People v. Hietschold: Substantial Compliance with Section 113‑4(e) Where the Court Warns Only of Trial in Absentia

I. Introduction

In People v. Hietschold, 2025 IL 130716 (Ill. Nov. 20, 2025), the Illinois Supreme Court confronted a narrow but recurring procedural issue with broad implications for criminal practice: what exactly must a trial judge say to a defendant to satisfy the statutory admonishment requirement for trials in absentia under section 113‑4(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and how strictly must the statute’s language be followed?

The case arose from an aggravated battery prosecution tried entirely in the defendant’s absence. The trial court had repeatedly warned the defendant that if he failed to appear, his trial could proceed and he could be tried, found guilty, and sentenced without being present. However, the court never added the final statutory phrase—that failure to appear “would constitute a waiver of his right to confront the witnesses against him.”

A divided appellate panel reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court’s failure to expressly mention the waiver of confrontation rights rendered the admonishment defective and invalidated the trial in absentia. The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed. It held that the trial court had “substantially complied” with section 113‑4(e) because the “essence” of the admonition is a clear warning that trial can proceed in the defendant’s absence. The additional language about confrontation is a corollary to that central warning, not an independent element that must be recited verbatim as a condition of a valid trial in absentia.

The Court also addressed, and rejected as non-prejudicial, a claim that the absence of a formal arraignment on the felony charges undermined the validity of the proceedings or the application of section 113‑4(e).

This decision solidifies statewide a line of appellate authority and clarifies that, under Illinois law, substantial compliance with section 113‑4(e) is satisfied when the defendant is clearly warned that (1) he has the right to be present and (2) trial may go forward even if he voluntarily absents himself—even if the judge does not explicitly add that his absence will waive face‑to‑face confrontation of witnesses.

II. Case Background

A. Charges and Pretrial Proceedings

Defendant David A. Hietschold was initially charged with misdemeanor battery. The State later enhanced the matter by filing two felony counts of aggravated battery in a public place of accommodation under section 12‑3.05(c) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/12‑3.05(c) (West 2020)). The misdemeanor case was nolle prossed upon consolidation with the felony case on April 28, 2021.

Over multiple pretrial hearings, the case progressed toward trial:

• Defense counsel obtained continuances because defendant was undergoing surgeries.
• On October 20, 2021, the court inquired about a possible plea. Counsel requested a Supreme Court Rule 402 conference. The court scheduled a Rule 402 conference and set a trial date.
• At that October 20 hearing (conducted via Zoom), the court admonished defendant:

  “You must be present on that day. If you are not, a warrant could issue for your arrest and you could be tried in your absence and if found guilty, sentenced in your absence.”

  Defendant indicated his understanding with a thumbs up.
• A Rule 402 conference occurred in January 2022. In February 2022, original defense counsel withdrew; new counsel was appointed due to a breakdown in communication.

Through the spring and summer of 2022, defense counsel reported ongoing plea discussions and efforts to gather mitigation materials. On July 22, 2022, the court set a firm trial schedule:

• Case set for trial on September 29, 2022;
• Jury to be summoned for October 3, 2022.

At that July 22 hearing (also via Zoom), the court again specifically admonished defendant:

“Mr. Hietschold, you do have a right to be present at all of your court dates. You do need to be present on both of those dates.

If you fail to come to court, that would constitute a waiver of your right to be present, and the trial could continue without you.

You could be found guilty, you could be sentenced if you don’t come back to court.”

Defendant affirmatively stated that he understood.

B. Failure to Appear and Trial in Absentia

At an interim August 2022 hearing, defendant failed to appear without prior waiver of his presence. The court chose to waive his presence for that hearing but emphasized that he must appear on the trial date.

Defendant did not appear on September 29, 2022, when the case was called for trial. The State answered ready and moved to proceed in absentia, representing that defendant was not in local hospitals or in custody elsewhere. Defense counsel:

• Objected that defendant had not been arraigned on the felony information, and thus had not formally pleaded; and
• Requested a continuance to gather additional evidence, including potential exterior surveillance footage from the bar.

The State argued that arraignment was not a prerequisite to proceeding to trial under section 115‑4.1 (725 ILCS 5/115‑4.1(a) (West 2022)), especially where defendant had long been on notice of the charges and the trial setting. The court found no prejudice from the lack of formal arraignment, noting that the case had been pending “for quite a long time,” that all parties had proceeded as if a not‑guilty plea were in place, and that scheduling a jury trial presupposed a plea of not guilty. The court continued the matter one day for production of a transcript of the admonishments.

The next day, the court acknowledged that it had not expressly told defendant he would waive his right to confront witnesses if he failed to appear. Nonetheless, it held that its admonitions substantially complied with section 113‑4(e) and granted the State’s motion to proceed in absentia. It also denied the defense continuance request, finding no well-founded basis for delay and noting that bar exterior surveillance footage had already been overwritten due to retention limits.

C. Evidence, Verdict, and Sentencing

The trial proceeded with defendant absent but represented by counsel. The State’s evidence included:

• Testimony from the complainant, Kristen Tunney, and other witnesses;
• Video from inside the Third Street Station Bar in Geneva on February 2, 2021.

Evidence showed that Tunney went to the bar with coworkers, observed defendant arguing with a woman, and briefly intervened by asking the woman if she would feel safer with Tunney’s group. Later, defendant came up behind Tunney, struck her, and caused her to hit a wall and fall to the ground. The jury found defendant guilty on both aggravated battery counts.

On January 25, 2023, the court merged the counts and sentenced defendant in absentia to 42 months’ imprisonment and 12 months’ mandatory supervised release. He was later apprehended and taken into custody on May 17, 2023.

D. Appellate Court Proceedings

On appeal, defendant argued primarily:

1. That the trial court erred in trying him in absentia because it had not fully complied with section 113‑4(e): it warned him of possible trial and sentencing in his absence, but did not tell him that failing to appear would waive his right to confront witnesses; and
2. That the admonition was especially defective because he had not yet been arraigned when it was given, and, in his view, the statute contemplates admonitions at or in connection with arraignment.

The appellate majority held:

• Section 113‑4(e) required the court to warn defendant both that trial could proceed in his absence and that his absence would waive his right to confront witnesses.
• Substantial compliance could not be found where only one of these “components” was given.
• Therefore, the trial in absentia was improper, and the conviction must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

The dissent argued that this was, in substance, a strict‑compliance reading that conflicted with every prior appellate decision and this Court’s treatment of similar admonition provisions. It stressed that the core of the statute was giving notice that the trial may proceed without the defendant, and that the record omissions concerning earlier proceedings (including the misdemeanor case) must be construed against the defendant.

The Illinois Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal under Rule 315(a).

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

A. Holdings

The Illinois Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Rochford, reversed the appellate court and reinstated defendant’s conviction. The key holdings are:

1. Substantial compliance with section 113‑4(e) does not require the trial court to recite verbatim that failure to appear will waive the defendant’s right to confront witnesses. The “essence” of the admonition is that the defendant has a right to be present but that trial may proceed in his absence if he fails to appear when required.
2. The trial court here substantially complied with section 113‑4(e) by twice telling defendant that:
   • He had a right to be present at all court dates;
   • He needed to be present on the specified dates; and
   • If he did not appear, he could be tried, found guilty, and sentenced in his absence, and his failure to appear would constitute a waiver of his right to be present.
3. The lack of a formal arraignment did not prejudice defendant and did not bar application of section 113‑4(e). Everyone proceeded as if a not‑guilty plea had been entered, and the statute expressly allows the admonition at arraignment “or at any later court date on which [the defendant] is present.”

B. Standard of Review and Framework

• The Court reaffirmed that:
  • A defendant has a constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of trial, and voluntary absence constitutes a waiver of that right even without advance warning (Phillips).
  • Section 113‑4(e) creates a statutory right to be admonished about the consequences of failure to appear; it does not itself embody a constitutional requirement.
  • Because no constitutional right to admonitions exists, substantial—rather than strict—compliance with section 113‑4(e) is sufficient (Phillips, Dominguez, Ratliff).
• The question whether the trial court substantially complied with section 113‑4(e) is a question of law reviewed de novo, even though the ultimate decision to proceed in absentia is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Statutory and Constitutional Context

1. Section 113‑4(e): The Admonition Statute

Section 113‑4(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:

“If a defendant pleads not guilty, the court shall advise him at that time or at any later court date on which he is present that if he escapes from custody or is released on bond and fails to appear in court when required by the court that his failure to appear would constitute a waiver of his right to confront the witnesses against him and trial could proceed in his absence.” (725 ILCS 5/113‑4(e) (West 2022), emphasis added.)

This provision is part of a broader statutory scheme governing trials in absentia, most notably section 115‑4.1 (725 ILCS 5/115‑4.1), which authorizes trial in absentia where a defendant, having been given notice, willfully fails to appear.

As earlier decisions explained:

• Partee: The admonition is part of a “complex series of tradeoffs” balancing:
  • the defendant’s right to be present at trial,
  • the State’s interest in expeditious administration of justice, and
  • a traditional distrust of trials in absentia.
• Garner: The primary statutory purpose is to prevent “bail jumping” and promote speedy satisfaction of judgments; section 113‑4(e) is a prophylactic measure designed to dissuade absconding and to provide a formal waiver of the right to be present.

2. Constitutional Rights at Stake

Two constitutional rights intersect with section 113‑4(e):

• Right to be present at trial (due process / confrontation-based): A defendant has a constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of trial. But this right can be waived by voluntary absence, even without an admonition, if the defendant has notice of the proceedings and chooses not to appear (Phillips).
• Right to confront witnesses (Sixth Amendment): This includes the right to:
  • hear and view witnesses as they testify, and
  • cross‑examine adverse witnesses, either personally or through counsel (Lofton).

Section 113‑4(e) does not create these rights; it imposes a statutory duty on the court to warn the defendant of potential consequences of failing to appear. Because the admonition itself is not constitutionally mandated, Illinois courts have consistently applied a “substantial compliance” standard to evaluate whether a given admonition is sufficient.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Partee and Garner: Purpose and Scope of Section 113‑4(e)

• People v. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d 24 (1988):
  • Described section 113‑4(e) as a “prophylactic measure” designed to discourage absconding and to build a record of a formal waiver of the right to be present.
  • Stressed the balance between defendants’ rights and the administration of justice.
• People v. Garner, 147 Ill. 2d 467 (1992):
  • Held that the admonishment is required even for “experienced criminals”; no exception exists based on sophistication.
  • Reversed where the defendant received no admonition at all under section 113‑4(e).
  • In a key passage, stated that the legislative scheme aims to ensure that trial in absentia does not occur unless the defendant makes a valid waiver of his right to be present “and to confront witnesses against him.”

In Hietschold, the defendant relied heavily on this quoted language from Garner to argue that valid waiver required both components of the statutory admonition to be expressly given. The Supreme Court distinguished Garner on the ground that it involved a total absence of admonition, not the level of detail required where some warning was given. Garner did not address substantial compliance.

2. Phillips, Smith, and Ramirez: Admonitions, Waiver, and Willful Absence

• People v. Phillips, 242 Ill. 2d 189 (2011):
  • Confirmed that section 113‑4(e)’s “shall” is mandatory: the court must give some admonition.
  • However, because there is no constitutional right to admonitions, substantial compliance suffices.
  • Framed the essence of the statute as informing the defendant of the right and obligation to be present and permitting a knowing waiver of that right.
• People v. Smith, 188 Ill. 2d 335 (1999):
  • Interpreted section 115‑4.1(a) governing trials in absentia.
  • Adopted a three‑part test (drawn from Coppage and Broyld) to establish the State’s prima facie case that a defendant’s absence was willful:
    1. Defendant was advised of the trial date;
    2. Defendant was advised that failure to appear “could result in trial in absentia”; and
    3. Defendant did not appear when the case was called.
  • Explicitly cited and relied on appellate decisions that had found substantial compliance with section 113‑4(e) without explicit mention of the confrontation right.
• People v. Ramirez, 214 Ill. 2d 176 (2005):
  • Reaffirmed the same three‑part test for willful absence.

By endorsing a test that focuses solely on warning about trial in absentia (not explicit confrontation waiver), Smith and Ramirez effectively crystallized what the Supreme Court now describes as the “essence” of section 113‑4(e).

3. The Appellate Line: Clark, Broyld, Coppage, Liss, Talidis, Velasco

Before the appellate decision in Hietschold, Illinois appellate courts were remarkably uniform:

• People v. Clark, 96 Ill. App. 3d 491 (1981), People v. Broyld, 146 Ill. App. 3d 693 (1986), People v. Coppage, 187 Ill. App. 3d 436 (1989), and People v. Liss, 2012 IL App (2d) 101191:
  • Held that a warning that trial could proceed in the defendant’s absence was sufficient substantial compliance, even when the judge did not expressly mention waiver of confrontation.
  • Coppage famously stated that “the specific words used are not important as long as it is apparent that defendant was made aware that he has the right to be present at his trial but that his absence need not preclude the court from proceeding.”
• People v. Velasco, 184 Ill. App. 3d 618 (1989):
  • Held the admonition adequate where the trial court warned the defendant that if he failed to appear, trial would proceed without him—even without reference to confrontation.
  • Was cited approvingly in Garner on other points.
• People v. Talidis, 2023 IL App (2d) 220109:
  • Did not directly analyze substantial compliance, but characterized section 113‑4 as requiring a warning that trial may proceed in the defendant’s absence if he fails to appear.

The appellate majority in Hietschold departed from this line by implicitly adopting a strict‑compliance approach, treating the confrontation language as an independent, indispensable “component.” The Supreme Court’s opinion restores the earlier understanding.

4. Mendoza and Rule 402: An Analogy on Substantial Compliance

The Court substantially relied on People v. Mendoza, 48 Ill. 2d 371 (1971), which concerned Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a)(4). That Rule (implementing Boykin v. Alabama) required that, before accepting a guilty plea, the court must personally admonish the defendant and ensure he understands that by pleading guilty he waives:

• the right to trial by jury, and
• the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”

In Mendoza, the trial court fully informed the defendant that a guilty plea automatically waived the right to a jury trial but did not expressly mention the waiver of confrontation rights. The Court nonetheless held that the admonition substantially complied with Rule 402, especially where the defendant was represented by counsel and there was no indication he was unaware of the consequences.

Hietschold draws a direct analogy:

• Rule 402 admonitions are at least as important as those under section 113‑4(e), because a guilty plea permanently forecloses trial, whereas trial in absentia still provides a full adversarial proceeding.
• If substantial compliance is satisfied in the guilty‑plea context when the judge fails to specifically mention waiver of confrontation, despite the rule’s explicit text, then a fortiori substantial compliance is satisfied for section 113‑4(e) when the judge omits the explicit confrontation language but gives a robust warning that trial will proceed in the defendant’s absence.

The Court also referenced People v. Krantz, 58 Ill. 2d 187 (1974), and People v. Dominguez, 2012 IL 111336, for the principle that “substantial compliance” does not require literal compliance or verbatim recitation, only that the court communicate the essence of the rule or statute.

5. Other Notable Precedents

• People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356:
  • Held that courts need only substantially comply with Rule 401 admonitions regarding waiver of counsel, because the constitutions do not require admonitions before that right can be waived. The Court uses this analogy to reinforce that section 113‑4(e) likewise only demands substantial compliance.
• People v. Tennant, 65 Ill. 2d 401 (1976):
  • Quoted Wigmore for the principle that “the main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross‑examination.” The Court uses this to emphasize that defendant, though absent, retained confrontation in its core sense through his attorney’s cross‑examination at trial.
• People v. Lofton, 194 Ill. 2d 40 (2000):
  • Explained that confrontation includes both the right to see and hear the witnesses and the right to cross-examine them personally or through counsel. This supports the Court’s characterization of face‑to‑face observation as ancillary to the core right of cross‑examination.
• People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365 (1999) and People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382:
  • Reinforced that a guilty plea waives multiple constitutional rights and that Rule 402 admonitions implement federal due process requirements from Boykin. Again, this makes the Rule 402 regime a particularly stringent baseline for substantial compliance—one that section 113‑4(e) does not exceed.
• People v. Brokowski, 25 Ill. 2d 497 (1962) and Garner:
  • Established that absence of a formal arraignment or plea is not itself fatal if the record shows that the omission caused no prejudice.
• People v. Eppinger, 2013 IL 114121:
  • Noted the general rule that a defendant tried in absentia must be represented by counsel, with a narrow exception for in‑custody defendants who refuse both counsel and to come to court. Hietschold fits within the general rule: defendant was absent but fully represented.

Taken together, these precedents supplied both the doctrinal tools (substantial compliance, essence-of-admonition analysis) and the policy context (balancing rights and efficiency) that shaped the Court’s ruling in Hietschold.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Hietschold

1. The Arraignment Issue: No Prejudice, No Reversible Error

Defendant argued that the statutory admonition regime assumes an arraigned, not‑guilty defendant, and that the absence of a formal arraignment on the felony case made the admonition defective or mis‑timed.

The Court rejected this argument on several grounds:

• Functional reality over formal label: Although no formal plea of not guilty appears in the record, everyone—court, prosecution, and defense—proceeded on the assumption that defendant had pleaded not guilty. Two of defendant’s own motions described the plea as not guilty, and scheduling a jury trial inherently presupposes such a plea.
• No prejudice: Under Brokowski and Garner, failure to arraign or take a formal plea is “a mere formality” unless it adversely affects substantial rights. Here, no prejudice was shown: defendant knew the charges, was represented by counsel, engaged in plea discussions, and prepared for trial.
• Statute’s timing flexibility: Section 113‑4(e) explicitly allows the admonition at arraignment “or at any later court date on which [defendant] is present.” Thus, even if the admonition traditionally coincides with arraignment, nothing in the text forbids giving it later, as occurred here.
• Defendant’s own appellate theory: His challenge was fundamentally directed at the content of the admonition, not at the timing or presence of a formal plea. He treated himself as a not‑guilty defendant for purposes of invoking the statute, undercutting any claim that the absence of an arraignment rendered the statute inapplicable.

Accordingly, the arraignment omission did not change the analysis: the only live question was whether the admonitions given substantially complied with section 113‑4(e).

2. Substantial Compliance and the “Essence” of the Admonition

The central doctrinal move in Hietschold is the Court’s definition of the “essence” of section 113‑4(e), and its insistence that substantial compliance is measured against that essence, not against each literal phrase of the statute.

Section 113‑4(e) in full requires warning that failure to appear:

1. “would constitute a waiver of [the defendant’s] right to confront the witnesses against him”; and
2. “trial could proceed in his absence.”

Defendant characterized these as two independent “components” of equal weight, arguing that the court had given him only “50%” of the required admonition. The Supreme Court disagreed with this framing.

The Court reasoned:

• Substantial compliance focuses on essence, not on mechanical components: Citing Dominguez and Krantz, the Court reiterated that:

  “Substantial compliance ‘does not require a strict verbatim reading’ of the admonishments, but rather ‘the court must impart to a defendant largely that which is specified.’ […] In other words, the trial court must communicate the statute’s ‘essence,’ rather than ‘wholly’ what is specified.”

• The “essence” of section 113‑4(e) is that a defendant who fails to appear cannot stop the trial from going forward:

  “We conclude that the ‘essence’ of the admonishment about trial in absentia in section 113‑4(e) is just that—the admonishment that a defendant’s failure to appear at trial will not prevent the trial from proceeding in his absence.”

  The warning that trial will proceed without him is what motivates attendance and concretely informs the defendant of the stakes of absconding.
• Confrontation loss is a corollary, not an independent concept: Once a defendant is told that trial can proceed without him, it is implicit that he will not be able to view the witnesses in person. The defendant does retain the core of the confrontation right—cross‑examination—through counsel:
  • As Tennant emphasizes, the “main and essential purpose” of confrontation is the opportunity to cross‑examine.
  • Lofton describes the right to see and hear witnesses as an element of confrontation, but not its sole essence.
  Thus, the impact on confrontation is largely an inevitable byproduct of choosing to be absent. Explicitly stating this corollary, while preferable, is not indispensable to the statutory purpose.
• Consistency with earlier characterizations of section 113‑4(e): When the Supreme Court previously summarized section 113‑4(e), it consistently focused on notice that the defendant has a right to be present and that trial may proceed in his absence:
  • Phillips: the court must inform defendant of “his right to be present” and the possibility that trial may proceed without him.
  • Garner: the statute exists to “provide for a formal waiver of [a defendant’s] right to be present.”
  • Partee: the admonition was designed to balance the right to be present with efficient adjudication.
  The Court found it significant that, when formulating the test for willful absence in Smith and Ramirez, it did not include any reference to express admonition about confrontation rights; the test asks only whether the defendant was warned that failure to appear could result in trial in absentia.

By adopting this essence‑based view, the Court restores the longstanding understanding that the gravamen of section 113‑4(e) is the warning that trial can and will proceed even if the defendant chooses not to appear.

3. Analogy to Rule 402 and Mendoza

The Court further strengthened its analysis by drawing a careful analogy to Rule 402(a)(4) and Mendoza:

• Rule 402 explicitly requires warning that by pleading guilty, the defendant waives both jury trial and confrontation.
• In Mendoza, the Court held that a guilty plea was validly accepted where the judge fully advised the defendant only of waiver of a jury trial, not of confrontation.
• The Court emphasized that Rule 402 admonitions are “equally or more important” than those required under section 113‑4(e), given that a guilty plea extinguishes the right to any trial at all, while a trial in absentia still provides an adversarial proceeding with full counsel representation.

Thus, if substantial compliance suffices when a defendant permanently surrenders the right to a trial (guilty plea) without an explicit confrontation warning, it would be incongruous to demand more literalism before permitting a trial to go forward in the defendant’s voluntary absence, when counsel is actively litigating the case on his behalf.

4. Response to the Appellate Court’s “Law Abhors Trial in Absentia” Argument

The appellate majority below argued that because the “law abhors trials in absentia” but not guilty pleas, the analogy to Rule 402 was misplaced and a stricter reading of section 113‑4(e) was warranted.

The Supreme Court addressed this argument by distinguishing:

• Policy disfavor vs. legal impossibility: Trials in absentia are “not favored,” but they are plainly permitted where a defendant voluntarily absents himself after receiving proper notice. The law also recognizes that a defendant has a duty to appear and that voluntary absence is a waiver of the right to be present.
• Nature of the rights at stake:
  • A guilty plea is a comprehensive waiver of several fundamental trial rights; advocates and courts must ensure the waiver is knowing and intelligent under the Due Process Clause (Boykin).
  • By contrast, a defendant who is tried in absentia suffers no loss of trial as such—he only loses the ability to personally attend and see the witnesses. Counsel still fully contest the case, and the State retains its burden of proof.

Thus, far from making section 113‑4(e) more demanding than Rule 402, the policy disfavor of trials in absentia is already accounted for by:

• Requiring some admonition (section 113‑4(e));
• Requiring a showing of willful absence (section 115‑4.1 and Smith/Ramirez); and
• Subjecting the decision to proceed in absentia to abuse‑of‑discretion review.

Within that framework, strict verbatim adherence to the statutory text is not required when substantial compliance effectively conveys the statute’s core message.

5. Application to the Facts: Why the Admonition Was Sufficient

Applying the law to the facts, the Court concluded that the trial court’s admonitions met the substantial compliance standard:

• Defendant was twice expressly told he had a right to be present and needed to appear on specific dates.
• He was twice told that if he failed to appear, trial could proceed without him and he could be tried, found guilty, and sentenced in his absence.
• One admonition expressly labeled nonappearance a “waiver” of his right to be present.
• Defendant affirmatively indicated he understood (via thumbs up on Zoom and verbal acknowledgement).
• The record strongly suggested that defendant’s absence was strategic, triggered by disappointment with plea negotiations rather than misunderstanding of the consequences.

In light of this record, there was no basis to conclude that “real justice” had been denied or that defendant suffered prejudice from the omission of the explicit confrontation language.

6. The Court’s Cautionary Note to Trial Judges

Although the Court held that substantial compliance was satisfied here, it nonetheless ended with an express caution:

“We emphasize that we expect trial courts to provide defendants with the full section 113‑4(e) admonishment, which can be accomplished quickly and easily by following the statutory language.”

In other words, the opinion sets a floor, not a ceiling. Trial judges are strongly encouraged to track the statute verbatim to avoid unnecessary litigation and to ensure maximum clarity. But failure to utter the precise phrase “waiver of the right to confront witnesses” will not, by itself, invalidate a trial in absentia when the defendant has been clearly and repeatedly warned that trial can and will proceed without him if he fails to appear.

D. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What Is a Trial in Absentia?

A trial in absentia is a criminal trial that goes forward even though the defendant is not physically present in the courtroom. Illinois law allows this in limited circumstances:

• The defendant has been properly notified of the charges and the trial date;
• The defendant voluntarily fails to appear (does not have a compelling excuse such as hospitalization or detention elsewhere); and
• The State shows, at least prima facie, that the absence is willful.

The defendant must be represented by counsel (with a narrow statutory exception not applicable here), and the State still must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. “Admonitions” and “Substantial Compliance”

Admonitions are formal warnings or explanations given by a judge to a defendant. They are designed to ensure that the defendant understands key rights and consequences, such as:

• What rights are waived by a guilty plea;
• What happens if the defendant fails to appear for court.

“Substantial compliance” means the judge does not have to read the statute or rule word-for-word, but must:

• Communicate the main message accurately; and
• Ensure the defendant understands that message.

If a minor or technical deviation does not mislead the defendant or cause prejudice, the admonition is still legally adequate.

3. The Right to Confront Witnesses vs. the Right to Be Present

The right to confront witnesses includes:

• The right to see and hear the witnesses testify in open court;
• The right to cross‑examine those witnesses, usually through your attorney.

The right to be present at trial is broader; it encompasses not only confrontation but also the ability to directly observe and participate in all critical stages of the proceeding. If a defendant voluntarily does not show up, he gives up the benefit of being physically present and personally seeing the witnesses, but his lawyer can still vigorously cross‑examine them—which satisfies the core purpose of confrontation.

4. Arraignment and Prejudice

Arraignment is the formal process where the defendant is called before the court, informed of the specific charges, and asked to enter a plea (e.g., guilty or not guilty).

Failure to conduct a formal arraignment or failure to record a formal plea is not automatically reversible error. Courts ask whether the omission actually harmed the defendant’s substantial rights—did he understand the charges, have counsel, prepare a defense, and participate in proceedings as if he had pleaded not guilty? If so, any technical defect in arraignment is usually treated as harmless.

V. Impact and Implications

A. For Trial Courts

Hietschold gives trial judges clear guidance and a safe harbor:

• To ensure appellate-proof admonitions, judges should read section 113‑4(e) verbatim or use an equivalent script explicitly mentioning:
  • waiver of the right to confront witnesses; and
  • the possibility of trial proceeding in the defendant’s absence.
• But if a judge inadvertently omits the confrontation phrase while clearly and repeatedly warning the defendant that trial can proceed in his absence, the omission will not necessarily invalidate a later trial in absentia.
• Judges can confidently continue using admonition language that mirrors the Coppage/Broyld line, as long as it unmistakably:
  • informs the defendant of his right to be present; and
  • makes clear that the defendant will be tried and sentenced even if he fails to appear voluntarily.

The opinion also underscores that admonitions can lawfully be given at any later court date when the defendant is present, not just at arraignment. This flexibility is important in modern practice, where arraignment may be brief and later hearings (including remote ones via Zoom) may be more conducive to substantive admonitions.

B. For Defense Counsel and Defendants

Defense lawyers should take several lessons:

• You cannot count on strict technicalities in the wording of section 113‑4(e) admonitions to invalidate trials in absentia if the judge clearly warned your client about trial proceeding in his absence.
• Advising clients on the consequences of nonappearance must be robust and practical; it is unwise to suggest that a client might later exploit minor omissions in the admonition.
• Because failure to appear after such warnings will almost certainly be deemed a voluntary waiver of presence, the only viable challenge will be to show:
  • lack of real notice of the trial date; or
  • a compelling non‑willful reason for absence (e.g., sudden hospitalization, mistaken custody).
• Record completeness is critical: as the dissent below noted, defendants bear the risk of incomplete records (e.g., missing transcripts from earlier, related misdemeanor proceedings that might contain admonitions).

C. For Appellate and Postconviction Litigation

Hietschold sharply narrows the ground for successful challenges to trials in absentia based on section 113‑4(e). Going forward:

• Reversals are likely only where:
  • the defendant received no admonition at all under section 113‑4(e), or
  • the admonition was so vague or misleading that it failed to communicate the possibility of trial in absentia.
• Arguments that the court did not mention confrontation rights verbatim will generally fail, so long as:
  • the defendant was told he had a right to be present; and
  • he was warned that trial could proceed without him.
• Section 113‑4(e) claims will continue to be assessed under an “essence‑of‑admonition” framework anchored by Smith, Ramirez, and now Hietschold.

D. Policy Considerations: Bail Jumping and Efficient Justice

By embracing substantial compliance and emphasizing the trial‑in‑absentia warning as the statute’s core, the Court reinforces the legislature’s twin aims:

• Deterring bail jumping: Defendants are put on clear notice that nonappearance is a tactical gamble they are unlikely to win. Choosing not to appear will not force a continuance; instead, it will usually result in an uncontested trial (from their perspective) with counsel but no personal presence.
• Promoting efficient adjudication: Courts and prosecutors can rely on the admonition regime to move cases forward when defendants simply disappear, without being hamstrung by hypertechnical objections to the exact wording of warnings previously given.

At the same time, the requirement that trial judges give admonitions—and the expectation that they include the full statutory language—maintains a meaningful check on routine or careless use of trials in absentia.

VI. Conclusion

People v. Hietschold crystallizes an important rule in Illinois criminal procedure:

To substantially comply with section 113‑4(e), a trial court need not recite verbatim that failure to appear waives the defendant’s right to confront witnesses, so long as it clearly advises the defendant that he has a right to be present and that his trial may proceed in his absence if he fails to appear when required.

The decision:

• Affirms that admonitions under section 113‑4(e) are statutory and subject to a substantial-compliance standard, not a rigid verbatim rule;
• Aligns the interpretation of section 113‑4(e) with long‑standing appellate decisions and with the Supreme Court’s treatment of similar admonition requirements (especially Rule 402);
• Clarifies that the “essence” of the admonition is warning about the possibility of trial in absentia, while loss of face-to-face confrontation is a collateral, implied consequence; and
• Confirms that technical defects like absence of formal arraignment will not invalidate a conviction absent actual prejudice.

In the broader legal landscape, Hietschold importance lies less in novel doctrine than in consolidation and clarification. It closes the door on strict‑compliance arguments about the wording of section 113‑4(e), restores uniformity with prior precedent, and provides practical guidance to trial courts and litigants about what is required—and what is not—before a defendant may be tried in absentia in Illinois.