People v. Cox (2025): Appellate Division Clarifies that Trial Courts Are Not Required to Conduct a Sua Sponte Psychiatric-Defense Inquiry During Plea Allocution Once Competency Has Been Established

Introduction

People v. Cox, 237 A.D.3d 1405 (3d Dep’t 2025), arose from a 2013 guilty plea in Ulster County to strangulation in the second degree and attempted rape in the third degree. After the plea minutes were lost, the defendant, Sampson Cox, moved—years later—for a reconstruction hearing, asserting that the missing transcript impaired his direct appeal and that his plea was involuntary because the trial court failed to explore a possible psychiatric defense. The Appellate Division’s 2023 decision remitted for a reconstruction hearing. The 2025 appeal considered (1) whether the reconstruction hearing was properly conducted and (2) whether the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary despite the trial court’s failure to ask about psychiatric defenses. The Court affirmed both the original judgment and the post-remittal order, and—importantly—announced that once a defendant has been found competent under CPL § 730, a sentencing court has no obligation, sua sponte, to inquire into potential psychiatric defenses during the plea allocution.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Appellate Division (Fisher, J.) held that the reconstruction hearing satisfied due-process requirements; the People met their burden of proof (preponderance of the evidence) regarding what transpired during the 2013 plea.
• The Court reaffirmed that challenges to the validity of a plea are unpreserved without a post-allocution motion, and the “narrow exception” to preservation did not apply.
• Crucially, the Court held that a trial judge, having already found a defendant competent following a CPL 730 examination, is not required to investigate unraised psychiatric defenses before accepting a guilty plea.
• The Court rejected an Erlinger-based challenge to New York’s persistent violent felony offender scheme as unpreserved and, on the existing record, academic.
• The judgment of conviction (2013) and the post-reconstruction order (2024) were both affirmed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• People v. Walker, 117 A.D.3d 1578 (4th Dep’t 2014) – Sets the preponderance-of-the-evidence burden at reconstruction hearings on collateral issues.
• People v. Conceicao, 26 N.Y.3d 375 (2015) & People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d 662 (1988) – Preservation requirement for plea challenges.
• People v. Osman, 151 A.D.3d 494 (1st Dep’t 2017); People v. Lee, 185 A.D.3d 439 (1st Dep’t 2020); People v. Robinson, 179 A.D.3d 568 (1st Dep’t 2020) – Earlier holdings that trial courts need not inquire about psychiatric defenses in the absence of indicia of mental illness.
• People v. Alomar, 93 N.Y.2d 239 (1999) & People v. Chappell, 198 A.D.3d 1018 (3d Dep’t 2021) – Methods and goals of record reconstruction.
• People v. Rowles, 188 A.D.2d 926 (3d Dep’t 1992) – Standard for determining voluntariness of a plea after competency findings.
• Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024) – Newly articulated federal rule on jury findings in recidivist sentencing, cited and distinguished.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds on two tracks—procedural and substantive.

Procedural Track (Record Reconstruction and Preservation)

1. The loss of plea minutes triggers a reconstruction hearing under People v. Alomar. The hearing’s purpose is to “reconstruct and settle the record,” not to retry guilt.
2. Following Walker, the People bore a preponderance burden to prove what transpired. Although the County Court ultimately used a “beyond a reasonable doubt” phrasing, that higher articulation could only strengthen, not undermine, the People’s showing.
3. Because Cox never moved to withdraw his plea or vacate the judgment under CPL § 440, his involuntariness claim was unpreserved. The “narrow exception” (where the allocution itself reveals the defect) did not apply given the credible reconstruction evidence.

Substantive Track (Psychiatric-Defense Inquiry)

1. New York courts have long held that once a defendant has been adjudged competent under CPL § 730, a plea judge need only ensure that competence persists; the judge need not explore defenses the defendant chooses to waive.
2. People v. Osman and its progeny provide specific authority that no sua sponte psychiatric-defense inquiry is required unless new indicia of mental disease surface during allocution.
3. In Cox, the competent-to-stand-trial finding was recent, no new symptoms emerged, and the plea colloquy (according to the retired judge and ADA) confirmed the defendant’s lucidity. Thus, the panel held that the trial court properly refrained from raising psychiatric defenses.

3. Impact on Future Cases and Doctrinal Development

• Clarifies Judge’s Duty at Plea Stage – The decision crystallizes the limits of judicial inquiry once a CPL 730 competency determination has been made, thereby streamlining plea proceedings and reducing opportunities for collateral attack based on unasserted mental-health defenses.
• Record-Reconstruction Template – By approving a reconstruction hearing that relied on (a) judicial scripts, (b) contemporaneous notes, and (c) testimony from the plea participants, the Court furnishes a blueprint for rebuilding lost or destroyed transcripts statewide.
• Interaction with Erlinger – Although the Court dismissed the recidivist-sentencing challenge as unpreserved, its dicta signal that New York will scrutinize Erlinger arguments case-by-case, foreshadowing future litigation concerning jury findings on prior convictions.
• Preservation Doctrine Strengthened – The decision reinforces that even constitutional claims (e.g., due-process voluntariness) may be forfeited without an appropriate motion. This serves as a cautionary tale for defense counsel.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Reconstruction Hearing

A judicial proceeding held when a transcript is missing. The court reconstructs what occurred using testimony, notes, memory, or other records so that an appellate court can review the defendant’s claims on an adequate record.

CPL § 730 Examination

A statutory process to determine whether a criminal defendant is “competent to stand trial”—i.e., whether the defendant understands the proceedings and can assist counsel. A finding of competency means the defendant can make tactical decisions, including pleading guilty.

Sua Sponte Inquiry

An action a judge undertakes on her own initiative, without being prompted by either party.

Boykin Rights

Derived from Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); a defendant who pleads guilty waives the right to trial by jury, to confront witnesses, and to remain silent. The judge must ensure the waiver is knowing and voluntary.

Persistent Violent Felony Offender

New York’s enhanced-sentencing status for defendants with at least two prior predicate violent felonies (PL § 70.08), triggering life-imprisonment exposure.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The civil-type burden requiring proof that a fact is more likely than not true (just over 50%). Lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Erlinger v. United States

2024 Supreme Court decision requiring a jury, not a judge, to find disputed facts about the timing of prior convictions for enhanced sentencing under ACCA. Its relevance to New York’s recidivist statutes remains an open question.

Conclusion

The Third Department’s decision in People v. Cox sets a significant precedent: once competency has been judicially determined, a trial court is under no obligation to probe speculative psychiatric defenses during a guilty-plea colloquy. Combined with its reinforcement of record-reconstruction protocols and the preservation doctrine, the case strengthens procedural regularity in New York’s criminal-plea practice. Practitioners should heed the appellate court’s implicit message: attack plea voluntariness promptly and preserve all arguments; absent clear contemporaneous evidence, courts will presume a valid waiver of rights, especially when competency has already been adjudicated.