People v. Jasso: Clarifying the Declaration-Against-Interest Exception and Sentencing Discretion under Senate Bill 620

Introduction

People v. Jasso (S179454) is a 2025 Supreme Court of California decision affirming a murder conviction and death sentence while addressing several evidentiary and sentencing issues of statewide importance. Defendant Christopher Guy Jasso was convicted of first‐degree murder with special circumstances—murder during a robbery—and suffered personal firearm‐use and discharge enhancements. His appeal raised numerous contentions: the admissibility of double‐layered hearsay (statements by accomplice Fabian Perez to friend Manuel Rivera, then by Rivera to police); confrontation‐clause challenges; sufficiency and corroboration of evidence for the robbery‐murder special circumstance; instructional errors re felony‐murder and accomplice liability; and prosecutorial comments in penalty phase. In the penalty phase, the court also considered Jasso’s violent conduct in custody and his background. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the conviction and sentence but remanded for the trial court to consider striking firearm enhancements under Senate Bill No. 620.

Summary of the Judgment

Justice Kruger’s opinion, joined by six colleagues, resolved Jasso’s automatic appeal of his capital judgment. The Court held:

Declaration‐against‐interest exception: Accomplice Perez’s statements to friend Rivera were admissible under Evidence Code § 1230 because they exposed Perez to criminal liability (robbery, disposing of a murder weapon, sharing proceeds) and were sufficiently trustworthy in context. Rivera’s refusal to testify did not bar admission of his statements to Detective Carrillo; Jasso’s counsel had expressly agreed to that procedure.
Confrontation Clause: Perez’s out-of-court statements to Rivera were nontestimonial, and Rivera’s statements to police were also nontestimonial, so there was no Sixth Amendment violation.
Robbery‐murder special circumstance: Evidence corroborating Perez’s account—fingerprints on a newspaper in the taxicab, Circle K video placing Jasso in Cardona’s van shortly before the shooting, forensic shell‐casing analysis linking Jasso’s home ranch to the murder weapon, and wallet‐disposal evidence—was sufficient and independent of Perez’s statements.
Felony‐murder instructions & Senate Bill 1437: Although the jury received a pre-2019 definition of felony murder, the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the true‐findings on firearm enhancements and special circumstance necessarily show Jasso was the actual killer.
Aider‐and‐abettor (CALCRIM 400) instruction: Any potential confusion from “a person is equally guilty” was cured by the accomplice liability instruction (CALCRIM 401) and by the overwhelming proof that Jasso personally shot the victim.
Prosecutorial comments: Remarks about Jasso’s “opportunity” to hold the People to their burden were not improper Griffin comments on failure to testify but rather an argument about Jasso’s denial of process to his jail victim.
Sentencing discretion under Senate Bill 620: Because the enhancements for firearm use and discharge became discretionary after January 1, 2018, and Jasso’s judgment was not yet final, the Court remanded for the trial court to consider striking them in the interest of justice.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

People v. Spriggs (1964) 60 Cal.2d 868, and People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419: early declarations-against-interest cases establishing that statements “so far contrary to the declarant’s penal interest” carry sufficient reliability to overcome hearsay exclusion.
People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698: modern exposition of Evidence Code § 1230 and factors for assessing trustworthiness—declarant unavailable, statement against penal interest, reliability in context.
People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603: collateral or self-serving assertions in an accomplice statement must be redacted; only truly “self-inculpatory” portions qualify.
People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, and People v. Tran (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1207: “inextricably tied” admissions (here, participation in robbery and disposing of weapon) support admission of related statements (shooter’s acts) as against interest.
Ohio v. Clark (2015) 576 U.S. 237, and Michigan v. Bryant (2011) 562 U.S. 344: nontestimonial hearsay does not implicate the Confrontation Clause.
Senate Bill 1437 (2018) & Senate Bill 620 (2017): legislative reforms to the felony-murder rule and discretionary striking of firearm enhancements.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court divided the evidentiary dispute into two “layers” of hearsay. First, Perez→Rivera statements were admissible under the declaration-against-interest exception (§ 1230) because they exposed Perez to liability for robbery, murder, accessory after the fact (disposing of a gun), and theft of proceeds. Perez narrated his own participation and disposal of evidence, making the statements trustworthy despite portions that shifted blame to Jasso.

Second, Rivera’s refusal to testify at trial did not preclude Detective Carrillo from relating what Rivera told him, because Jasso’s counsel expressly agreed to that procedure—and thus forfeited any hearsay or confrontation objection. The Court declined to resolve on direct appeal whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, holding those questions more appropriate for habeas corpus, given the silent record about defense strategy.

On the robbery-murder special-circumstance and accomplice-corroboration rules (Pen. Code § 1111), the Court stressed that even erroneously admitted evidence counts for sufficiency analysis, and found multiple independent links between Jasso and the crime—fingerprint, video, rifle-casing analysis, wallet recovery—satisfying corroboration.

The Court recognized alternative-theory error under Senate Bill 1437’s narrowing of felony murder but deemed the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The true findings on firearm use/discharge and special circumstance could not stand unless Jasso was the actual killer or a major participant with reckless indifference.

The accompanying CALCRIM 400 instruction on accomplice liability did not independently allow conviction on a natural-probable-consequences theory, because the jury also received CALCRIM 401 (requiring shared intent to kill) and because the evidence established personal discharge of the weapon into the victim’s head.

Finally, since Senate Bill 620 granted trial courts authority to strike otherwise mandatory firearm enhancements in the interest of justice, and Jasso’s judgment was not yet final when SB 620 went into effect, the case was remanded for the sentencing court to exercise that discretion.

3. Impact

Hearsay practice: Guidance on applying Evidence Code § 1230 in multi-layered hearsay contexts—declaring that accomplice statements to friends may fall outside Confrontation Clause as nontestimonial and be admissible where sufficiently self-inculpatory.
Trial strategy: Forfeiture of confrontation or hearsay objections may follow defense agreements to alternative presentation. Ineffective-assistance claims over such choices generally belong to collateral review.
Senate Bill 1437 and 620 jurisprudence: Felony-murder instruction errors may survive on sufficiency grounds where proof of actual killing is overwhelming. Mandatory firearm enhancements must now be reviewed under § 1385 discretion.
Confrontation Clause: Reinforcement of the testimonial/nontestimonial distinction—statements to friends or in casual contexts remain outside confrontation scope.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Hearsay vs. testimonial statements: Hearsay is any out-of-court statement offered to prove its truth. Testimonial statements—like formal police interrogations—bring Confrontation Clause protections. Casual statements to friends do not.
Declaration against penal interest (§ 1230): A hearsay exception if the speaker admits conduct that would subject them to criminal liability, making it unlikely they’d lie.
Felony murder: Traditional rule lets liability without intent when a death occurs during certain felonies. Senate Bill 1437 (2018) now requires either actual killing, intent-to-kill aid, or major participation with reckless indifference.
Senate Bill 620: Post-2017 law allows courts to strike firearm-use enhancements in the interest of justice, though initially mandatory.
Aider and abettor liability (CALCRIM 400/401): You can be “equally guilty” if you assist the perpetrator, but for murder you must share the intent to kill (CALCRIM 401).
Automatic appeal (§ 1239(b)): Any death sentence triggers an appeal directly to the Supreme Court, regardless of trial court rulings.

Conclusion

People v. Jasso reaffirms the contours of the declaration-against-interest exception and the testimonial inquiry under the Confrontation Clause, while underscoring that strategic agreements by defense counsel can foreclose later objections. It clarifies that pre-2019 felony-murder instructions do not automatically require reversal where the evidence demonstrates actual killing beyond doubt. Finally, it implements the Legislature’s grant of discretionary sentencing power under Senate Bill 620 by remanding for the trial court’s determination on firearm enhancements. This decision offers trial courts and practitioners a detailed roadmap for handling multi-layered hearsay, sentencing discretion under newly enacted statutes, and harmless-error analysis in capital cases.