People v. Kadar: CPL 245.25 Plea-Offer Disclosure Obligations Attach Only When the Prosecution Makes the Plea Offer (Not When the Court Does)

Court: Appellate Division, Third Department

Date: December 31, 2025

Citation: 2025 NY Slip Op 07348

1. Introduction

People v. Kadar addresses the intersection of guilty pleas, preservation rules, and New York’s post-2019 discovery regime under CPL article 245. The defendant, Budhnarain Kadar, was indicted for second-degree murder (strangulation of his girlfriend) and tampering with physical evidence. After the People produced extensive discovery (CPL 245.20) but while their CPL 245.70 protective-order motion was pending to withhold additional witness-related materials, the defendant pleaded guilty—accepting a plea disposition offered by the court (not the prosecutor).

On direct appeal and by leave from the denial of a CPL 440.10 motion, the defendant argued primarily that: (i) his plea was not knowing/voluntary (based on sentencing remarks), (ii) the plea was improperly accepted without ensuring CPL 245.25 compliance, and (iii) he received ineffective assistance of counsel (including discovery-related and intoxication-defense allegations). The Third Department affirmed both the judgment and the CPL 440.10 order.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Plea voluntariness challenge was unpreserved because the defendant did not move to withdraw the plea or vacate the judgment before sentencing; the narrow “Lopez exception” was not triggered by his sentencing remarks, which the court characterized as remorse rather than an intent-negating recantation.
CPL 245.25 disclosure obligations did not apply because the plea offer accepted by the defendant was extended by the court, whereas CPL 245.25(2) applies “where the prosecution has made a guilty plea offer.”
Any alleged discovery defects did not warrant relief on this record and, in any event, were forfeited by the guilty plea absent a showing that they impacted the decision to plead.
The sentence (19 years to life) was not unduly harsh or severe, and restitution reimbursement to the Office of Victim Services was statutorily authorized.
The CPL 440.10 ineffective-assistance claims were properly denied without a hearing where they were unsupported, contradicted by the record, or not raised below.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

A. Preservation and the “narrow exception” for plea challenges

People v Morales: Cited for the general rule that record-based challenges to a guilty plea must be preserved by a postallocution motion (e.g., to withdraw the plea) when the defendant had an adequate opportunity to do so.
People v Lopez: The foundational authority defining the rare circumstance where preservation is excused—when the defendant’s factual recitation (or relevant statements during plea/sentencing) “clearly casts significant doubt” on guilt, negates an element, or otherwise calls voluntariness into question, thereby triggering a duty of further inquiry.
People v Tyrell, People v Worden, People v Moses: Reinforce the constrained scope of the Lopez exception and the requirement that the record must affirmatively present a real inconsistency with guilt or voluntariness—not merely dissatisfaction or equivocal remorse.
People v McKennion and People v Beasley: Invoked for the trial court’s duty, when the exception is triggered, to make sufficient inquiry to ensure the plea is knowing and voluntary.
People v Robles and People v Lomack: Third Department applications of the same inquiry obligation in the plea context.
People v Reese and People v Van Alstyne: Address the trial court’s obligation, once doubt is raised, to inquire further and/or provide an opportunity to withdraw the plea.
People v Sims and People v Matos: Used to support the key characterization here—statements that are best understood as remorse, regret, or apology do not necessarily negate intent or compel further inquiry.
People v Skyers (compared): Cited as a contrast—illustrating that where statements truly undermine an element (such as intent) the duty to inquire may be triggered, underscoring why the court deemed Kadar’s remarks insufficient.

B. Discovery under CPL Article 245, guilty pleas, and materiality to the plea decision

People v Hewitt and People v Pizarro: Support the proposition that substantial compliance with discovery and the absence of a demonstrated effect on the decision to plead defeat claims premised on alleged disclosure shortcomings.
People v Fisher: Cited for the principle that relief generally requires a showing that alleged discovery issues were consequential to the plea decision (i.e., impacted whether the defendant would have pleaded guilty).
People v Maclean, People v Peterson, and People v Salters: Reinforce the forfeiture principle—nonjurisdictional defects, including many discovery complaints, are generally forfeited by a valid guilty plea.

C. Restitution/OVS reimbursement

People v Burkett: Cited in support of restitution reimbursement to the state for funeral expenses via the Office of Victim Services framework, consistent with Penal Law § 60.27 and Executive Law § 621.

D. CPL 440.10 hearings and summary denial standards

People v Monteiro and People v Byrd: Establish that a hearing is required only where a CPL 440.10 motion presents material nonrecord facts which, if proven, would entitle the defendant to relief.
People v Marte-Feliz and People v Podeswa: Support summary denial when claims are self-serving, contradicted by the record, or unsupported by competent evidence (CPL 440.30[4]).
People v Phelps and People v Sparks: Stand for the appellate limitation that ineffective-assistance theories not raised in the CPL 440.10 motion are not preserved for appellate review in that posture.

E. Ineffective assistance claims tied to investigation/defenses

People v Guynup, People v Leiva, and People v Robetoy: Used to reject speculative intoxication-defense claims absent evidentiary support that such a defense was viable or would have altered the outcome.
People v Gonyea: Supports the conclusion that an “advantageous plea” and a record devoid of indicia of counsel’s ineffectiveness justify denial without a hearing.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Sentencing remorse vs. intent-negating statements (preservation and the Lopez exception)

The defendant attempted to reframe his sentencing remarks (“I did not mean to do this. It was a terrible mistake.”) as negating the intent element of intentional murder. The Third Department rejected that characterization by contextual reading: the statements were apologies and expressions of regret, not factual assertions inconsistent with the allocution (where the defendant had admitted intentionally causing the victim’s death). As a result, the “rare case” exception of People v Lopez did not apply, and the claim remained unpreserved because no postallocution motion was filed.

Notably, the sentencing judge expressly responded on the record that strangulation signified an intentional homicide, underscoring the court’s view that the defendant’s remarks were not a true disavowal of intent but an attempt to mitigate culpability through remorse.

B. The CPL 245.25 holding: prosecution-made plea offer as the statutory trigger

The opinion’s most distinctive doctrinal point is its textual reading of CPL 245.25(2): the disclosure requirements apply “where the prosecution has made a guilty plea offer.” Here, the defendant accepted an offer “made by Supreme Court” (a court-extended disposition), not the People’s on-record offer that included an appeal waiver and a 20-to-life recommendation. Because the statutory trigger was absent, the court held that Supreme Court did not err by accepting the plea without “ensuring” CPL 245.25 compliance.

The court also emphasized practical voluntariness indicia: defense counsel represented that discovery had been received; the defendant confirmed he had time to consult about discovery; and the defendant proceeded despite knowing a protective-order motion was pending concerning additional witness-related materials.

C. Forfeiture and lack of demonstrated effect on the plea decision

Even beyond the CPL 245.25 trigger issue, the Third Department found no basis to conclude that any alleged discovery violation affected the decision to plead guilty, citing People v Hewitt, People v Pizarro, and People v Fisher. It then applied the familiar guilty-plea forfeiture principle (as reflected in People v Maclean, People v Peterson, and People v Salters) to reject discovery-based challenges after the plea.

D. CPL 440.10: no hearing required on unsupported or unpreserved theories

The court adhered to CPL 440.30(4) summary-denial standards: where a defendant’s allegations are conclusory, self-serving, contradicted by the record, or unsupported by other evidence, a hearing is not required (People v Marte-Feliz; People v Podeswa). Several ineffective-assistance theories were rejected as unreviewable because they were not raised in the CPL 440.10 motion (People v Phelps; People v Sparks). The two addressed theories—failure to provide discovery and failure to investigate intoxication—were rejected as evidentially unsupported and/or not shown to be viable in a way that would matter.

3.3. Impact

Clarifies the scope of CPL 245.25 in plea practice: The decision underscores that CPL 245.25’s plea-related disclosure provision is keyed to a “guilty plea offer” made by the prosecution. Where the operative offer is court-extended, defendants may face an uphill climb arguing that CPL 245.25(2) independently requires the court to confirm prosecutorial disclosure as a condition of accepting the plea.
Reinforces a narrow reading of the Lopez exception: Post-plea/sentencing expressions of remorse—even phrased as “I didn’t mean it”—will often be treated as mitigation, not as an element-negating claim, unless they clearly contradict guilt or the allocution.
Signals evidentiary expectations for CPL 440.10 discovery and defense-investigation claims: Allegations that counsel failed to share discovery or pursue intoxication must be supported by competent evidence and a plausible showing of viability/materiality; conclusory assertions will not force a hearing.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Preservation”: Many appellate claims must be raised first in the trial court (e.g., by moving to withdraw a plea before sentencing). If not, appellate courts generally will not review them.
The “Lopez exception”: A narrow safety valve—if a defendant says something during the plea or sentencing that plainly suggests they might not be guilty (or that an element is missing), the judge must ask follow-up questions or allow plea withdrawal. Mere remorse usually is not enough.
CPL 245.25(2): A discovery rule that, by its text, is triggered when “the prosecution has made a guilty plea offer.” In Kadar, the defendant accepted a plea offer made by the court, so the appellate court treated CPL 245.25(2) as inapplicable.
Protective order (CPL 245.70): A mechanism allowing the prosecution to seek permission to withhold or limit disclosure (often to protect witness safety or confidentiality). Here, the motion was pending at the time of the plea.
CPL 440.10 motion: A post-judgment motion to vacate a conviction, often used for claims that rely on facts outside the trial record (like certain ineffective-assistance allegations). Courts may deny without a hearing if claims are unsupported or contradicted by the record.
Forfeiture by guilty plea: A valid guilty plea generally waives many nonjurisdictional objections (including numerous discovery-related complaints), unless a defendant can show a legally recognized exception.

5. Conclusion

People v. Kadar affirms a murder-and-tampering guilty plea and provides a pointed statutory takeaway: CPL 245.25(2)’s plea-offer disclosure obligations are framed as applying when the prosecution makes the guilty plea offer; where the defendant pleads to a court-extended offer, the statute does not, on this decision’s reading, impose the same pre-plea disclosure condition. The opinion also reemphasizes strict preservation rules for plea challenges and a restrained application of the People v Lopez exception, while reiterating that CPL 440.10 hearings are not warranted on unsupported, speculative, or record-contradicted ineffective-assistance claims.

People v. Kadar — CPL 245.25 Plea-Disclosure Applies Only to Prosecutorial Plea Offers, Not Court-Extended Offers