People v. Grigoroff: When a Confession Is the Only Evidence, Courts Must Not Undercut False-Confession Expert Proof (and Must Charge “Promise by the Police” When Supported)

1. Introduction

In People v Grigoroff (Appellate Division, Second Department, Dec. 31, 2025), the defendant, Anthony Grigoroff, appealed from a judgment of the County Court, Putnam County, convicting him of murder in the second degree and two counts of attempted burglary in the second degree.

The prosecution’s case hinged on a confession obtained after a 12-hour interrogation while the defendant was an 18-year-old inmate removed from jail for questioning. The defendant repudiated the confession, contending that police promises and interrogation tactics created a substantial risk of a false confession. Unlike the first trial, the retrial featured defense expert testimony from a specialist in “disputed confessions,” who evaluated the defendant and concluded he was more vulnerable than average to falsely confess.

The appeal centered on whether the trial court’s handling of that expert evidence—and certain jury-instruction and evidentiary rulings—deprived the defendant of a fair trial in a confession-only prosecution.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Department reversed the judgment “on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice” and remitted for a new trial. While it held the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, it concluded the defendant was denied a fair trial because the County Court (1) improperly limited the defense expert’s testimony about false-confession research, (2) improperly excluded portions of the expert’s curriculum vitae, and (3) set the trial for a date when the defense expert was unavailable, resulting in a conditional, video-recorded presentation while the People’s expert testified live.

The court emphasized the cumulative effect of these rulings in a case where the confession was the sole evidence. It also noted that at the new trial it would be error not to give the jury instruction titled “Promise by the Police” if requested and supported by the evidence.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

People v Grigoroff , 131 AD3d 541: The earlier appeal reversed for unrelated errors, but the Second Department had noted that “the police utilized deceptive techniques” during interrogation. The 2025 opinion builds on the retrial posture: because the confession remained the only link to guilt, trial-court decisions affecting the defense’s ability to contest confession reliability were outcome-critical.
CPL 470.15[5]; People v Danielson , 9 NY3d 342 , 348; People v Mateo , 2 NY3d 383, 410; People v Bleakley , 69 NY2d 490, 495; People v Romero , 7 NY3d 633 , 644: These authorities frame weight-of-the-evidence review. The court applied them to affirm that, despite reversal on fairness grounds, the jury’s verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.
People v Powell , 37 NY3d 476 , 479: Cited for the proposition that admissibility and limits of expert testimony are primarily within the trial judge’s discretion. The Second Department treated that discretion as bounded: it is abused when it excludes relevant expert foundations in a confession-only case.
People v Bedessie , 19 NY3d 147 , 161: Establishes that expert psychological testimony on false confessions must be “relevant to the defendant and interrogation before the court.” The trial court relied on “relevance” to exclude studies; the Second Department rejected that narrow relevance view, holding the excluded studies did bear on the risk of false confessions and were germane given the defendant’s intellectual functioning.
Doviak v Finkelstein & Partners, LLP , 137 AD3d 843 , 847: Used to support that a jury is entitled to see information relevant to assessing an expert’s credibility and weight; excluding article titles from the curriculum vitae “without basis” improperly deprived the jury of that evaluative material.
People v Wrotten , 14 NY3d 33 , 40: Although video testimony is not automatically erroneous, “Live televised testimony is certainly not the equivalent of in-person testimony.” The court leveraged this principle not to ban video evidence, but to underscore how the scheduling decision, combined with other restrictions, skewed the evidentiary presentation in a way that mattered to fairness.
People v Mattocks , 100 AD3d 930 , 931; People v Engstrom , 86 AD3d 580 , 581; People v Andre , 185 AD2d 276, 277-278: Cited for cumulative-error analysis and due process: individually tolerable missteps may collectively deprive a defendant of a fair trial, especially where the defense hinges on a single, central evidentiary theme.
CJI2d[NY] Statements [Admissions, Confessions]—Promise by the Police; CPL 60.45[2][b][i]; People v Butts , 72 NY2d 746, 750; People v Huntley , 15 NY2d 72: These authorities govern voluntariness and the duty to instruct. The Second Department stated it was error not to charge “Promise by the Police” where the defendant testified about alleged promises during the interrogation and requested the instruction; voluntariness, when properly raised, must be submitted to the jury.
Matter of State of New York v Floyd Y. , 22 NY3d 95 , 107 (and id. at 109): Supports admission of certain out-of-court statements not for truth, but to explain expert methodology, subject to reliability and a probative-value versus prejudice balancing.
CPL 470.05[2]: Preservation rule applied to summation claims.
People v Fuhrtz , 115 AD3d 760; People v Birot , 99 AD3d 933; People v Guevara-Carrero , 92 AD3d 693; People v McHarris , 297 AD2d 824, 825; People v Adamo , 309 AD2d 808; People v Clark , 222 AD2d 446; People v Vaughn , 209 AD2d 459; People v Almonte , 23 AD3d 392 , 394; People v Svanberg , 293 AD2d 555: These cases collectively ground the court’s conclusion that the summation remarks were either unpreserved, fair comment, fair response, or not sufficiently pervasive to deny a fair trial.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The core holding turns on the relationship between (a) a confession-only prosecution and (b) the defendant’s ability to present meaningful expert evidence on the reliability of that confession. The appellate court treated the defense expert’s testimony as “the crux” because the confession was “the sole evidence linking the defendant with the crimes.”

A. Improper narrowing of “relevance” for false-confession research

Although People v Bedessie , 19 NY3d 147 , 161 requires that expert testimony be relevant to the defendant and interrogation, the trial court’s application was too restrictive. It excluded (i) an Innocence Project study reporting that about 25% of DNA-exonerated individuals had confessed, and (ii) a University of Michigan Law School study reporting 10% false confessions among 1,405 exonerations (1989–2012), with overrepresentation of mental illness or intellectual disability.

The Second Department held these studies were relevant to illustrating the risk and phenomenon of false confessions—precisely what the jury needed to evaluate a confession-centric case—particularly given evidence that the defendant’s IQ was lower than 93% of same-age individuals. In other words, the relevance inquiry is not confined to whether the case involved DNA or whether the defendant had a diagnosed mental illness; it includes whether the research contextualizes risk factors and supports the expert’s methodology in assessing the defendant’s vulnerabilities.

B. Undermining expert credibility by excluding curriculum vitae information

The court found it “without basis” to exclude portions of the curriculum vitae (specifically, titles of certain articles). In an expert-driven dispute, the jury’s ability to weigh credentials and professional output is part of assessing reliability and weight. The exclusion therefore weakened the defense expert’s credibility presentation, contrary to the principle reflected in Doviak v Finkelstein & Partners, LLP , 137 AD3d 843 , 847.

C. Scheduling-driven imbalance: conditional video testimony versus live testimony

The opinion does not declare conditional video testimony per se improper. Instead, invoking People v Wrotten , 14 NY3d 33 , 40, it recognized that video is not equivalent to live, in-person testimony. That mattered here because the jury saw the People’s expert live but saw the defense expert only via an edited recording (edited due to the research exclusions). This created a compounding disparity in the presentation of the central defense.

D. Cumulative error in a confession-only case

The court emphasized that even if each ruling might be viewed as insufficient alone, together they denied due process and a fair trial (citing People v Mattocks, People v Engstrom, People v Andre). The “cumulative effect” doctrine was especially forceful because:

the confession was the sole evidence of guilt;
the defense centered on false-confession vulnerability and interrogation pressure;
the trial court’s rulings prevented the defense expert from fully explaining the science supporting his evaluation;
the People’s expert gained an advantage by characterizing the field as “scant” and “primitive” in the absence of the excluded research.

E. Required instruction on “Promise by the Police” when supported

Looking ahead to retrial, the court underscored that where the defendant requests it and the evidence supports it, the court must charge the jury on “Promise by the Police” under CJI2d[NY] Statements [Admissions, Confessions]—Promise by the Police and CPL 60.45[2][b][i]. Applying People v Butts , 72 NY2d 746, 750, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant when deciding whether to instruct. Under People v Huntley , 15 NY2d 72, voluntariness—when properly raised—must go to the jury upon request.

3.3. Impact

False-confession expert testimony will be harder to “sterilize” through narrow relevance rulings. The opinion signals that foundational research (including exoneration-based studies) can be relevant even if the defendant’s case does not mirror the study’s procedural posture (e.g., DNA).
Expert-credibility materials (like CV publication titles) matter in close cases. Trial courts should articulate concrete reasons for excluding such material; otherwise, exclusion risks reversal where credibility is central.
Scheduling decisions can become fairness issues when they skew the evidentiary playing field. The decision cautions that forcing a key defense expert into conditional, recorded testimony—especially when the People present live expert testimony—can contribute to cumulative unfairness.
Confession-only prosecutions invite heightened scrutiny of trial management. When the confession is the sole inculpatory evidence, appellate courts may be more willing to find that limitations on contesting reliability are prejudicial.
Jury instructions on police promises are not optional when supported. The opinion reinforces that voluntariness theories supported by testimony must be charged on request, framing this as an error to avoid on retrial.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Disputed confession” / “false confession” expert testimony: Specialized testimony explaining (1) how certain interrogation tactics and personal vulnerabilities can increase the risk of an untrue confession, and (2) whether the defendant’s characteristics and the interrogation circumstances suggest heightened risk.
“Relevance to the defendant and interrogation before the court” (from People v Bedessie): The expert’s science and conclusions must connect to the actual interrogation and the defendant’s traits; it is not enough to give abstract lectures. Here, the appellate court held the excluded studies were sufficiently connected because they explained the phenomenon and related to intellectual vulnerability present in the defendant.
Conditional examination / video-recorded expert testimony: Testimony taken when a witness cannot attend trial in person, recorded and later played for the jury. Permissible in some circumstances, but the court emphasized it is not the same as live testimony and may matter when credibility and persuasion are central.
Cumulative error: A doctrine recognizing that multiple trial errors, each potentially “harmless” alone, can combine to deny a fair trial—particularly when they all affect the same pivotal issue (here, confession reliability).
“Promise by the Police” instruction (voluntariness): A jury charge directing jurors to consider whether police promises induced a statement, potentially rendering it involuntary. If the evidence supports that such promises were made and the defendant asks for the instruction, the charge must be given.

5. Conclusion

People v Grigoroff establishes a practical rule for confession-driven prosecutions: when the confession is the only evidence, trial courts must not restrict defense false-confession expert proof in ways that prevent the jury from hearing the research foundation, evaluating the expert’s credibility, or receiving a balanced presentation (including avoiding scheduling choices that effectively privilege one side’s expert). The decision also reinforces that, when supported by evidence and requested, the jury must be instructed on “Promise by the Police” so jurors can properly assess voluntariness.

The opinion’s broader significance lies in its insistence that “expert gatekeeping” and trial management are not neutral acts in a confession-only case: they can determine whether the jury meaningfully evaluates reliability, and thus whether the defendant receives a constitutionally fair trial.