People v. Greene: Prolonged Child Abuse, a Single Fatal Blow, and Depraved Indifference Murder Under Penal Law § 125.25(4)

I. Introduction

In People v. Greene, 2025 NY Slip Op 06931 (3d Dept Dec. 11, 2025), the Appellate Division, Third Department, confronted a recurring but legally difficult problem in New York homicide law: when does a fatal assault on a single child victim in an abusive household rise from first-degree manslaughter to depraved indifference murder of a child under Penal Law § 125.25(4)?

The case involves a certified foster parent, Dequan Greene, convicted by a Schenectady County jury of:

• Second-degree murder under Penal Law § 125.25(4) (depraved indifference murder of a child),
• First-degree manslaughter under Penal Law § 125.20(4) (child homicide with intent to cause physical injury), and
• Two counts of endangering the welfare of a child.

The majority opinion (Fisher, J.) affirms all convictions and sentences, holding that the weight of the evidence supports a finding that Greene acted with both recklessness and depraved indifference to human life. A detailed dissent by Aarons, J., would reverse the depraved indifference murder conviction, emphasizing the narrowness of that mental state in one-on-one killings and warning against collapsing it into ordinary recklessness or intent-to-injure manslaughter.

The decision is significant because it pushes the law of child-focused depraved indifference murder further into the realm of single-incident fatal assaults preceded by a pattern of non-lethal abuse, and does so in the face of a strong dissent that invokes the Court of Appeals’ restrictive depraved-indifference jurisprudence. In practical terms, Greene is likely to influence how prosecutors charge, and how courts evaluate, fatal child-abuse cases where caregivers both abuse and then attempt to resuscitate the child.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

Greene and his wife were certified foster parents. In September 2020 they took into their care two brothers, born in 2015 and 2016, after removal from their biological mother. By late December 2020, the younger child (the victim, age four and developmentally disabled) and his brother exhibited extensive bruising and injuries.

On December 20, 2020, Greene was alone caring for the children. According to the victim’s brother, the fatal incident unfolded as follows:

• The victim urinated on the couch and lied about it.
• As punishment, Greene made him take a cold shower and eat a mixture of ketchup, mustard and corn (described as “nasty”).
• Greene then ordered the victim to perform a “wall sit” (back against wall, knees bent as if seated). When the child could not maintain the position, Greene forced him onto the floor and stepped on his abdomen.
• Greene ordered the victim to get up; when the child said he could not, Greene repeated the demand. The victim did not respond again, and the brother testified: “He was dead.”

Cell phone records show Greene called his wife at 5:07 p.m. and 5:08 p.m.; she arrived and called 911 at 5:11 p.m. First responders arrived within minutes to find the child unresponsive, cold, pale, pulseless and apneic. Greene gave varying explanations: the victim had fallen from a toddler chair and slurred his speech before collapsing; alternatively, he might have been choking on food. Emergency personnel performed CPR and the Heimlich maneuver; the child was pronounced dead at the hospital at 6:38 p.m.

The autopsy revealed:

• Severe internal bleeding, with nearly one-third of the victim’s blood in the abdominal cavity,
• A massive liver laceration “almost tearing it into two,” and damage to the mesentery (the tissue attaching the intestines to the back wall of the abdominal cavity),
• Multiple bruises across the body in different stages of healing.

The forensic pathologist testified that:

• The fatal injuries were caused by “severe compression” of the abdomen and lower chest requiring “a significant amount of force,” comparable to the compression seen in high-speed car crashes with seat belts; a mere fall from an 11-inch toddler chair, CPR, or the Heimlich maneuver could not account for these “terrific” and “unsurvivable” injuries.
• The victim would have lost consciousness within minutes of the injury and death would follow shortly thereafter.
• A “significant stomp” by an adult male on the child’s abdomen would be consistent with the injuries.

Investigators observed that both brothers were covered in bruises and abrasions. A nurse examiner testified that the brother’s bruises were consistent with blunt force trauma. The brother reported that:

• Greene had previously “step[ped] on [his] tummy,” and on the day of the incident Greene “jump[ed] on [the victim’s] tummy.”
• Greene would place the boys in “time out” for prolonged periods in a chair, pour water on their heads if they fell asleep, and record these episodes.
• The boys were frequently given food different from that served to the other children.

The prosecution introduced:

• Medical records and photographs documenting the children’s injuries over time,
• Evidence that Greene and his wife repeatedly cancelled foster-care visits in November and December 2020, sometimes citing a COVID quarantine that did not match Greene’s work activity,
• Text messages from the wife to Greene stating “No more bruises. We need them to heal” and a message from Greene about a video of him pouring water over the boys: “[D]elete this before we go to prison.”

Greene testified that:

• He was a trained foster parent with a clean record.
• The boys “tussled” with each other and he sometimes had to break them up.
• On the day in question, the victim simply fell from a toddler chair and began slurring his words; Greene performed CPR and the Heimlich while calling his wife to come home.
• The water-pouring videos were family “prank wars,” and his prison-related text was a joke.
• He denied abusing the children, though he did not directly deny all of the brother’s accounts of punishment and conceded that stomping on a child could seriously injure or kill.

The defense called an emergency physician who suggested the injuries could be consistent with rescue efforts, but he conceded that Greene’s story of a fall from a toddler chair did not match the medical evidence.

B. Procedural History

A January 2021 indictment charged Greene with:

• Penal Law § 125.25(4): second-degree murder (depraved indifference murder of a child),
• Penal Law § 125.20(4): first-degree manslaughter (child homicide with intent to cause physical injury), and
• Two counts of endangering the welfare of a child.

After a jury trial in County Court (Sypniewski, J.), Greene was convicted on all relevant counts. County Court imposed:

• 25 years to life on the murder conviction,
• 25 years (plus five years postrelease supervision) on the manslaughter conviction, concurrent with the murder sentence,
• One year on each endangering count (merging by operation of law with the felony sentences), and
• $6,000 in fines associated with the murder and one endangerment conviction.

Greene appealed, arguing:

1. The murder and manslaughter convictions were not supported by legally sufficient evidence and were against the weight of the evidence, and
2. The sentencing judge exhibited bias warranting resentencing.

C. Holdings

The Third Department majority held:

• Legal sufficiency: Greene’s sufficiency challenge was unpreserved because his trial motion to dismiss was general and did not specify the grounds he later raised on appeal.
• Weight of the evidence: Despite the lack of preservation for sufficiency, the court was obligated, on Greene’s weight-of-the-evidence claim, to review whether each element of each crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court concluded that:
  • The evidence overwhelmingly supported a finding that Greene inflicted the fatal injuries and thereby caused the victim’s death (actus reus).
  • The evidence also supported findings that Greene acted (a) with recklessness creating a grave risk of serious physical injury or death, and (b) under circumstances evincing depraved indifference to human life as required by § 125.25(4).
  • The same evidence supported his conviction for first-degree manslaughter under § 125.20(4).
• Sentencing and bias: Although the sentencing judge’s remarks were “injudicious,” they did not demonstrate impermissible bias. The imposed sentences were consistent with similar cases and were not harsh or excessive.

Judge Aarons, dissenting in part, agreed that the evidence proved:

• That Greene inflicted the fatal injury, and
• That he was guilty of first-degree manslaughter and the remaining offenses,

but concluded that the weight of the evidence did not support a finding of depraved indifference to human life. Aarons would have:

• Reversed the § 125.25(4) murder conviction and dismissed that count of the indictment, and
• Vacated the sentence and remitted for resentencing before a different judge, given the judge’s comments viewed in light of the reduced top count.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents and Doctrinal Background

1. The Statutory Scheme

Two statutes are central:

• Penal Law § 125.25(4): Depraved indifference murder of a child
  A defendant aged 18 or older is guilty when, “[u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, and being eighteen years old or more the defendant recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious physical injury or death to another person less than eleven years old and thereby causes the death of such person.”
• Penal Law § 125.20(4): First-degree manslaughter (child abuse version)
  This provision criminalizes causing the death of a child under 11 where, being 18 or older, the defendant intends only to cause “physical injury” (a lower threshold than “serious physical injury”) but, in doing so, engages in conduct creating a grave risk of serious physical injury or death, and death results.

As the majority notes in footnote 2, subdivision (4) of § 125.25 was adopted as part of a 1990 legislative package to address child abuse homicides. The sponsoring materials emphasize that juries often resisted finding that abusive caregivers intended to create a grave risk of death; the statutory solution was to:

• Reduce the prosecution’s burden on the risk element (allowing murder liability where the conduct creates a grave risk of serious physical injury, not just a grave risk of death), in recognition of the vulnerability of children,
• Without altering the independent requirement that the conduct occur under circumstances evincing depraved indifference to human life.

That last point is central to the dissent’s critique: the Legislature eased proof of the risk component but not the mental-state component of depraved indifference.

2. Depraved Indifference After Suarez and Maldonado

The Court of Appeals has, over the last two decades, significantly narrowed the scope of “depraved indifference”:

• People v. Suarez, 6 NY3d 202 (2005): established that depraved indifference is a distinct, heightened mental state, not merely extreme recklessness. It is “so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard for the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to be the equivalent of intentional murder.” Depraved indifference is ordinarily absent in “one-on-one” killings.
• People v. Maldonado, 24 NY3d 48 (2014): reaffirmed that depraved indifference is “rare” in one-on-one cases and cannot be proved by “risky behavior alone.” The concept has meaning independent of both recklessness and the gravity of the risk created.

Within that framework, the Court has identified two recurring one-on-one scenarios where depraved indifference may exist (as summarized by the dissent, tracking Suarez and Wilson):

1. Where the defendant abandons a helpless victim in life-threatening circumstances (e.g., leaving a person unconscious in freezing conditions), or
2. Where the defendant, intending to harm (but not to kill), engages in torture or a “brutal, prolonged and ultimately fatal course of conduct” against a particularly vulnerable victim, thereby prolonging and intensifying suffering while repeatedly failing to seek help.

3. Child Abuse and Depraved Indifference: Barboni and Wilson

Two cases figure prominently in the majority’s reasoning:

• People v. Barboni, 21 NY3d 393 (2013): The Court upheld a depraved indifference murder conviction where a caregiver subjected a child to a prolonged course of brutal abuse culminating in a fatal injury, and critically, failed to obtain medical care despite having multiple opportunities. The Court emphasized:
  • A “brutal, prolonged and ultimately fatal course of conduct” against a vulnerable victim can evidence depraved indifference, particularly when the defendant had repeated chances to “regret his actions and display caring” but did not.
  • Depraved indifference may exist even when the final, fatal blow is delivered in a single violent outburst, if contextualized by a pattern of abuse and omission of care.
• People v. Wilson, 32 NY3d 1 (2018): Upheld a depraved indifference assault conviction where a child victim endured months of severe injuries (scarring, broken bones, brain damage, etc.), and the defendant failed for an extended time to seek medical care. The “prolonged period” of abuse and refusal to obtain help showed multiple missed chances to manifest concern for the child’s life.

These cases anchor the majority’s use of “brutal, prolonged and ultimately fatal course of conduct” as a pathway to finding depraved indifference in a one-on-one child abuse setting, even where the final blow is a single act.

4. Appellate Division Child-Abuse Cases

Both the majority and dissent rely heavily on several Appellate Division precedents applying § 125.25(4) and its related child-abuse statutes:

• People v. Nelligan, 135 AD3d 1075 (3d Dept 2016), lv denied 27 NY3d 1072 (2016): Affirmed depraved indifference child murder conviction where the defendant had subjected a toddler to ongoing abuse and failed to seek prompt medical care.
• People v. Warrington, 146 AD3d 1233 (3d Dept 2017), lv denied 29 NY3d 1038 (2017): Upheld a depraved indifference murder conviction amid evidence of repeated abuse and delay in obtaining aid; emphasized that the sincerity of post-injury rescue efforts is for the jury to assess.
• People v. Hall, 182 AD3d 1023 (4th Dept 2020), lv denied 35 NY3d 1045 (2020): Similar application; severe injuries and failure to get immediate medical help supported depraved indifference.
• People v. Stahli, 159 AD3d 1055 (3d Dept 2018), lv denied 31 NY3d 1088 (2018), and People v. Ford, 43 AD3d 571 (3d Dept 2007), lv denied 9 NY3d 1033 (2008), also involve brutal abuse of children, sometimes with single violent blows causing liver lacerations, but in a context of broader maltreatment.

These cases collectively support the proposition, emphasized in the majority’s footnote 3, that depraved indifference can exist even when the fatal injury is inflicted in a single outburst, if embedded in brutal treatment of a vulnerable child.

5. Standard of Review: Weight of the Evidence

The court proceeds under the weight-of-the-evidence standard because Greene’s legal sufficiency challenge was unpreserved. Under People v. Sanchez, 32 NY3d 1021 (2018), and People v. Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 (1987):

1. The court first determines whether an acquittal would not have been unreasonable, and if so,
2. It “views the evidence in a neutral light” and weighs the relative probative force of the evidence and the strength of competing inferences, giving deference to the jury’s credibility findings but not abdication of its own responsibility.

Because a weight review obliges the court to consider whether each element was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it serves as a functional backstop in cases where legal sufficiency has not been preserved.

B. The Majority’s Legal Reasoning

1. Actus Reus: Who Inflicted the Fatal Injury?

The majority finds that the jury could readily conclude that Greene, not accidental forces or rescue efforts, caused the fatal injury:

• The autopsy and pathologist’s testimony rule out:
  • A fall from an 11-inch toddler chair,
  • Choking, or
  • CPR/Heimlich maneuvers
  as sources of such catastrophic liver and mesenteric lacerations.
• The magnitude and nature of the trauma (akin to a high-speed crash with seat-belt compression) are strongly consistent with a “significant stomp” by an adult on the child’s abdomen.
• Greene’s own expert conceded that the injuries did not match his account of events.
• The victim’s brother directly testified that Greene stepped—and previously had stepped—on the children’s stomachs as punishment. His description of the fatal episode (the stomp, the command to get up, and the victim’s subsequent silence) correlated with the medical evidence that unconsciousness would occur within minutes.

On this basis, the court concludes that the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Greene was “the actor who inflicted the victim’s fatal injuries,” satisfying the actus reus of § 125.25(4).

2. Recklessness: Conscious Disregard of a Grave Risk

Recklessness, as defined in Penal Law § 15.05(3), and quoted in the opinion, requires that a person:

“[I]s aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable grave risk of death to another person and that the disregard of this risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would have observed in the situation.”

The majority has little difficulty finding recklessness:

• Greene used severe physical force (a stomp) against the abdomen of a four-year-old as a form of discipline, and he admitted that such conduct can seriously injure or kill a child.
• As a certified foster parent, he had been specifically trained that any corporal punishment was forbidden (18 NYCRR 441.9[c]). This training underscores his awareness that physical force on foster children is dangerous and prohibited, rendering his conduct a gross deviation from a reasonable caregiver’s duty of care.
• The nature of the force—analogous to forces that cause lethal injuries in car crashes—objectively created a grave risk of serious physical injury or death.

Thus, the majority holds that the People proved the recklessness element of both § 125.25(4) and § 125.20(4).

3. Depraved Indifference: A “Brutal, Prolonged and Ultimately Fatal Course of Conduct”

The core of the case lies in the mental-state element of depraved indifference. The majority relies on:

• The vulnerability of the victim (age four, developmental disability, foster-care placement),
• The pattern of physical and psychological abuse inflicted over the three months in Greene’s home, and
• The circumstances of the fatal stomp and Greene’s surrounding conduct.

Drawing on Barboni, Wilson, Nelligan, Warrington, and related cases, the majority reasons:

• Depraved indifference is an “utter disregard for the value of human life – a willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one simply does not care whether grievous harm results or not.”
• It is often present where there is “wanton cruelty, brutality or callousness directed against a particularly vulnerable victim, combined with utter indifference to the life or safety of the helpless target.”
• While depraved indifference is “ordinarily not present” in one-on-one killings, it may be inferred when:
  • The defendant engages in a brutal course of conduct over an extended period against a vulnerable victim, and
  • Persists despite opportunities to desist or to seek assistance, thereby displaying a continued lack of caring.

Against that doctrinal backdrop, the majority views the evidence as establishing a “brutal, prolonged and ultimately fatal course of conduct” (quoting Barboni):

• There was extensive evidence of systematic physical and psychological abuse of both brothers:
  • Recurring bruises in different stages of healing on both children.
  • Prior episodes where Greene stepped on the brother’s abdomen.
  • Harsh punishments such as cold showers, forcing the victim to eat unpalatable food, prolonged “time-outs” with water poured over their heads, and differential food treatment compared to other children.
• Text messages—“No more bruises. We need them to heal,” and “Delete this before we go to prison”—support an inference that Greene knew his conduct was abusive, expected bruising, and sought to conceal it rather than stop.
• The level of force employed in the fatal stomp reflects “wanton cruelty and brutality” toward a naturally vulnerable child, as underscored by the legislative history recognizing a child’s “naturally vulnerable condition.”
• On the day of the fatal incident:
  • Greene imposed escalating punishments (cold shower, “nasty corn,” wall sit) before the stomp.
  • After the stomp, the child quickly lost consciousness, but Greene did not immediately dial 911; instead he twice called his wife before emergency services were contacted.
  • He misled first responders about the cause of the child’s condition, offering false, benign explanations (fall, possible choking) that did not match the trauma, and thereby risked misdirecting medical interventions.
  • His demeanor in speaking to police afterward was described as “very laid-back,” discussing his children, music and work even as the victim was being treated.

The majority aggregates this evidence to find:

“[T]he jury could find that defendant engaged in a ‘brutal, prolonged and ultimately fatal course of conduct against a particularly vulnerable victim’ … [and] that defendant evinced a wanton and uncaring state of mind reflecting a callous indifference to the victim’s life.”

The opinion further emphasizes that Greene’s status as a trained foster parent—explicitly instructed that corporal punishment is impermissible—makes his conduct especially culpable and supports the inference of “recklessness as to a grave risk of serious physical injury or death.” This bolsters the view that his actions were not impulsive ignorance, but deliberate disregard.

4. Post-Injury Rescue Efforts

A central defense argument, heavily stressed by the dissent, is that Greene:

• Immediately (or nearly so) attempted to resuscitate the victim through CPR and the Heimlich,
• Promptly involved his wife and, within minutes, emergency services were called, and
• Appeared to be upset and praying at the scene.

The majority responds that:

• The People need only show that Greene had the necessary mental state “when the crime occurred, not at all times thereafter” (citing Waite and Williams).
• Post-injury rescue efforts, especially by the person who inflicted the injuries, primarily raise credibility questions for the jury. The jury may:
  • View such efforts as sincere concern inconsistent with depraved indifference, or
  • Deem them belated and self-serving, motivated by fear of criminal liability rather than genuine care.
• The appellate court finds “no reason to disturb” the jury’s conclusion that Greene’s belated expressions of concern “did not reflect any genuine interest in the victim’s welfare” (tracking language from Warrington).

In effect, the majority reiterates that rescue attempts do not automatically negate depraved indifference; they are one piece of evidence that can be outweighed by a demonstrated pattern of cruelty and concealment.

5. First-Degree Manslaughter

The court’s treatment of the manslaughter conviction is comparatively brief: the same evidentiary record, with its strong proof of intent to cause at least physical injury (e.g., using a stomp as punishment, escalating discipline), sufficiently supports the § 125.20(4) conviction. This is doctrinally straightforward: if a juror believes that Greene intended to hurt (though not necessarily to kill) the victim through his disciplinary tactics, the elements of manslaughter 1 are met.

6. Sentencing and Alleged Judicial Bias

Greene argued that certain comments by the trial judge at sentencing (including labeling him a “murderer” and “sociopath”) showed bias warranting resentencing. The majority:

• Notes that Greene did not object contemporaneously,
• Characterizes the remarks as “injudicious” but not reflective of impermissible bias, especially given the lack of any indication of bias during trial, and
• Holds that the sentences imposed were consistent with those in similar cases and not harsh or excessive considering the brutality of the conduct and Greene’s lack of remorse.

The dissent, by contrast, views the same comments as sufficiently prejudicial—particularly once the depraved indifference count is set aside—that resentencing before a different judge would be warranted.

C. The Dissent’s Approach

1. Re-Emphasizing the Narrowness of Depraved Indifference

Judge Aarons begins by acknowledging the brutal nature of Greene’s conduct, but stresses a crucial distinction: “depravity is not enough.” Depraved indifference is “something even worse” than depravity alone, requiring:

“wanton cruelty, brutality, or callousness, combined with an utter indifference as to whether the victim lives or dies.” (emphasis in original)

Relying heavily on Suarez, Maldonado, and Lewie, the dissent underscored:

• Depraved indifference is a rare mental state in one-on-one killings, and
• It must be conceptually distinct from recklessness and the magnitude of the risk; it cannot be inferred solely from how dangerous or morally repugnant the conduct was.

While Greene’s actions are “cruel,” “brutal,” or even “monstrous,” the dissent insists that the evidence must support that he did not care at all whether the victim lived or died, not merely that he cared “much too little.”

2. One-on-One Scenarios: Abandonment and Prolonged Torture

The dissent reiterates the two paradigmatic one-on-one scenarios where depraved indifference has been found:

1. Abandonment of helpless victim in life-threatening circumstances.
   This does not apply here; Greene never abandoned the child but stayed and attempted some form of assistance.
2. Torture or “brutal, prolonged and ultimately fatal” course of conduct.
   To fit here, the pattern of conduct must itself reveal that the defendant had multiple opportunities to reconsider and aid the victim yet chose not to, thereby demonstrating an utter disregard for life.

Judge Aarons takes the position that this second scenario is not satisfied because:

• The earlier abuse, while reprehensible and abusive, was not life-threatening and did not itself cause or contribute to the victim’s death.
• The fatal stomp was effectively a single, catastrophic act; the medical evidence showed that the earlier bruises had no causal connection to the child’s death.
• Thus, Greene’s failure to desist from earlier non-lethal abuse does not show that, at the time of the stomp, he was utterly indifferent to whether the victim lived or died.

The dissent accepts that the stomping satisfied:

• Recklessness, because Greene knew it posed a grave risk, and
• Intent to cause physical injury, as evidenced by the manslaughter conviction.

However, it views these findings as pointing away from depraved indifference, which is best understood as acting “not because one intends harm, but because one simply does not care whether grievous harm results or not.”

3. The Role of the Manslaughter Conviction

Although the Court of Appeals has held (e.g., in People v. Baker, 14 NY3d 266 [2010]) that convictions for intentional manslaughter and depraved indifference murder are not legally inconsistent, the dissent urges that, on a weight-of-the-evidence analysis, the manslaughter finding is highly relevant:

• By convicting on manslaughter 1 under § 125.20(4), the jury necessarily found that Greene acted “with intent to cause physical injury.”
• Ordinarily, “a defendant who intends to injure a particular person cannot generally be said to be indifferent—depravedly or otherwise—to the fate of that person.”
• Thus, to find depraved indifference, the fact-finder must identify additional evidence beyond the stomp itself that shows Greene treated the victim’s life as irrelevant.

In the dissent’s view, the majority largely reuses the stomp and its consequences to satisfy both recklessness and depraved indifference, effectively collapsing the two elements.

4. Post-Injury Conduct: Evidence Against “Utter Indifference”

Judge Aarons catalogues several facts that, in his view, pull strongly against a finding of utter indifference:

• The pathologist testified that the victim’s injuries were nonsurvivable regardless of the timing of medical intervention. But Greene did not know that; from his perspective, the child might still be saved.
• Greene:
  • Called his wife twice within minutes of the injury,
  • His wife called 911 within three minutes of arriving,
  • He performed CPR on the child until first responders arrived, and
  • Appeared upset and was praying as paramedics worked on the victim.
• These steps, taken in a compressed timeframe, are “inconsistent with an inhumane ambivalence to the plight of a vulnerable victim.”

The dissent acknowledges that the jury was free to believe that these actions were motivated by self-preservation or guilt, but it argues:

• Such “cover-up” actions primarily show consciousness of guilt, not a particular culpable mental state.
• To rely on them as proof of depraved indifference stretches the concept beyond what Suarez, Maldonado, and Matos permit.

Similarly, the dissent discounts the evidentiary weight of Greene’s alleged joviality hours later and the “awkward small talk” with an officer, viewing them as weak or ambiguous indicators compared to the concrete steps he took to secure help.

5. Prior Abuse, Missed Appointments, and Videos

The dissent also dissects the evidence of prior abuse and concealment:

• The bruising, together with the brother’s testimony and the wife’s “no more bruises” text, supports a finding of physical abuse—but:
  • There is no evidence that Greene previously inflicted life-threatening injuries or had seen his abuse bring the child to the brink of death and chosen to continue anyway (as in Wilson).
  • Thus, the prior abuse shows he cared “much too little” for the children’s safety, but not that he was utterly indifferent to whether they lived or died.
• The cancelled foster-care visits were initiated by Greene’s wife; at most they support an inference of an attempt to hide bruises, not an inference of depraved indifference.
• The “time-out” water-pouring video shows, in the dissent’s view, questionable but not manifestly “brutal, wanton or even criminal conduct.” Interpreting it together with the “delete this before we go to prison” text as proof of depraved indifference is “preposterous.”

Likewise, the brother’s statement that Greene did the “same things” to him (e.g., “step[ ] on [his] stomach”) does not, without more, show that Greene repeated lethal-level force after witnessing its consequences, as in Barboni or Wilson.

6. Critique of the Majority’s Doctrinal Move

A central doctrinal dispute arises from the majority’s formulation that depraved indifference may be found where the defendant subjected the vulnerable victim to a “prolonged period of” abuse leading up to the fatal assault and “failed to obtain medical care” afterward. The dissent contends that:

• This is a weakened version of the “brutal, prolonged and ultimately fatal course of conduct” standard from Suarez and Barboni.
• In the Court of Appeals cases, the course of conduct involved:
  • Months of extreme injuries (broken bones, dislocated shoulders, brain damage, severe burns),
  • Multiple life-threatening episodes, and
  • Extended failure to obtain any medical help despite obvious and grave harm.
• By contrast, the record here shows non-life-threatening abuse at unspecified times plus a single fatal blow, with emergency assistance summoned within minutes.

The dissent criticizes the majority for:

• Failing to explain how a “prolonged period of abuse,” absent evidence of prior near-lethal episodes or long-term denial of medical care, yields an inference of utter indifference.
• “Lowering” the bar to the point that “every reckless killing of a child in an abusive household” risks being elevated to second-degree murder, contrary to the Legislature’s careful distinction between § 125.25(4) (depraved indifference murder) and § 125.20(4) (first-degree manslaughter).

In the dissent’s view, while the legislature reduced the People’s burden on the risk element in child homicide cases, the majority in Greene blurs the line by effectively relaxing the independent requirement of depraved indifference.

D. Synthesis: What Legal Principle Emerges?

Taking the majority and dissent together, People v. Greene can be understood as establishing—or at least strongly reinforcing—the following propositions:

1. Patterned non-lethal abuse can, when combined with a single fatal act, support a finding of depraved indifference murder under § 125.25(4).
   The majority treats three months of escalating abuse, documented bruises, harsh discipline, texts acknowledging bruises, and efforts to avoid official scrutiny, as sufficient to characterize Greene’s treatment of the victim as a “brutal, prolonged and ultimately fatal course of conduct,” even though:
   • Only one act—the stomp—was directly life-ending, and
   • The medical evidence did not link earlier abuse causally to the death.
   This extends prior case law that more often tied depraved indifference to either multiple grave injuries or extended denial of medical care.
2. Prompt or “immediate” rescue efforts by the perpetrator do not preclude depraved indifference; their sincerity is for the jury to evaluate.
   Building on Warrington, Hall, and Barboni, the court confirms that:
   • The key inquiry is the defendant’s mental state at the moment of the fatal conduct.
   • Subsequent attempts to revive the victim or obtain help may be discounted as insincere or strategic, particularly when paired with lies about what happened.
   In Greene, the majority accepts the jury’s view that calling the wife first, giving false explanations, and then performing CPR were not inconsistent with depraved indifference at the time of the stomp.
3. In child-abuse homicides, foster-care training and regulatory prohibitions on corporal punishment are relevant to both recklessness and depraved indifference.
   By emphasizing that Greene was a certified foster parent trained that all corporal punishment was forbidden, the majority adds doctrinal weight to the notion that:
   • Such training makes dangerous disciplinary tactics especially blameworthy, and
   • It supports an inference that the caregiver knew, but consciously disregarded, grave risks to the child’s life or serious bodily integrity.
4. On weight-of-the-evidence review, Appellate Divisions will scrutinize every element of a depraved-indifference conviction even where legal sufficiency is unpreserved, but will give substantial deference to jury credibility determinations, especially in child-abuse contexts.
   The majority acknowledges that a different verdict (acquittal on murder, or conviction only for manslaughter) would not have been unreasonable, yet defers to the jury’s rejection of the defense narrative when confronted with:
   • Strong medical proof contradicting Greene’s story,
   • Compelling eyewitness testimony from the victim’s brother, and
   • Documented patterns of abuse and concealment.

The dissent, conversely, frames these same propositions as a problematic expansion: it sees Greene as blurring the carefully drawn line between manslaughter and depraved indifference murder, especially in a statutory context where the Legislature already relaxed the risk requirement in § 125.25(4).

E. Likely Impact and Future Developments

1. Charging and Plea Negotiations in Fatal Child-Abuse Cases

Prosecutors will likely read Greene as strong support for charging:

• Both § 125.25(4) depraved indifference murder and § 125.20(4) manslaughter in fatal child-abuse cases where:
  • There is evidence of a pattern of physical or psychological abuse, even if prior injuries were not life-threatening, and
  • The fatal act is a single, intense application of force.

The majority’s willingness to deem such patterns “brutal, prolonged and ultimately fatal” may encourage broader use of the child-depraved-indifference statute, particularly:

• Where text messages, photographs, or missed appointments suggest awareness and concealment of abuse.
• Where the caregiver has special training (e.g., foster parents, childcare professionals) imposing heightened duties of care.

At the plea-bargaining stage, defense counsel will need to factor in the risk that appellate courts may uphold depraved-indifference convictions even with evidence of post-injury rescue efforts, especially if the surrounding pattern of conduct is strong.

2. Defense Strategy: Emphasizing Mental-State Distinctions

The dissent provides a roadmap for defense arguments in similar cases:

• Highlight the distinct elements of recklessness, intent to injure, and depraved indifference, insisting that:
  • The same act (e.g., the stomp) cannot do all the work for both recklessness and depraved indifference without collapsing the statutory scheme.
  • The presence of an intent to injure (manslaughter) usually undermines, rather than supports, an inference of utter indifference.
• Develop a detailed timeline of post-injury conduct to show that the defendant did care—albeit inadequately or too late—thus negating “utter indifference.”
• Attack the use of non-life-threatening prior abuse as evidence of a “brutal, prolonged and ultimately fatal course of conduct” unless there is proof that:
  • Prior injuries were grave and obviously life-threatening, and
  • The defendant intentionally failed to seek medical help over an extended period.

In appellate practice, counsel may invoke the dissent’s concern that expanding depraved indifference in this way risks turning nearly every reckless child killing in an abusive environment into second-degree murder, undermining legislative distinctions.

3. Jury Instructions and Trial Framing

Greene underscores the importance of:

• Clear jury instructions that:
  • Explain depraved indifference as a distinct, heightened mental state separate from recklessness.
  • Clarify that not all heinous or reckless conduct is “depraved”; the jury must find an utter disregard for whether the victim lives or dies.
  • In one-on-one cases, invite jurors to consider whether the conduct fits recognized scenarios (abandonment, prolonged torture, or their functional equivalents).
• Trial strategy on both sides that explicitly addresses these distinctions:
  • Prosecutors will emphasize patterns of cruelty, concealment, and violations of special caregiving duties.
  • Defense will stress any evidence of care, attempts to help, or limitations in the severity or duration of prior abuse.

4. Potential for Higher-Court Review

Given the vigor and detail of the dissent, and its reliance on core Court of Appeals precedents (Suarez, Maldonado, Matos), Greene presents a natural candidate for further appellate review. A higher court could:

• Endorse the majority’s broader reading, confirming that patterns of non-lethal abuse plus a single fatal blow suffice for depraved indifference, or
• Rein in that approach, reaffirming that child-focused depraved indifference still requires either prolonged life-threatening maltreatment or abandonment-type conduct.

Even without such review, the case will likely be cited heavily in future Third Department decisions, and beyond, as litigants argue over the boundaries of the child-depraved-indifference statute.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Depraved indifference to human life
  A special, very severe mental state. It is not just being reckless or acting dangerously. It means acting with such extreme lack of concern—such an “I don’t care if this person lives or dies” attitude—that the law treats the person almost like someone who meant to kill.
• Recklessness
  Acting while aware that what you are doing creates a serious and unjustifiable risk of very bad harm (here, serious physical injury or death), but choosing to do it anyway. Recklessness is less blameworthy than intending the result, but more blameworthy than a mere accident.
• First-degree manslaughter (child version, Penal Law § 125.20[4])
  In child-abuse settings, this crime punishes someone who:
  • Intends only to cause “physical injury” (any impairment of physical condition or substantial pain) to a child under 11,
  • But in doing so engages in conduct that creates a grave risk of serious physical injury or death, and
  • The child dies as a result.
  The key is: the person meant to hurt, but not necessarily to kill.
• Depraved indifference murder of a child (Penal Law § 125.25[4])
  This crime arises where:
  • The defendant is over 18 and the victim is under 11,
  • The defendant acts recklessly, creating a grave risk of serious physical injury or death to the child,
  • The child dies, and
  • The circumstances show depraved indifference to human life—an utter disregard for whether the child lives or dies.
• Weight of the evidence review
  On appeal, when reviewing the “weight of the evidence,” a court:
  • Asks whether a not-guilty verdict would have been reasonable, and if so,
  • It neutrally weighs all the evidence and competing inferences, while respecting the jury’s ability to observe witnesses.
  • Unlike “legal sufficiency,” weight review allows the appellate court to consider credibility and decide if the verdict is against the overall strength of the evidence.
• Consciousness of guilt vs. mental state at the time of the crime
  “Consciousness of guilt” refers to actions taken after a crime (e.g., lying to police, hiding evidence) that suggest the person knows they did something wrong. These actions do not necessarily show what the person’s specific intent or level of indifference was at the time of the crime; they simply show that the person now fears being held responsible.
• “Brutal, prolonged and ultimately fatal course of conduct”
  A phrase used by the Court of Appeals to describe patterns where a defendant:
  • Inflicts painful or severe abuse over an extended period on a vulnerable victim, and
  • Continuously fails to seek help despite obvious suffering,
  • Such that the overall pattern shows a deep, sustained lack of concern for whether the victim lives or dies.

V. Conclusion

People v. Greene sits at the intersection of two powerful trends in New York criminal law: the tightening of depraved indifference doctrine in one-on-one homicides, and the Legislature’s and courts’ increasing willingness to impose severe liability for fatal child abuse. The Third Department majority, drawing heavily on child-abuse precedents like Barboni and Wilson, upholds a depraved indifference murder conviction where:

• The fatal act was a single, brutal stomp to a child’s abdomen,
• This act was embedded in a documented pattern of prior physical and psychological abuse, concealment, and violations of foster-care training, and
• The caregiver’s post-injury rescue efforts were deemed by the jury to be belated and insincere.

The dissent, by contrast, insists that depraved indifference must remain a rare mental state, distinct from recklessness and intent to injure, and that the record shows a caregiver who cared “much too little” for a vulnerable child’s safety but not someone utterly indifferent to whether the child lived or died. It warns that the majority’s approach risks converting many reckless child-killing cases into second-degree murder under § 125.25(4), thereby eroding the deliberate statutory distinction between that offense and first-degree manslaughter.

The resulting opinion offers both a doctrinal tool for prosecutors seeking to sustain child-depraved-indifference convictions and a robust dissent that defense counsel and courts may invoke to cabin that expansion. Until higher courts refine the contours, Greene will stand in the Third Department as a leading case for the proposition that a pattern of non-lethal abuse, coupled with a single fatal act and contested rescue efforts, can satisfy the demanding requirements of depraved indifference murder of a child.