People v. Goberdhan: VTL § 600 Applies Off‑Highway; Use of Juror Numbers/Initials Is Not a Mode‑of‑Proceedings Error Absent Objection

Introduction

This commentary examines the Appellate Division, Third Department’s decision in People v. Goberdhan (2025 NY Slip Op 04601), an opinion that consolidates and clarifies two important strands of New York criminal procedure and substantive law. First, the Court holds that New York’s hit‑and‑run reporting statute, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600(2)(a), applies to incidents in private parking lots and is not confined to “public highways,” rejecting the notion that a vehicle ceases being a “motor vehicle” upon leaving a public road. Second, on a closely watched topic, the Court concludes that a trial court’s practice of referring to jurors by numbers and initials—without calling full names aloud—is a ministerial irregularity that does not constitute a nonwaivable “mode‑of‑proceedings” error where the parties know jurors’ identities and no objection is made; the Court also declines, on these facts, to exercise its interest‑of‑justice power to order a new trial. The case also addresses weight‑of‑the‑evidence review of intent to kill in a vehicular homicide, a Batson challenge, a for‑cause challenge to a State Police civilian employee, several ineffective‑assistance claims, and sentence review.

The prosecution arose from a December 2019 incident in which the defendant chased a man who had grabbed his wallet and, during a pursuit captured largely on surveillance video, struck the victim twice with his vehicle and pursued him off camera; the victim later died from compressive blunt force injuries consistent with being run over. A jury convicted defendant of intentional second‑degree murder and leaving the scene of an incident without reporting. The judgment was affirmed over a dissent arguing the use of an anonymized jury warranted reversal in the interest of justice and that the sentence should be reduced.

Summary of the Judgment

Convictions affirmed. The Court upheld the jury’s finding of intent to kill on weight‑of‑the‑evidence review, emphasizing permissible inferences from the surveillance footage and autopsy evidence.
VTL § 600(2)(a) applies off‑highway. The Court rejected the defense theory that the statute’s reporting duty evaporates when an incident occurs in a private parking lot; there is no statutory “public highway” limitation and a vehicle remains a “motor vehicle” in that setting.
Anonymous‑jury claim unpreserved and not a mode‑of‑proceedings error. Using juror numbers and initials without calling full names aloud, where parties had the juror list and could participate meaningfully, is a ministerial deviation, not a fundamental structural defect. The Court declined to reverse in the interest of justice.
Batson challenge rejected. The trial court credited the prosecutor’s race‑neutral reasons (education level, legal studies background, inattentiveness, comments perceived as victim‑blaming), and the appellate court deferred.
For‑cause challenge properly denied. A State Police civilian employee vouched for impartiality; no record basis showed bias.
Ineffective assistance claim failed. Remaining complaints reflected strategy or matters outside the record; on the whole, counsel provided meaningful representation.
Sentence affirmed. Consecutive maximum terms were not unduly harsh or severe given the facts.

Dissent (McShan, J., joined by Garry, P.J.). The dissent would reverse and remit for a new trial because the court anonymized the jury without statutory authority or limiting instructions, risking the presumption of innocence; and would reduce the sentence by running terms concurrently and modestly lowering the minimum on the murder count.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1) Preservation and Weight‑of‑the‑Evidence Review

People v. Hodge, 224 AD3d 1082 (3d Dept 2024); People v. Colvin, 218 AD3d 1016 (3d Dept 2023): Failure to renew sufficiency objections at the close of all proof renders them unpreserved.
People v. Lozano, 203 AD3d 1231 (3d Dept 2022); People v. Starnes, 206 AD3d 1133 (3d Dept 2022): On weight‑of‑the‑evidence review, the appellate court views the record neutrally, defers to credibility findings, and ensures elements are proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

2) Intent to Kill Inferred from Vehicular Conduct

People v. Callahan, 186 AD3d 943 (3d Dept 2020); People v. Lewis, 224 AD3d 1143 (3d Dept 2024): Intent to kill may be inferred from conduct and circumstances, including repeated use of a vehicle as a weapon.
People v. Dorvil, 234 AD3d 1106 (3d Dept 2025); People v. Grady, 233 AD3d 1369 (3d Dept 2024): The jury may reject defendant’s self‑serving account and accept reasonable inferences from the evidence.
People v. Leppanen, 218 AD3d 995 (3d Dept 2023); People v. Stanford, 130 AD3d 1306 (3d Dept 2015): Deference to jury on intent inferences.

3) VTL § 600(2)(a) Applies Off‑Highway; “Motor Vehicle” Status Persists

People v. Cassata, 238 AD3d 1492 (4th Dept 2025); People v. Lopez, 144 Misc 2d 325 (Sup Ct, NY County 1989): Support the view that the statute’s obligations are not limited to public highways.
People v. Bell, 21 Misc 2d 578 (Monroe County Ct 1960): Early authority that § 600’s reporting duty is not highway‑bound.
Statutes referenced: VTL §§ 600(2)(a), 125, 134.
Additional weight‑of‑the‑evidence authorities: People v. Papineau, 19 AD3d 1149 (4th Dept 2005); People v. Ferguson, 193 AD3d 1253 (3d Dept 2021); People v. Tromans, 177 AD3d 1103 (3d Dept 2019).

4) Duplicity Preservation and Resolution

People v. Allen, 24 NY3d 441 (2014); People v. Agan, 207 AD3d 861 (3d Dept 2022): Duplicity claims must be preserved.
People v. Black, 65 AD3d 811 (3d Dept 2009); People v. Delbrey, 179 AD3d 1292 (3d Dept 2020): Clarify the unit of prosecution and jury charge focus for leaving‑the‑scene offenses.

5) Anonymous Jury: Preservation, Mode‑of‑Proceedings, and Interest‑of‑Justice

Mode‑of‑proceedings framework: People v. Patterson, 39 NY2d 288 (1976), affd 432 US 197 (1977); People v. Kelly, 5 NY3d 116 (2005); People v. Gray, 86 NY2d 10 (1995); People v. Agramonte, 87 NY2d 765 (1996).
Ministerial nature of calling names; not MOP: People v. Stewart, 231 AD3d 1480 (4th Dept 2024); People v. Jenne, 224 AD3d 953 (3d Dept 2024); People v. Bostic, 217 AD3d 678 (2d Dept 2023).
Meaningful participation; ability to object: People v. Mack, 27 NY3d 534 (2016); People v. Allen, 232 AD3d 1256 (4th Dept 2024); People v. Hebert, 218 AD3d 1003 (3d Dept 2023); People v. Gonzalez, 214 AD3d 1439 (4th Dept 2023).
Prior Third Department reversals on anonymous juries in the interest of justice: People v. Tenace, 229 AD3d 908 (3d Dept 2024); People v. Heidrich, 226 AD3d 1096 (3d Dept 2024), lv denied 42 NY3d 927 (2024).
Court of Appeals guidance: People v. Flores, 32 NY3d 1087 (2018) (characterizing anonymous juries as “extraordinary procedure”); see also People v. Flores, 153 AD3d 182 (2d Dept 2017).
Post‑trial statutory changes: 2024 amendments to CPL 270.15(1‑a) and (1‑b) (good‑cause findings and mandatory limiting instruction when identities are withheld) inform, but do not govern, this pre‑amendment trial.

6) Batson Challenge

People v. Bridgeforth, 28 NY3d 567 (2016): Three‑step Batson protocol.
Deference at step three: People v. Hecker, 15 NY3d 625 (2010).
Prima facie mootness once reasons offered: People v. Morgan, 230 AD3d 864 (3d Dept 2024).
Recent Third Department affirmances: People v. Cruz, 228 AD3d 1019 (3d Dept 2024); People v. Cruz, 238 AD3d 1327 (3d Dept 2025).

7) For‑Cause Challenge

CPL 270.20(1)(b): Standard for excusing juror for cause.
People v. Contompasis, 236 AD3d 138 (3d Dept 2025); People v. Alger, 206 AD3d 1049 (3d Dept 2022): Assurances of impartiality suffice absent record showing likely bias.

8) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Meaningful‑representation standard: People v. Houze, 177 AD3d 1184 (3d Dept 2019).
Strategic explanations and record limits: People v. Maffei, 35 NY3d 264 (2020); People v. Sposito, 193 AD3d 1236 (3d Dept 2021), affd 37 NY3d 1149 (2022).
Grand jury testimony issues often require CPL 440 motions: People v. Reynolds, 2025 NY Slip Op 03607 (3d Dept 2025); cf. People v. Dunbar, 218 AD3d 931 (3d Dept 2023).
Expert “homicide” opinion framed as medical conclusion mitigates risk: People v. Every, 146 AD3d 1157 (3d Dept 2017), affd 29 NY3d 1103 (2017).
Recent applications: People v. Hoyt, 237 AD3d 1360 (3d Dept 2025); compare People v. Franklin, 237 AD3d 1246 (3d Dept 2025).

9) Sentencing Review

CPL 470.15(3)(c), (6)(b): Discretionary interest‑of‑justice sentence review.
Affirmances on harshness/severity: People v. Cruz, 238 AD3d 1327 (3d Dept 2025); People v. Bova, 232 AD3d 939 (3d Dept 2024).
Dissent’s contrasting view on reduction: People v. Parker, 231 NYS3d 276 (3d Dept 2025).

Legal Reasoning

A. Intentional Murder: Inferences from Vehicle Use and Forensic Proof

Although defendant argued he lacked an intent to kill and was merely trying to “block” the victim while emotionally overwhelmed, the jury saw surveillance clips of two separate strikes—with one pinning the victim against a wall—followed by a close pursuit off camera and audible engine revving. The autopsy revealed catastrophic compressive injuries (including tears to the heart and aorta) consistent with being run over; the forensic expert specifically opined the fatal crushing occurred beyond the cameras’ views. The Court held that, even though an acquittal was not unreasonable on this record, the jury permissibly inferred intent to cause death from the manner of driving and the resulting injuries. Standard weight‑of‑the‑evidence deference to the jury’s credibility choices and inferential judgments carried the day.

B. VTL § 600(2)(a): Reporting Duty Applies in Private Parking Lots

The defense contended the vehicle ceased being a “motor vehicle” under the statute once it entered a private lot, and that § 600(2)(a) effectively applies only to incidents on public highways. The Third Department rejected both premises:

“Motor vehicle” status does not vanish off‑highway; nothing in § 600(2)(a) conditions the duty on location.
The statute’s text contains no “public highway” limitation; its focus is on the operator’s knowledge (actual or cause to know) that a personal injury occurred due to an incident involving the vehicle, and on immediate stopping and reporting duties.

Relying on cross‑departmental authority and trial‑level decisions dating back decades, the Court clarified that § 600(2)(a) obligations attach regardless of whether the incident occurs on a street, driveway, or private lot. The verdict on the leaving‑the‑scene count was therefore not against the weight of the evidence. The Court also disposed of the duplicity claim as unpreserved and substantively unfounded in light of the jury’s narrow instruction linking culpability to the initial injury‑causing departure from the scene.

C. Anonymous Jury: Ministerial Irregularity, Not a Mode‑of‑Proceedings Error, and No Interest‑of‑Justice Reversal

Before jury selection, the trial court used juror numbers and initials rather than calling out full names. The defense had the juror list; both parties used it; and the court elicited full names of jurors’ relatives in law enforcement—making clear identities were not hidden from the litigants. The defense did not object.

The Third Department held that:

Calling full names aloud is a ministerial act under CPL 270.15(1)(a), not a core structural component of the trial. Where the parties know the jurors’ identities and can participate meaningfully, any failure to use full names in open court is not a nonwaivable mode‑of‑proceedings error.
Because the claim was unpreserved, and because defendants were not prevented from objecting or participating, the Court would not reach the issue as a matter of right.
Exercising its interest‑of‑justice discretion (CPL 470.15), the Court declined to reverse on these facts—distinguishing earlier Third Department cases that had granted relief where anonymization risked prejudice and the record warranted corrective action. The majority saw no “rare” or “unusual” circumstances “crying out” for reversal here.

The dissent urged the opposite result: that anonymization, even if not a mode‑of‑proceedings error, undermined the presumption of innocence absent a record of necessity and appropriate limiting instructions—especially since, at the time of trial, there was no statutory authority to conceal juror names. The dissent leaned on People v. Flores’s caution that anonymous juries are an “extraordinary procedure,” on recent Third Department reversals (Tenace, Heidrich), and on the 2024 amendments to CPL 270.15(1‑a) and (1‑b) requiring good‑cause findings and a non‑prejudicial instruction when identities are withheld.

D. Batson: Race‑Neutral Reasons Credited

Once the prosecutor offered race‑neutral reasons for striking three prospective jurors (legal studies background and risk of “expertizing” the law; a remark perceived as victim‑blaming; inattentiveness and preference for jurors with more education), the step‑one prima facie inquiry was moot. The trial court found the reasons nonpretextual at step three, and the Appellate Division—on a deferential factual standard—saw no basis to disturb that finding.

E. For‑Cause Challenge Properly Denied

A civilian State Police employee knew a potential witness from years prior but had no contact with forensic personnel and gave unequivocal assurances of impartiality. The record did not show a mindset likely to preclude an impartial verdict; the denial of the for‑cause challenge was within the court’s discretion.

F. Ineffective Assistance: No Deficiency Shown on the Record

Defendant’s complaint about being allowed to testify before the grand jury is outside the record and is for a CPL 440 motion. Other claims (jury selection strategy, not objecting to the medical examiner’s “homicide” categorization) either reflected reasonable strategy—especially given cross‑examination framing “homicide” as a medical conclusion—or would have been unlikely to succeed. Viewing counsel’s performance in totality, the Court found meaningful representation.

G. Sentencing: No Interest‑of‑Justice Reduction

Despite defendant’s lack of criminal history, the majority deemed the consecutive maximum terms not unduly harsh given the fatal, callous conduct, and declined to reduce the sentence. The dissent would have run the terms concurrently and modestly reduced the minimum on the murder count, citing the narrow temporal window, the victim’s initial theft of the wallet, and the absence of a violent history.

Impact and Practical Implications

1) Hit‑and‑Run Prosecutions in Private Lots

Goberdhan removes any lingering doubt in the Third Department: the duties in VTL § 600(2)(a) apply outside public highways. Expect more prosecutions for failure to stop and report in parking lots, driveways, and other private spaces. Defendants cannot invoke “location” to evade liability; the core inquiries are whether the operator knew or had cause to know an injury occurred and whether the operator stopped, identified themselves, and reported as statutorily required.

2) Anonymous‑Jury Procedures After the 2024 Amendments

This decision tightens preservation expectations and narrows mode‑of‑proceedings arguments. Going forward:

Defense counsel should object on the record if a court intends to avoid calling full names aloud, and should request the findings and instruction now required by CPL 270.15(1‑a) and (1‑b) when any form of anonymization is considered.
Trial courts should make express good‑cause findings (threats to juror safety or integrity) and give the non‑prejudicial limiting instruction when juror identities are withheld from the public record.
Absent objection and where parties have juror identities and can participate meaningfully, appellate courts in the Third Department are less likely to reverse, particularly on mode‑of‑proceedings grounds.

The split between the majority (no reversal) and dissent (reverse in the interest of justice) signals ongoing sensitivity around juror anonymity’s potential to erode the presumption of innocence. The 2024 statutory framework provides guardrails; adherence will be essential to avoid appellate scrutiny.

3) Inferring Intent to Kill from Vehicular Conduct

The decision reinforces that repeated use of a vehicle to strike a victim—especially combined with close pursuit, engine revving, and forensic evidence of crushing—can support a jury’s finding of intent to kill, even when the defendant advances a non‑homicidal motive (retrieving a wallet) and claims impaired perception. Video and forensic reconstruction remain powerful, often decisive evidence.

4) Batson and Voir Dire Strategy

Batson challenges continue to turn on trial‑level credibility determinations. Prosecutors should articulate concrete, content‑linked reasons (e.g., specific comments, inattentiveness, background concerns). Defense counsel should develop comparative juror analyses and demonstrate pretext with specificity to overcome deference at step three.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mode‑of‑Proceedings Error: A fundamental, structural flaw affecting the organization or basic mode of trial (e.g., total deprivation of counsel at a critical stage). Such errors cannot be forfeited or waived. By contrast, ministerial deviations (like not calling juror full names aloud when parties have identities) are not mode‑of‑proceedings errors and require an objection to preserve.
Weight of the Evidence vs. Legal Sufficiency: Legal sufficiency asks whether, viewing the evidence most favorably to the prosecution, any rational juror could convict. Weight review, by contrast, has the appellate court neutrally re‑weighing proof and credibility, while still deferring to the jury unless the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
VTL § 600(2)(a) (Leaving the Scene): If you operate a motor vehicle and know or have reason to know another person was injured from an incident involving your vehicle, you must stop, provide identifying information, and report to police if no officer is present. The duty is not confined to public highways.
Anonymous Jury: Any procedure concealing juror identifying information from the public record (names, addresses) is sensitive because it may suggest the defendant is dangerous. As of 2024 amendments to CPL 270.15, courts need good‑cause findings and must give a limiting instruction telling jurors not to draw negative inferences from anonymity.
Batson Challenge: A three‑step process. The movant shows an inference of discriminatory strikes; the opponent gives race‑neutral reasons; the court decides pretext. Appellate courts defer heavily to trial courts at step three.
Duplicity: Charging more than one offense in a single count. Objections must be raised before or during trial. Here, the jury charge limited the theory to the initial departure after causing injury, avoiding duplicity.
Ineffective Assistance (NY Standard): The question is whether counsel provided “meaningful representation” considering the totality. Strategic choices and record‑based limitations matter; many claims belong in post‑conviction proceedings where facts outside the trial record can be developed.

Conclusion

People v. Goberdhan is significant in two respects. Substantively, it cements that VTL § 600(2)(a)’s stop‑and‑report obligations apply in private parking lots and other off‑highway settings; a vehicle does not lose its status as a “motor vehicle” merely by leaving a public road. Procedurally, it marks the Third Department’s measured approach to anonymized‑jury practices: absent objection and where counsel has juror identities and participates meaningfully, the use of numbers and initials is a ministerial irregularity that does not trigger nonwaivable mode‑of‑proceedings error, and will not—without more—compel interest‑of‑justice reversal. The dissent underscores the countervailing concern that anonymization risks eroding the presumption of innocence unless tightly justified and accompanied by careful instructions, a concern now codified by the 2024 amendments to CPL 270.15.

On the remaining issues, the decision reaffirms settled principles: juries may infer intent to kill from vehicular conduct and forensic findings; Batson outcomes hinge on credited race‑neutral reasons; for‑cause challenges fail absent demonstrable bias; ineffectiveness claims require more than hindsight disagreement; and sentences within statutory bounds will not be disturbed absent a compelling equitable basis. Collectively, Goberdhan provides practical guidance to trial courts and practitioners on preserving objections, structuring voir dire under the new CPL 270.15 framework, and litigating hit‑and‑run prosecutions outside the public‑highway context.

Practice Pointers

Always renew sufficiency motions at the close of all proof to preserve appellate review.
Object on the record to any anonymization of juror identities; request CPL 270.15(1‑a) good‑cause findings and the CPL 270.15(1‑b) limiting instruction.
In leaving‑the‑scene cases, focus on whether the defendant knew or had reason to know an injury occurred; location (public vs. private) is not a defense.
For Batson, build comparative analyses and identify similarly situated non‑struck jurors to show pretext.
Develop IAC claims via CPL 440 when they turn on advice or strategy outside the trial record.