014) establishing the Commission on Youth, Public Safety, and Justice, highlighting research on adolescent brain development, increased risks of harm in adult settings, and recidivism data favoring youth-oriented interventions.
  • Assembly floor debates (particularly Judiciary Chair Joseph Lentol’s remarks) indicating that only “extremely rare and exceptional cases” should remain in criminal court, with concrete examples of extraordinary circumstances (e.g., series of serious crimes over many days, particularly cruel or heinous conduct, coercive ringleader behavior).
• Related New York cases:
  • People v Guerrero (235 AD3d 1276), Clark v Boyle (210 AD3d 463), and trial-level decisions such as People v T.P. (2021), People v K.S. (2024), People v A.M. (2024), People v W.C. (2025), People v J.R. (2024), People v B.H. (2024), and People v J.K. (2023), which collectively reflect trial courts’ application of Raise the Age removal/retention mechanics and help illustrate the emerging contours of “extraordinary circumstances.”
  • Green v Montgomery (95 NY2d 695) for the rehabilitative mission of Family Court and the benefits of avoiding criminal convictions for youth.
  • Family-law uses of the phrase “extraordinary circumstances,” e.g., Matter of Suarez v Williams (26 NY3d 440), Matter of Kerry D. v Deena D. (230 AD3d 492), and Matter of Morales v Diaz (233 AD3d 1033), to show that across different legal contexts the Legislature deploys “extraordinary circumstances” to set a very high bar.
  • People v Cook (34 NY3d 412) and Forman v Henkin (30 NY3d 656) on the abuse-of-discretion standard and the “reasonably support” test for reviewing discretionary determinations.

Together, these authorities support the court’s insistence on a narrow, exceptional meaning of “extraordinary circumstances” and a strong presumption favoring Family Court jurisdiction for adolescent offenders.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolds in three steps: statutory structure, interpretive method, and application to the facts.

1. Statutory structure of CPL 722.23:
   • The Raise the Age framework presumes removal of adolescent-offender cases to Family Court. If the case fits certain violent-felony retention criteria and the People prove those by a preponderance within six days—e.g., that the adolescent displayed a firearm “in furtherance of” the offense—the case can be kept in the Youth Part. Otherwise, CPL 722.23(1) says the action “shall” be removed unless the People timely move and the court determines “extraordinary circumstances” exist. The motion “shall” be denied in the absence of such a determination, and the court must make written findings.
   • This architecture uses mandatory language to create a default path to Family Court, interrupted only by narrow exceptions. Importantly, the Legislature specifically carved out weapon-display cases under CPL 722.23(2)(c)(ii)—underscoring that mere possession (without display in furtherance of another offense) was expected, in the mine run, to be removed to Family Court.
2. Interpretive method and legislative purpose:
   • Because “extraordinary circumstances” is undefined, the court relies on ordinary meaning (dictionaries like Merriam-Webster and Black’s Law Dictionary) and legislative history. “Extraordinary” denotes what is beyond the usual, customary, or common; the Legislature thus intended a very high threshold.
   • Legislative history—informed by adolescent development science and executive and legislative policy goals—shows a deliberate design to reduce adult-court prosecutions of 16- and 17-year-olds, mitigate lifelong consequences of adolescent mistakes, and channel cases into a rehabilitative system unless the facts are highly unusual or heinous and the youth is demonstrably not amenable to Family Court services.
   • The opinion articulates a practical analytical framework: courts should look for aggravating factors that demonstrate cruelty, heinousness, or meaningful recidivism signaling something beyond impulsive adolescent conduct or environmental pressures; weigh those against mitigating factors (poverty, trauma, learning difficulties, immaturity, peer influence, lack of role models, substance abuse, etc.); and ask the overarching question whether there is a real possibility of reform—in other words, whether the youth is amenable to Family Court services or, conversely, whether there is strong proof that Family Court would not help.
3. Application to the case:
   • Mere possession of a loaded firearm (without display in furtherance of another offense) by a 16-year-old, in a high-crime area, with no harm to persons or property, is not “extraordinary.” The Legislature explicitly contemplated that such cases, absent the display/use factor, could be removed to Family Court.
   • The ADA’s unsourced affirmation about a prior livestream showing the youth pointing a gun at a camera while smoking marijuana—even if considered—did not add the kind of exceptional aggravation that warrants retention: it neither alleged harm nor connected the firearm to further criminal purpose. The behavior, the court notes, aligns with recognized adolescent traits—immaturity, susceptibility to peer pressures, and poor situational control.
   • The Youth Part’s reliance on a prior youthful offender adjudication for a group assault at age 14, coupled with one subsequent arrest, did not establish a pattern of recidivism or escalation demonstrating non-amenability. The record also showed meaningful engagement with services and mentorship—ironically used by the Youth Part to infer futility. The Second Department rejected the notion that a single rearrest suffices as “strong proof” that Family Court cannot help, warning that such reasoning would collapse the statutory presumption of removal.

On the standard of review, the court applied abuse of discretion as a matter of law, asking whether the record reasonably supported the Youth Part’s determination. It held that it did not.

Impact and Forward-Looking Consequences

The decision has immediate and systemic implications for Raise the Age practice:

• High bar reaffirmed: The Second Department cemented a stringent reading of “extraordinary circumstances.” Routine or even serious adolescent misconduct that falls short of display/use in furtherance, causing injury, or showing unusual cruelty/heinousness will ordinarily be removed to Family Court.
• Burden on the People’s showing: While CPL 722.23(1)(d) does not specify a formal burden of proof, the decision makes clear the People must present a robust, fact-specific record of aggravation and non-amenability. Unsworn or unsourced allegations will carry little weight, and speculative inferences from a single rearrest will not suffice.
• Amenability is central: Evidence of engagement with services weighs against retention. Courts should avoid treating partial progress interrupted by a new arrest as dispositive proof of futility. The inquiry is holistic and reform-oriented.
• Examples of truly extraordinary cases: The opinion’s reliance on legislative history provides guideposts: multiple serious crimes over days, especially cruel or heinous conduct, or coercive ringleader dynamics—particularly if paired with a documented pattern of failed intervention and escalating violence.
• Procedural discipline: Youth Parts must issue written findings and, “to the extent practicable,” conclusions of law when denying removal. The appellate court’s close review here signals that perfunctory or generalized findings will be vulnerable on appeal.
• Plea consequences: Where improper retention led to a plea in criminal court, reversal and removal can vacate the conviction and redirect the matter to Family Court, altering the long-term consequences for the youth.
• Systemic alignment: The decision aligns the Second Department’s approach with contemporary juvenile science and legislative intent, likely reducing the number of adolescent cases retained in criminal court and increasing Family Court caseloads for rehabilitative disposition.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Raise the Age: A 2017 legislative reform that moved most 16- and 17-year-old felony cases to a specialized Youth Part for an initial screening, with a presumption that cases will be removed to Family Court unless narrow exceptions apply.
• Youth Part: A part of Supreme or County Court that initially receives adolescent-offender felony cases and decides whether to retain them or remove them to Family Court.
• Removal vs. retention: Removal terminates the criminal action and transfers the matter to Family Court for juvenile delinquency proceedings; retention keeps the case in adult criminal court’s Youth Part for prosecution.
• CPL 722.23(2)(c) retention: For certain violent felonies, the People can prevent removal by promptly proving, among other things, that the youth displayed a firearm or deadly weapon in furtherance of the offense, or caused significant physical injury, or committed certain sex offenses.
• “Extraordinary circumstances” under CPL 722.23(1)(d): A very high threshold permitting retention even where the violent-felony criteria are not met—reserved for truly exceptional cases with unusual aggravating facts demonstrating non-amenability to Family Court.
• Display “in furtherance” of the offense: More than mere possession; the weapon must be shown in a way that advances or facilitates the commission of the charged offense.
• Youthful offender (YO) adjudication: A non-criminal outcome that can replace a conviction for certain eligible youths, sealing the record and avoiding collateral consequences. A YO is not a criminal conviction and should be contextualized carefully when used to assess “recidivism.”
• Abuse of discretion as a matter of law: An appellate review standard asking whether the lower court’s discretionary decision is unsupported by the record or rests on an error of law; here, whether the record “reasonably supports” the finding of extraordinary circumstances.
• Preponderance of the evidence: The more-likely-than-not evidentiary standard expressly used by CPL 722.23(2)(c) for the violent-felony retention path. The statute does not specify a burden for the “extraordinary circumstances” pathway, but the decision signals the need for persuasive, concrete proof.

Conclusion

People v. Lloyd F. clarifies, with uncommon precision, that “extraordinary circumstances” under CPL 722.23(1)(d) means what it says: extraordinary. The Second Department anchors its analysis in statutory text, legislative history, and modern adolescent development science to enforce a strong presumption of removal to Family Court. The opinion provides a functional test—seeking uncommon aggravation and credible evidence of non-amenability, balanced against mitigation—and rejects routine markers (mere loaded-gun possession without display/use, a prior YO, unsourced social-media bravado, and a single rearrest) as insufficient to overcome the default.

The ruling’s key takeaways are:

• Only the most exceptional cases should remain in the Youth Part.
• Weapon possession without display/use and without harm is ordinarily not “extraordinary.”
• Non-amenability requires strong, specific proof; a single subsequent arrest does not meet that standard.
• Courts must make careful findings and honor the statute’s rehabilitative aims and presumption of Family Court jurisdiction.

By restoring this case to the Family Court pathway, the Second Department reinforces Raise the Age’s core policy choice: treat adolescent offending primarily as a problem for a rehabilitative system unless the facts are truly beyond the ordinary. This decision will guide Youth Parts in cabining the “extraordinary circumstances” exception to the narrow, exceptional role the Legislature intended.