People v. Fuentes: Document-Specific “Tends to Impeach” Standard Clarified; Derivative IAB Reports Need Not Precede a Valid Certificate of Compliance

Introduction

In People v. Fuentes, 2025 NY Slip Op 05872 (Oct. 23, 2025), the New York Court of Appeals addressed a recurring fault line in New York’s transformed criminal discovery regime: whether the People’s certificates of compliance (COCs) and statements of readiness (SORs) are invalid when, before filing, the prosecution fails to disclose a police Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) report about unrelated misconduct allegations against the arresting officer. The case sits at the intersection of the 2019 discovery reforms (CPL art. 245), the speedy trial statute (CPL 30.30), and longstanding constitutional disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States.

The key dispute centered on CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv), which requires disclosure of “[a]ll evidence and information, including that which is known to police or other law enforcement agencies acting on the government’s behalf in the case, that tends to … impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness.” The defense claimed that because the People did not disclose an IAB report concerning the officer’s conduct in an unrelated incident before filing their COCs, their trial readiness was illusory and the case had to be dismissed under CPL 30.30. The People countered that they had timely disclosed the substance of the impeachment material by producing the civil complaint and docket information about the unrelated incident and that, in any event, the IAB report did not itself “tend to impeach.”

Writing for the Court, Judge Singas affirmed the Appellate Term’s denial of the speedy-trial dismissal, but “on different grounds.” The Court assumed without deciding that CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv) reaches unrelated misconduct allegations, yet concluded the People’s disclosures here satisfied their automatic discovery obligations and supported valid, timely COCs. In doing so, the Court articulated an important clarifying principle: the “tends to impeach” standard is document-specific; an IAB report that merely recycles already-disclosed allegations and contains no independent impeaching content does not need to be disclosed before filing a COC.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court of Appeals held that the People’s COCs were valid and that their announcement of readiness was timely under CPL 30.30. Even assuming CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv) covers impeachment material arising from unrelated incidents, the Court ruled that:

• The People timely disclosed the core impeachment information by providing the docket number, complaint, amended complaint, docket report, and notice regarding a federal civil lawsuit alleging unlawful police conduct by the arresting officer, Officer Congedo, and others.
• The subsequently produced IAB report about that same incident did not itself “tend to impeach” Officer Congedo because it:
  • Contained no separate allegations of misconduct beyond those in the already-disclosed civil complaint;
  • Reflected that the complainants declined to be interviewed;
  • Recounted the officer’s own description of a lawful search and recorded an exoneration finding; and
  • Contained civilian witness accounts that did not identify Congedo as engaging in misconduct.
• Because the IAB report added no independent impeachment value beyond what had already been disclosed, the People were not required to disclose that particular document before filing a valid COC. Nothing in CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv) obliges disclosure of “every single document referencing impeachment material … based solely on that reference.”

The Court therefore affirmed the Appellate Term’s order denying dismissal, without reaching whether the People exercised due diligence (CPL 245.50) in obtaining the IAB report or whether any prejudice analysis applied. The Court also declined to resolve broader questions about the meaning and scope of the “relate to the subject matter of the case” language in CPL 245.20(1), including in light of amendments that took effect August 7, 2025.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• People v. King, 42 NY3d 424 (2024): Cited to underscore that the 2019 discovery reforms were a “sea change” tying discovery to trial readiness under CPL 30.30. This frames the stakes: invalid discovery compliance can vitiate trial readiness and expose a case to dismissal on speedy-trial grounds.
• People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200 (2023): Reaffirmed that CPL 245 creates automatic disclosure obligations and ties them to readiness. Bay also articulated a pre-2025 framework for evaluating prosecutorial due diligence and rejected prejudice as a required showing for 30.30 dismissal under then-existing law. The majority in Fuentes cites Bay for context and sanctions (CPL 245.80), while the dissent relies heavily on Bay to argue that the majority smuggles a prejudice-like inquiry into the pre-2025 regime.
• People v. Garrett, 23 NY3d 878 (2014): A Brady case holding impeachment evidence must be disclosed when favorable and material; additionally, Garrett limited imputed knowledge to misconduct committed while acting as part of the prosecution team. Fuentes notes that CPL 245.20(2) now statutorily deems items held by state or local law enforcement to be in the People’s possession for automatic discovery—expanding beyond Garrett’s constitutional imputation.
• Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 US 150 (1972); United States v. Bagley, 473 US 667 (1985): Foundational constitutional disclosure requirements for exculpatory and impeachment evidence. Fuentes contrasts Brady/Giglio’s timing (“meaningful opportunity to use”) with CPL 245’s strict early deadlines and readiness tether.
• People v. Smith, 27 NY3d 652 (2016); People v. Rouse, 34 NY3d 269 (2019): These decisions endorse the use of prior misconduct allegations to impeach police witnesses, subject to relevance and the trial court’s discretion. Fuentes cites them to acknowledge that non-case misconduct can support impeachment if it truly bears on credibility.
• People v. Cortijo, 70 NY2d 868 (1987); People v. Steadman, 82 NY2d 1 (1993): Both address timing for Brady disclosure (“meaningful opportunity to use”), a separate constitutional baseline distinct from CPL 245’s automatic discovery timelines.

Legal Reasoning

The Court proceeds in three deliberate steps:

1. It assumes, without deciding, that CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv) requires the People to disclose impeachment material about unrelated misconduct, even under the pre–August 7, 2025 version of the statute. This approach avoids prematurely resolving the meaning of “relate to the subject matter of the case.”
2. It recognizes that the applicable statutory standard requires disclosure of evidence that “tends to … impeach.” To give content to that phrase, the Court looks to plain meaning (citing Black’s Law Dictionary definitions of “tend” and “impeach”) and to its own impeachment jurisprudence (Smith, Rouse), which stresses specificity and relevance to credibility.
3. Applying that standard to the particular IAB report at issue, the Court finds no independent impeachment value in the document:
   • The report did not memorialize interviews of the complainants (the Clementes), and its recited allegations were drawn entirely from their civil pleadings—documents the People had already disclosed pre-COC.
   • The report summarized Officer Congedo’s account of a lawful, consent-based search and recorded an exoneration finding; those features, if anything, would not discredit her veracity.
   • Notes of other civilian witnesses did not describe misconduct by Congedo.
   Because the IAB report contained no separate impeaching content beyond what the defense already had, the Court held it did not itself “tend to impeach” and thus did not have to be disclosed before the COC to render readiness valid. In a key clarifying line, the Court adds that CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv) does not require the People to turn over “every single document referencing impeachment material … based solely on that reference.”

Importantly, the Court explicitly disclaims any reliance on prejudice to the defense; its conclusion rests on the statutory “tends to impeach” threshold, not on an assessment of whether the defense was harmed by the timing of the IAB disclosure.

The Dissent’s Critique

Chief Judge Wilson, joined in relevant part by Judge Rivera, argues that the pre–August 7, 2025 version of CPL 245.20 required production of “all evidence and information” tending to impeach, and that the IAB report was not redundant:

• Unlike the civil complaint, the IAB materials reflected specific information about Officer Congedo’s role (including her completion of a consent-to-search form) and included additional interviews and factual details not in the civil pleadings.
• Under the 2019 reforms, “tends to” is broader than Brady/Giglio’s “materiality” and does not allow the People to pick and choose among different items of impeachment material.
• The majority’s “no additional value” rationale resembles a prejudice inquiry. But prejudice was not part of the pre-2025 Bay framework; it became one among many statutory factors only with the 2025 amendments to CPL 245.50(5). Applying prejudice implicitly, the dissent says, effectively rewrites the former statute and short-circuits the Legislature’s chosen effective date.

The dissent would reverse, or at minimum remit, for a proper application of the pre-2025 statutory framework, without importing a prejudice overlay.

Statutory Framework and 2025 Amendments

The 2019 discovery reforms dramatically changed practice:

• CPL 245.10(1): Strict deadlines for automatic disclosure (20 days if in custody; 35 days if not).
• CPL 245.20(1): Required disclosure of “all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case” in the People’s possession or control, with 21 enumerated categories, including impeachment evidence under subparagraph (k)(iv).
• CPL 245.20(2): Deems items held by state or local law enforcement to be in the People’s possession.
• CPL 245.20(7): Presumption of openness favoring disclosure.
• CPL 245.50: Valid COC is a prerequisite to trial readiness; due diligence standard governs compliance; failure to file a valid COC precludes readiness absent “special circumstances.”
• CPL 245.80: Sanctions for belated disclosure.

While this appeal was pending, the Legislature amended CPL 245.20(1) and (1)(k) (effective August 7, 2025). The amendments:

• Moved the “relate to the subject matter of the case” phrase out of the lead sentence in CPL 245.20(1) and into several enumerated subparagraphs, including impeachment in (1)(k), and added clarifying words (“the following material and information”).
• Added to CPL 245.50(5) a multi-factor codification of due diligence, directing courts to consider, among other things, whether delayed disclosure “was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense’s ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial.” No single factor is determinative.

Fuentes acknowledges the amendments but resolves the case under principles common to both versions: the “tends to impeach” threshold, applied document-by-document, remains central.

Why the Precedents Matter Here

The Court’s logic is anchored in its earlier impeachment cases:

• Smith and Rouse establish that allegations of police misconduct can be fertile impeachment material if relevant to credibility, but they also emphasize specificity and relevance. Fuentes uses that sensibility to ask whether the IAB report itself contributes impeaching content—not whether some other, previously disclosed source does.
• Garrett, though a constitutional case, signals the limits of imputed knowledge; the statutory deeming provision in CPL 245.20(2) goes further. Yet Fuentes shows that even when possession is deemed, production still depends on whether the item meets the “tends to impeach” threshold.
• Bay is the lodestar for the pre-2025 due diligence analysis and the non-necessity of prejudice at that time. Fuentes does not formally apply Bay’s factor test because it resolves the case on the anterior question—whether the IAB report belonged in the impeachment bucket at all.

Impact and Practical Implications

For Prosecutors

• Fuentes permits a calibrated, content-sensitive approach to impeachment discovery before filing a COC. If the prosecution has already disclosed the substance of impeaching allegations (e.g., through civil pleadings and docket materials), a derivative document that:
  • adds no independent impeaching content;
  • repeats allegations already disclosed; and
  • contains exonerative findings or the officer’s account consistent with lawful conduct
  need not hold up a COC.
• However, this is a narrow safe harbor. If an IAB report (or any other document):
  • includes admissions, inconsistent statements, or credibility-damaging details not found in prior disclosures;
  • records adverse findings, sustained charges, or disciplinary outcomes bearing on truthfulness; or
  • features complainant or witness statements contradicting the officer
  it likely “tends to impeach” and must be disclosed before filing a COC.
• Best practices remain to promptly request, review, and disclose law-enforcement-held materials (CPL 245.20(2); 245.55(1) flow-of-information duties) and to document due diligence. Post–August 7, 2025, prosecutors should also frame any delayed disclosure in terms of the CPL 245.50(5) factors, including prejudice.

For Defense Counsel

• Fuentes raises the bar for invalidating a COC based solely on the non-production of a derivative IAB report. Defense challenges will be stronger if they:
  • Identify independent impeaching content in the withheld document (new facts, inconsistencies, adverse findings);
  • Explain why that content differs from and exceeds the already-disclosed materials; and
  • Demonstrate how the item bears on credibility in the case at hand (e.g., consent, probable cause, coercion).
• Make specific Brady/Giglio demands early, reference known lawsuits or complaint numbers, and, where appropriate, request in camera review to test the prosecution’s “no impeaching content” assertion.
• Post–August 7, 2025, consider the new CPL 245.50(5) factors in any dismissal motion and develop a record of prejudice or impeded preparation stemming from delayed disclosure.

For Trial Courts

• Fuentes invites a document-specific inquiry: does the contested item itself have a tendency to impeach, or is it merely a derivative reference to already-disclosed allegations?
• Courts should avoid conflating this threshold inquiry with prejudice, especially for pre-amendment cases, consistent with Bay. For post–August 7, 2025 cases, prejudice becomes one factor in evaluating due diligence under CPL 245.50(5), but it is not dispositive.
• Because Fuentes affirms “on different grounds,” it does not endorse the proposition that all IAB materials about unrelated incidents are categorically outside automatic discovery. The assumption arguendo keeps that question open for future cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Certificate of Compliance (COC): The prosecutor’s sworn statement that, after due diligence and reasonable inquiries, all required automatic discovery has been disclosed (CPL 245.50[1]). A valid COC is a prerequisite to being “ready for trial” under CPL 30.30.
• Statement of Readiness (SOR): The People’s declaration that they are ready to proceed to trial; without a valid COC, an SOR does not stop the CPL 30.30 clock.
• “Tends to impeach”: A threshold requiring that the item itself have some bearing on discrediting a testifying witness’s credibility. Fuentes makes this a document-specific inquiry, not a general rule that every document touching on impeaching themes must be turned over pre-COC.
• IAB report: An internal police document reflecting an administrative inquiry into alleged officer misconduct. After repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a and under CPL 245.20(2), such materials in law enforcement’s possession are deemed in the prosecution’s possession for discovery purposes.
• Brady/Giglio: Constitutional rules requiring disclosure of favorable evidence, including impeachment, in time for meaningful use by the defense. CPL 245 requires earlier and broader automatic disclosure and ties compliance to trial readiness.
• “Relate to the subject matter of the case”: A phrase in pre–August 7, 2025 CPL 245.20(1) whose meaning has been debated. The 2025 amendments relocate this phrase to various subparagraphs, including impeachment in (1)(k). Fuentes does not decide how this phrase limits or informs impeachment disclosure in either version; it assumes broad coverage and decides on narrower grounds.
• Huntley/Dunaway hearings: Pretrial hearings addressing voluntariness of statements (Huntley) and legality of arrests/seizures (Dunaway). Although the dissent references hearing timing, the majority’s timeline shows the IAB report was produced before the scheduled hearing in this case.

Case Background and Procedural Posture

The defendant, Henry Fuentes, faced misdemeanor charges arising from an encounter with Suffolk County Police Officer Danielle Congedo. The People:

• Filed a COC and SOR on May 11, 2021, including a spreadsheet flagging a pending federal civil lawsuit against Officer Congedo, with plaintiffs’ names and the docket number.
• On July 28, 2021, produced the civil complaint and amended complaint, the docket report, and a notice of the lawsuit, and filed a supplemental COC and SOR. The civil pleadings alleged aggressive police conduct, an unlawful home search and seizure, and asserted that consent to search was obtained only after officers had completed the search.

Before a scheduled Huntley/Dunaway hearing where Congedo would testify, the defense argued (Jan. 10, 2022) that the People had not complied with CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv) for failing to produce IAB materials regarding the civil allegations. On January 14, 2022, the People turned over an IAB report (dated April 27, 2020) concerning the civil allegations, an updated federal docket report, and notice that the suit had been resolved, and filed a second supplemental COC.

In February 2022, the defense moved to dismiss on CPL 30.30 grounds, arguing that the COCs were invalid because the People had not exercised due diligence and had not disclosed all required impeachment materials before filing. The District Court agreed and dismissed, but the Appellate Term reversed and reinstated the accusatory instrument, concluding that the IAB materials did not “relate to the subject matter of the case” and thus were not automatically discoverable. The Court of Appeals granted leave and affirmed the reversal on different grounds: regardless of the “subject matter” debate, the IAB report did not itself “tend to impeach,” and the People had already disclosed the impeaching allegations from the civil case pre-COC.

Significance and Takeaways

• Fuentes supplies a critical, practical gloss on CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv): automatic disclosure of impeachment materials is governed by the document’s own impeachment value. Derivative documents that add nothing beyond previously disclosed impeaching allegations need not delay a valid COC.
• The Court deliberately leaves unresolved the reach of the “subject matter of the case” limitation and the interplay between impeachment of unrelated incidents and automatic discovery—issues sharpened by the 2025 statutory amendments. Future cases may address those questions directly.
• For cases governed by the pre–August 7, 2025 law, Fuentes emphasizes “tendency to impeach” over prejudice. For post-amendment cases, courts must additionally consider prejudice and other factors under CPL 245.50(5) when assessing due diligence, but Fuentes’s document-specific threshold remains a gateway question.
• Litigation will likely focus on whether a contested item adds independent impeaching content. The more a report contains unique, credibility-damaging material (inconsistencies, adverse findings, sustained charges, contradictory witness accounts), the more likely it must be disclosed before a COC. Conversely, documents that simply restate already-disclosed allegations and exonerate the officer will typically not invalidate a COC if disclosed later.

Conclusion

People v. Fuentes sharpens the contours of automatic impeachment discovery under CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv). The Court holds that the “tends to impeach” standard is applied document-by-document: a report that merely reiterates previously disclosed allegations and lacks independent impeaching substance need not be disclosed before the People file a valid certificate of compliance and announce readiness. By affirming on this narrower ground, the Court avoids resolving the broader “subject matter of the case” debate and the pre-/post-2025 statutory differences, while providing concrete guidance that will shape day-to-day discovery practice.

The decision encourages careful, content-driven assessments of putative impeachment materials. Prosecutors should continue robust, early disclosure of genuine impeachment evidence, especially where documents contain unique credibility-damaging content. Defense counsel should pinpoint the independent impeachment value of any withheld item when challenging a COC. Trial courts, in turn, should police the line between an item that truly “tends to impeach” and one that is merely derivative. In this way, Fuentes advances the 2019 reforms’ goals of fairness and efficiency without imposing unnecessary duplication that does not meaningfully inform credibility assessments.