People v. Dunn (Cal. 2025): Rejecting Localized Juror Exclusion, Clarifying Miranda’s “Interrogation” in Medical Settings, and Endorsing Victim‑Impact Audio at Capital Sentencing

Introduction

In People v. Dunn, S184521 (Cal. July 24, 2025), the California Supreme Court unanimously affirmed a capital judgment arising from a methamphetamine-fueled shooting spree in Elk Grove that left two men dead, injured others, and culminated in a shootout with police. The case presented a dense suite of pretrial, trial, and penalty-phase issues—from a novel request to exclude jurors who resided in the specific city where the crimes occurred, to Miranda and voluntariness challenges over hospital statements made in the presence of a nurse, claims about courtroom restraints and juror cause challenges, and multiple penalty-phase evidentiary disputes, including whether the jury could hear a song recorded by a murdered victim.

The Court’s decision is notable for three clarifications that will resonate in California trial practice:

Venue and jury composition: The Court rejected the defendant’s “novel” request to blanket-exclude prospective jurors from the city of Elk Grove and reaffirmed county-level venue analysis and standard prophylactic voir dire tools over sub-county exclusionary remedies.
Miranda “interrogation” in medical settings: A guard’s question posed to a nurse in a hospitalized suspect’s room was not “interrogation” where the officer did not speak to the defendant and had no reason to believe the question would elicit a response from him; the suspect’s incriminating interjection was therefore admissible as a volunteered statement.
Victim‑impact audio: Playing a brief audio recording of the victim singing his own song at the penalty phase was permissible; audio-only material does not raise the same concerns as produced video tributes and need not be pre-screened by the court absent red flags.

Beyond these focal points, the Court addressed and rejected numerous claims: Vienna Convention consular notification, shackling, cause challenges and peremptories, spectator/juror incidents, impeachment of a defense expert with “lack of remorse,” admission of a “Satanic Bible” possession reference, polling of jurors about press coverage, a pinpoint instruction tethered to “transferred intent,” and standard constitutional challenges to California’s death penalty scheme. The Court found no reversible error and deemed any arguable missteps harmless given the overwhelming record evidence.

Summary of the Opinion

The California Supreme Court, per Justice Corrigan, affirmed the convictions and death sentence. Key holdings include:

Venue/Jury Pool: Denial of the motion to change venue was proper; the defendant’s proposal to exclude all Elk Grove residents from the county venire lacked legal authority. Robust voir dire and a juror questionnaire were adequate safeguards, and no Elk Grove resident served on the jury.
Consular Notification: No Vienna Convention or Penal Code section 834c violation where law enforcement had no reason to know or suspect a foreign nationality, and no mid-trial duty on courts to advise of consular rights. No prejudice shown.
Shackling: Manifest need existed based on in-custody misconduct; there was no showing the jury saw restraints or that the restraints impaired defense participation.
Cause Challenges/Peremptories: Only one disputed juror served; the record showed impartiality and no structural or actual prejudice.
Spectator and Witness Conduct: A victim’s family member sketching participants and a detective’s hallway remark to jurors did not prejudice the defense; the court’s prompt inquiry and admonitions sufficed.
Hospital Statements: The guard’s question to a nurse was not interrogation; the defendant’s statements (“I was on methamphetamines,” “I knew what I was doing”) were volunteered and admissible.
Impeaching Defense Expert: Cross-exam questions about the defendant’s post-crime statements showing emotional detachment were proper to test the expert’s psychosis opinion; the brief Satanic Bible reference was harmless.
Press Coverage Polling: Absent evidence of exposure, the court had no obligation to poll jurors about recent news articles; repeated admonitions are presumed effective.
Pinpoint Instruction on Transferred Intent: The requested instruction would have improperly barred the jury from considering relevant planning/intent evidence and risked confusion where transferred intent was not in play.
Penalty‑Phase Factor (b): An improvised “slungshot” made from a plastic bag and wetted newspaper tied to a string supported factor (b) evidence of unlawful weapon possession in custody.
Victim Impact Evidence: The volume and tenor were within permissible bounds; playing a recording of the victim singing was proper and not unduly prejudicial.
Death Penalty Scheme: The Court reaffirmed prior holdings rejecting broad constitutional challenges to California’s capital sentencing framework.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Venue and Pretrial Publicity: The Court applied People v. Proctor, People v. Peterson, People v. Scully, People v. Ramirez, People v. Johnsen, People v. Rountree, and Harris, using five core factors (nature/gravity of offense, extent/nature of coverage, size of the community, defendant/victim status, and any political overtones). Skilling v. United States grounded the deference to trial courts managing publicity and juror impartiality. The Court stressed Sacramento County’s size, time lapse, modest recognition rates countywide, and robust voir dire practices over the defendant’s city-specific exclusion remedy (for which no authority existed).
Consular Notification: Anchored in Vienna Convention Article 36 and Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, the Court assumed arguendo enforceable individual rights (as in In re Martinez) but demanded prejudice (People v. Vargas; People v. Mendoza; People v. Leon). Section 834c’s “known or suspected foreign national” trigger and the absence of any trial-court notification duty were central.
Shackling: Guided by People v. Duran and Deck v. Missouri, and more recent cases (People v. Poore; People v. Bell; People v. Miracle; People v. Lewis & Oliver), the Court upheld restraints based on out-of-court custodial conduct where the record showed “manifest need,” and found no prejudice absent evidence jurors saw restraints.
Cause Challenges/Peremptories: The well-settled Yeoman rule and its progeny (People v. Yeoman; People v. Black; People v. Rices; People v. Westerfield; People v. Hamilton; People v. Rhoades) controlled: losing peremptories isn’t reversible error absent an actually biased juror. Juror 8’s responses reflected openness to both penalties and no fixed bias.
Counsel’s Voir Dire Remark: Strickland v. Washington and United States v. Cronic set the deficiency/prejudice framework; Bell v. Cone clarified Cronic’s narrow reach. McCoy v. Louisiana was inapposite; counsel did not concede guilt or override the client’s objectives. Context showed a hypothetical explanation of penalty-phase preconditions, not an admission.
Presence of Victim Family / Witness Exclusion: Penal Code section 1102.6 gives immediate family a right to attend, subject to overriding fair trial concerns (People v. Winbush; People v. Tully; People v. Griffin; People v. Myles). The Court found no abuse where attendance was tailored.
Spectator/Juror Incidents: Holbrook v. Flynn supplies the federal benchmark. California cases (Myles; People v. Chatman; People v. Cowan) support trial court discretion and prejudice-focused inquiry. The judge’s swift fact-finding and targeted admonitions were credited.
Miranda/Interrogation: Rhode Island v. Innis defined interrogation. The Court leaned on that objective “reasonably likely to elicit” test, reaffirmed by cases like People v. Mickey, People v. Elizalde, People v. Peevy, and People v. Miranda-Guerrero: the officer’s question to the nurse was not directed at the suspect, and a volunteered interjection is admissible.
Impeaching the Expert with Remorse Evidence: People v. Jackson (2014) and related decisions allow remorse-related evidence in the guilt phase when relevant to disputed issues (e.g., mental state) or to test an expert’s opinion (People v. Doolin; People v. Townsel; People v. Henriquez; People v. Steskal). Evidence Code section 721 authorizes probing the bases of expert opinions. The Court found the 352 balance favorable and any “Satanic Bible” reference harmless (cf. People v. Hajek & Vo).
Jury Polling re Publicity: People v. Pride, People v. Dennis, and People v. Clark confirm no duty to poll absent some indication of exposure; admonitions are presumed followed.
Pinpoint/Transferred Intent: The narrow transferred-intent doctrine (People v. Scott) did not apply. The Court, following People v. Zaragoza, People v. Scully, and People v. Moon, upheld refusal of an overbroad, potentially confusing pinpoint instruction that would have barred consideration of relevant planning evidence (and defense argument was ample to highlight the limits).
Penalty Phase Factor (b): The jury could consider unadjudicated criminal activity involving force/violence or a threat thereof (section 190.3, factor (b)). The improvised slungshot analysis drew on Penal Code sections 4502 and 4574, Jackson v. Virginia’s sufficiency standard, and People v. Fannin and People v. Savedra regarding weapon definitions. Deputy testimony sufficed (People v. Penunuri; People v. Tuilaepa; Steskal).
Victim Impact: Payne v. Tennessee permits evidence of the victim’s character and loss impact. The Court relied on California authorities (People v. Edwards; People v. Russell; People v. Simon; People v. Spencer; People v. Verdugo; People v. Taylor; People v. Mendez; People v. Vines; People v. Kelly) to uphold both the volume and content, including playing the decedent’s own song. Bosse v. Oklahoma preserves Booth’s separate bar on opinion evidence about the crime/defendant/penalty, but does not limit Payne’s broader allowance.
Death Penalty Framework: Recent decisions (People v. Helzer; People v. Camacho; People v. Tran; People v. Gonzalez; People v. McDaniel; People v. Mataele; People v. Parker; Poore) were reaffirmed; Apprendi, Ring, and Hurst do not require beyond-a-reasonable-doubt findings for the jury’s normative penalty selection.

Legal Reasoning Deep Dive

1) Venue and the “Elk Grove only” exclusion

The defense’s survey showed higher case recognition in Elk Grove (83.6%) than elsewhere in Sacramento County (54.5%), and advocated excluding Elk Grove residents from the venire. The Court emphasized two pillars:

Venue is assessed at the county level; Sacramento’s size and diversity weighed against removal. Time had blunted publicity.
No legal authority supports excising sub-county geographic subsets of jurors. Trial courts are entrusted to deploy conventional safeguards—detailed questionnaires, individualized voir dire, open-ended questioning—over unprecedented geographic culling.

Given that no Elk Grove resident sat and seated jurors professed impartiality, the Court found neither error nor actual prejudice.

2) Consular notification: who must advise, when, and prejudice

Section 834c mandates advisement within two hours by officers for “known or suspected” foreign nationals. Law enforcement had no reason to know defendant’s dual citizenship; the fact emerged years later at the penalty phase. The Court expressly declined to impose a mid-trial advisory obligation on courts upon later discovery, calling that a “remarkable extension” of Article 36. Even assuming a violation, the defense showed no prejudice beyond speculative mitigation leads; robust mitigation was already presented.

3) Shackling: manifest need and harmlessness

The record showed recent in-custody violence (including weapon use), threats, spitting/throwing, and reclassification for safety. That supported “manifest need.” The court did not delegate to officers; it considered specifics. With wrapped leg chains and no evidence of jurors seeing restraints, any assumed error was harmless under longstanding precedent.

4) Cause challenges: the Yeoman prejudice standard

Only Juror 8—questioned at length—sat. He expressed sensitivity to random public shootings but affirmed he could be impartial and consider both penalties, viewing LWOP as the harsher option in some cases. Without a showing that an incompetent juror was forced upon the defense, the denial of 11 other cause challenges, even if arguendo erroneous, provided no reversible prejudice.

5) Voir dire remark: no concession of guilt or McCoy violation

Viewed in context, defense counsel’s statement merely explained that jurors consider penalty only after a unanimous guilt finding; it did not concede guilt or undercut defense objectives. Nor did it trigger Cronic’s extreme presumption. The prospective juror at issue did not serve.

6) Victim family presence and later spectator issues

Section 1102.6 gives immediate family a statutory right to attend unless overridden by substantial fair-trial risks. The court allowed attendance while prohibiting recall in the guilt phase. Later, a family member’s sketching and a detective’s hallway comment were promptly addressed with individualized juror interviews and admonitions. Jurors said they could remain fair, and no inflammatory conduct occurred in front of the panel.

7) Miranda: the “functional equivalent of interrogation” applied

Interrogation under Innis includes conduct the police should know is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The officer did not speak to the suspect or ask him anything; he casually asked a nurse a general question. From the suspect’s perspective, there was no compulsion. The defendant’s interjection—like other spontaneous statements he made before and after—was volunteered and admissible.

8) Impeachment of expert with post-homicide statements

Because the defense expert ascribed the killings to meth-induced psychosis and framed the defendant’s behavior as survivalist and delusional, the prosecutor could probe contrary statements (emotional distance from victims, focus on his own daughter, shame at being made a fool) to test whether the diagnosis fit the facts or whether antisocial traits better explained the conduct. That is classic cross-examination under Evidence Code section 721. The “Satanic Bible” reference was brief, lacked foundation for any true religious nexus, drew a sustained objection on tattoos, was not argued, and was harmless given substantial evidence of premeditated killings.

9) No duty to poll jurors about press absent exposure evidence

Repeated admonitions suffice; courts need not convene evidence-free hearings that risk amplifying prejudice. The Court reaffirmed the presumption that jurors follow instructions unless there is an indication to the contrary.

10) Pinpoint instruction and transferred intent

Transferred intent is narrow: missing the intended victim but killing another. The prosecutor did not argue it, and the evidence didn’t support it. By broadly forbidding the jury from considering defendant’s stated plan to kill a rival (which was relevant to planning and deliberation), the proposed instruction misstated the law and risked confusion. Defense argument already highlighted the limits.

11) Penalty-phase “other crimes” for a slungshot-like device

Deputy testimony established a plastic bag packed with hardened, wetted newspaper tied to a string—a classic striking implement that could produce significant injury—and thus a “deadly weapon” or a slungshot analogue under sections 4574/4502. The jury could reasonably find the factor (b) offense beyond a reasonable doubt even without a photograph.

12) Victim-impact scope and audio recording of the victim

The overall volume—eight witnesses across two decedents plus a surviving officer—was well within precedent. The audio of the victim singing a song he wrote was probative of his individuality; unlike edited video tributes with emotive soundtracks, audio-only material did not require pre-screening where counsel had the file and voiced no specific objection. The content was not inflammatory or manipulative, and resembled other approved materials (e.g., Verdugo’s songs; Vines/Kelly performances). Bosse’s limit on opinion testimony from victims’ families remained intact and was not implicated.

13) Death penalty constitutional challenges

The Court reiterated that California’s capital scheme—with factor (a) consideration, death-qualification, no requirement of special unanimous written findings on aggravators (beyond factor (b)/(c) proof), and a normative selection decision—comports with federal and state law. Apprendi/Ring/Hurst do not alter this framework.

Impact

Venue strategy: Defense efforts to carve sub-county juror exclusions will likely fail absent statutory change. Practitioners should concentrate on detailed questionnaires, individualized voir dire, and empirical showings of countywide saturation and bias.
Miranda in clinical environments: The ruling clarifies that officers’ neutral questions to third parties in a suspect’s presence are not per se “interrogation.” The touchstone remains whether the conduct is reasonably likely to elicit a response from the suspect. Departments should still train to avoid edge cases (e.g., directed comments designed to elicit responses under Innis).
Victim-impact evidence management: Courts can admit audio recordings created by victims to illuminate individuality without automatic pre-screening. Parties should nonetheless disclose such materials early, and courts should consider pre-screening for video tributes or when defense flags specific concerns.
Expert impeachment scope: Prosecutors may use a defendant’s statements about emotional reactions (or their absence) to test defense mental-state opinions in the guilt phase. Defense experts should anticipate and contextualize such material.
Spectator/juror incidents: The case models best practices: immediate inquiry, separate questioning, tailored admonitions, and transparent record-making. It also cautions witnesses (including police) against hallway interactions with jurors.
Consular notification: Defense counsel should raise Vienna Convention issues early, build a record that officers knew or should have suspected foreign nationality, and be prepared to demonstrate concrete prejudice.
Factor (b) evidence in custody: Detailed testimony describing improvised weapons (even without exhibits) may suffice. Defense can emphasize benign uses (e.g., fishing lines) but that goes to weight, not admissibility.
Pinpoint instructions: Proposed instructions that preclude consideration of relevant mental-state evidence (e.g., planning to harm others) risk rejection as overbroad; framing that targets real legal risks (and tracks actual theories advanced) is essential.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Change of Venue: Moving a trial to another county when local publicity threatens impartiality. Courts weigh crime seriousness, media extent/nature, community size, defendant/victim prominence, and politicization. Remedies short of moving include careful juror questionnaires and individualized voir dire.
Miranda “Interrogation”: Not just direct questioning. It includes any police words/actions officers should know are likely to evoke an incriminating response. Volunteered statements—made without prompting—are admissible even if the person is in custody.
Transferred Intent: A doctrine that transfers intent to kill an intended victim to an unintended victim who is actually killed by the same act. It does not apply where the defendant intentionally shoots the very person he hits, nor does it bar use of other-intent evidence to show planning/deliberation.
Factor (b) Evidence (Penalty Phase): The jury may consider proof beyond a reasonable doubt of other criminal acts involving force, violence, or threats by the defendant, even if not separately charged or adjudicated.
Slungshot: A weighted object attached to a flexible strap or cord used to strike—often an improvised weapon. Possession in custody can support factor (b) aggravation.
Victim‑Impact Evidence: Proof of the victim’s uniqueness and the effects of the crime on loved ones. It is inherently emotional but must not be so inflammatory as to provoke an irrational verdict. Opinion testimony by family about punishment remains prohibited under Bosse/Booth.
Manifest Need for Restraints: Courts may restrain a defendant in the jury’s presence only upon a specific showing of necessity (e.g., safety risks, escape concerns, likely disruption). Any error is harmless absent evidence jurors saw restraints or the restraints hindered defense participation.
Consular Notification (Vienna Convention/§ 834c): Police must advise a “known or suspected” foreign national of the right to have the consulate notified soon after arrest/detention. Relief requires showing a violation and prejudice. Courts are not obligated to deliver mid-trial advisements when foreign citizenship first appears.

Conclusion

People v. Dunn is primarily an affirmance grounded in established law, but it meaningfully clarifies several recurring trial-management and evidentiary issues. It rejects a city-specific juror exclusion remedy in favor of orthodox countywide venue analysis and targeted voir dire; it refines Miranda’s “interrogation” analysis in clinical settings by distinguishing volunteered statements from police-elicited ones; and it endorses the admissibility of victim-impact audio recordings that illuminate a victim’s individuality without the pitfalls associated with produced video tributes. The decision also reiterates core principles governing shackling, juror cause challenges, spectator and witness conduct, the impeachment of mental-state experts, factor (b) weapon evidence in custody, and the scope of victim-impact presentations. Finally, it reaffirms the constitutional stability of California’s capital sentencing framework.

For practitioners, Dunn underscores the centrality of meticulous voir dire over untested structural remedies, careful handling of custodial statements in hospital settings, and thoughtful curation of penalty-phase evidence to balance probative value with fairness. For trial courts, it offers a clear blueprint for managing spectator and witness issues, evaluating restraint needs, and calibrating penalty-phase presentations. In the broader legal landscape, Dunn’s measured approach will provide steady guidance in capital and serious felony trials where publicity, mental-state defenses, and emotionally powerful evidence converge.