People v. Class (2025): Appellate Reassignment on Remand in Postconviction Cases Limited to Bias or Probability of Bias; Rule 615(b)(2) Authority Clarified and Serrano Overruled

Introduction

In People v. Class, 2025 IL 129695, the Illinois Supreme Court resolved a recurring procedural question in postconviction practice: when, if ever, may a reviewing court sua sponte order that a different trial judge preside on remand? The Court held that in postconviction proceedings an appellate court may order reassignment on remand only when the record clearly demonstrates judicial bias, a probability of bias, or prejudice on the part of the original judge. Reassignment cannot be justified on generalized “interests of justice” grounds, on a belief that a new judge would better apply the law, or by borrowing federal reassignment factors. In doing so, the Court clarified the source of appellate authority (Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(2)) and expressly overruled People v. Serrano to the extent it allowed reassignment for reasons other than bias or prejudice in the postconviction context.

The decision arose from a Cook County murder case in which the petitioner, Angel Class, filed a successive postconviction petition asserting actual innocence. The appellate court reversed the second-stage dismissal and remanded for a third-stage evidentiary hearing, but went further and—without a party’s request—ordered reassignment to a different circuit judge “in the interests of justice.” The State sought review solely on the reassignment question. Justice Rochford authored the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Theis and Justices Overstreet and Holder White. Justice Cunningham, joined by Justice O’Brien, concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with the legal standard but concluding that the record warranted reassignment. Justice Neville took no part.

Summary of the Judgment

Authority to reassign: The Court held that Rule 615(b)(2) permits a reviewing court to “modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent to” the judgment under review, which includes the power to direct assignment to a new judge on remand.
Rule 366 not applicable: Rule 366(a) governs civil appeals and cannot be used to expand remedies in criminal or postconviction cases beyond what Rule 615(b) authorizes.
Narrow reassignment standard in postconviction cases: An appellate court may sua sponte order reassignment in the postconviction context only in rare circumstances where the record clearly shows judicial bias, the probability of bias, or prejudice. A belief that the judge committed legal error or might repeat it is insufficient.
Federal factors rejected: Federal reassignment criteria developed under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (e.g., the Robin factors) are inapposite for Illinois postconviction appeals.
Supervisory authority distinguished: Prior Illinois cases that reassigned on remand without a bias finding (Heider, Dameron, Jolly) are explained as exercises of this Court’s supervisory authority in direct appeals—power the appellate court does not possess.
Serrano overruled: To the extent Serrano permitted reassignment on remand in postconviction matters based on “interests of justice” or other grounds short of bias/probability of bias/prejudice, it is overruled.
Disposition: The Court affirmed the appellate court’s reversal of the second-stage dismissal and the remand for a third-stage evidentiary hearing, but reversed the sua sponte reassignment directive. The case returns to the circuit court without reassignment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

People v. Young, 124 Ill. 2d 147 (1988): Distinguished the authority of reviewing courts in criminal appeals (Rule 615) from civil appeals (Rule 366). Young underpins the Court’s conclusion that Rule 366 cannot be used to alter criminal/postconviction appellate powers, yet Rule 615(b)(2) is broad enough to permit modification of “subsequent proceedings,” encompassing reassignment orders.
People v. Webster, 2023 IL 128428: Reinforced that Rule 366 is not a fallback to obtain relief otherwise unavailable under Rule 615. This bolstered the Court’s refusal to use Rule 366 in a postconviction appeal to justify reassignment.
People v. Hall, 157 Ill. 2d 324 (1993); People v. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1 (1999); People v. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d 239 (1997): Established that postconviction proceedings are collateral, that petitioners do not enjoy the full panoply of trial rights, and that there is no absolute right to substitution of judge in postconviction matters. These cases frame the limited due process baseline for reassignment on remand.
People v. Hawkins, 181 Ill. 2d 41 (1998); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927): Articulated due process’s demand for a fair tribunal free from actual bias or a probability of bias—a basic fairness principle the Court adopts as the governing yardstick for sua sponte reassignment in postconviction appeals.
People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311 (2010); Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008): Emphasized the party-presentation principle and cautioned courts against raising unbriefed issues absent compelling justification. This informed the Court’s criticism of the appellate court’s sua sponte reassignment in Class.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994); Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228 (2002); People v. Conway, 2023 IL 127670: Set the modern standard for bias: adverse rulings rarely support a bias claim; bias generally must stem from extrajudicial sources or reveal deep-seated antagonism making fair judgment impossible. Applied here, the appellate court’s concerns amounted to alleged legal error, not bias.
People v. Thompkins, 181 Ill. 2d 1 (1998); Steidl (again): Support the proposition that reassignment might be ordered in postconviction matters, but only in rare cases where bias or a probability of bias appears on the record.
People v. Heider, 231 Ill. 2d 1 (2008); People v. Dameron, 196 Ill. 2d 156 (2001); People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142: Instances where this Court ordered reassignment on remand to avoid appearance concerns or to correct Krankel errors, but those decisions are understood as exercises of this Court’s unique supervisory authority in direct appeals—authority the appellate court lacks.
People v. Del Vecchio, 129 Ill. 2d 265 (1989); People v. Wilson, 37 Ill. 2d 617 (1967): Examples of extreme circumstances requiring recusal (pecuniary interest; judge as potential material witness with knowledge outside the record). The record in Class did not present similar circumstances.
People v. Vance, 76 Ill. 2d 171 (1979): Adverse rulings against a party, by themselves, do not establish judicial bias; an important corrective to the appellate court’s “hostility” descriptor.
People v. Serrano, 2016 IL App (1st) 133493: Relied upon below for an “interests of justice” reassignment. The Supreme Court overruled Serrano for postconviction appeals to the extent it allowed reassignment without a showing of bias, probability of bias, or prejudice.
Federal authorities (28 U.S.C. § 2106; United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Awadallah, 436 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2006); Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 2017)): The Court rejected importation of federal three-factor reassignment tests where personal bias is absent; those tests are not controlling or apt in Illinois postconviction appeals governed by Rule 615.

Legal Reasoning: Why the Court Rejected Sua Sponte Reassignment Here

The Court’s analysis unfolded in three steps.

Source of authority: Rule 615(b)(2) allows an appellate court to “modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent to” the reviewed judgment. This includes ordering a different judge to preside on remand. Rule 366(a) plays no role in criminal/postconviction appeals and cannot be used to circumvent the limits of Rule 615 (Young; Webster).
Applicable standard in postconviction appeals: Because postconviction proceedings are collateral, and because there is no absolute right to substitution of judge, reassignment must be grounded in due process. That translates to a limited, bias-based rule: an appellate court may sua sponte order reassignment only where the record clearly shows actual bias, a probability of bias, or prejudice (Thompkins; Steidl; Hawkins; Liteky).
Application to the record: The appellate court’s reasons for reassignment—its lack of confidence that the judge would apply Robinson’s actual-innocence standard correctly; characterizing the judge’s treatment of affidavits as “hostile” or overly credibility-focused at the second stage—amount to allegations of legal error and adverse rulings, not bias. Under Liteky and Illinois cases adopting its framework, adverse rulings and intra-case impressions almost never establish bias. There was no extrajudicial source of antagonism, no pecuniary interest, no likelihood the judge would be a witness, and no “average person” temptation overwhelming neutrality. Thus, reassignment was improper.

The Court further admonished that by raising reassignment sua sponte without a due-process predicate, the appellate court strayed from the party-presentation principle and risked acting as an advocate rather than a neutral arbiter (Givens; Greenlaw).

Why Heider, Dameron, and Jolly Did Not Save the Reassignment

The appellate court relied on these Supreme Court decisions to argue for flexibility beyond bias-based reassignment. The Supreme Court distinguished them on two grounds:

They were direct appeals—not collateral postconviction proceedings, which are narrower in scope and rights.
They implicitly invoked this Court’s supervisory authority—an “unequivocal grant of power” under the Illinois Constitution to oversee the administration of justice statewide. The appellate court has no such authority.

Accordingly, appellate panels cannot cite those cases to justify reassignment in postconviction matters without a record-based showing of bias, probability of bias, or prejudice.

Rejection of Federal Reassignment Factors

Federal appellate courts sometimes employ multi-factor tests under § 2106 to decide reassignment even without personal bias (e.g., to preserve the appearance of justice or ensure compliance with mandates). The Supreme Court held these federal tests are inapplicable in Illinois postconviction appeals governed by Rule 615(b) and constrained by Illinois due process jurisprudence. In short, Illinois postconviction reassignment is a narrow, bias-based remedy.

What the Court Did—and Did Not—Decide

Decided: In postconviction appeals, reassignment on remand by the appellate court requires a clear record of bias, probability of bias, or prejudice. Rule 615(b)(2) is the source of authority; Rule 366 does not apply. Serrano is overruled to the extent inconsistent.
Not decided: Whether, in direct criminal appeals, an appellate court (or this Court) may order reassignment for non-bias reasons. The opinion suggests such outcomes in earlier cases were possible only under this Court’s supervisory authority, which appellate courts lack.
Not disturbed: The appellate court’s merits ruling that the petitioner made a substantial showing of actual innocence under People v. Robinson and is entitled to a third-stage evidentiary hearing. Only the reassignment directive was reversed.

The Dissent’s View

Justice Cunningham (joined by Justice O’Brien) agreed with the majority’s legal standard but found it satisfied here. The dissent stressed an objective due process lens: when a trial judge has prematurely weighed credibility and effectively conducted a third-stage merits assessment during a second-stage review, an objective observer could reasonably doubt the judge’s ability to approach the third-stage hearing with a neutral mind. The dissent analogized to Krankel cases (e.g., Fields, as approved in Jolly), where reassignment is ordered because the judge, having already heard and rejected arguments on the merits in an improper posture, may be “partial to a particular outcome” on remand. The dissent emphasized the appearance of neutrality and the practical need to ensure the appellate mandate is meaningful.

Impact

Immediate practical effects

Appellate courts in Illinois postconviction appeals retain the power to reassign on remand, but only on a record showing of bias, probability of bias, or prejudice. “Interests of justice,” efficiency, or concerns that the judge may repeat a legal error are insufficient.
Litigants seeking reassignment on remand in postconviction cases should build a record of objective indicators of bias or prejudice (e.g., extrajudicial knowledge; pecuniary stake; circumstances showing the “average judge” could not remain neutral). Mere disagreement with a judge’s legal rulings will not suffice.
Appellate courts should avoid sua sponte reassignment absent a clear due process predicate and should generally adhere to the party-presentation principle.
“Serrano-style” reassignment rationales are no longer available in postconviction appeals. Panels cannot use federal reassignment factors to expand Illinois practice under Rule 615(b)(2).

Longer-term doctrinal effects

Recalibration of appellate remedies: The decision brings uniformity to reassignment doctrine in postconviction appeals and curtails divergent approaches among districts.
Clear separation of powers and supervisory authority: The Court refines the line between what the appellate court can do under Rule 615(b)(2) and what only the Supreme Court may do under its supervisory authority, particularly in direct appeals.
Mandate compliance vs. neutrality: While the dissent flagged concerns about enforcing mandates where a judge appears committed to prior analysis, the majority’s rule channels such concerns into bias-based, record-driven inquiries rather than general prophylactic reassignment.
Increased emphasis on trial-level motions: Practitioners may pivot toward timely motions for substitution for cause (or recusal) in the circuit court, documenting due process concerns, rather than relying on appellate reassignment after the fact.

Unresolved or open questions

Direct appeals: The opinion suggests—but does not hold—that non-bias reassignment on remand in direct appeals may be proper only under the Supreme Court’s supervisory authority. The standard for appellate court reassignment in direct appeals remains to be fully clarified.
Contours of “probability of bias”: Future cases may refine what objective facts suffice to show a probability of bias in postconviction matters, especially where a judge has made premature credibility findings at earlier stages.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Postconviction proceeding: A collateral process (after direct appeal) where a convicted person alleges constitutional violations not previously adjudicated. It proceeds in stages: - Stage 1: Initial screening for frivolousness. - Stage 2: The State may move to dismiss; well-pleaded facts are taken as true unless refuted by the record; no credibility findings should be made. - Stage 3: Evidentiary hearing with live testimony and credibility assessments.
Successive postconviction petition: A later petition filed after a first postconviction petition; leave to file typically requires cause and prejudice. Actual innocence claims are a recognized exception allowing successive petitions based on newly discovered, material, and noncumulative evidence of innocence that would probably change the result when viewed holistically (People v. Robinson).
Third-stage evidentiary hearing: A live hearing at which witnesses testify and the court makes credibility findings; the petitioner bears the burden to prove constitutional violations or actual innocence within the applicable framework.
Sua sponte: Action taken by a court on its own initiative without a request from either party. Courts use this sparingly to avoid becoming advocates rather than neutral arbiters (party-presentation principle).
Rule 615(b)(2) vs. Rule 366(a): Rule 615 governs criminal and postconviction appeals; Rule 366 governs civil appeals. Rule 615(b)(2) permits modifying subsequent proceedings (including reassignment). Rule 366 cannot be used in criminal/postconviction appeals to create remedies unavailable under Rule 615.
Supervisory authority: The Illinois Supreme Court’s constitutional power to oversee the courts statewide, allowing it to issue directives (including reassignment in direct appeals) beyond what appellate courts can do.
Judicial bias vs. adverse rulings: Bias usually requires extrajudicial hostility or a level of antagonism that makes fair judgment impossible. Adverse legal rulings, even erroneous ones, rarely establish bias (Liteky).
Probability of bias: An objective due process concept: even without proof of subjective bias, reassignment may be required when the average judge in the same position would likely not be neutral (e.g., where the judge has a personal stake, extrajudicial knowledge of disputed facts, or would likely be a witness).
Krankel inquiry: A limited, preliminary trial-court investigation into a defendant’s pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The State’s role is minimal at this stage to avoid turning it into an adversarial merits hearing. If a judge improperly conducts an adversarial inquiry and prejudges the merits, reassignment may be warranted to preserve neutrality at the proper later stage (as in Fields, endorsed in Jolly).

Conclusion

People v. Class draws a clear and practical boundary for Illinois appellate courts in postconviction appeals: reassignment on remand is a narrowly tailored remedy grounded in due process, available only when the record shows actual bias, a probability of bias, or prejudice. The Court affirms that Rule 615(b)(2) supplies the power to modify proceedings to include reassignment, but it rejects reliance on Rule 366 and federal reassignment factors, and it overrules Serrano’s broader “interests of justice” approach in this context. By insisting that appellate reassignment be tied to concrete, record-based indicators of bias rather than perceived legal missteps or efficiency concerns, the Court promotes both the party-presentation principle and the integrity of trial-level adjudication. At the same time, the dissent reminds practitioners that due process also guards the appearance of neutrality and that in some remand scenarios—particularly where judges have prematurely reached merits conclusions—reassignment may still be appropriate under the majority’s standard. Going forward, litigants seeking reassignment in postconviction matters must carefully develop and document bias-based grounds; appellate courts must confine sua sponte reassignment to rare, well-supported cases; and trial courts should be attentive to stage-specific limits (especially on credibility findings) to avoid triggering reassignment disputes. The net result is a more disciplined, transparent framework for managing who presides on remand in Illinois postconviction proceedings.